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PREFACE 
 
Over the last decade, commodities markets have risen from relative obscurity to a subject of 
intense scrutiny by policy makers and financial supervisors. A dramatic rise in global productivity, 
markets liberalisation and increased access to international finance have fuelled commodity sector 
growth  and  trade.  This  growth  in  turn,  along  with  market  deregulation  and  swift  technological 
advancement, including electronic trading, has engendered an unprecedented rise commodity linked 
financial transactions. Once considered an arcane field of business, commodities trading has drawn an 
entirely  new  sector  -  financial  participants  –  into  both  physical  and  derivatives  trading,  raising 
concerns about the role of these participants in these markets. The food and financial crises between 
2007 and 2009, which were accompanied by elevated levels of commodity price volatility, heightened 
these concerns and, together with other important market changes, led to the formation of this Task 
Force.    
Supported  by  the  input  received  in  the  Task  Force  meetings,  this  Final  Report  intends  to 
demystify the commodities sphere by providing an in depth examination of the major commodity 
groups, focusing on product characteristics, supply chains, pricing, liquidity, financial intermediation, 
industry players and the interplay between derivatives markets and the underlying physical goods. In 
so doing, the Report contributes to the international debate with  important information about the 
diverse  market  structures  across  commodities,  including  supply  and  demand  elasticities, 
concentration of ownership, infrastructure organisation and layers of financial participation. While 
describing  the  endogenous  factors,  it  also  examines  the  increasing  role  of  exogenous  factors  now 
impacting commodities. Finally, it assesses the drivers of the growth of derivatives markets and their 
impact on price formation.   
Ideally,  the  paper  will  help  those  entrusted  with  commodity  markets  decision-making  and 
supervision to gain a greater understanding of the various components of each market and how these 
markets operate within the global context. It should also heighten the debate surrounding the cross 
border regulatory harmonization process and jurisdictional issues as many commodity benchmarks 
allow multi-country delivery and settlement. 
Markets  evolve  constantly.  Prior  to  2000,  few  analysts  predicted  the  explosive  growth  of 
commodity markets, including derivatives markets. Although the principles of sound markets vary 
little overtime, the landscape beneath them is constantly shifting and increasing in complexity year 
after year. Today, the level of knowledge needed for proper supervision and rulemaking has never 
been higher. This Report is a timely contribution to the current state of commodities price formation.    
 
 
Ann Berg 
 
Chair of the Task Force 
Independent Consultant to International Organisations 
Former Board Director, Chicago Board of Trade DRAFT VERSION 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
ommodities lie at the heart of the global economy. Access to and affordability of commodities 
are essential to the wellbeing, growth and competitiveness of our economies, which are highly 
dependent  on  commodity  trade.  Indeed,  access  to  and  affordability  of  essential  food 
commodities, such as staple foods, are important elements for the stability of many societies. Markets 
are seen as a guarantee to ensure this access and affordability, with the preconditions that they are 
transparent and competitive, and that market failures are properly addressed.  
Volatile prices and actual or perceived government interference have raised questions over the 
efficient functioning of commodities price formation and sparked fears that instability could wreak 
havoc on global markets. Against this background, this CEPS-ECMI Task Force Report takes a fresh 
look at the structure of commodities markets and their price formation mechanisms, including their 
interaction with the international financial system. 
The  report  surveys  the  functioning  and  market  organisation  of  eleven  different  (storable) 
commodities markets to ascertain drivers of price formation and highlight potential market failures. 
These markets are: crude oil, natural gas, iron ore, aluminium, copper, wheat, corn, soybean oil, sugar, 
cocoa and coffee. The commodities can be grouped into four categories: energy, raw materials and 
base metals, agricultural, and soft commodities. 
  A complex marketplace 
The way prices are formed in markets for physical commodities and futures contracts is the result of 
complex interactions between idiosyncratic factors, such as product characteristics (quality, storability 
or  substitutability,  etc.)  and  supply  and  demand  factors  (capital  intensity,  industry  concentration, 
production  facilities,  average  personal  income  level  or  technological  developments,  etc.),  and 
exogenous factors, such as access to finance, public subsidies and interventions, and the weather.  
Price  formation  relies  on  the  efficient  functioning  of  the  market  organisation  for  physical 
commodities  and  linked  futures  contracts.  Market  microstructure  developments,  such  as  market 
liberalisation, the development of futures market infrastructure and the expansion of international 
trade, have significantly altered the organisation of commodity markets over the last decade.  
In  general,  supply  factors  (such  as  capital  intensity)  are  more  important  drivers  of  price 
formation for energy commodities and industrial metals, while agricultural and soft commodities markets are 
more influenced by demand factors (such as income growth) and exogenous factors that can cause 
supply shocks (such as weather events or government policies). Energy commodities and industrial 
metals rely on a more complex market organisation with easier access to finance due to their ability to 
hold value (for carry trades), which may enhance pro-cyclicality with regards to shocks within the 
financial system (opportunity costs). 
  Market fundamentals 
Volatile spot price levels across several commodities and a growing correlation between returns of 
financial and non-financial assets have raised concerns over the role of factors that are unrelated to 
market  fundamentals  in  price  formation.  Exogenous  factors,  such  as  greater  interaction  with  the 
financial system and supply constraints in the freight markets, have become increasingly important 
over the last decade. More detailed analysis is needed, however. The empirical analysis conducted in 
this  report  confirms  that  demand  and  supply  fundamentals  remain  solid  drivers  of  futures  price 
formation across all the commodities markets covered by the report. By channelling information about 
supply  and  demand  fundamentals  to  the  physical  and  futures  markets,  together  with  ensuring 
smooth management and aggregate transparency of inventories, the functioning of commodities price 
formation mechanisms can be improved. 
The  growth  of  emerging  economies  (in  particular,  of  Chinese  industrial  consumption)  lies 
behind the structural shift in prices, which – through the astonishing growth of international markets 
– has contributed to greater interconnection between physical commodities markets and so to higher 
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responsiveness to pro-cyclical global demand factors. Despite the growth in demand slows down across 
commodities markets, demand levels are still reaching new historical peaks, thanks also to product 
and market characteristics. For instance, technological changes have promoted the widespread use of 
some commodities for alternative applications, such as corn for fuels or soybean oil for pharmaceutical 
products.  New  fundamental  factors  may  therefore  affect  the  use  of  a  commodity  and  its  price 
formation, which may ultimately increase the correlation with other factors that are not directly linked 
to the underlying physical commodity (the weight of crude oil prices in the price formation of corn, 
for example).  
In fact, some commodities may be very responsive to crude oil prices. First, responsiveness is 
the result of the (exogenous) link to transport fuels or costs of fertilizers for agricultural commodities, 
for  instance.  Second,  responsiveness  to  crude  oil  prices  may  be  linked  to  direct  government 
interventions to promote biofuels. This is the case for corn, for instance. However, the evidence points 
to only a weak (but strengthening) link between corn and crude oil, which rules out for the moment 
any transmission of the instability of energy policies to the market for corn.  
In sum, demand has been constantly growing across all commodities markets for more than a 
decade.  This  has  led  to  a  general  fall  in  stock-to-use  ratios,  in  particular  for  agricultural  and  soft 
commodities. Without significant investments in new technologies, questions remain over the ability 
of current supply to satisfy growing demand in the long term. 
In line with the historical trend, commodities are a volatile asset class and price volatility is on 
average  within  a  stable  range  in  the  long  term.  However,  the  growing  interconnection  between 
financial and non-financial assets, and between regional physical markets, has amplified the reaction 
to market shocks, such as the recent financial crisis and the global economic  downturn, and thus 
created volatility peaks in the short term. As a consequence, short-term volatility remains above pre-
crisis levels, in particular for agricultural commodities. 
  International trade and the interaction with the financial system 
The  expansion  of  international  trade  across  all  commodities  markets,  supported  by  regional  trade 
liberalisation  and  broader  WTO  commitments,  has  coincided  with  the  economic  expansion  of 
emerging markets, such as China and Brazil, and their growing participation in these markets. The 
growth of domestic demand in the emerging economies has been an important driver of growth for 
commodities  markets.  Cross-border  trade  liberalisation  has  increased  the  effect  of  competition  on 
commodities production costs and so made ‘traditional’ subsidy programmes ineffective and/or too 
costly. New developments on the supply side, such as new unconventional sources of natural gas or 
the new co-products of corn processing (e.g. biofuels), have also been stimulating cross-border trade 
in new markets. 
Seaborne freight markets have become the backbone of international trade, but they can be subject 
to abrupt volatile trends when supply capacity has to adjust. In 2008, freight costs for iron ore shipped 
from Brazil went from roughly 200% to less than 20% of the commodity price in under six months.  
Cross-border competition has come with the price of higher short-term volatility, though, which 
is coupled with the effects of government subsidy programmes that have supported artificial prices in 
several commodities and have increased incentives to invest in new more efficient technologies to 
reduce energy consumption in metal production or harvested areas for crops, for example. Growing 
links between commodities markets and international trade have intensified the effects of government 
actions such as export bans. Most notably, direct market interventions in an open market model with 
international trade are unable to create incentives to tackle underlying problems of market structure. 
When the fiscal capacity of a country is reduced, the market has to face sudden adjustments with 
highly  volatile  patterns.  For  instance,  in  agricultural  and  soft  commodities  markets,  where  the 
opportunity costs of the land use are high (e.g. US wheat farms) or too low (e.g. sugar plantations in 
Brazil),  public  investments  in  new  technologies  for  innovative  applications  and  infrastructures, 
respectively,  might  be  a  preferable  alternative  to  subsidies.  They  might  favour  more  efficient 
allocation of the land if the market itself is unable to rebalance due to such transaction costs.  
The  increasing  interaction  of  commodities  markets  with  the  financial  system  over  the  last 
decade is commonly referred to as  ‘financialisation’. Low costs of financing and lower opportunity 
costs  (returns  on  alternative  asset  classes)  have  favoured  storage  of  commodities  (carry  trades),  
 
especially those with a good ‘store of value’ properties, such as metals. These circumstances have 
increased the opportunities for financial participants to enter these markets and the opportunities for 
commodity trading houses to use financial leverage to expand their physical interests. As a result, 
returns from commodities are increasingly pooled with returns from pure financial assets (a ‘pooling 
effect’). The process increases co-movements among asset classes that have historically been seen to be 
following opposite causal patterns. This situation is the result of the combined effects of multiple 
circumstances,  including  the  growth  of  international  trade  and  cross-border  interaction  among 
physical  markets,  reinforced  by  easier  access  to  international  finance  and  credit  partly  due  to 
widespread  expansionary  monetary  policies,  a  favourable  regulatory  framework  with  the 
deregulation  in  the  US,  and  technological  changes  favouring  electronic  trading  and  promoting 
accessibility to futures markets from any remote location around the globe. In fact, empirical evidence 
suggests that a strong positive correlation between commodities prices and financial indices emerged 
in the early 2000s, when all of the factors mentioned above came together with renewed strength. 
Since then, the correlation has remained strongly positive across all commodities markets assessed by 
this CEPS-ECMI Task Force report. Overall, the financialisation process has increased pro-cyclicality, 
i.e.  responsiveness  to  the  economic  cycle  and  vulnerability  of  commodities  markets  to  short-term 
shocks also coming from the financial system. However, the latter has been instrumental to the growth 
of international commodities markets. Unless governments want to push back on international trade, 
financialisation  is  a  natural  outcome  of  the  new  environment  we  live  in.  Despite  the  growing 
interconnection, fundamentals remain key drivers of futures price formation. 
Well  before  the  financial  crisis  erupted  in  2008,  commercial  participants  (e.g.  commodity 
producers and merchants) were responding to strong demand pressures by quickly expanding their 
physical business activities on a global level, so laying the path for the growth of futures markets and 
the entry of non-commercial participants (e.g. investment funds) who were attracted by high returns. 
Technological  developments  in  trading  (e.g.  algorithmic  trading),  financial  innovations  (e.g. 
commodities  indexes)  and  easy  access  to  international  finance,  prompted  by  accommodating 
monetary policies, fuelled this expansion. The value of international trade in commodities futures has 
soared together with the size of commercial participants and their interests in futures markets, which 
have ultimately favoured the arrival of purely financial participants. The empirical analysis confirms 
that  the  expansion  of  commercial  futures  positions  has  been  leading  price  formation  in  futures 
markets,  through  the  steady  increase  in  futures  positions  and  OTC  financial  activities.  Non-
commercial futures positions have, in the meantime, become by far the biggest component of futures 
markets, though evidence still points to commercial participants leading price formation in futures 
markets.  
Commodity trading houses with interests across different commodities markets and significant 
financial  exposure  have  been  boosted  their  physical  holdings  in  international  markets,  and  may 
become ‘too-physical-to-fail’. The use of financial leverage to increase physical holdings, through the 
easy access to international finance helped by accommodating monetary policies, may have systemic 
implications.  Aggregate  data  on  physical  holdings,  coupled  with  a  minimum  set  of  information 
confidentially disclosed to regulators, for example, may reduce risks of moral hazard for national 
governments that have to cope with the sheer size of these entities in case of trouble. 
Technological  developments  have  changed  the  infrastructure  of  commodities  markets  and 
prompted innovation and sophistication in risk management. While these changes provided tools for 
(some) trading practices by non-commercial participants, bundled in very high intra-day volumes, that can 
theoretically damage price formation in the short term through herding behaviours, the evidence in 
this report suggests that to date the role of non-commercial participants in commodities markets has been 
generally  benign.  The  growth  of  index  investments  has  not  so  far  caused  distortions  in  price 
formation. An indiscriminate ban of legitimate trading practices may result in liquidity losses at the 
expense  of  the  efficiency  of  price  formation,  although  this  report  does  not  perform  an  ex  ante 
quantification. The actions of supervisors should target damaging trading practices, such as cornering 
attempts, rather than specific categories of traders. Proper surveillance mechanisms and supervision 
of exchanges policies are essential, in particular when it comes to dealing with complex algorithmic or 
pure high-frequency trading. More time and data (e.g. aggregate data on volumes by category of 
trader) are needed, however, to improve the analysis of trading practices in the short term and the 
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  Market organisation matters! The interaction between futures and spot markets 
Futures markets are an essential infrastructure to support risk management in physical markets and, 
therefore, their price formation. Futures markets have supported the development of international 
trade and the consolidation of commercial participants fuelled by the opening up of international 
trade. Transparent and stable futures markets promote healthy interaction between the physical and 
financial spheres of commodities markets, which today are inextricably linked. As a result of greater 
interconnectedness,  market  infrastructure  also  allows  faster  circulation  of  information  by  increasing 
accessibility and so the resilience of price formation mechanisms.  However, as market infrastructure 
adapts to a more global and interconnected environment after demutualisation, exposure to global 
risks requires a sophisticated surveillance mechanism and more coordination between supervisory 
authorities at international level.  
As the industry pushes for consolidation at regional and global level, a minimum set of requirements 
to ensure accessibility and interaction with competitors while preserving rights on key intellectual 
properties may be beneficial for the innovation around new products and services to attract liquidity 
and, ultimately, serve the interests of commodity users. The implications of financial reforms on the 
market power of market infrastructures operators should be carefully assessed. 
Warehousing  and  delivery  systems  linked  to  futures  exchanges  are  an  important  element  of 
efficient price formation, which help the convergence of futures to spot (physical) prices. Both loading 
out  capacity  and  locations  of  warehouses  depend  on  the  nature  of  the  commodity.  For  example, 
industrial  metal  warehouses  are  typically  needed  close  to  net  consumption  areas,  while  for 
agricultural commodities a location close to net production areas is often preferable, as the product 
requires immediate storage and delivery. Expanding points of delivery and/or increasing delivery 
capacity should depend on the characteristics of the underlying physical markets, in order to limit 
supply bottlenecks (i.e. delivery queues) and improve the functioning of international benchmarks. 
Internal  management  of  positions  by  the  exchange,  linked  to  the  actual  delivery  capacity  of  the 
infrastructure, may also be helpful to avoid artificial shortages if significant positions suddenly take 
delivery, as occurred in 2010 when the Armajaro fund took delivery of roughly 5% of global yearly 
production of cocoa in just a few days, creating a supply shortage among the exchange’s sponsored 
warehouses. This would require periodic assessment of the rules set by the infrastructure, whether 
they still fit structural developments in the underlying physical market.  
Issues with the delivery system or liquidity problems with the underlying physical markets of 
the  futures  contracts  that  are  recognised  international  benchmark  prices  can  affect  the  functioning  of 
commodities  markets organisation and ultimately the convergence between futures (forward) and 
spot prices. Moreover, a well functioning delivery system provides an efficient tool to support supply 
adjustments  when  disequilibrium  between  physical  demand  and  supply  emerges.  For  instance, 
problems with the physical delivery of LME aluminium forwards are increasing the reliance on more 
opaque regional premia assessments (on average more than 15% of the nominal LME price in 2012), 
which are partially compensating for the fall in price of the official benchmark following a period of 
oversupply.  Excess  or  shortage  of  supply  in  the  physical  market  of  the  futures  contract  can  also 
increase reliance on regional premia. The West Texas Intermediate and the Brent futures contracts, for 
crude  oil,  have  been  suffering  from  (regional)  supply  excess  and  shortage,  respectively,  in  their 
underlying physical markets. Tackling the underlying supply balance and delivery issues is crucial for 
price formation. There is therefore a risk that by adding financial layers (e.g. the use of derivatives) 
and price assessments as a substitute for prices formed with arm’s length transactions or replacing 
transparent exchange-based price formation mechanisms with a pricing system reliant on assessed 
regional premia, the actual conditions of underlying physical markets may no longer be reflected. 
More broadly, a recognised international benchmark should i) have enough supply in the underlying 
reference physical market (supply security); ii) provide market access and an efficient price discovery 
system (demand security); and iii) promote competition in the upstream and downstream physical 
market,  and  where  possible,  develop  secondary  markets  for  underlying  forward  contracts.  For 
markets such as crude oil, initiatives would need to be undertaken at the global level by the relevant 
forum to achieve these objectives.  
Conflicts of interests in commodities markets can have harmful effects, with strong implications 
for physical flows and market competition. Therefore, rules for sponsored warehouses, for example,  
 
should be set by the exchange only once the interest of its shareholders (often represented in the Board 
of the exchange) in the external market infrastructure, , e.g. ownership of sponsored warehouses, are 
properly disclosed and ultimately managed. Conflicts may arise, in particular, when financial and 
non-financial activities are combined in the same entity. Conflicts of interests between the ownership 
of market infrastructures and/or of physical/futures/other financial holdings of market participants 
therefore  need  to  be  appropriately  identified,  disclosed,  and  ultimately  managed  by  the  parties 
involved under the coordinated international supervision of competent authorities. 
Finally, claims that the size of futures markets is many times larger than physical markets and 
thus may distort price formation based on underlying physical transactions cannot be proven, but also 
cannot be ruled out. Further data and analysis is required to substantiate such claims. When looking 
at liquidity curves in futures markets, the size of open interest is only a fraction of the corresponding 
physical markets size, with high peaks only for cocoa and coffee (respectively at around 80% and 
210%). However, when looking at yearly volumes of contracts compared to yearly production, futures 
markets are many times larger than the corresponding physical production (up to nine times larger for 
the main corn futures contract). But the comparisons between volumes of transactions that are only 
carried out to exploit information about physical trades in the trading of different futures maturities 
(e.g. calendar spread) with the actual physical production (which is not a measure of the intensity of 
physical trade) may ultimately overestimate the weight of futures over physical markets. Physical 
production  is  an  inaccurate  and  conservative  proxy  of  underlying  physical  market  transactions. 
Finally, this CEPS-ECMI Task Force Report estimates the total notional value of outstanding (open 
interest) over-the-counter and exchange-traded financial transactions in commodities (e.g. futures and 
options) at around $5.58 trillion in 2012. Over-the-counter transactions make up roughly 38% of the 
total outstanding value (open interest).  
  How can policy actions be improved? 
Cross-border  commodities  trades  involving  rules  set  by  a  global  market  infrastructure  operating  in 
different  jurisdictions  with  different  legal  entities  and  supervisory  frameworks  has  created 
uncertainty for market participants that need to be addressed by supervisors. Greater coordination 
among competent national authorities in cross-border commodity transactions  (e.g. supervision  of 
rules governing the delivery system) would be highly beneficial for the functioning of key recognised 
benchmark futures contracts  
More data on futures volumes aggregated by category of trader, as well as reliable aggregated 
information about underlying physical transactions, are needed for regulators and researchers to have 
a  full  understanding  of  short-term  trading  practices  and  their  implications  for  commodities  price 
formation. However, even if data is disclosed in aggregates, the transparency of underlying physical 
markets at the global level may be still unreliable if there is no effective private (based on reputation) 
or public enforcement mechanism. It can be even counterproductive to undertake policy actions on the 
basis of information that cannot be considered reliable and can therefore be used with strategic intent 
by  producing  countries  in  particular.  For  instance,  data  on  crude  oil  storage  within  international 
initiatives  such  as  the  Joint  Oil  Data  Initiative  (JODI)  may  amplify  the  strategic  behaviours  of 
producing countries that often provide false or misleading information to the market.  
Full transparency of methodologies and governance, and accessibility to underlying market data, is 
a  crucial  aspect  for  regulators  to  ensure  the  smooth  functioning  of  price  assessment  services.  A 
regulatory  framework  designed  around  public  accountability  will  most  likely  preserve  voluntary 
reporting by commodities firms and the right of judgement for price assessment entities in illiquid 
market conditions. The objective is to support the reputational market while at the same time avoiding 
the creation of a legally binding price assessment process that would only increase the systemic effects 
of market failures. 
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K E Y  D R IV E RS   O F C O M M O D I TI E S   P RI C E  
F O R M A TI O N  
P R O D U C T 
C H A R A C TE R I S TI CS    
S U PP L Y  FA C TO R S  
◦ Quality 
◦ Storability 
◦ Renewability 
◦ Recyclability 
◦ Substitutability 
◦ (Final) usability 
 ◦ Production convertibility and 
capital intensity 
◦ Horizontal and vertical integration 
◦ Storability and transportability 
◦ Industry concentration 
◦ Geographical concentration 
(emerging markets) 
◦ Technological developments 
◦ Supply peaks and future trends 
D E M A N D   FA C TO RS     E XO G E N O U S  F A CTO R S  
◦ Income growth and urbanisation 
◦ Technological developments and 
alternative uses 
◦ Long-term habits and 
demographics 
◦ Economic cycle 
 ◦ ‘Financialisation process’ and 
monetary policies 
◦ Subsidies programmes 
◦ General government interventions 
(e.g. export bans) 
◦ The economic cycle and other 
macroeconomic events 
◦ Technological developments 
◦ Unpredictable events (e.g. weather) 
M A R KE T  O R G A N IS A TI O N  
◦ Microstructural developments (e.g. competitive setting) 
◦ Functioning of internationally recognised benchmark futures or physical prices 
◦ International trade 
◦ Expansion of commodities futures markets and ‘non-commercial’ investors 
◦ Futures markets infrastructure 
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  Key drivers of price formation matrices 
Product, supply, and demand factors  
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Matrix of exogenous factors and market organisation  
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INTRODUCTION 
ommodities  markets  have  attracted  much  attention  during  and  after  the  financial  crisis. 
Exceptionally volatile price patterns in 2008-2009 have created uncertainty and contributed to a 
polarised debate around the interaction between the financial and commodities markets. In 
September  2011,  the  Centre  for  European  Policy  Studies  and  the  European  Capital  Markets  put 
together a Task Force comprising experts from commodities firms, market infrastructures operators, 
financial institutions, independent experts, academics, and policy-makers. After almost two years of 
data  gathering  and  qualitative  desk  research,  in  addition  to  the  information  collected  through 
presentations in Task Force meetings, the final report aims at dispelling myths and discussing realities 
about a complex and hotly debated issue. The study reviews price formation mechanisms in four 
groups of commodities markets, more specifically: crude oil, natural gas, iron ore, aluminium, copper, 
wheat, corn, soybean oil, sugar, cocoa, and coffee; grouped into four categories: energy, raw materials 
and base metals, agricultural, and soft. The report examines the key drivers of futures price formation, 
with  particular  focus  on  storable  commodities  and  the  interaction  between  futures  and  physical 
markets. Empirical and qualitative analyses adopt a long-term approach, leaving assessments of short-
term trends to other research. A fundamental aspect of this analysis is the approach towards the 
complexity  of  commodities  market  structure.  Commodities  can  be  properly  understood  only  by 
looking at the specific characteristics of the product and the organisation of the market. The report 
therefore describes the following: 
1.  The  characteristics  of  supply  and  demand  (fundamentals,  product  characteristics,  freight 
markets, emerging markets demand, exogenous factors, etc.). 
2.  Market  organisation  (supply  and  distribution  bottlenecks,  anti-competitive  practices,  market 
infrastructure, exogenous shocks, etc.). 
3.  Trading  practices  and  financialisation  (fundamentals,  interaction  between  futures  and  spot 
markets, trade transparency, benchmark prices, hedging practices, etc.). 
4.  Market  surveillance  (accountability  of  market  participants,  market  transparency,  access  to 
information, conflicts of interest policies, market abuses, etc.). 
The study is structured as follows: 
  Chapter 1 reviews the theoretical and empirical work on how commodities physical and futures 
markets work and interact, by also providing analyses on the interaction between commodities 
and financial assets. 
  Chapters 2 to 5 assess 11 different commodities markets by looking at product and market 
characteristics, exogenous factors, empirical analyses, and market organisation. 
  Chapter 6 recaps the key findings emerging in the report and gives a weight to each driver of 
price formation, taking into account the nature of the commodity. 
 
C  
 
 
1.  SETTING THE SCENE: THE STRUCTURE OF 
COMMODITIES MARKETS 
ommodity  markets  are  at  the  core  of  the  global  economy  and  influence  people’s  daily 
decisions about essential needs. Greater accessibility and control over commodities shape the 
actions  of  economies  that  are  increasingly  relying  on  the  provision  of  resources  mainly 
produced in emerging markets. Commodities markets rely on a complex interaction between 
several factors, of which supply and demand factors are only some. Due to their importance, any 
market event would immediately attract a great deal of attention from policy-makers. In the wake of 
the  recent  financial  crisis  and  its  repercussions  for  commodities  markets,  regulators  are  eager  to 
explore further market structure and practices of market participants and trading venues, to minimise 
the  risk  of  market  manipulations  and  to  fully  understand  the  link  between  physical  and  futures 
markets, as the latter grow in size and in their range of products. 
This chapter illustrates the basic function and the  nature  of a commodity, and describes in 
particular the fundamental role of spot and futures markets. This section will also address the validity 
of some policy concerns, and shed new light on how commodity physical and futures markets have 
developed and will probably change. 
1.1  Defining ‘commodity’ and key product characteristics 
 ‘Search’ goods 
A ‘commodity’ is a good with standard quality, verifiable ex ante, which can be traded on competitive 
and liquid global physical markets (Clark et al., 2001). More generally, goods and services can be 
classified into three categories: search goods, experience goods, and credence goods. A search good is 
a product or service for which it is possible to assess the quality before purchase. Search elements 
include those attributes of the relationship that are easily detected and understood by customers. An 
experience good, however, is a product or service for which the buyer can evaluate the quality only 
after its purchase and use. Finally, a credence good (Darby and Karni, 1973) is a product or service 
whose  value  and  quality  cannot  be  assessed  even  after  its  use,  as  its  features  cannot  be  easily 
compared with other products or services.  
As Table 1 suggests, commodities are essentially search goods for which information on quality 
can be easily found before the purchase, with no need to experience the product (as it would be the 
case for experience goods such as ‘durables’; Nelson, 1970). This implies that demand for goods with 
similar supply and product characteristics will be intrinsically ‘less sticky’ to price changes (i.e. high 
price elasticity) for commodities than other goods (such as experience goods). These characteristics 
allow parties to ‘shop around’ more easily, especially for commodities with more standard quality 
(e.g. corn). Low costs to acquire information about product characteristics and other structural factors 
make these goods suitable for trade.  
Table 1. Key characteristics  
Types of goods  Products 
Quality 
assessment  Use 
Information 
costs 
Ex ante  Ex post 
Search 
Commodities 
(e.g. crude oil or rice) 
Yes  Yes 
Intermediate 
Low 
Final 
C  
 
Experience 
Durable goods 
(e.g. car) 
No  Yes 
Intermediate 
Medium 
Final 
Credence 
Financial services 
(e.g. loan or 
investment advice) 
No  No 
Intermediate 
High 
Final 
Source: Author. 
Each commodity has its own specific characteristics, such as product properties, availability in 
nature,  transportability,  production  and  storage  processes,  substitutability,  concentration  of 
producers/users,  nature  of  the  value  chain,  and  so  on.  In  addition,  some  commodities,  such  as 
agricultural  commodities  like  wheat  and  corn,  are  renewable  and  therefore  have  seasonal  price 
swings, mainly due to structural supply constraints. For instance, wheat can only be harvested once a 
year (from May for winter wheat to mid-August for spring wheat). Cocoa plants, in contrast, become 
commercially productive roughly five years after plantation and their economic life can last up to 40 
years. Supply characteristics may therefore affect demand elasticity when, for instance, availability of 
substitute products is limited, as in the case of crude oil. Product characteristics, such as the ability to 
store the product over a long period, are also key elements. Notably, alternative uses, such as the 
production of ethanol from corn crops, and excessive dependence in the production process from 
energy costs, as in the smelting of alumina, allow commodities prices to influence each other’s price 
formation processes (again, as in the case of crude oil). 
Endogenous factors, such as costs, production yields and end users’ reserve prices, are very 
specific factors influencing commodities prices in the short and long term. They are mainly linked to 
the way the commodity is produced (mining, extraction, plantation, etc.) and used. Particular demand 
and supply characteristics also expose commodities to a list of exogenous factors. 
Table 2. Exposure to exogenous factors 
Key product characteristics    Exogenous factors  Examples 
Seasonality    Weather and currency  Drought 
Transportability    Freight market/mobility 
restrictions 
Freight capacity 
Alternative 
uses/substitutability 
  Other commodities 
markets 
Biofuel policies 
Storability    Market/warehouse 
location 
Pipeline disruption 
Production yields    External incentives for 
long-term investments 
or technological shock 
Price subsidies 
Source: Author. 
Seasonality in the production of a commodity, such as wheat, exposes it to exogenous factors 
since production cannot be postponed to when conditions are more profitable. For instance, weather 
conditions  may  not  allow  the  annual  seasonal  harvest,  or  currency  devaluation  may  make  it 
unprofitable to harvest wheat in that country on the basis of pre-agreed conditions. Transportability 
can be affected by costs of freight, which may be linked to the cost of other commodities or to the 
potential  anti-competitive  market  structure  of  the  sector.  Restrictions  to  free  mobility  of  specific 
commodities by governments (the Russian wheat export ban in 2008, for example) to promote national 
interests  are  another  example  of  an  exogenous  factor.  Accessibility  to  market  infrastructure 
determines  the  possibility  to  develop  liquid  markets,  where  prices  are  readily  available  and  less 
subject  to  temporary  short-term  supply  and  demand  imbalances.  Finally,  the  alternative  use  of  a 
commodity  (using  corn  to  produce  ethanol  when  crude  oil  prices  soar,  for  instance)  or  lack  of 
incentives for long-term investment in infrastructure and production (when price subsidies support 4 | SETTING THE SCENE: THE STRUCTURE OF COMMODITIES MARKETS 
 
unsustainable  market prices, for instance) are additional examples  of how exogenous factors may 
drive price formation in these markets. 
This wide set of characteristics affects the way commodities are traded and distributed. As a 
result,  commodities  markets  are  very  diverse  and  supply  and  demand  are  influenced  by  several 
variables. Nevertheless, commodities are generally treated as being homogeneous products despite 
these differences. Their common use results in a wide range of users and the exogenous factors that 
may  affect  their  demand.  Both  demand  and  supply  instability,  and  the  heavy  dependence  on 
exogenous variables, make commodities prices historically highly volatile (Cashin and McDermott, 
2002). Prices are formed in many ways, and there are many variables that affect their patterns. As a 
result,  long-term  price  trends  are  often  predictable  while  short-term  patterns  are  usually  highly 
volatile, with big price swings that can reshape the ultimate allocation of resources in the market for 
long periods. 
Commodities covered by this report can be grouped into three categories: 
  Energy (e.g. crude oil, natural gas). 
  Raw materials and industrial metals1 (e.g. iron ore, copper, aluminium). 
  Food and agriculture (e.g. wheat, rice). 
Taken individually, commodities have a high level of homogeneity even though they may have 
different quality grades. As a result, the product characteristics of a commodity do not determine the 
competitive advantage of a business. Instead, success is achieved through the ability to integrate the 
value chain through an efficient vertical infrastructure that is able to link production to distribution at 
a low cost and to provide effective hedging tools to protect the whole value chain from volatile price 
patterns. 
1.2  Physical and futures markets  
The standard quality of the good makes commodities easy to sell to end users, whether consumers or 
industrial  companies.  With  technological  advances  and  the  globalisation  of  trade,  small  regional 
markets  have  gradually  become  international  or  global  market  hubs,  accessible  directly  through 
physical operations run by global freight companies and trading houses, or indirectly from any place 
in the world through the ‘pit’ (floor) or the electronic access to a venue running trading of physically 
deliverable (or offset) futures contracts globally. The creation of liquid and competitive international 
markets has reduced transaction costs and increased chances to meet individuals’ risk profiles. This 
section  explores  the  general  characteristics  of  commodities  markets  and  their  role  in  coping  with 
commercial firms’ and individuals’ choice. 
There are two types of commodities markets: physical and futures (derivatives) markets. The 
physical market is a general market (for which is hard to point to one specific place where the trade is 
done)  that  accommodates  the  need  to  balance  supply/demand  disequilibria.  Futures  markets2, 
instead, serve the intertemporal choice of  end users by trading expectations on supply and demand 
patterns,  which  occur  mainly  through  changes  of  inventory  levels  over  a  diverse  time  period. 
Particular market characteristics, such as seasonal production or demand, require the use of tools that 
can ensure sufficient time to plan business development and investments in production processes.  
To accommodate demand and supply, these markets should be competitive and liquid (Clark et 
al., 2001), which means that they will be able to provide a market clearing price at all times, and for all 
quantities, within a reasonable time frame. The availability of market clearing prices for all orders sent 
by the buyer/seller implies a dynamic equilibrium between demand and supply. A competitive 
market structure would potentially increase efficiency and market liq uidity over time. It is important 
                                                            
1 Metals can be grouped into precious (e.g. silver) and industrial (e.g. copper). Due to their scarcity and capacity 
to hold value, precious metals are mainly affected by the business cycle and exogenous factors (such as monetary 
policies) and only in a limited way by underlying physical market dynamics. For this reason, this report does not 
discuss for this set of commodities. 
2 The report focuses only on futures markets. Other derivatives markets, such as option markets, are not part of 
this study.  
 
that  barriers  to  entry  to  and  exit  from  the  market  are  always  kept  fairly  low,  and  competition 
authorities  are  able  to  enforce  competition  rules  and  fight  monopolistic  market  behaviours. 
Particularly in commodities markets, structural supply or demand constraints may favour conditions 
for the development of monopolistic, oligopolistic or monopsonistic powers and, thus, for one or more 
counterparties to charge unfair mark-ups on final prices. Since commodities markets are central to the 
global  economy,  the  efficiency  of  their  market  structure  should  be  seen  as  a  crucial  area  of 
coordination among national supervisory bodies. 
1.2.1  Physical markets: explaining their role in the value chain 
Physical  markets  bring  together  buying  and  selling  interests  in  the  physical  commodity  to  level 
supply and demand imbalances, taking into account immediately available inventory levels. The spot 
price is the price of a commodity that is readily available to be delivered. The spot price at any time t (
) is mainly influenced by the equilibrium between supply and demand, which drives changes in 
inventories (available stocks). 
Net demand 
Net  demand  (∆N)  is  the  difference  between  supply  X  and  demand  Q,  which  are  influenced  by 
currently available market prices and demand/supply endogenous and exogenous factors (such as 
technological  improvement in production and weather conditions). Changes in net demand affect 
levels  of  inventories,  which  ultimately  determine  the  spot  price.  If  there  is  more  production  than 
demand, inventories will increase so markets will get more supply and prices will go down, and vice 
versa  if  demand  is  higher  than  supply.  Net  demand  represents  a  de  facto  indicator  of  inventory 
variations.  
Figure 1 illustrates an example of the structural impact of inventories on spot prices (Pyndick, 
2001). Let’s assume that there is a long period of drought in  the United States, which reduces the 
amount  of  corn  crops  that  can  be  harvested.3  This would imply that to keep the current level of 
demand, sellers of corn would need to reduce their available inventories to  cope with  lower-than-
expected production. 
Figure 1. Impact of inventories on spot prices 
 
Source: Author. 
                                                            
3 The United States is one of the biggest producers in the world. 
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With the gradual reduction of inventories, the line representing all demand/supply equilibria 
for  different  prices  (but  the  same  level  of  inventories)  will  shift  upwards  and  prices  will  initially 
increase to  . Initially at  , ∆N<0, i.e. demand is still higher than current supply. If the drought 
continues and the supplier cannot produce more, the price will stabilise at a higher level ( ) with 
lower levels of inventories but demand and supply in equilibrium (∆N=0). If the drought stops and 
production recovers in time, the production of corn crops will increase and the price will drop until 
the net demand is equal to zero, again at  . 
1.2.1.1  The fundamental role of inventories 
Inventories are the first real barrier against market prices fluctuations. Inventories minimise the costs 
of adjusting production due to foreseeable (e.g. demand volatility or increases in the marginal cost of 
production)  and  unforeseeable  (e.g.  weather  shocks)  market  circumstances.  Inventory  levels  keep 
demand and supply in equilibrium over time. In addition, they reduce marketing costs by facilitating 
production  and  delivery  schedules  (Pyndick,  1994;  2001).  Inventories  also  reduce  the  impact  of 
unpredictable disruptive events, working as a buffer against exogenous factors. As a consequence, the 
main  drivers  of  inventory  levels  may  vary  depending  on  the  type  of  commodity.  For  metal  (and 
perhaps energy) commodities, inventory levels are primarily affected by the business cycle, mainly 
through GDP levels (Fama and French, 1988). When a peak in demand comes, inventory levels go 
down drastically to absorb the adjustment of production, and vice versa. For seasonal commodities 
such as food and agricultural commodities, however, weather changes may have important effects on 
inventory levels by affecting the productivity of the harvest season. In both cases, changes in the 
inventory levels have immediate effects on spot and futures prices, which react differently to the high 
or low level of inventories (Fama and French, 1988; Section 1.2.4 of this report). 
Furthermore, inventories need to be properly managed because they have explicit and implicit 
costs of storage that will ultimately affect production costs. If released too quickly into the market, 
inventories  can  cause  excessive  supply  and  a  drop  in  spot  and  futures  prices.  Management  of 
inventories is a key risk management process for commodities firms. 
Carrying a commodity (storage) over time has three main costs: 
  Costs of physical storage (and insurance). 
  Opportunity costs. 
  Costs from price risk. 
Storage costs can be split into three subcategories: warehousing and handling costs (load in, 
load out, storage), insurance, and material degradation. Costs of storage essentially depend on the 
availability of warehouses, competition for them (if not owned by the commodity owner), and the 
nature  of  the  commodity,  which  may  need  specific  storage  characteristics  to  limit  material 
degradation. The storability of the commodity may be fairly limited – green coffee beans can only be 
stored for few months before losing their original properties, for instance. Another important cost of 
storage  is  the  opportunity  cost  of  carrying  a  commodity  over  time,  which  includes  the  interest 
foregone by not investing the capital in risk-free instruments instead of in the commodity. The central 
bank’s nominal interest rate is usually considered as point of reference to calculate foregone interest. 
Current and future rates of consumption, as well as price volatility, are elements that contribute to the 
cost of carry, but they may not be easily predicted. A third element is the potential cost (or benefit) if 
prices  move  against  the  commodity  holder,  in  particular  if  the  future  spot  price  will  be  below 
expectations. In effect, expectations about spot prices are part of the storage costs internalised through 
futures prices. This cost can usually be efficiently hedged in the derivatives markets. 
As  already  mentioned,  storage  levels  change  vis-à-vis  changes  in  net  demand  levels  (i.e. 
differences between supply and demand), N=X-Q.  Net demand and thus storage levels are affected 
by the three costs mentioned above, which are main components of the marginal convenience yield 
(MCY),  Ψ.  The  MCY  represents  the  cost  of  carry  for  a  commodity,  i.e.  the  benefits  of  holding  a 
commodity. The higher the MCY, the more negative the difference between futures and spot prices 
(‘backwardation’,  i.e.  spot  prices  are  higher  than  futures  prices),  as  the  pressures  to  hold  the 
commodity rather than buying a futures contract are higher. 
2 P 2 P
3 P
1 P 
 
Ψ=f(N, ˃, r, p, ʵ) 
The function Ψ, representing the marginal convenience yield, is affected by a key endogenous 
variable,  i.e.  the  level  of  net  demand  N,  the  evolution  of  supply  (production)  and  demand 
(consumption).4 Other (exogenous) variables that directly impact levels of inventories, and so MCY, 
are  ˃, r, p, ʵ, which cause a shift in the curve  of the  Ψ function.  Price volatility  ˃  has a positive 
relationship  with  inventory  levels.  The  higher  the  volatility,  the  greater  the  protection  requested, 
through higher inventory levels, by market participants. Inventories are the link between volatility 
and spot prices in the future, through the impact of current spot prices on inventory levels.5 Risk-free 
interest rates r affect the cost of carry of a commodity with a positive sign. The lower the interest rate, 
the smaller the cost opportunity to exploit potentially higher spot prices in the future. The expected 
spot price p affects the current and future rate of consumption , and so the inventory levels will shift 
accordingly.  Other  exogenous  variables  that  may  affect  inventories,  such  as  problems  with  the 
operational aspects of storage, can cause a shift of the MCY curve as well.  
The MCY can be therefore represented (Pyndick, 2001) by,  
  Ψ = (1+ ) -[ ( ) + ] +    (1) 
where  (1+ )   is  the  opportunity  cost  of  investing  money  in  other  assets,  [   ( )+
] is the future spot price at T (usually represented by the price of a future contract at time 
T), which is composed of the expected future spot price at time t (now), plus the value added of 
holding a commodity rather than an alternative investment. The   , so called ‘risk-adjusted discount 
rate’  (Pyndick,  2001),  measures  the  excess  return  of  a  commodity  over  an  alternative  risk-free 
investment. It can be derived from equation (1), i.e. 
  =   (2) 
where  is the price of a future contract with delivery date T. In addition, from equation (1) 
we can derive the dividend yield of a commodity, which is 
    (3) 
The dividend yield of a commodity is the return of carrying the commodity, minus the cost of 
physical  storage,  which  unlike  bonds  or  equities  may  be  also  negative.  Further  analysis  of  the 
interaction between spot and futures markets through inventories will be discussed in Section 1.2.4. 
As shown above, inventories and supply/demand factors show strong links with spot prices. 
Empirical evidence confirms the significance of the link between prices and inventories over time and 
the sign of the relationship. Higher inventory levels put downward pressure on prices, and vice versa 
(see also the following chapters). As examples, let us consider two important commodities – corn and 
copper. For corn, we take annual data in logarithms for beginning stocks6 and real prices7 from 1960 to 
                                                            
4 We refer to actual production and consumption, rather than expectations. 
5  This finding is confirmed by the extensive empirical analyses run in the following chapters on the single 
markets and summarised in the last chapter. 
6 We used beginning stocks (ending stock lagged of one period) rather than actual ending stocks because this data 
may feed better into price expectations. Estimations with ending stocks, however, are not significantly different 
from results with beginning stocks. 
7 Real prices are calculated with 2005 GDP deflator based on data from 15 countries. 
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2011.  The  data  confirm  a  strong  negative  correlation  (ρ=-85%)  between  spot  prices  and  inventory 
levels, even though the coefficient is low (i.e. the impact of the variable is somewhat limited). This is 
particularly the case for commodities that are subject to seasonal patterns and so to exogenous shocks, 
such as weather-related events, which can materially affect the supply of the product.8  
Figure 2. Link between real spot prices and inventories for corn, 1960-2011 
 
Sources:  Author’s  estimates  from  US  Department  of  Agriculture  (USDA)  and  World  Bank.  Note:  Natural 
logarithms. 
The relationship with underlying spot prices is confirmed even when taking into consideration 
the  size  of  global  ending  stocks  over  global  consumption  (stock-to-use  ratio).  Demand  affects 
underlying prices by reducing the inventory levels, waiting for the production to adjust over time.  
Figure 3. Stock-to-use ratio and real prices for corn, 1960-2011 
 
Sources: Author’s calculation from USDA and World Bank. Note: Natural logarithms. 
By  adding  consumption  data,  the  relationship  suggests  a  greater  impact  on  prices  but  it 
explains less. As it is generally the case for agricultural commodities, demand does explain a great 
                                                            
8 For a more detailed analysis of fundamental drivers of supply and demand, see following chapters. 
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deal of price movements, but factors that constrain supply and ultimately impact on inventory levels, 
such as weather-related events, may often dominate price patterns.  
Continuous interaction between inventories and production/demand determines general price 
trends. However, inventories are not always available if, for example, the product degrades quickly 
(or  cannot  be  stored,  as  with  electricity)  or  costs  of  production  are  high  (due  to  fixed  costs)  and 
producers  cannot  increase  capacity  in  the  short  term.  For  commodities  that  are  not  subject  to 
seasonality, such as industrial metals, storage is less costly and consumption is fairly predictable. In 
this case, inventory levels generally play a more limited role and typically form a smaller fraction of 
total production, while external shocks to supply can have a strong impact. As production can only 
adjust slowly over time due to high fixed costs of increasing scale, however, consumption is also a key 
driver of price formation. 
Annual data for LME copper (1992-2011) shows a weaker link between LME inventories9 and 
LME real prices (Figure 4). 
Figure 4. Link between inventories and real spot prices for copper, 1992-2011  
 
Sources: LME, World Bank. Note: Natural logarithms. 
As mentioned above, the complexity and costs of the production process for industrial metals, 
coupled with a fairly predictable demand, keep the absolute value of inventories very low in relation 
to  total  consumption  (left-hand  panel,  Figure  5).  Incentives  to  ‘produce  and  store’  may  cause 
oversupply and so the supply side keeps a tight control over production and, thus, inventories. This 
limits the impact of inventory holdings on prices.  
                                                            
9 The study uses the words ‘inventories’ and ‘stocks’ as interchangeable. 
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Figure 5. Real prices link with copper inventories and consumption, 2000-2011 
   
Sources: World Copper Association (WCA), World Bureau of Metal Statistics (WBMS), LME, World Bank. 
When  taking  into  account  the  impact  of  consumption  on  global  ending  stock  (stock-to-use 
ratio), however, data show that consumption has a major impact on prices, which have a negative 
correlation  (-74.64%)  with  stock-to-use  ratio  over  the  sample  (as  shown  by  the  left-hand  panel  of 
Figure 5). This preliminary analysis confirms that commodities may have common drivers of price 
formation, but the impact of each driver on price patterns may be completely different depending on 
the  type  of  commodity  being  analysed.  A  generalised  approach  across  commodities,  even  with 
sophisticated statistical models, may be therefore unable to capture the significant divergences among 
commodities and their product characteristics. Following chapters present more detailed empirical 
analyses of drivers of price formation looking at each commodity market covered by this report. 
For commodities that cannot be stored, such as electricity, there are no inventory levels that can 
smooth  the  impact  of  supply  and  demand  imbalances  on  market  prices.  However,  the  use  of 
derivative  contracts  (such  as  futures)  can  help  to  smooth  volatility  (see  Section  1.2.2).  With  no 
inventories, it is typically difficult to build an open spot market because it requires high liquidity and 
a high number of participants. The inability to create such a market typically encourages long-term 
contracts between the supplier and the end user for quantities that may vary within a specific range 
agreed ex ante. 
A  second  factor  that  has  a  strong  impact  on  spot  markets  is  ‘seasonality’.  For  agricultural 
commodities, seasonal factors affect volumes and timing of production and distribution of products. 
In effect, production can only take place at a specific time of the year. Therefore, if external factors – 
such as dry weather – emerge, the impact on prices can be devastating if demand remains stable. 
Wheat, for instance, can be harvested from May to September in all different quality grades. Anything 
that affects the plantation during the autumn or the harvest from May to September  can have an 
immediate  impact  on  prices,  which  can  have  long-term  effects  if  this  impact  is  prolonged  and 
inventories are not large enough or cannot store wheat for long periods. 
1.2.1.2  Physical markets organisation and reference prices 
Physical  markets  can  be  mainly  organised  in  two  ways:  as  auction  markets,  or  bilateral  markets. 
Auctions bring together  multiple buying and selling  interests in a centralised and open platform, 
whereby interests interact through ex- ante transparent prices. The platform can be organised with a 
system  of  warehouses  and  depository  receipts  for  each  purchase,  a  standardised  contract  (ex  ante 
information about quality and quantity of the commodity for each contract), and a clearinghouse that 
minimises counterparty risks in order to increase liquidity and attract key players at the global level. 
This platform is generally called ‘exchange’. Exchanges typically act as ‘riskless counterparties’, i.e. 
they do not use own capital to interpose itself and facilitate market transactions.  
Exchanges differ from regional physical markets, which are small markets with limited size. 
Small physical market hubs have limited storage capacity and are able to serve only specific, small 
areas. They can be even pure auction mechanisms, which differ from a centralised exchange since no 
clearinghouse would interpose itself between the two parties and transactions may be customised 
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and/or occasional.  These market hubs are close to pure bilateral markets, which are typically over-
the-counter spot or forward contracts between a producer and an end user. Bilateral transactions can 
be  also  drafted  as  long-term  contracts  (LTCs),  with  agreement  over  long-term  provision  of  a 
commodity (still frequently used in markets such as iron ore). These contracts are highly customised 
transactions  to  support  hedging  strategies,  and  are  often  complemented  by  transactions  in  open 
auction markets. Depending on the nature of transaction, whether it is to exchange cash flows or a 
physical  commodity,  an  intermediary  (respectively  an  investment  bank  or  a  commodity  trading 
house) may also interpose between the two parties to facilitate the customisation of the transaction, 
even if this requires the direct holding of a commodity.  
Spot physical markets can therefore have three different price settings: 
1.  Spot physical transactions (bilateral or through auctions). 
2.  Cash forward market with short-term delivery (bilateral or through auction if standardised).  
3.  Cash rolling front-month futures market (auction). 
The pure spot physical markets are mainly regional hubs, bilateral transactions or any other 
market that provides the commodity on the spot, i.e. delivery is immediately after the transaction is 
concluded.  These  markets  are  typically  not  fully  developed,  since  the  immediate  delivery  of  the 
product for large players cannot physically be done on the spot and requires a proper and efficient 
system  of  warehouses.  These  regional  markets  are  decentralised  and  do  not  necessarily  act  as  a 
riskless counterparty. They may, in fact, mix centralised transactions and over-the-counter bilateral 
negotiations, which may even involve risk capital of the market infrastructure.  
The vast majority of international physical markets work as a cash physical forward market. A 
cash forward market is a cash physical market with physical delivery linked to the characteristic of the 
product.  For  some  industrial  metals,  it  may  even  go  down  to  T+2  or  T+3,  while  for  agricultural 
commodities it would be closer to harvesting season. For instance, the London Metal Exchange offers 
this  kind  of  forward  market  for  metals,  and  in  particular  for  aluminium  and  copper  which  are 
considered in this study, because of its widespread network of warehouses across key regional areas 
(742 sponsored warehouses in 14 countries10). The LME fo rward prices have  thus become reference 
prices for several industrial metals in bilateral transactions. 
Lastly, the rolling front-month futures contract is not strictly a physical market, but its price is 
very close to the underlying physical market becaus e it is based on a futures contract that is 
deliverable at an imminent maturity (generally, up to three months). This means that market arbitrage 
pushes the price of the contract close to the underlying physical market price at maturity because it 
becomes a deliverable contract. It is typically the first futures contract available for delivery in the 
upcoming month, and is the futures contract with the shortest delivery date. It can be physically 
delivered or closed-out with an offsetting transaction before delivery. However, the front-month price 
would never have a perfect correspondence to a specific physical spot price, since differences  in 
quality and location of delivery  with the cash physical market  need to be discounted in the final 
prices.  
Reference prices 
A  benchmark  (or  reference)  price  is  a  price  recognised  by  parties  as  fair  for  their  bilateral 
transactions (Clark et al., 2001). The growth of multiple global liquid exchanges has increased the 
availability  of  liquid  reference  prices,  which  have  promoted  a  more  competitive  environment,  as 
markets that have been historically dominated by cartels or by a dominant producer are replaced by 
new and more competitive market settings. Even though the historical tensions in market structure 
between liquidity fragmentation and competition (market fragmentation) may emerge, ‘liquidity’ is 
the crucial aspect for a market price to become the reference for thousands of bilateral commodities 
transactions in the first place. Benchmark or reference prices usually differ by region. For instance, the 
West  Texas  Intermediate  crude  oil  price  used  for  North  American  production  and  distribution 
                                                            
10  LME  is  not  the  owner  of  the  warehouses,  but  warehouses  need  to  follow  specific  rules  agreed  with  the 
exchange in advance. The exchange can also impose minimum loading amounts vis-à-vis the full capacity of the 
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through pipelines (but also for bilateral contracts) is different from the Brent crude oil price, which is 
used more for European and Middle East benchmark prices, as well as for seaborne crude oil. The 
divergence between the two prices (spread or basis11) takes into account regional differences that the 
benchmarks represent, in terms of costs of transport, storage, delivery, and availability of the product. 
These aspects apply to all benchmark prices that have acquired a broader regional status  over the 
years.  
The rolling front-month futures price is often considered as a useful proxy for physical markets 
prices  across  commodities,  even  though  cash  forward  auctions  (e.g.  for  industrial  metals)  and 
benchmark regional spot market (assessed) prices (such as Dated Brent) are an important part of the 
market. Liquid reference prices are not available in every commodities market, however. For instance, 
even though spot regional prices have become available recently, iron ore has been until recently 
priced  through  LTCs  between  producers  and  users  yearly  revised  in  bilateral  negotiations.  The 
calculation of price in LCTs may also rely on external benchmarks, such oil-indexed prices for pipeline 
gas (see section 3.1). The reasons for the existence of less developed markets can be multiple. For 
instance, the high costs of production may induce the seller to link herself to a specific counterparty 
for a long period, as fixed costs would make the costs of a volatile production path unsustainable. 
Stability  in  the  production  plan  through  LCTs  may  be  an  essential  element  for  these  markets 
developing on a global scale. Finally, reference prices can also rely on figures assessed by specialised 
agencies that collect information about physical transactions from market participants or estimate the 
figure using market data if no eligible transactions are immediately available in some illiquid markets 
(see Box 5). 
Market actors 
The range of market players in physical markets has widened dramatically in recent years. Several 
players  have  acquired  significant  interest  in  commodities  markets  thanks  to  fast-developing 
international  trade  and  easier  access  to  credit,  and  their  importance  in  modern  economies  has 
constantly grown. Risk management in the commodities business is a complex exercise that needs to 
be complemented by strong risk management tools. Commodities firms have gradually built their 
own risk management functions and trading desks to deal with risk in derivatives markets. Vertical 
integration  of  production,  refining,  and  distribution,  supported  by  a  common  risk  management 
process, has been a successful model for big commodities firms and trading houses, such as Bunge 
and Glencore respectively.  
However, not all commodities firms have deep enough pockets to build strong internal risk 
management functions, and so rely on the support of financial intermediaries for their commodities 
business.  Over  the  years,  investment  banks  and  other  financial  intermediaries  have  gradually 
acquired important stakes in physical commodities, as part of the products they offer commodities 
firms (OTC hedging) or for the design of indexes to attract liquidity that could potentially enlarge 
their base offer. Acting directly in physical markets, however, has strong implications in terms of 
capital  costs  (fixed,  variable,  and  for  the  opportunity  cost  to  allocate  resources  to  different  uses). 
Physical commodities may also have high storage costs and, if interest rates are reasonably high, high 
opportunity costs. As a consequence, the involvement of non-commodity firms in physical markets is 
confined  to  few  specialised  financial  players,  and  even  less  as  financial  institutions  shrink  in  the 
aftermath  to  the  financial  crisis,  while  broader  involvement  of  non-commodity  firms  is  part  of 
standardised futures markets and trading practices (see Section 1.2.2). In any case, both commodities 
and financial firms have increased their size and exposure to both physical and futures markets in the 
last decade. 
Box 1. Key commodities market players 
The galaxy of commodity firms is vast, with a diverse nature and size of underlying businesses, from 
small  farmers  to  big  international  trading  houses.  Each  commodity  market  has  its  own  specificities, 
                                                            
11 This basis is different from the basis risk, which is the difference between spot and future prices.  
 
which in the end shape its market structure, the business model of these companies, and the competitive 
environment in which they live. The limited amount of resources, together with geopolitical factors (i.e. 
the  control  over  these  resources),  put  a  structural  cap  on  the  number  of  active  companies  in  each 
commodity market that has been growing constantly over the years with the expansion of international 
markets. Pressures to concentrate are also eased by the growing size of these markets. However, the 
move  towards  internationalisation  and  centralisation  of  commodity  trading  activities  has  also  been 
growing constantly over the years. Immediate benefits related to synergies in supply management, tax 
efficiency,  and  other  economies  of  scale  supported  by  technological  changes  and  global  financial 
integration (KPMG, 2012) have boosted the size and internationalisation of the top commodities firms in 
every sector.  
The  building  up  of  infrastructure  in  emerging  markets  to  extract/produce  more  resources, 
coupled with technological advances in logistics, has widened the range of competitors and the size of 
the relevant markets. However, market structure is fundamentally affected by the characteristics of the 
product itself. In particular, Figure 6 shows how, for each cluster of commodity, the business model of 
the  company  may  be  substantially  influenced.  The  lack  of  more  granular  publicly  available  data  on 
individual commodity production does not allow the calculation of global market shares for each of 
these important commodities firms. 
Figure 6. Key determinants of business model for international commodity firms 
 
Source: Author. 
For  instance,  in  the  agricultural  markets,  production  is  typically  fragmented  among  small 
producers. International trade is therefore concentrated among few big players (see Table 3), which are 
integrated  horizontally  and  provide  services  to  myriad  small  firms  bringing  together  microscopic 
businesses. Big players typically also have some vertical integration from production to distribution and 
sale of final products. Due to the limited sunk cost component in the production process, a key business 
factor is the ability to streamline the process vertically from production to distribution (even though 
production is carried out by small producers) and to protect the business from external factors through 
the use of plain vanilla and complex risk management tools. Tables 3 and 6 show not only the actual size 
of  the  top  commodities  companies  across  commodities  markets,  but  their  astonishing  compounded 
annual growth rates as the global economy developed in the last decade and so international trade. 
Table 3. Top ten agricultural companies (grains, soybean oil, white sugar, coffee, cocoa) by total revenues, 2003 vs. 
2011 ($bn) 
   
Ownership  Country  Total assets  Total revenues 
       
2003  2011  2003  2011 
2003-11 
CAGR 
1  Cargill  Private  USA  Na  72.29  na  119.47  - 
2  Archer Daniels 
Midland 
Public  USA  17.18  42.19  30.70  80.68  13% 
3  Bunge  Public  USA  9.8  23.28  22.16  58.74  13% 
4  Louis-Dreyfus  Private  France  Na  22.75  na  57.67  - 14 | SETTING THE SCENE: THE STRUCTURE OF COMMODITIES MARKETS 
 
5  Kraft  Public  USA  Na  98.84  na  54.37  - 
6  Nestle  Public  Switzerland  66.83  129.05  66.53  46.53  - 
7  Wilmar  Public  Singapore  Na  39.64  na  44.71  - 
8  Agrium  Public  Canada  2.27  13.14  2.4  15.47  26% 
9  Conagra  Public  USA  15.0  11.41  16.9  12.30  - 
10  Viterra  Public  Canada  0.78  7.01  2.7  11.79  20% 
Source: Author calculations from websites, annual reports, and OANDA. 
*End of 2010. Note: Exchange rate with USD is yearly average. 
In the market for metals and raw  materials, the high fixed (and sunk) costs to start and keep 
production stable over time in order to reach a critical mass result in a fairly concentrated market, but 
still  with  some  horizontal  cross-product  activities.  A  key  business  factor  is  the  ability  to  integrate 
vertically  production,  refining,  and  smelting  of  metals  to  reach  the  end  market  with  limited  risk  of 
squeezes along the value chain, or to specialise horizontally across the same stage of the value chain. 
However, both models require deep pockets and few firms have been able to develop such an integrated 
model. Not all industrial metal and raw materials companies have achieved high growth rates in the last 
decade, as Table 4 suggests, and those that have achieved high growth may have been specialising more 
in part of the value chain. Rising energy costs have been an important burden for companies involved in 
high energy-consuming refining activities, such as aluminium smelters. 
Table 4. Top ten industrial metal and raw materials companies (aluminium, copper and iron ore) by total revenues, 
2003 vs. 2011 ($bn) 
   
Ownership  Country  Total assets  Total revenues   
   
   
2003  2011  2003  2011 
2003-11 
CAGR 
1  ArcelorMittal  Public  Luxembourg  112.16*  121.88  80.17*  93.97  - 
2  Bhp Billiton  Public  Australia-UK  28.87  102.89  16.54  71.74  20% 
3  Rio Tinto  Public  Australia-UK  na  119.55  58.1**  60.54  - 
4  Vale  Private  Brazil  11.4  128.70  5.3  60.40  36% 
5  Anglo American  Public  UK  34.4  87.28  24.9  51.12  9% 
6  Alcoa  Public  USA  31.7  40.12  21.5  25.00  2% 
7  Aluminumcorp of 
China 
Public  China  na  21.87  na  18.72  - 
8  Codelco  State-owned  Chile  8.9  20.83  3.7  17.52  22% 
9  Mitsui Chemicals  Public  Japan  10.1  16.27  8.7  17.48  9% 
10  Votorantim  Private  Brazil  na  38.37  na  16.88  - 
Source: Author’s selection from websites, annual reports, and OANDA. Note: A longer list is available in the Annex. 
Exchange rate with USD is yearly average. Note: *2006 data, **2008 data. 
Geopolitical factors and the role of substitute products have pushed energy commodities firms to 
concentrate on the extraction and refining of  oil, with  limited horizontal integration across products 
(largely only to natural gas) and often limited vertical integration. Aside from a few global multi-product 
commodity firms that extract oil, refine it, and produce fuel products, the market is concentrated along 
national markets where oil can be extracted and exploited by the country concerned. The crucial role of 
energy markets in industrial economies has also prompted state intervention to keep control of access to 
a resource that can affect global economic and political equilibria. Geopolitical aspects have influenced 
the ownership of energy commodities firms. The number of state-owned companies in this sector is  
 
noticeably higher than in other sectors (among emerging markets, in particular), and the nationalisation 
of  the  Argentine  business  of  Repsol  by  the  government  has  sparked  fears  among  long-established 
privately and  publicly owned international firms about the role of government  policies in emerging 
countries. 
Table 5. Key energy companies (crude oil and gas) by total revenues, 2003 vs. 2011 ($bn) 
   
Ownership  Country  Total assets  Total revenues   
       
2003  2011  2003  2011 
2003-11 
CAGR 
1  Royal Dutch 
Shell 
Public  Netherlands  219.51*  345.26  306.75*  470.17  - 
2  Exxon Mobile  Public  USA  219.01**  331.05  370.68*  467.03  - 
3  Sinopec  Public  China  na  177.08  na  387.68  - 
4  BP  Public  UK  112.82  293.07  178.72  375.52  10% 
5  Petrochina  Public  China  50.12  296.69  21.27  310.04  40% 
6  Total  Public  France  86.48  228.36  104.65  257.09  12% 
7  Conoco Phillips  Public  USA  82.45  153.23  105.09  251.23  12% 
8  Chevron  Public  USA  81.47  209.47  120.03  244.37  9% 
9  Gazprom  Public  Russia  83.07  431.21  24.5  217.73  31% 
10  Saudi Aramco  State-owned  Saudi Arabia  na  na  na  210.00***  - 
Source: Author’s selections from websites, annual reports and OANDA. Note: A longer list is available in the Annex. 
Exchange rate with USD is yearly average. *2005 data, **2006 data, ***2010 data. 
As shown by Table 5, due to the relevant impact of the sector on the economy, total revenues of 
the energy commodity businesses are much higher than other sectors. The largest agricultural and metal 
firm would be a long way off the top ten in the list of largest energy firms by total revenues, at 18th and 
19th, respectively (see Annex). The table also shows that the last decade has been a period of incredible 
growth for energy companies, as new oil-intensive emerging economies expanded beyond expectations. 
Finally, there are a handful of global commodity trading companies that combine the offer of 
intermediary services for other commodity firms (for physical and financial services) and logistics in 
multiple commodities (typically oil, some metals and a few agricultural commodities). These firms, also 
due to the easy access to international finance, have increased their exposure to physical markets over 
the years through the ownership of firms dedicated to production, refining, and/or logistics. The nature 
of  trading  companies,  which  typically  invest  in  the  most  profitable  areas  of  commodities  markets 
through sophisticated financial instruments and financial leverage, makes their offers more diversified 
across commodities markets, but also exposes them to fluctuations in futures markets and the financial 
system  (due  to  their  leveraged  positions).  Easier  access  to  international  finance  and  so  to  financial 
leverage, due to their nature of trading houses with strong financial expertise, has boosted revenues to 
levels close to those of big energy firms. The largest commodity trading company would be 6th in the list 
of the biggest oil and gas companies in the world, with much higher total revenues than those of the 
largest agricultural and metal businesses. 
Table 6. Key trading companies by total revenues, 2003 vs. 2011 ($bn) 
 
 
Ownership  Country  Total assets  Total revenues   
 
     
2003  2011  2003  2011 
2003-11 
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1  Vitol  Private  Netherlands  na  na  61*  297.00  22%* 
2  Glencore  Public  Switzerland  59.90**  86.16  142.34**  186.15  - 
3  Trafigura  Private  Netherlands  na  na  na  121.50  - 
4  Noble group  Public  Hong Kong  1.07  17.34  4.28  80.73  44% 
5 
Gunvor 
International 
Private  Cyprus  na  na  na  80.00  - 
6  Mercuria  Private  Switzerland  na  na  na  75.00  - 
7  Marubeni***  Public  Japan  41  65  75.2  55.63  - 
8  Xstrata  Public 
Switzerland-
UK 
10.00  74.83  3.47  33.88  33% 
9 
Marquard & Bahls 
AG  Private  Germany  0.78  5.63  5.44  25.84  22% 
10  System Capital  Private  Ukraine  na  28.45  na  19.55  - 
Source: Author’s selection from websites, annual reports and OANDA. Note: *2004 data; **2007 data; *Fiscal year 
ended in March 2012. Exchange rate with USD is yearly average.   
These companies trade not only with their own proprietary capital, both in the physical and 
the financial marketplace, but also on behalf of other firms or as a direct counterparty of other 
commodity firms. Their involvement in physical market trading varies depending on the business 
model.  
Table 6 shows ample divergence among total assets held by these firms. Companies exploit 
big  investments  in  information  and  minimise  costs  for  their  cross-product  activities.  They  run 
trading desks, like investment banks, and are usually headquartered in countries that provide some 
fiscal advantages or synergies with their assets holdings. Since the explosion of international trade 
at the beginning of the 2000s, the size of commodities trading houses  in terms of total assets and 
revenues has increased exponentially. The recent merger between Glencore and Xstrata, which may 
create the biggest trading house worldwide with more than $160 billion in assets, is a sign that this 
market is gradually reaching  a tipping point and more investments in direct physical holdings, 
rather than futures positions or intermediary services, may generate new synergies and increase 
profitability in a highly competitive environment. As these firms continue to grow, there might be 
an incentive for highly leveraged firms in the moment they begin to lose profitability to increase 
direct exposure to physical markets,  as  to  become  strategically  ‘too-physical-to-fail’.  This  might 
increase the risk of moral hazard for national governments. Finally, qualitative and quantitative 
information on financial and physical activities for some of these global firms is limited (even in 
aggregate  form  and  on  a  confidential  basis  to  regulators),  so  an  assessment  by  supervisors  of 
financial stability and market structure implications is currently very hard to perform. Coordination 
at international level among public authorities might be needed to share and reconcile information 
about physical holdings of these companies. 
Key risks 
There are several endogenous risks for firms involved in trading physical commodities on the spot 
market. The most important is price risk, which is the risk for a commodity firm of being too exposed 
to future price trends by holding too much or too little inventory. As shown above, inventories play a 
crucial role in mitigating price volatility due to supply and demand imbalances. Another important 
risk is related to the shipment of commodities, in particular to volatile freight rates.   
 
Figure 7. Key commodity risks 
 
Source: Author. 
Transportation risk12 is particularly important for those commodities  for which shipping costs 
are high in relation to the value of the underlying commodity, and consumption may occur away from 
the place of production, such as with grains and raw materials  (see Section 1.2.3). Finally, there are 
three transaction-specific risks: product risk; mismatch risk; and counterparty risk. First, the risk that 
the commodity will not be delivered with the characteristics agreed  ex ante by the two counterparties 
is  a  concrete  disincentive  to  enter  into  an  agreement  with  no  assurance  about  the  quality  of  the 
counterparty. Delivery does not usually happen on the spot because it may take some time to unload 
the amounts of commodities requested. This risk is one reason why exchanges with a well-organised 
warehousing system, ensuring quick delivery of products, have been developing fast at the global 
level. Second, there is the risk linked to the mismatch between the financial transaction and the given 
underlying commercial exposure. Currency trends also add more risks, as commodity trading is a key 
part of international trade that moves resources from production to consumption areas. Finally, there 
is counterparty risk, i.e. the credit risk of the counterparty, which can affect the transaction at any 
time.  This  is  usually  less  relevant  for  spot  markets,  as  the  transactions  last  few  days.  However, 
standardised safeguards to check whether the counterparty is financially healthy might be a crucial 
move for spot transactions as well.  
There are many examples of the risks involved in a commodity transaction, especially if it is 
done ‘cross-border’. Table 7 shows how several risks are involved in export pricing for the cross-
border delivery of a commodity. 
Table 7. Commodity risks, US soybeans to North Spain 
Price Calculation  USD/Bu  USD/MT  Risks 
Chicago futures  11.84  435  World commodity price 
New Orleans basis  0.72  26  Local commodity price 
Export elevation  0.08  3  Interior logistics, Port congestion 
Insurance  0.04  1  Cargo damage, Commodity quality 
Working capital  0.04  1  World debt markets 
Vessel demurrage  0.20  7  Interior logistics, Weather, Port congestion 
                                                            
12 This report considers the term ‘transportation risk’ as including the set of risks that are involved with the 
shipping of a commodity after the delivery point of the exchange. It is used with a general meaning and it does 
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Ocean freight  0.95  35 
World commodity price, Weather, Port 
congestion 
Discharge elevation  0.06  2  Interior logistics, Port congestion 
Discharge storage  0.09  3  Interior logistics, World debt markets 
Collection and fees  0.06  2  Political, Individual counterparty 
Delivered in store in 
Bilbao 
14.07  517  Sum of the foregoing 
FX Rate  1.28  1.28  FX market 
  Euro/Bu  Euro/MT   
Dlvd in store Bilbao  11.04  406  Sum of the foregoing 
Source: Bunge (2012). 
Price risks, currency risks, freight and transportation risks, storage risks, and exogenous factors 
(such as weather and government decisions) are all among the factors that the international firm has 
to consider when deciding to trade ‘cross-border’. 
Box 2. Unravelling the role of financial institutions in physical commodities markets 
The business of financial institutions, and in particular banks, has developed in different directions in the 
last decade. The growing importance of finance for funding large and medium commodities businesses 
has  led  to  diversification  in  the  business  model  of  investment  banks,  which  have  increased  their 
investments in physical commodities trading. The growth of commodities firms and their global impact 
has led production and risk management functions to become more interconnected. This has become a 
profitable  business  for  financial  institutions,  as  commodities  firms  are  not  always  able  to  handle  all 
exposures through their own internal risk management systems. Table 8 shows the amounts at the stake 
in the commodities derivatives business for key financial institutions at the end of 2011. There are also 
myriad smaller banks that provide financing services to the commodities business.  
Table 8. Top 12 most active financial institutions in commodities derivatives, by notional/total assets 
€bn – End 2011 
Notional 
value13 
Gross value 
(fair value)* 
Total 
assets  Revenues 
% Notional/ 
Total assets 
% Gross/ 
Total assets 
Ratio 
Gross/ 
Revenues 
Morgan Stanley  607.07  61.60  579.00  25.02  104.85%  10￿ 64%  2￿ 46 
Goldman Sachs  614.91  57.51  712.82  2￿ .25  86.26%  ￿ .07%  2.59 
JP Morgan  859.35  90.62  1,749.42  75.07  49.12%  5.18%  1.21 
Barclays  857.09  26.89  1,876.86  38.76  45.67%  1.43%  0.69 
Bank of America  639.22  29.65  1,643.84  72.91  38.89%  1.80%  0.41 
Credit Suisse  281.62  n/a  862.41  21.56  32.65%  n/a  n/a 
Société Générale  343.09  17.06  1,181.37  25.64  29.04%  1.44%  0.67 
Deutsche Bank**  459.13  44.36  2,164.10  33.23  21.22%  2.05%  1.34 
Citigroup  221.11  21.92  1,446.82  60.50  15.28%  1.52%  0.36 
BNP Paribas**  156.29  13.75  1,965.28  42.38  7.95%  0.70%  0.32 
Credit Agricole  69.79  8.50  1,860.00  35.13  3.75%  0.46%  0.24 
HSBC  59.06  2.85  1,973.16  46.44  2.99%  0.14%  0.06 
Tot.  5,167.72  374.71  18,015.09  498.88  49.71%^  3.9%^  1.15^ 
Global OTC  2,5714  405  -  -  -  -  - 
Global ETD***  3,585  -  -  -  -  -  - 
                                                            
13 Balance sheets do not provide further granularity on how this notional value can be decomposed, i.e. what kind 
of commodities derivatives trades (OTC or it includes estimation of  exchange-traded derivatives positions in 
commodities). It includes precious metals. For exchange-traded futures contracts, notional value in this analysis 
means value of open interest. 
14 Including OTC derivatives on gold and other precious metals, at the end of 2012.  
 
Source: 2011 Annual reports, SEC K10 files, BIS (2013 update), WFE/IOMA. *Before netting adjustments. ^Weighted 
average (notional). “Estimates. ***Conservative estimate of value of traded futures and options contracts. See 
section 1.2.2.3 for more details.15  
The range of  financial institutions is very broad and includes: brokers/dealers,  private banks, 
commercial banks, merchant banks, insurance companies, investment managers, mutual funds, hedge 
funds, and private equity funds. To develop these activities, most of these institutions have invested 
significant  resources  in  physical  trading,  such  as  supply  and  production  firms,  warehouses,  and 
logistics/transportation companies. 
As at today, for instance, Morgan Stanley owns: 
  Six power plants (three in Europe and three in the United States). 
  A fleet of roughly 100 vessels (through ownership control of Heidmar). 
  Several fuels and gas assets (through Transmontaigne Inc.16 and Heidmar). 
These assets are marked in the balance sheet at a fair value of roughly $6 billion (end of 2011). The 
company is therefore positioned to provide production, distribution, and shipping services across several 
commodities. It provides bundles of services to main commodity producers through long-term contracts 
in which the bank commits to provide agreed amounts of a commodity, such as crude oil or gas, and 
related risk management services. This helps clients to manage risks with a single counterparty, as well 
as to expand in a market supporting investment decisions. However, the bank exposes itself to a wide 
array of exogenous factors. 
“Commodity  price  and  implied  volatility  risk  as  a  result  of  market-making  activities  and  maintaining 
positions in physical commodities (such as crude and refined oil products, natural gas, electricity, and precious and 
base  metals)  and  related  derivatives.  [...]...changes  can  be  caused  by  weather  conditions;  physical  production, 
transportation and storage issues; or geopolitical and other events that affect the available supply and level of 
demand for these commodities.” (Morgan Stanley, 2011 SEC 10k file, p. 103). 
The  business  is  under  threat  from  cyclical  factors  and  upcoming  regulatory  tightening  over 
systemically  important  financial  institutions,  which  has  already  pushed  some  players  to  quit  the 
commodity  business  (Royal  Bank  of  Scotland  and  Nomura,  for  example)  due  to  the  higher  costs  of 
capital in the aftermath of the on-going financial crisis. But opportunities may also arise. 
“We directly or indirectly own interests in, or otherwise become affiliated with the ownership and operation 
of public services, such as airports, toll roads and shipping ports, as well as power generation facilities, physical 
commodities and other commodities infrastructure components, both within and outside the United States. Recent 
market conditions may lead to an increase in opportunities to acquire distressed assets and we may determine 
opportunistically to increase our exposure to these types of assets. These activities expose us to new and enhanced 
risks,  including  risks  associated  with  dealing  with  governmental  entities,  reputational  concerns  arising  from 
dealing  with  less  sophisticated  counterparties  and  investors,  greater  regulatory  scrutiny  of  these  activities, 
increased  credit-related,  sovereign  and  operational  risks,  risks  arising  from  accidents  or  acts  of  terrorism,  and 
reputational concerns with the manner in which these assets are being operated or held.” (Goldman Sachs, 2011 
SEC K10 file, p.28) 
The fast development of the business also raises questions about the implications for competition, 
in particular whether the stake held in physical markets may exert dominant or oligopolistic pressure on 
price, as well as concentration risks for operations. Disclosure of physical holdings and ownership stakes, 
in aggregate fashion (following current initiatives in financial regulation), may become a key aspect for 
supervisors to properly oversee conflicts of interest between the different legitimate functions that these 
operators perform, to avoid anti-competitive behaviours, and to minimise the effects of non-financial 
risks on the stability of the financial system. Finally, more meaningful disclosure and breakdown of 
derivatives exposure can help to quantify the impact of such activities on the companies’ balance sheets. 
Current  regulatory  actions,  both  in  Europe  and  the  United  States,  are  setting  higher  disclosure 
requirements for derivatives exposures, but the hard task will be to make this information meaningful.  
                                                            
15 These statistics do not include the turnover value of commodities futures and options of the London Metal 
Exchange,  NYSE  Euronext  (US),  Australian  Securities  Exchange  SFE  Derivatives  Trading,  Multi  Commodity 
Exchange of India, Singapore Exchange, plus an undefined list of small commodities exchanges. 
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Long-term price changes 
In addition to exogenous factors affecting commodities prices, there are variables that do not directly 
affect supply and demand, but can create incentives that change long-term investment decisions and 
have a counteracting effect on price elasticity. These changes can happen on both the supply and the 
demand side. On the supply side, for instance, a prolonged peak in the level of prices may reduce the 
costs of capital, which may increase long-term investments in production, reducing production costs 
and thus prices in the long term (Geman, 2005; Figure 8a).  
Figure 8. Supply shift and demand twist 
(a)  (b) 
 
 
Source: Author. 
However, it may also happen that high prices, subsidised by government policies, reduce the 
willingness of producers to invest in the long term as they feel protected by external support. This 
would ultimately result in an inability to compete in the market once these subsidies are lifted for any 
reason (such as a financial crisis), making it very hard to produce at the lower cost imposed by the 
market. Market prices may become unstable because it would time for production to adapt to the new 
environment. On the demand side, a prolonged increase in the price of crude oil may have a limited 
impact on requested quantities, but in the long term may push the economy to increasingly rely on 
alternative sources of energy, which would ultimately increase price elasticity and reduce the slope of 
the demand curve (see Figure 8b). 
Underinvestment in supply has long been subject to discussion in the academic literature and 
policy-making. A combination of short-term and long-term aspects increases variables that affect price 
patterns. As a result, long-term price trends are often predictable, but the short-term pattern is highly 
volatile with big price swings that can reshape the ultimate allocation of resources in the market for 
long periods, and so change long-term price trends.17 
1.2.2  Futures markets 
Open markets are platforms matching buyers’ and sellers’ interests over one or multiple assets across 
space and time. Futures contracts (or ‘futures’) are agreements between two parties to buy or sell an 
agreed quantity of an asset (commodity) at a certain future date for an  ex ante agreed price. This 
market accommodates the intertemporal choice of commodity producers, users and traders (so called 
‘risk transfer’). It allows the management of demand and supply risks through the expectations for 
                                                            
17 To understand better the intensity of the link between supply and demand elasticity to market changes, please 
see markets descriptions in the following chapters.   
 
inventory levels, which are the response function of physical demand/supply imbalances reflected by 
spot market prices.  
Take, for example, a wheat producer  that wants to protect its core business from a drop in 
prices during the next harvest period, perhaps resulting from oversupply due to very good weather 
conditions. The producer therefore decides to sell a quantity of futures contracts approximating the 
estimated production level with a contract expiration corresponding to the end of the harvest. In this 
way, the producer can almost fix the price of its harvest well before the harvest takes place. This gives 
the producer the ability to plan investments over the long term and to restrict potential losses to a 
predictable range. Before the expiration date of the futures contract, if the price of the original futures 
sale is higher than the prevailing market price, the producer would buy back the futures with an 
offsetting transaction at a lower price. This would hedge losses in the physical market incurred by 
selling at a lower market price than initially forecasted. However, if the market price is higher than the 
original futures sales price, the producer will sell the cash commodity in the marketplace and the 
higher cash price received would cover the losses caused by buying back the initial futures sale at a 
higher price. In the futures transaction, the difference between the initial futures price and the daily 
settlement price is marked-to-market by the exchange clearinghouse which maintains the financial 
integrity of the exchange by requiring initial margins for any new transaction and by collecting or 
remitting variation margins on a daily basis on all open positions. If the  producer gains from the 
futures  transaction,  they  would  collect  the  value  of  the  initial  margin  deposit  plus  the  difference 
between the original and final price. 
1.2.2.1  The development of futures markets: a brief history 
The origins of modern futures markets date back to the 19th century, but physical commodities and 
archaic forms of futures markets have even more ancient origins going back to the beginning of the 
civilised  world  (Berg,  2011).  Futures  markets,  as  a  market  supporting  the  activities  of  physical 
commodities markets to reduce inefficiency and transaction costs, have been around for a little over a 
century and began operations with very simple contracts. The first futures contracts were effectively 
just  delivery  contracts,  or  ‘to  arrive’  contracts  (Gray  and  Rutledge,  1971),  for  producers  in  the 
surrounding  areas  of  Chicago.  The  first  exchange,  the  Chicago  Board  of  Trade  (CBOT),  started 
operations  in  1848  and  soon  became  the  point  of  reference  for  similar  platforms  across  advanced 
economies. Over the years, these platforms have spread around market hubs to allow commodities 
actors to trade spot or transfer risk to those that could actually bear it close to large consumption 
areas.  Dramatic  price  fluctuations  and  disputes  among  buyers  (e.g.  merchants)  and  sellers  (e.g. 
farmers), especially in agricultural commodities where external factors such as the weather and means 
of transport had unforeseeable impacts, have made futures markets an indispensable tool to run a 
competitive commodities business. 
Technological developments during the 1970s and 1980s made trading from remote locations 
possible. Following these important changes, a process of consolidation among exchanges to benefit 
from economies of scale began, first at the regional level and gradually now at the global level. The 
computerisation of trading has made competition among national exchanges possible.  This process 
culminated in the 1990s with a general liberalisation of the sector. The vast majority of exchanges, at 
least all of them in Europe and the United States, have become for-profit entities that aim to expand 
business  to  find  new  opportunities  and  increase  liquidity  with  higher  volumes  of  transactions. 
Growing competition has also created an additional boost to technological innovation, thus increasing 
direct access to capital markets for end users. As a consequence of these market changes, commodities 
markets have expanded their volumes of transactions during the beginning of the 21st century, both on 
exchanges and over-the-counter bilateral markets. Key commodities exchanges are today the only 
place where the prices of specific commodities are formed and used as global benchmark prices for 
bilateral transactions. From small and niche market activities, exchanges today have become global 
actors  with  a  diversified  business  that  cuts  across  all  services  linked  to  trading  of  commodities 
derivatives and other financial instruments (e.g. clearing, settlement, data and technological services). 
Technological  advances  are  pushing  the  boundaries  of  relevant  markets  at  the  global  level,  even 
though relevant legal and infrastructural issues at the national level impede the rapid development 
towards fully-fledged market competition among global exchanges. 22 | SETTING THE SCENE: THE STRUCTURE OF COMMODITIES MARKETS 
 
Futures  markets  have  historically  been  an  essential  part  of  commodities  markets,  helping 
commodities users and producers to hedge or transfer risk over their inventories due to seasonality 
issues (Irwin 1954). Working (1962) concluded that these markets have managed to facilitate contract 
holding, to build up different types of hedging strategies and to incorporate the convenience yield and 
thus price of storage in the intertemporal price spread. Futures prices represent the expected  spot 
price  on  the  basis  of  currently  available  information,  especially  for  storable  commodities  (Carter, 
2000). A lack of balance in the physical market pushes up futures prices, which ultimately results in 
additional  price  discovery  when  arbitrageurs  absorb  fairly  quickly  potential  price  abnormalities 
between futures and spot markets (Geman, 2005). Futures markets give a sense of where the spot price 
is heading, by signalling greater storage opportunities when futures prices are high and lower storage 
when futures prices drop close or below spot prices. However, this might not be the case for non-
storable commodities, for which futures prices may be an unreliable forecast of cash market prices 
(Kamara, 1982) because no physical link with supply and demand can be established through the 
management of inventories. In this case, market liquidity is a key indicator of reliability.  
1.2.2.2  Contractual characteristics 
Despite the fact that futures contracts are a simple tool to transfer risk across time and space, the 
organisation of futures markets is rather complex, whether it is run through an exchange or bilaterally 
(over-the-counter)  in  a  customised  fashion.  The  ability  to  deal  with  transaction-specific  risks  is 
enhanced in a futures market setting, where contracts are standardised in terms of size and other 
factors. OTC markets are more costly and may require deep pockets that many commodities firms 
may not have. As Table 9 suggests, commodities transactions can be concluded through cash spot, 
cash forward, and futures contracts. Temporal and spatial risk transfer in commodities markets can be 
done  through  bilateral  agreements  mainly  in  the  OTC  space  (forward  contracts)18  or thro ugh 
standardised contracts listed on exchanges (futures contracts).  
Forwards are customised contracts (volumes and quantities) and can be either  Free-On-Board 
(FOB) priced or include cost of storage, insurance and freight (CIF) in the final price . Physical and 
(sometimes) cash settlement is done to maturity, so the holding period is typically to delivery. 
Customisation (plus limited exposure to interest rates and collateral requirements), however, comes at 
higher transaction costs and counterparty risk, which can make transactions less attractive for limited 
volumes. Futures contracts,  on the other hand , are standardised contracts with delivery  at a given 
location at a pre-defined set of dates during the year. The underlying commodity also has a common 
quality grade, which reduces delivery   risks. Prices are typically FOB  (or in warehouse; as for 
industrial metals) and contracts are typically offset with a reversal trade before maturity and marked -
to-market on a daily basis through margin calls. By keeping a  maintenance margin rather than 
disbursing the full value of the contract, buyers and sellers are leveraging to increase exposure with a 
limited amount of cash. These contracts should, in principle, serve commercial firms, which typically 
do not hold large  amounts of cash. In contrast to OTC forwards, which are used for bigger volumes, 
these standardised contracts are highly liquid, due to the limited amount of cash needed.  Small 
investors can also potentially invest in these markets. Through the system of m argin calls, then, there 
is only a very limited exposure to counterparty risk (certainly less than in  the  case  of forward 
contracts). However, standardised futures contracts may  involve expose to other two types of risk: 
currency risk and interest rate  risk. Since the contract is traded in the currency where the most liquid 
market is (historically) located, there is a currency risk for players acting in countries with  a different 
currency. The currency for the vast majority of these products is the U.S.  dollar. In addition, the open 
futures contract position requires the maintenance of a margin account where cash is kept away from 
alternative uses, so the opportunity cost is at least the risk-free interest rate. 
                                                            
18 That are not financial agreements (OTC swaps), which result in a pure exchange of cash flows rather than the 
delivery of a physical commodity. An OTC swap is a pure financial transaction.  
 
Table 9. Key characteristics of transactions 
  Spot contract  Forward contract  Futures contract 
Nature of transaction 
Bilateral 
(OTC) 
Bilateral 
(OTC) 
Multilateral 
(exchange) 
Transaction terms  
(delivery dates, 
contract size) 
Customised  Customised  Standardised 
Price  FOB  FOB/CIF  FOB (or in warehouse) 
Settlement  Physical 
Cash/Physical 
(to maturity/shipment) 
Cash (daily) 
Offset/Physical 
(to maturity, ‘physical’ if 
requested) 
Typical holding 
period  
To delivery  To delivery  Before delivery 
Delivery  Spot  Customised  Selected months 
Storage costs  No  Yes  Yes 
Transaction costs  Medium  Medium/High  Low 
Leverage  No  No  Yes 
Counterparty risk 
Limited 
(spot) 
High 
Limited 
(daily mark-to-market) 
Currency risk  No 
Limited 
(choice) 
Yes 
Price risk  No  Yes  Yes 
Interest rate risk  No  No  Yes 
Regulation and 
supervision 
Limited  Limited  High 
Source: Author. 
Both  forward  and  futures  contracts  are  exposed  to  price  risk,  which  is  affected  by  market-
specific  and/or  exogenous  factors  that  can  make  holding  a  commodity  profitable  and  promote 
strategies to hedge commercial risks.  
Two key elements have made futures contracts traded on exchange a successful tool to deal 
with commodity risks:  
a.  Margin calls. 
b.  Physical delivery. 
Margin calls (with a stable cash account) allow leverage and align open positions to market 
value, minimising counterparty risk. Profits and losses are thus realised before maturity, while  as 
opposed to only at maturity for forwards. This key feature attracts liquidity and allows the contract to 
be closed out with an offset transaction at any time before delivery. The high standardisation of future 
contracts and daily collateralisation typically permit the closing out of contracts without running the 
risks of physical delivery (e.g. quality grade, delivery time, receipts, etc.). The transaction can be offset 
before delivery with an equal offsetting purchase or sale (essentially an exchange of cash; Lerner, 
2000).  Anecdotal  evidence  suggests  that  fewer  than  2%  of  futures  contracts  are  settled  through 
physical delivery.  
The physical delivery obligation, when the contract is brought to maturity, essentially aligns the 
futures contracts to the underlying spot market prices close to maturity (‘no arbitrage clause’, see 
below). For forwards, the contract is completed with actual delivery of the underlying commodity. In 
around 98% of futures, there is no actual delivery since traders enter into reversal trades (offsetting). 
Another way to terminate futures contracts, without an offsetting transaction or physical delivery, is 
the liquidation in cash of the difference between the agreed price to delivery and the spot price of the 
underlying  commodity.  Finally,  parties  can  also  agree  a  combination  of  compensation  with  an 
offsetting transaction and delivery of the commodity or the exchange of the futures position with a 24 | SETTING THE SCENE: THE STRUCTURE OF COMMODITIES MARKETS 
 
corresponding  physical  market  position  of  a  market  participant  that  wants  to  switch  exposure  to 
current prices with exposure to prices at a future date (exchange for physical). 
Actual delivery of the commodity is set a few times a year for futures contracts on exchanges, 
depending on the type of futures contract that is traded on the exchange for that specific commodity. 
Typically, there are no more than four or five delivery dates per year (i.e. every three or four months). 
1.2.2.3  Futures market structure 
Financial transactions in commodities may take place on organised electronic multilateral platforms, 
such as exchanges, or in bilateral settings (over-the-counter). Due to lack of comparable data, the size 
of exchange-traded commodities futures and options markets versus the OTC markets at the end of 
2012 can be only estimated. Roughly $1.36 trillion was the total notional value of outstanding global 
OTC commodity forward  and swaps in 2012.19 The notional value  of outstanding contracts (open 
interest) on futures commodities exchanges, estimated by taking the value of the turnover (as total 
value of traded contracts) of futures contracts and discounting it by a decompressing factor, is $3.17 
trillion.20 As a result, outstanding value of exchange-traded futures contracts was at least 70% of total 
OTC and ETD commodities futures markets ($4. 53 trillion) at the end of 2012, up from 66% a year 
before, as OTC commodities derivatives have been shrinking  more than $450 bil lion in one year, 
mainly  due  to  regulatory  pressures  on  collateral  requirements,  costs  of  capital  and  banks’ 
deleveraging (see Table 10). 
Table 10. Notional value of outstanding commodities futures and options traded OTC and on exchange ($bn) 
  Exchange-traded  Over-the-counter  Total 
  2011  2012  2011  2012  2011  2012 
Futures 21 
3,226 
(65%) 
3,168 
(70%) 
1,745 
(35%) 
1,363 
(30%) 
4,971  4,531 
Futures and options 
3,585 
(58%) 
3,485 
(62%) 
2,570 
(42%) 
2,101 
(38%) 
6,155  5,584 
Note:  Exchange-traded  data  are  conservative  estimates  derived  from  turnover  value  of  futures  and  options 
contracts. 22 Value of over-the-counter positions is not daily marked-to-market. 
Source: Author’s estimates from WFE/IOMA, BIS, CME, LIFFE, LME, ICE, other sources. 
Due to its systemic size, the trading environment is also closely regulated and supervised by 
both exchanges and regulators. The interest of the platform operator is thus in ensuring that trades are 
done  smoothly  with  no  major  dysfunctions,  because  only  a  stable  and  standardised  trading 
environment can potentially attract the critical mass of liquidity needed to make the business of the 
neutral operator sustainable over time. As Figure 9 shows, commodity futures trading on exchanges 
has grown very fast  in the last  ten years, despite  being already a significant  part of commodities 
futures trading. OTC markets have also grown rapidly (at a slower pace, though), which suggests that 
more players have accessed these markets gradually over the last decade. After the crisis erupted in 
                                                            
19 Forward and swaps can be considered as the OTC market equivalent of futures exchanges contracts. 
20 This ‘decompressing factor’, which is equal to 0.0338977, is a ratio between the weighted (by production in 
tonnes) average of the open interest ratio over physical production (in 2011) for selected liquid futures contracts 
(natural gas, crude oil, copper, aluminium, cocoa, coffee, corn, soybean oil, wheat, white sugar), and the weighted 
average (by production in tonnes) of the value of traded contracts ratio over value of physical production (in 2011 
and average spot price from World Bank) for the same liquid contracts (except for copper, aluminium and white 
sugar; volumes of contracts traded during 2011 with maturity up to 12 months). 
21 Forwards and swaps for OTC transactions. 
22  The  statistics  published  by  the  World  Federation  of  Exchanges  and  the  International  Options  Market 
Association do not include the turnover value of commodities futures (forwards) and options traded on the 
London Metal Exchange, NYSE Euronext (US), Australian Securities Exchange SFE Derivatives Trading, Multi 
Commodity Exchange of India, Singapore Exchange, plus an undefined list of very small commodities exchanges.  
 
2007, however, OTC transactions have lost ground in favour of more open and transparent trading 
venues due to increasing cost of funding for bilateral transactions.  
Figure 9. Growth of Exchange-traded and over-the-counter commodity derivatives (2002=100-2012) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from BIS, WFE, ECMI (2012). Note: Exchange-traded data on number of contracts 
might be underestimated before 2008. Data include futures only for exchange-traded contracts. 
The size of commodities futures exchanges has more than tripled since 2004, particularly as a 
result of the financial crisis, which has reduced dealers’ capital commitment in OTC transactions and 
increased the role of transparent venues as a cheaper source of liquidity for commodities users. The 
size of the global commodities futures exchange reached its peak in 2012, with almost 3 billion traded 
contracts and seven global market infrastructures of which no one is European and four of them are 
Chinese companies (see Figure 10).  
Figure 10. Growth of commodity futures exchanges volumes by number of contracts, 2002-2012 
 
Note: 2012 data for Multi Commodity Exchange of India is from 2011.23 
Source: Author’s calculations from WFE and ECMI (2012). 
                                                            
23 ‘Others’ include: MICEX / RTS, NYSE Euronext (Europe), Bursa Malaysia Derivatives, ICE Futures Canada, 
Thailand Futures Exchange, Johannesburg SE, BM&FBOVESPA, ASX SFE Derivatives Trading, Korea Exchange, 
Buenos  Aires  SE,  NYSE  Euronext  (US),  Rofex,  ASX  Derivatives  Trading,  BSE  India,  Bursa  Malaysia,  Japan 
Exchange Group – Osaka, Tokyo Commodity Exchange (TOCOM), Tokyo Grain Exchange. 26 | SETTING THE SCENE: THE STRUCTURE OF COMMODITIES MARKETS 
 
US  and  Chinese  exchanges  are  the  leading  participants  in  commodities  futures  market 
infrastructure. As shown in Figure 10 and Figure 11, CME group is the biggest global exchange by 
value of open interest and number of traded contracts in its commodities markets, at least for the 
commodities covered in this report. 
As suggested above, the growth of Chinese exchanges has been astonishing, and today they 
have  a  global  market  share  of  almost  50%,  as  China  has  de  facto  become  the  major  commodities 
consumer in the world (Figure 11). Some Chinese exchanges have become points of reference in Asia 
but, partly due to governance issues and legal  uncertainty for these emerging exchanges, most of 
benchmark futures prices are still formed in US and European venues. 
Figure 11. Global commodity futures exchanges volumes by number of contracts, 2012 
 
Note: Data for Multi Commodity Exchange of India is from end of 2011. 
Source: Author’s calculations from WFE and ECMI (2012). 
The  trading  landscape  is  still  on  the  move,  however,  and  global  competition  may  lead  to 
additional  attempts  at  consolidation.  The  recent  acquisition  of  NYSE  LIFFE  by  ICE  will  certainly 
increase  ICE’s  global  market  share  and  will  perhaps  create  the  biggest  European  commodities 
exchange. Most importantly, the merger follows the path of consolidation between European and US 
exchanges striving to increase their market share and market power at the global level. Given the 
similar underlying macroeconomic conditions and financial systems of the two regions, cross-border 
merger and acquisition activities may find more solid ground for synergies and economies of scale to 
develop,  as  often  seen  in  recent  years.  Finally,  implications  of  current  regulatory  reforms  on  the 
market power of global infrastructures require further investigation. Commercial interest around new 
services that are generally considered not profitable (such as trade repositories) points at the market 
power  generated  by  the  economies  of  scale  and  scope  that  providing  this  service  may  offer,  in 
combination with several trading, clearing and settlement services that vertically integrated market 
infrastructures already offer to clients. 
1.2.2.4  Market organisation 
The most common type of market setting for the trading of commodity futures is an auction system 
handled by ad hoc organisations (for-profit entities, after demutualisation) called ‘commodities futures 
exchanges’. This auction system, whether orders are submitted through an open outcry session (via a 
member of the exchange) or through an electronic trading platform (via a broker that is an exchange 
member and has pre-trade controls before the submission of the order), is open to anyone who meets 
the financial requirements needed to trade these standardised contracts (among which is a ‘margin 
account’).  The  nature  of  an  auction  requires  the  market  to  be  fully  transparent  with  regards  to  
 
membership rules, types of orders that users can introduce into the system, and prices of each lot of 
underlying contracts. Auction markets, in addition, have lower transaction costs and can ensure a 
more efficient flow of information into prices. However, these standardised markets may be unable to 
deal with block sizes, which can produce market impact if not properly managed. If price-sensitive 
information about market operations of a commodity firm is not properly managed by insiders, the 
market can also break down, ultimately causing a run on liquidity. 
Electronic trading 
The evolution and growth of commodity futures exchanges has followed the development of new 
legal and technological tools, which have made the trading process more standardised and suitable for 
electronic  trading. On the legal side, future contracts traded on exchanges have at least four pre-
determined aspects: quantity, delivery date, delivery point (among a list), and quality grade. On the 
technological side, the ‘electronification’ of trading has fit squarely into the modern developments of 
commodities markets and electronic trading has almost completely taken over the old open outcry 
(‘the pit’). For instance, as Figure 12 shows, almost all futures trading on CME for corn and wheat is 
done through an electronic platform, which increases the speed and volumes of transactions, reduces 
access costs, and provides a single access point from any location around the world.  
Figure 12. Corn and wheat electronic futures (average daily volume) 
 
Source: CME Group. 
Obviously, the diffusion electronic may also carry costs, which are mainly linked to operational 
aspects,  i.e.  the  ability  to  handle  new  technologies  and  computer  algorithms  smoothly  and  to 
supervise complex operations that  could potentially  become market  manipulation  (e.g.  ‘cornering’ 
practices).  However,  technology  also  offers  the  ability  to  detect  abusive  practices  through  new, 
sophisticated tools and the astonishing growth of exchange trading in the last decade  and greater 
choice for investors is strongly linked to the diffusion of technology in commodities trading. 
Finally, electronic trading also means that new forms of trading and market-making activities 
take place with the use of complex technologies and algorithms, combined into the so-called ‘high-
frequency’  trading  practices.  In  commodities  futures  markets,  high-frequency  trading  is  a  less 
prominent  activity  than  for  other  asset  classes  (such  as  equities  secondary  markets)  due  to  the 
different  market  microstructure.  However,  as  for  other  asset  classes,  high-frequency  trading  in 
commodities futures markets may bridge price formation of futures contracts on the same commodity, 
but traded on different markets. High-frequency trading may be beneficial as long as it is properly 
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immediately identified and properly managed, or in some cases banned if the potential effects of such 
practices cannot be controlled by the infrastructure. 
Clearing and margins 
Clearing and settlement services are essential services for a commodity futures exchange, both for the 
financial settlement (in around 98% of the cases) and physical settlement. Clearing services, i.e. the 
definition of the net amount that a party will receive or will pay as a result of the futures contract 
position, are typically performed by a central counterparty (CCP). The CCP is often owned and run by 
the  exchange,  but  there  are  many  cases  of  commodities  futures  where  the  clearing  services  are 
outsourced to an external venue. The CCP, through an operation called ‘novation’, becomes the only 
counterparty of the transaction, so performing ‘netting’ (the calculation of one net claim if there are 
multiple open positions that refer to the same user). Typically, contracts are marked-to-market value 
on a daily basis. So at the end of the day, the CCP calculates the net claim or credit that the user has 
against its own margin account, and the user is finally asked to provide cash (or other assets on which 
a haircut is applied) if the margin account drops below the maintenance level in order to restore the 
initial level. Daily marked-to-market settlement of open positions, through the use of margin calls and 
other risk management service to minimise collateral use, allow better management of counterparty 
risk and the possibility to leverage high-value contracts with a minimum cash margin account (see 
Table 11).  
Table 11. Margins and leverage 
  Main 
futures 
contract 
Position 
Initial 
margin 
Maintenance 
margin 
Contract 
Value* 
Initial 
Leverage* 
Max 
Leverage* 
CME 
Corn 
 
$2,363  $1,750  $37,750  16  22 
Wheat 
 
$3,038  $2,250  $43,300  14  19 
Soybean 
Oil   
$1,215  $900  $30,600  25  34 
Copper 
 
$5,400  $4,000  $93,145  17  23 
WTI 
Crude    
$6,548  $4,850  $87,040  13  18 
Natural 
Gas    
$2,565  $1,900  $34,790  13  18 
       
 
   
 
ICE 
Cocoa 
Hedge  $1,250  $1,250  $24,750  20  20 
Speculative  $1,375  $1,250  $24,750  18  20 
Coffee 
Hedge  $4,050  $4,050  $60,375  15  15 
Speculative  $4,455  $4,050  $60,375  14  15 
Sugar 
Hedge  $2,050  $2,050  $21,280  10  10 
Speculative  $2,255  $2,050  $21,280  9  10 
Soybean 
oil 
Hedge  $1,250  $1,250  $30,600  24  24 
Speculative  $1,375  $1,250  $30,600  22  24 
Corn 
Hedge  $2,100  $2,100  $37,600  18  18 
Speculative  $2,310  $2,100  $37,600  16  18 
Brent 
Crude    
$5,000  $4,200  $107,650  22  26 
       
 
   
 
NYSE 
Cocoa 
 
£1,200.00  £1,062.00  £16,300  12  15 
Coffee 
 
$1,300.00  $1,040.00  $20,330  14  20 
Sugar 
 
$1,600.00  $1,408.00  $27,010  14  19 
Wheat 
 
£1,200.00  £900.00  £10,677  12  12  
 
       
 
   
 
LME 
Aluminium 
 
$3,252  $3,252  $49,063  15  15 
Copper 
 
$14,500  $14,500  $199,750  14  14 
*Value at October 19th, 2012. 
Source: Author’s calculations from exchanges and clearinghouses. 
In addition, daily mark-to-market values and financial settlement of margin calls permit the 
contract to be closed out by an offsetting transaction at any time before the maturity of the contract. 
This makes commodity futures an easy-to-use tool for all type of commodities users and investors, 
which ultimately facilitates concentration of liquidity in the market (Geman, 2005). 
Physical delivery and warehouses 
A small proportion of futures contracts are settled through the physical delivery of the commodity at 
maturity.  However,  physical  delivery  plays  an  important  role  since  it  allows  futures  prices  to 
converge to spot prices at maturity (taking into account a premium or discount that should be applied 
to the futures price at maturity).  This ‘commitment to deliver’ the underlying physical commodity 
keeps futures markets tied to physical spot prices, even though most of the futures transactions are 
not physically delivered.  Physical settlement promotes price discovery because it allows arbitrage 
between futures and spot markets in the first place. As for clearing services, the physical delivery of 
the commodity may be outsourced to external companies that manage warehouses in compliance with 
the  rules  set  by  the  exchange  (‘sponsored  warehouses’).  In  addition  to  the  general  financial  and 
conduct requirements to be eligible as a ‘sponsored warehouse’, rules typically deal with different 
aspects  of  commodities  storage  that  may  ultimately  affect  the  correct  execution  of  the  physical 
delivery as promised in the future contract, and so distort market prices: 
  Physical storage of the commodity. 
  Delivery notes (promissory notes or warrants).  
  Location. 
Warehouses (or grain elevators) have to comply with a minimum set of standards for the way 
they store commodities. For instance, bean commodities such as cocoa require storage in sealed bags, 
under a specific setting that allows sampling, along with several additional requirements for how the 
commodity should be handled and stored against external agents (see, for instance, LIFFE, 2012). All 
these measures should aim at minimising the degradability of the commodity. 
Another important aspect is the issuance of warehouse receipts (or warrants) through which the 
user is entitled to receive the commodity from a specific warehouse in-store or free-on-board (FOB). In 
general, these receipts are a promise by the warehouse to deliver a good stored in their premises. They 
are not documents of ownership under English law, even though they can be negotiable instruments, 
so may not be accepted by financial institutions as a pledge. In some cases, therefore, these receipts 
may not ensure the delivery of the good in time, and the warehouse may not be held liable if the user 
cannot prove negligence. In addition, in the event of bankruptcy, the holder of a warehouse receipt 
will typically join the list of creditors of the warehouse company and would not be able to exercise its 
ownership right before a judge decide over the claim. A different regime has been implemented for 
LME warrants (see Box 3). Nevertheless, it is crucial that local laws do not add uncertainty to the legal 
value  of  the  receipt,  by  adding  additional  taxes  or  other  barriers  to  the  smooth  delivery  of  the 
commodity. 
Finally,  geographical  location  and  capacity  of  the  delivery  system  play  a  crucial  role.  The 
location of warehouses in key areas of net consumption (such as for metals) or net production (such as 
for agricultural products), logistical connections, effective systems of protection against corruption, 
and a sound legal system are  the factors that contribute  most to the attractiveness  of  commodity 
exchange for commodities users and to making the process of convergence of futures contract prices 
to the spot market price more efficient. The efficiency of futures markets is very much linked to that 
tiny 2% of physically settled trades. If the system of physical delivery is put in jeopardy by external 
factors  (even  government  policies)  or  internal  policies  (of  the  exchange  or  the  warehouse),  the 
implications will affect the pricing of all futures contracts, whether in the end settled physically or 
offset. As a result of the inability to hedge on futures markets (because of the uncertainty in the final 30 | SETTING THE SCENE: THE STRUCTURE OF COMMODITIES MARKETS 
 
price of futures contracts due to uncertainties in the physical delivery), spot prices will start to price 
the information of a badly functioning futures market, thus increasing volatility and pushing prices 
away from ‘pure’ supply and demand fundamentals.  As stated by the IOSCO principle (2011) on 
“promotion of price convergence through settlement reliability”, “settlement and delivery procedures 
should  reflect  the  underlying  physical  market”.  Most  notably,  location  of  delivery  points  and/or 
delivery capacity shall meet characteristics of underlying physical markets, which would then limit 
supply  bottlenecks  (i.e.,  delivery  queues)  and  promote  the  well-functioning  of  international 
benchmarks. Internal management of positions by the exchange, linked to the actual delivery capacity 
of  the  infrastructure,  may  be  also  helpful  to  avoid  artificial  shortages  if  significant  positions  take 
delivery in a short timeframe. Artificial supply cuts fuelled by delivery queues may increase reliance 
on  less  transparent  price  formation  settings,  such  as  price  assessments  based  on  submissions  of 
physical transactions. 
Box 3. The LME warehousing and warrants system 
Most of the global exchange warehouse networks have a few delivery points in the continent where the 
exchange  is  located,  or  in  another  large  area  of  net  consumption/production.  The  London  Metal 
Exchange, however, runs a different business model from the classic commodity exchange, due to its 
capillary  system  of  warehouses.  A  network  of  742  warehouses  spread  around  the  world  (Table  12) 
ensures that the short-term futures contract (up to three months, usually) can be used as a cash price 
reference with delivery close to points of net consumption. No LME delivery is possible today in China.  
Table 12. LME’s network of warehouses 
  Aluminium  Copper  Zinc  Lead  Tin  Nickel  Cobalt1  Cobalt2  Steel 
All 
metals 
Belgium  32  32  32  32  27  27  3  -  12  44 
Germany  18  15  18  18  14  14  -  -  -  18 
Italy  38  28  38  38  26  34  -  -  2  40 
Japan  6  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  6 
Korea 
(South) 
58  58  -  -  42  58  -  -  5  63 
Malaysia  52  52  52  52  24  49  -  -  11  63 
Netherlands  177  177  177  174  142  145  6  2  16  193 
Singapore  54  54  54  54  50  50  3  3  -  54 
Spain  20  20  20  20  20  20  -  -  2  22 
Sweden  8  7  7  7  -  2  -  -  -  8 
Turkey  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  9  9 
UAE  -  8  8  8  -  8  -  -  4  11 
UK  37  31  37  37  33  33  -  -  -  37 
USA  160  116  159  160  84  141  2  1  11  174 
Grand Total  660  598  602  600  462  581  14  6  72  742 
Source: LME. 
As  a  result  of  this  network,  LME  warehouses  stored  more  than  11%  of  the  global  annual 
production of aluminium and less than 2% of copper, at the end of 2011. Due to the drop in demand 
following the crisis, high futures prices and low interest rates (see Section 1.3), the amount of aluminium 
in LME warehouses more than doubled from 2008 to 2009, becoming de facto the main global spot market 
for aluminium in the world.  
Table 13. LME aluminium and copper stocks, 2003-2011  
Year 
Global 
Production 
Global 
Consumption 
LME 
stocks* 
% Global 
production 
Global 
Production 
Global 
Consumption 
LME 
stocks* 
% Global 
production 
 
Aluminium  Copper 
2003  28,002  27,608  1,423  5.08%  15,221  15,315  431  2.83% 
2004  29,940  29,957  693  2.31%  15,832  16,671  49  0.31% 
2005  31,889  31,689  644  2.02%  16,651  16,680  92  0.55%  
 
2006  33,975  33,935  698  2.06%  17,353  17,007  191  1.1% 
2007  38,186  37,411  929  2.43%  18,044  18,143  199  1.1% 
2008  39,669  36,900  2,338  5.89%  18,501  18,138  341  1.84% 
2009  37,198  34,765  4,624  12.43%  18,613  18,178  502  2.7% 
2010  41,112  39,662  4,275  10.4%  19,190  19,365  378  1.97% 
2011  43,652  42,027  4,979  11.41%  19,578  19,508  372  1.9% 
2012  45,207  45,000  5,100  11.28%  19,951  20,376  300  1.5% 
Source: LME, WMBS, International Aluminium Institute, CRU. Thousands of metric tonnes (MT). Note: see 
Annex for full data from 1992. Note: *end of the year, thousands tonnes. See also sections 3.2.1.4 and 3.3.1.4. 
The delivery warrants issued by LME-sponsored warehouses  is a special case in  international 
banking finance. Even though they do not have legal value under English law, they are widely accepted 
as a fully negotiable receipt that can be pledged in financial transactions, such as loans to finance stocks 
rental costs. The reasons can be found in the requirements that LME asks of warehouses that want to be 
part of its network. There are three key requirements (LME, 2011): 
1.  The delivery warrant should identify the specific parcel of metal within the warehouse (plus the 
exact brand, weight and shape).24 
2.  In the event of bankruptcy, local laws must foresee that no restriction should be placed on owners 
of metals that want to take possession of the individually identified metal. 
3.  The warehouse should meet all other requirements that are requested by the international banking 
finance activities for the warrant to be accepted as a fully negotiable. 
These  three  safeguards  offer  sufficient  legal  certainty  for  the  claim.  The  first  requirement 
establishes  the  claim  of  the  user  on  a  physically  (individually)  identifiable  commodity  within  the 
premises of the warehouse. LME also decides which brands of aluminium are eligible to be traded and 
stored on the LME network. The second ensures that the local legal environment does not impede taking 
possession  of  that  specific  good,  even  under  bankruptcy.  The  third  requirement  ensures  that  the 
warehouse  is  complaint  with  the  additional  requirements  that  the  banking  industry  recognises  as 
internationally acceptable market practices. 
In addition to the legal aspects of the warrant, to be approved as a ‘good delivery point’: 
  The  warehouse  should  be  located  in  a  area  of  net  consumption  and  away  from  areas  of 
production. 
  The area where the warehouse is located should be a key passage for international trading.  
  The location of the warehouse should be safe, politically and economically stable, and with an 
appropriate fiscal and legal system. 
The first requirement above aims at protecting the location from volatile factors linked to short-
term supply and demand trends by keeping the delivery point away from areas of production. The 
second  ensures  that  the  warehouse  sits  in  the  right  place  in  terms  of  international  trade  of  that 
commodity. The third requirement, in addition to those linked to the legal value of the warrant, ensures 
that the environment in which the warehouse operates is safe and sound. This minimises the impact of 
external factors on the price formation of future contracts and their convergence to spot prices. 
No restrictions or transparency rules apply to the ownership of warehouses, which are usually 
owned  by  third  parties  to  which  LME  outsources  storage  and  final  delivery  of  the  commodity  (see 
Section 3.2.1.4).  
The regulatory and supervisory environment 
Due to their importance in strategic markets such as commodities, exchanges have received attention 
from regulators, especially in the United States, since the beginning of the last century (Pirrong, 1993; 
1995). A specific authority in charge of supervising commodities futures markets, the Commodity 
Futures  Trading  Commission  (CFTC),  was  established  in  the  United  States  in  1974.  The  first 
comprehensive  regulatory  framework  in  the  United  States  can  be  dated  back  to  1922  (the  Grain 
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Futures Act). Since then, US regulators have updated the text on several occasions, while in Europe 
and emerging markets is a different story. In Europe a limited set of regulations has been put in place 
over time at the  national  level, but harmonised European regulation is  only  being proposed now 
through the revision of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (Directive 2004/39) and the 
review  of  the  Market  Abuse  Directive  (Directive  2003/6)  for  commodities  futures  markets.  The 
Regulation on Wholesale Energy Market Integrity and Transparency (REMIT), instead, mainly applies 
disclosure requirements to the physical market for energy. Supervision, however, is still fragmented at 
the national level and in many cases there is no clear understanding of which authority should be in 
charge of supervising the relevant infrastructures of the commodities exchange at the national and 
European level. Most of the supervision, at least until today, was done by the exchanges themselves 
through internal mechanisms to regulate and control trades. It is, in fact, in the interest of the trading 
venue that trades are run smoothly on the platform. However, since the transformation of exchanges 
into  for-profit  entities,  regulators  have  gradually  shifted  their  attention  to  new  mechanisms  of 
supervision that can best  dedicate private and public (supervisors’) resources  to enforcement and 
market surveillance. Recent market turmoil and the astonishing growth of commodities markets in the 
last decade have led regulators to consider a more comprehensive and integrated approach, which 
may ultimately benefit from a harmonised cross-border initiative. 
1.2.3  Seaborne freight markets 
Seaborne freight markets have become an essential part of constantly increasing commodity trades 
across the globe. The ability to ship commodities at a reasonable price may determine the success, or 
even  the  death,  of  a  market.  As  market  prices  are  mostly  free-on-board  (FOB)25, i.e. they do not 
include freight costs but only d elivery at a pre -defined point, freight markets have developed an 
increasingly  competitive  environment,  with  cheaper  freight  rates  that  have  made  long -distance 
shipping sustainable and promoted a global network among operators and key trading venues.  
There are two ways of classifying freight markets: 
1.  By type of commodity.  
2.  By capacity and means of transport. 
The first splits commodities shipping into two further categories: wet and dry freight markets. 
Wet  markets  deal  with  seaborne  transportation  of  oil  and  oil  products.  Dry  markets  are  freight 
markets for dry bulk commodities, such as agricultural products like grains, and minerals/metals 
such as iron ore or aluminium. Almost 90% of all dry cargoes are metals and energy commodities. 
Only 10% of total dry cargo trades involve agricultural commodities, as these commodities tend to 
have  limited  storability  over  long  periods,  limited  demand,  or  are  usually  produced  close  to 
consumption areas. 
                                                            
25 Alternative prices may include costs of freight and insurance (the cost, insurance and freight, or CIF, price), 
except costs of transport after unloading at the port of destination. This price is typically used for customised 
commodity derivatives traded ‘over-the-counter’. It is, in effect, efficient for low volumes, but it does not give 
control on the shipment.  
 
Figure 13. Global dry cargo trade, 2011 
 
Source: DVB Research. 
The second way of classifying seaborne shipping is by capacity of the vessels, which may play a 
crucial role for low-price commodities that are consumed in high quantities. Here, there are three 
important categories: oil tankers, containers and dry bulk carriers. Although a larger vessel would 
allow more commodities to be shipped at a lower marginal cost, some destinations may limit the 
volume of ship possible due to the size of the port, for instance, or the need to pass through the Suez 
or Panama canals. Dry bulk cargoes can be either Capesize, Panamax, Suezmax or Handymax, while 
wet freights ships can be Aframax, Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCC), Ultra Large Crude Carriers 
(ULCC), Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) carriers or other types of tankers (Table 14).  
Table 14. Ship types and capacity 
  Dead Weight Tons (per ship)  Commodities 
Handymax  30,000 - 60,000  Dry bulk 
Capesize  80,000 – 225,000  Dry bulk 
VLOC  Above 225,000  Dry bulk 
Panamax  50,000 - 80,000   Dry bulk/Crude oil 
Supramax  120,000 – 200,000  Dry bulk/Crude oil 
Aframax  80,000 – 120,000  Crude oil 
VLCC  200,000 – 350,000  Crude oil 
ULCC  350,000+  Crude oil 
LNG/LPG Carriers  Up to 266,000 cubic meters  Liquefied gas 
Other tankers and 
general cargoes 
Up to 45,000 (short range) 
Up to 100,000 (long range) 
Containers, chemicals and other 
refined petroleum products 
Sources: www.shipping-markets.com and various websites. 
As the market develops, an increasing number of dry cargoes with a single deck are being built 
to carry massive numbers of containers. Containers allow better diversification and more flexible use 
for transport of multiple commodities. 
The market shares of these various means of transport are more or less stable over time, due to 
the characteristics of the industry. Containers are increasingly competing with dry bulk carriers in the 
dry freight market, but most of the dry shipping is still done with bulk cargoes (Figure 14).  34 | SETTING THE SCENE: THE STRUCTURE OF COMMODITIES MARKETS 
 
Figure 14. Dry fleet global capacity (dead weight millions tonnes)  
 
Source: Author from UNCTADstat (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development). 
The overall capacity of dry shipping has grown steadily over the last decade, as the production 
of  metals  and  agricultural  commodities  has  been  increasing  consistently  despite  the  2008  drop  in 
global  GDP  and  the  economic  slowdown  due  to  the  financial  crisis.  Shipping  capacity  has  also 
increased for wet freight markets, as oil tankers are an important element of the growing international 
trade in natural gas and are needed to meet the high demand of emerging Asian countries, which 
have limited access to pipeline oil or gas.   
The  structure  of  freight  markets  presents  many  challenges.  Inelastic  demand  and  supply 
exposes the market to sudden price swings and prolonged periods of instability. Figure 15 describes 
supply and demand interaction. As demand for seaborne freight services grows, the curve gradually 
shifts to the right from point a to point b, i.e. more demand causes the equilibrium to move to a level 
with higher quantity to be supplied at a higher market-clearing price. The growth in demand for 
minerals and industrial metals for construction in emerging markets from 2001 to 2007 contributed to 
the gradual shift from point a to point c. Among the industrial metals, iron ore production went up 
82.63%, aluminium by 56.27% and crude steel by 63.27%. Total global production of iron ore, steel, 
aluminium and copper soared by 72.8%, on average.  
Figure 15. Supply and demand interaction 
 
Source: Adapted from Nomikos (2012). 
Eight years of steady growth in demand gradually raised prices and volatility to unsustainable 
levels, once the capacity of the system had reached the critical point c. Freight rates for Brazilian iron 
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ore, for instance, reached up to 200% of the value of the underlying commodity in the autumn of 2007 
(Figure 16). 
Figure 16. Freight rates and total production/capacity (2006=100) 
 
Sources: Author’s elaboration from ICAP, UNCTADstat, WBMS, World Steel Association (WSA), LKAB.26 
As  a  consequence  of  this  prolonged  instability,  investments  flowed  into  the  industry  from 
financial firms to build sufficient capacity and keep up with growing volumes, shifting the supply 
curve (Figure 15) to the right (S2), i.e. the supply capacity experienced a sudden increase that pushed 
prices down over a short time frame. As a result of the growing supply of dry bulk cargoes (+33.62%) 
and the drop in demand in 2008, following the anaemic growth of global production due to the global 
financial crisis initially triggered by the burst of the housing market bubble in western economies, the 
cost of shipping tumbled by over 93% between June and December 2008 alone (Figure 17). Prices 
dropped to the equilibrium point d and may stay there for some time. 
Figure 17. BDI index and dry freight capacity (mn Dead Weight Tonnes, DWT) 
 
Sources: Author’s elaboration from ICAP and UNCTADstats.27 
                                                            
26 C3 freight rate is a dry bulk rate to ship iron ore from Brazil to China. 
27 The Baltic Dry Index (BDI) represents a major dry freight cost index that collects rates on major global routes, 
widely used across the shipping industry. 
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Since December 2008, prices have been subject to significant swings but have never returned to 
the levels reached in 2008. Figure 18 shows the 750-trading-day annualised volatility28 for the BDI 
index (from April 2007 to April 2012). Volatility is higher than other major commodities and almost 
double the volatility of a major equity index.  
Figure 18. 750-trading-day annualised volatility, 2007-2012 
 
Sources: Author’s calculation from CME, ICAP and Yahoo Finance. 
To hedge against these highly volatile trends and exogenous factors such as port congestion or 
geopolitical  events,  market  participants  are  increasingly  using  forward  contracts  on  underlying 
shipping routes, which are linked to indexes such as the BDI. These contracts are cash-settled, and 
OTC traded and cleared. They tend to have a high basis risk, i.e. the difference between the price of 
the forward and the underlying exposure, as they track an index and not the specific characteristics of 
the exposure. Liquidity in this market is usually concentrated in one-month to two-month contracts 
(Geman, 2005).  
1.2.4  Interaction between futures and physical markets price formation 
The interaction in price formation between futures and physical29 markets materialises in two phases: 
during the duration of the futures contract, and at maturity. During the duration of the futures 
contract, information about  inventory  levels  and exogenous factors fuel   increasing or decreasing 
divergence of futures prices with spot prices (Figure 19).  
                                                            
28 It is the annualised standard deviation of the natural logarithm of prices ratio. 
29 The words ‘physical’ and ‘spot’ are used interchangeably in this report. ‘Spot price’ can be pure physical of 
rolling front month price.  
 
Figure 19. Futures and spot prices interaction 
 
Source: Author’s own. 
When  the  futures  price  is  above  the  spot  price,  i.e.  the  basis  (difference  between  spot  and 
futures price) is negative, the market is in ‘contango’. When the futures contract price is below the 
spot price (i.e. the basis is positive), the market is in ‘backwardation’. At maturity, the price of the 
futures should converge to the spot price due to the ‘commitment to deliver’ mentioned above, which 
does not allow arbitrage to become systematic. . Recent contributions, such as Hernandez and Torero 
(2010), claim that futures markets have been even leading price changes in spot markets. 
The theory of storage 
During the duration of the contract, futures prices (for different maturities) fluctuate and may diverge 
from spot prices. The difference between spot price,    (at date t), and futures price,      
(at date t and 
maturity T)   is typically called “basis”.  The futures price can be written as follows: 
                                                 (4) 
Where r is the interest rate for risk-free alternative investments, k is the cost of warehousing and 
ρ  is  risk-adjusted  discount  rate  for  the  commodity,  i.e.  the  benefit  from  holding  the  physical 
commodity. 
Then, following the MCY formula (1) above: 
                               (5) 
As a result, the basis is the marginal convenience yield (full cost of carry of a commodity), 
minus  the  sum  of  the  interest  forgone  on  alternative  risk-free  investments  and  the  costs  of 
warehousing the commodity. This means that the basis is positive (backwardation), so the spot price is 
higher than the futures price, when the futures price is insufficient to cover interest foregone and the 
cost  of  warehousing  (exogenous  factors).  There  is  therefore  an  incentive  to  sell  the  commodity 
immediately, which results in a reduction in inventory levels. Besides the importance of warehousing 
systems and interest rates set through monetary policies, this suggests that several other factors put 
direct pressure on futures prices, but essentially through the increase or reduction of inventory levels 
that is a response function of demand and supply factors (Kaldor, 1939; Working, 1949; Telser, 1958; 
Brennan, 1958). Among these factors are monetary policies affecting interest rates (r), the costs and 
policies of the warehousing system (k), and the benefit from holding the commodity (ρ), which can be 
measured as follows: 
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This is the endogenous idiosyncratic factor that pushes anyone, whether a user or a producer, to 
hold a commodity. The first part of the equation is the reserve value that the holder gives to holding a 
commodity at date T, so the difference between expected spot price E(P) and current spot price. The 
second part is the net convenience yield, i.e. the dividend of the commodity, or the compounded value 
of current spot price at date T (using the risk-free interest rate) minus the current futures price, over 
the current spot price. As a consequence, both exogenous and endogenous factors (expectations) can 
affect inventories and, through them, the futures and spot price relationship (Figure 20). 
Figure 20. Futures-spot price interaction through inventories 
 
Source: Author’s own. 
As inventories fall, the spot price gradually catches up with the futures price and the curve 
inverts into backwardation until, for one of the three reasons mentioned above, the inventory levels 
recover and futures prices begin to regain ground to converge at maturity. Following Section 1.2.1.1, 
Figure 21 illustrates the relationship between inventories and the marginal convenience yield, which 
ultimately affects the basis and so futures prices, creating a direct link between physical and futures 
markets.  
Fama  and  French  (1988)  found  evidence  that  inventory  levels  are  positively  related  to  the 
marginal convenience yield. This evidence has been also confirmed by the empirical analysis in the 
following chapters. The higher the level of inventory, the lower the MCY, so inventory levels are 
directly related to the three factors that ultimately affect future prices (r, k and ρ).  
Figure 21. MCY-inventories relationship 
 
Source: Fama and French (1988).   
 
For metals, Fama and French (1988) found that when inventories are low, spot prices are more 
volatile than futures prices. The negative relationship between MCY and inventories has been also 
recognised by Routledge et al., (2000) and more recently by Gorton et al. (2008). This explains how 
futures  prices  are  complementary  tools  to  inventories  in  supporting  the  hedging  strategies  of 
commodities users and producers. For non-storable commodities, they are the only proper hedging 
tools available. 
For storable commodities, as a consequence of the storage theory (i.e. the storage process, being 
a response function of supply and demand, drives futures and spot prices), when the futures curve is 
in contango a ‘cash and carry’ trade opportunity arises. More specifically, the commodity investor will 
have incentives to sell the forward contract and buy the commodity directly or through a loan, if the 
risk-free interest rate is sufficiently low. When the futures curve is in backwardation, though, the 
futures price is insufficient to cover cost of storage and interest foregone for alternative investments, 
so the commodities investor may enter in a  ‘reverse cash and carry’ trade. He/she buys a future 
contract and sells the commodity immediately. 
The theory of ‘normal backwardation’ 
In addition to the storage theory, there is an additional theory, generally attributed to Keynes (1923), 
which assigns to futures markets the role of a risk transfer mechanism where investors earn a risk 
premium for bearing the future spot price risk for classic hedgers. If hedging demand (net shorts) 
exceeds the supply of long investors (net long positions), the risk premium would be positive. As a 
result, futures markets should usually be backwarded (spot prices higher than futures prices), as the 
hedgers  have  to  pay  a  risk  premium  to  speculators.  Futures  prices  are  thus  biased  estimates  of 
expected cash prices (Carter, 2000). The risk premium (π) can be defined as, 
                    (7) 
where E(P
T
) is the expected spot price at date T and      is the value of the future price with maturity 
T. This theory, however, has found very weak evidence over the years (see, among others, Gray, 1961; 
Rockwell 1967; Gray and Routledge, 1971). As Table 15 shows, when looking at trading patterns for 
seven key commodities, for only a few of the past 23 years was the curve in backwardation for the 
majority  of  the  trading  days  (using  a  differential  between  3-months  or  second  month  and  cash 
forward contracts or front-month). 
Table 15. Contango and backwardation by commodity (years) 
    1990-2012* 
Corn 
Contango  21 
Backwardation 
2 
(1996, 2012) 
Wheat 
Contango  20 
Backwardation 
3 
(1992-93,1996) 
Cocoa 
Contango  23 
Backwardation  0 
Aluminium 
Contango  23 
Backwardation  0 
Copper 
Contango  13 
Backwardation 
10 
(1990-91,1995-97,2004-2008) 
White sugar 
Contango 
7 
(1992, 1998-2000, 2004, 2008-09) 
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Soybean oil 
Contango  19 
Backwardation 
4 
(1994-95, 2003-04) 
Note: *Until 19/07/2012. 
Source: Author’s calculation from CME Group, LME, LIFFE. 
Cocoa and aluminium have not had prolonged periods in backwardation at all in the last 23 
years. Only sugar still has a future-spot prices curve in backwardation today. 
There are two problems with this theoretical framework. First, the hypothesis is that hedgers 
are all net shorts. As explained above, not all hedging positions are short (hedging may have very 
complex and diversified strategies). Second, as Gray and Routledge (1971) pointed out, Keynes may 
have been misinterpreted in his original idea. At his time, backwardation had several meanings and 
was also used to denote the risk premium paid by a seller to a buyer that allows postponing the 
delivery of a stock certificate. Following the two authors, Keynes may have just said that whether 
markets  can  reflect  contango  or  backwardation,  a  risk  premium  is  a  “normal”  component  of  the 
difference between spot and futures prices. In effect, if we disentangle the costs of storage and interest 
foregone from the basis, in the vast majority of cases the curve should offer a risk premium and so 
become  backwardated.  If  this  does  not  happen,  there  should  be  greater  incentives  to  stock  the 
commodity and benefit from contango later on. Keynes claimed that this was an exceptional situation 
vis-à-vis a ‘normal’ market activity. 
Price convergence 
A second important factor in the interaction among futures and spot markets is the convergence of 
futures contracts to the spot price. As mentioned above, this is mainly due to the ‘commitment to 
deliver’ embedded in the futures contract. When close to delivery, markets start to discount the fact 
that if the price of the future diverges at delivery, there is an opportunity of arbitrage among markets 
and so the market will adjust its value to the spot market. For instance, if at delivery day the futures 
price is lower than the spot price, the market will buy the futures contract until the two prices become 
equal (taking into account costs of delivery and differences due to different grades, etc.). Anticipating 
this behaviour, futures prices (front-month and other contracts with same maturity) will then adjust 
automatically to the spot price close to maturity (plus a differential). For corn futures contract traded 
on CBOT and spot price (US No.2, Yellow, U.S. Gulf, Friday, published by USDA), the differential 
around the last trade date (premium over futures price) was on average around 10% of the spot price 
in 2011. 
As illustrated in Figure 22, the front-month begins to converge to the December month contract in 
August, at the end of the harvest, as both front and December month discount same information about 
supply and demand so the differential with spot prices (dashed line) is converging to the front-month 
one by arbitrages opportunities.   
 
Figure 22. Futures price convergence in corn futures contracts 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from CBOT, FAO, USDA. Note: $cents/bushel; spot price is US No.2, Yellow, U.S. 
Gulf (Friday). 
The ‘commitment to deliver’ also ensures that futures market dynamics do not affect the spot 
market price directly. If prices do not catch up, arbitrage will produce convergence anyway. However, 
as suggested by Figure 22, futures and spot prices will in any case have some difference at maturity, as 
the futures prices embed delivery and interest foregone before you can actually hold the commodity.  
Futures/spot price divergence can be determined by two sets of factors:  
a.  The underlying commodity and delivery.  
b.  Problems with physical settlement. 
First, there is divergence if the physical underlying asset to be hedged is different from the 
commodity underlying the futures contract (e.g. using a crude oil futures contract to hedge jet fuel 
costs), as well as delivery features of the contract that are embedded in the final price (f.o.b., in-store, 
etc). Second, divergence can be caused by any impediment that does not allow delivery of the physical 
commodity. These impediments can arise because of problems with the grade of the commodity (and 
its chemical attributes), or the location of the delivery. As discussed in the Chapter 2, a prolonged 
delay in delivering the commodity may cause a spike in order cancellations and a sudden increase in 
price of physical and futures because the supply of the commodity is constrained. 
1.2.5  Why do market participants trade? 
Investing  in  commodities  has  always  been  subject  to  greater  scrutiny  due  to  the  implication  that 
demand and supply patterns in these markets may  have for the economy as a whole. The recent 
financial crisis has also increased the weight of investors shifting from purely financial asset classes to 
instruments  with  an  underlying  commodity  or  close  proxy.  Commodities  are  less  subject  to 
obsolescence (so they do not easily go out of market) and can be used as an inflation hedge. Among 
commodities, precious metals (like gold) have always played a larger role in the economy as a mean to 
protect value against inflation and have become an alternative to currency accumulation, especially in 
a world with low returns (IMF, 2012). Investing directly in commodities is, however, very costly due 
to the unpredictable factors that can change their price patterns and the amount of cash that is needed 
to cover daily margin calls for marked-to-market futures positions. Transferable securities, instead, 
can be held for long periods without any margin to be posted (unless they are purchased through 
leveraged operations).  
The investment strategies in commodities are manifold. They can be clustered, however, in  a few 
areas: 
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2.  Funding. 
3.  Arbitraging. 
4.  Information trading. 
Hedging 
Hedging is, perhaps, the investment objective that has received most attention over the years. Futures 
markets were originally designed to accommodate the needs of commodities users and producers that 
wanted  to  hedge  their  business  from  the  various  risks  linked  to  commodities.  An  example  of  a 
hedging strategy is the case of a trading firm that buys cash wheat and hedges the exposure to the 
physical commodity (to be delivered) in the period between the purchase and actual delivery to a 
buyer. Hedging can be short or long, as long as there is an immediate price risk to be protected, 
whether the commodity is physically held or not (e.g. electricity). Hedging activities can generate 
significant benefits (see among others, Heifner, 1972 and Peck, 1975), and there are several forms of 
commercial hedging (Working, 1962): 
1.  Arbitrage hedging. 
2.  Operational hedging. 
3.  Anticipatory hedging. 
4.  Selective hedging. 
5.  Pure risk-avoidance hedging. 
Arbitrage hedging is not classical hedging but covers the commodities user or producer from 
the exposure caused by the divergence between the futures price and the spot price. The strategy 
predicts convergence between the two prices and positions the investor to benefit from predictable 
changes in the basis and to avoid any impact on the main hedging operation. Operational hedging is 
the  classical  hedging  strategy,  where  the  futures  position  facilitates  commercial  business  by 
temporarily  substituting  a  cash  market  transaction,  so  providing  flexibility  to  the  day-to-day 
operations as well as protection from price risk. Anticipatory hedging is the purchase or sale of a 
futures  contract  by  a  commercial  firm  in  anticipation  of  a  forthcoming  cash  market  transaction. 
Selective hedging is done to avoid any risk on the transaction, so it should not provide any gain but 
simply protection over the completion of the operation. This hedging can certainly take various forms, 
either long  or short positions. It is usually done to  cover business  operations  from volatility risk. 
Finally, the pure ‘risk-avoidance’ hedge avoids unnecessary risk-taking by another position that is 
primarily based on information about future price trends rather than a specific physical exposure. This 
hedging is not usually done by the classic commodity firm, but by portfolio managers that want to 
diversify their portfolio. It often overlaps with ‘informed trading’ (see below). 
 
Box 4. Case study: corn storage hedge 
An example of a combined anticipatory and operational hedge is a corn storage hedge (Bunge, 2012). The 
user (or a producer collecting harvests from small regional farmers) in June wants to anticipate hedging 
the risk of storage from November (when he/she will buy the physical commodity) until March, which is 
the next available month for delivery. A large crop is expected (so large inventories and the spread 
between December and March is reasonably high).  
The  commodities  firm  buys  the  spread  between  December  (the  closest  available  date  to  the 
November harvest as in November the cash market is inactive) and the March futures contract, by selling 
the futures contract in March and buying the futures contract in December in case the crop is not large 
enough. For this transaction to be possible, the spread should be higher than the actual storage cost from 
November  to  March.  Typically,  the  distance  in  time  embeds  this  cost.  When  November  comes,  the 
commodity firm buys the corn from regional farmers and compares the spread with the March delivery. 
It should still realise a profit from the spread over the storage cost of keeping the commodity from 
November to delivery in March. Unwinding the futures position (spread) will produce additional costs, 
but the likely net gain of the hedge would remain positive (see below and Bunge, 2012). 
Buy the spread: 
Sell CH (corn futures with maturity in March) at 580 
Buy CZ (corn futures with maturity in December) at 550  
 
Gain put on spread: 30 (historically in June is 20; another reason to do the hedge) 
If  the  harvest  is  disappointing  and  demand  for  storage  space  reverts  to  normal,  the  hedge  will  be 
beneficial. 
The November outcome: 
Sell physical corn for March delivery at 595 
Buy physical corn in November spot market at 575 
Revenue on physical transaction: 20  
Storage cost November – March: -15  
Profit on physical transaction: 5  
Unwind futures spread: 
Sell CZ at 575 
Buy CH at 595 
Loss unwinding spread: 20 
Net gain on hedge: 30 - 20 =10  
Net gain on physical transaction: 5 
Final gain = 15 
If the crop is larger the gain should be higher, but if there is a hedge you have the same net result. So 
hedging does not necessarily give unpredicted high returns, but allows the commodity firm to stabilise 
earnings over time and predict trends. 
Other trading objectives 
Another trading objective is generated from the need for liquidity/funding relief. Positions may be 
taken to meet specific regulatory requirements, or be due to increasing margin requirements that can 
no longer be met by the commodity firm. Both situations may cause some level of trading that is not 
justified  by  other  investment  strategies.  Some  new  commodities  indexes,  structured  as  exchange-
traded funds, are used by financial institution as liquidity relief (De Manuel and Lannoo, 2012), but 
their size is still small if precious metals and crude oil are not included (see Section 1.3). Spotting a 
divergence between futures and spot price at maturity is the classic example of arbitrage. If the futures 
price at maturity is lower than the spot price (beyond the spread between the two due to delivery 
costs), the commodity firm will exploit this situation by buying the futures rather than the spot. This 
type of trading is developed in all asset classes once an opportunity arises to generate returns without 
risk. The important aspect of this transaction is that this is a risk-free operation. 
Informed trading, also known as ‘speculation’30, is a form of trading based on investments in 
private (non-inside) information, which the trader exploits to generate profits. Speculation is different 
from market manipulation, whereby the trader exploits inside information that is used illegally. It is 
important that the term ‘inside’ is properly defined to understand the distinction. Informed trading 
can be split into two main categories: 
1.  Trend spotters. 
2.  Index investing. 
The first category includes several strategies aimed at anticipating the trend in future or spot 
prices.  Among  these,  there  are  three  important  trading  styles  for  commodities:  a  legal  form  of 
‘scalping’; position trading; and ‘spread’ trading. Scalping is a different form of market making where 
the trader (through the use of advanced technologies, such as high-frequency trading) ‘makes’ the bid-
ask spread by exploiting small changes in the bid-ask spread through trading tick sizes. This trading 
activity should provide liquidity and reduce the size of the bid-ask spread. Technological advances 
are making it more stable even in highly volatile market conditions, with limited liquidity withdrawal 
under volatility. Position trading is the classical ‘trend spotting’ strategy, using private information 
(e.g. research, whether from a newspaper article or a complex statistical model) to predict how the 
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future curve will move and take a position accordingly. Finally, spread trading is an attempt to gain 
from  the  differences  between  future  contracts  with  different  maturities  or  commodities,  by 
recognising specific price patterns. For instance, March contracts may be historically low in relation to 
those expiring in May, net of carrying costs and interest foregone. Other categories of spread trading 
deal with strategies to gain from transactions across similar commodities, by exploiting seasonality 
factors.  
Index investing, whether for funding or informed trading, involves a significant new class of 
trader that has important differences with the classical informed trader, mainly taking long positions 
through indexes for long periods of time (see Section 1.3.3). 
Informed trading can involve three types of analyses: fundamental analysis, which looks at the 
general  fundamental  aspects  of  the  market  (including  political  aspects);  technical  analysis,  which 
follows patterns on complex charts; and quantitative analysis, which uses complex statistical models 
to identify trends and profit from them. 
Table 16. Comparing investment objectives 
  PROs  CONs 
Hedging  Risk protection and predictability  Costly 
Funding  Liquidity relief  Indirect costs on operations 
Arbitrage  Risk-free gain and price efficiency  Occasional 
Informed trading 
Investing in information, 
which flows into prices 
Risky 
Source: Author. 
An  important  difference  between  informed  trading  (or  speculation)  and  gambling  is  that 
speculation  allows  existing  risk  to  be  transferred  to  those  that  claim  they  can  handle  it,  while 
gambling  is  new  simply  unnecessary  risk.  Informed  trading  allows  new  pieces  of  information 
(whether low or high quality31) to be channelled into prices , thus increasing the efficiency of price 
formation  mechanism  (Grossman,  1977;  O’Hara,  1995).  Publicly  available  information  (or  its 
interpretation)  may  be  also  wrong,  but  this  noise  increases  the  incentives  for  traders  with  good 
information to trade on the market and so bring in good information, which would not be the case for 
a market with fully-informed participants. This would be beneficial even though investors may bet on 
the  continuation  of  the  trend  while  the  process  of  re-alignment  to  fundamentals  goes  on,  and 
temporarily shift prices away from fundamentals (through herding), at a high risk of being caught in 
the re-adjustment process (De Long et al., 1990; Vansteenkiste, 2011). However, excessive information 
may also discourage investments in information if there is not sufficient return. It would deteriorate 
the quality of price formation. It seems highly unlikely, therefore, that informed trading would drive 
prices  in  liquid  markets  significantly  away  from  fundamentals,  as  long  as  it  is  not  the  result  of 
information that is not correctly priced by all market participants (such as the spillover effects of 
prolonged expansionary monetary policy operations) or it is an attempt at manipulation (see the next 
section  for  early  empirical  evidence).  Even  if  trading  activity  were  to  drive  prices  away  from 
fundamentals, it is not in the nature of such trading to hold long-term equilibrium based on low-
quality information, unless for manipulation purposes (which is a different topic). This is particularly 
true  for  commodities  futures  markets,  where  positions  are  marked-to-market  on  a  daily  basis,  so 
prolonged positions in futures markets without any link to fundamentals cannot be held for long 
without the involvement of significant amounts of cash to keep margins at maintenance level and so 
high risk.  
                                                            
31 It may be, in fact, incorrect to distinguish between informed and uninformed traders. All trading is done on the 
basis  of  information,  whether  it  is  a  low  quality  or  high quality,  and  whether it  is  based  on a  fundamental 
analysis, or a technical analysis, or just on a pure arbitrage among markets and products.  
 
1.3  Key futures market developments  
In recent years, as a result of the financial and economic crisis and the resulting slump in values of 
several  asset  classes,  the  rise  in  commodities  prices  volatility  has  led  to  questions  over  the 
organisation of futures and physical commodities markets. Spikes in food prices and volatility (and 
also  in  energy  commodities)  have  called  into  question  government  policies  and  the  role  of  the 
financial sector in supporting the development of physical markets (EU COM, 2011). 
Food security, for instance, may have caused economic uncertainty and political instability in 
some  emerging  countries.  Worries  have  thus  mounted  around  the  organisation  of  commodities 
markets, as the perception of the public opinion is easily deceived by the complexity of the interaction 
between futures and physical markets. In the meantime, all commodities markets in the last decade 
have rapidly grown in volume and have become, for some investors, a separated asset class because of 
their supposedly counter-cyclical nature (Gorton and Rouwenhorst, 2004; Geman, 2005). Investments 
have  been  diverted  to  commodities  markets  in  a  process  known  as  ‘financialisation’,  which  some 
claim to be the cause of prolonged price spikes and volatility in certain commodities area.  
1.3.1  What does financialisation mean? 
‘Financialisation’  is  the  process  of  alignment  of  commodities  returns  with  pure  financial  assets 
(‘pooling effect’), so increasing co-movements among asset classes that have been historically seen as 
following  opposite  causal  pattern.  This  process  began  well  before  the  financial  crisis,  but  it  has 
continued to develop in several ways over the years. There are at least three events that, combined 
together, have contributed to massive investments in commodities markets that have changed their 
structure and organisation, and which can be summarised in the word ‘financialisation’: 
1.  Access to credit post-deregulation. 
2.  International trade. 
3.  Technological developments. 
Accommodating monetary policies, with easy access to cheap credit due to a prolonged period 
of low interest rates, have increased direct financing of commodities commercial operations. Frankel 
(2006) shows how the CRB commodity price index is strongly negatively related, both in the short and 
long-term, to real interest rates, which raises the question of how the transmission of any government 
policy (monetary or fiscal) results in new market developments for commodities (see Section 1.3.3). 
Accessibility  to  credit  and  transmission  channels  of  monetary  policies  were  also  improved  by  a 
gradual  removal  of  barriers  for  financial  institutions  that  wanted  to  invest  and  provide  support 
services  to  commodities  markets.  Regulatory  changes  throughout  the  1990s  in  the  United  States 
culminated  in  1999  with  the  US  Gramm-Leach-Bliley  Act  (GLBA)  or  the  Financial  Services 
Modernization Act32, which repealed part of the Glass-Steagall Act (1933)33. The GLBA, in particular, 
allowed combination of different financial activities (commercial, investment and insurance), through 
the use of subsidiaries, within the same group.  In addition, early evidence of a supposedly counter -
cyclical nature of commodities markets and their role for diversification  strategies (Gorton and 
Rouwenhorst, 2004, among others) has attracted liquidity  from  non-commercial players that  has 
boosted the growth of futures markets.  
The commitments to develop international trade through  the  gradual removal of subsidies 
programmes  or  other  barriers  to  cross -border  trade,  which  has  led  producers  to  look  for  risk 
management services to support production, have created enormous space for emerging countries 
that are large commodity producers or consumers. The entry of China, one of the  biggest global trade 
partners and heavy industrial economies (e.g. in oil and raw materials;  see Box 7), into the WTO has 
provoked a fundamental shift in the architecture of commodities markets and the size of financial 
flows supporting their activities.  Lifting restrictions on capital flows over the years has increasingly 
promoted global trade, in particular across sectors and regions of the world that were not major 
commodities trading partners one or two decades ago. 
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Finally,  technological  developments  and  market  liberalisation  in  the  last  decade  have  led 
exchanges  and  intermediaries  to  invest  in  infrastructure  technology,  which  has  promoted  the 
‘electronification’ of trading and the expansion of access points across the globe. Financial markets 
access for commodities producers, users and investors has strongly improved in the last decade. In 
effect, it is possible today to access exchanges remotely via the internet from any place in the world. 
This means that it is also easier for many small producers or users to access data on global benchmark 
prices  and  use  them  as  reference  prices  for  physical  transactions.  Exchanges  therefore  become  an 
essential mechanism of price formation for both futures and physical commodities markets.  
These developments altogether have pushed through new investments: direct purchases in the 
physical market, especially of those commodities with more counter-cyclical characteristics (e.g. gold) 
that can be stored with limited care; the purchase of stocks in commodities firms, both large and start-
up companies with access to new resources (for oil companies, stock market capitalisation has more 
than doubled in less than ten years); the purchase of commodities futures and options to take indirect 
long or short positions in physical markets (Figure 23); or the purchase of commodity indexes units for 
passive long investments (see Section 1.3.3). 
Figure 23. Commitment of traders (wheat CBOT futures contract) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from CFTC database. 
As a result, over the years, all types of traders have increased their position in the market more 
or less equally. ‘Commercial’ positions are prudential estimates, as many commercial companies may 
simply access OTC markets with non-commercial players that have to hedge the OTC position in open 
commodities  futures  markets.  Large  commodities  firms  have  massively  invested  in  own  account 
trading desks to now compete with specialised financial institutions, and have become a point of 
reference  for  the  hedging  operations  of  many  small-to-medium  commodities  firms.  As  Figure  23 
suggests, commercial (with direct exposure or through dealers) and non-commercial positions have 
been growing exponentially since 2003, keeping the natural offsetting of long and short positions. 
Figure 24 illustrates more clearly the exponential growth of all key commodities futures markets, in 
particular between 2003 and 2005, which was the period of the official entry of China in the WTO and 
the beginning of aggressive expansionary monetary policies (see Section 1.4).  Futures markets that 
have developed less have still at least doubled their original size (in open interest) in the last two 
decades.  
 
Figure 24. Open interest by commodity (1 January 1995=100) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from CME Group, LIFFE, LME. Note: monthly data. 
As a result of these important changes, producers have gained better access to credit and are 
now  able  to  obtain  reward  even  for  small,  quality  production,  which  ultimately  increases  the 
productivity of the land. Crops and other commodities can be stored longer because there is greater 
ability to control risk this causes. 
The astonishing growth of futures markets is also reflected in very high volumes, which have 
become multiples of underlying physical markets. Table 17, for instance, shows the volumes of key 
futures benchmark contracts with maturity up to one year (in physical equivalent for the year 2011) 
and compares it with 2011 production. It is a conservative estimate, as the table does not include other 
key futures benchmark for some of these contracts. Since liquidity is mostly concentrated in the first 
year of the maturity (please, see liquidity curves of key futures contracts in Annex), only the rolling 
value of volumes with maturity up to 1 year have been considered to estimate the ratio. 
Table 17. Benchmark futures contracts volumes and ratio over equivalent physical production 
  Futures 
volume 
Futures contract 
(venue) 
2011 global 
production 
Ratio 
futures/physical 
Unit 
Corn  8,142,408,531  5k bushels (CBOT)  814,256,000  9.99  tonnes 
Cocoa  39,072,420  10 tonnes (LIFFE)  3,899,657  10.02  tonnes 
Soybean oil  289,710,107 
60k pounds 
(CBOT) 
41,174,000  7.03  tonnes 
Natural gas  746,722,190 
10k mmBtu 
Henry Hub 
(NYMEX) 
122,338,445  6.1  bn BTU 
Crude oil  163,419,527,000 
1k bbl 
WTI (NYMEX) 
32,266,000,000  5.06  bbl 
Coffee  34,977,640 
10 tonnes 
Robusta (LIFFE) 
8,063,160  4.34  tonnes 
Wheat  1,630,041,328  5k bushels (CBOT)  653,000,000  2.5  tonnes 
Source: Author’s calculations from various sources. Note: Volume of futures contracts for the year 2011 (number 
of contracts) with maturity up to 12 months. Data on volumes for crude oil, natural gas, cocoa, coffee may 
double  if  the  other  available  liquid  futures  contract  for  each  of  these  commodities  (run  by  ICE)  is 
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However, a totally different picture emerges by looking at open interest concentration across 
futures markets, and then comparing these volumes with the global production. Liquidity curves (see 
annex) suggest that liquidity is essentially concentrated on contracts with 9 to 12 months maturity. 
The table below suggests that most of the liquidity in futures markets is concentrated in the first 12 
months, so the ratio over physical markets is measured accordingly. 
Table 18. Benchmark futures contracts open interest and ratio over equivalent physical production 
 
90th 
percentile 
Open Interest  
(in production 
unit) 
Futures 
contracts  
Equivalent 
global 
Production34 
Ratio 
financial/physical 
Natural Gas  
8 months 
(NYMEX) 
12,954,71635 
NYMEX 
- ICE 
81,558,963 
(bn BTU) 
15.8% 
Crude oil 
25 months36 
(NYMEX) 
3,248,147,76037 
WTI - 
Brent 
67,220,833,333 
(bbl) 
4.8% 
Copper 
8 months 
(NYMEX) 
6,339,000,00038  LME 
23,516,000,000 
(pounds) 
26.96% 
Aluminium 
n/a 
(LME) 
18,403,02539  LME 
43,989,000* 
(tonnes) 
41.84% 
Cocoa 
13 months 
(LIFFE) 
3,304,71140 
LIFFE – 
ICE 
4,223,917 
(tonnes) 
78.2% 
Coffee 
6 months 
(LIFFE) 
2,921,64041 
LIFFE - 
ICE 
1,343,860 
(tonnes) 
217.4% 
Corn 
11 months 
(CBOT) 
305,474,46642  CBOT 
746,401,333 
(tonnes) 
40.09% 
Soybean oil 
6 months 
(CBOT) 
2,897,56843  CBOT 
20,587,000 
(tonnes) 
14% 
Wheat 
10 months 
(CBOT) 
115,932,65644  CBOT 
544,166,667 
(tonnes) 
21.3% 
White sugar 
9 months 
(LIFFE) 
3,443,95045  LIFFE 
126,361,500 
(tonnes) 
2.73% 
Note: conservative estimates. *12 months production. 
Source:  Author’s  calculation  from  CME,  LME,  LIFFE,  ICE,  Goldman  Sachs  Research,  BP,  CRB  Commodity 
Yearbook. Conservative estimates. 
As shown above, despite a large increase, the actual size of open interest in futures markets vis-
à-vis the global physical production is still in a range well below 100%. For commodities, such as 
                                                            
34 End 2011 equivalent global production is the physical production corresponding to the number of months 
estimated in the first column as corresponding liquidity. 
35 31 May 2012. 
36 Above 12 months we compare with cap global production to annual values to build the ratio. 
37 31 May 2012. 
38 28 September 2012. 
39 28 September 2012. 
40 28 September 2012. 
41 31 August 2012. 
42 19 July 2012. 
43 19 July 2012. 
44 19 July 2012. 
45 30 March 2012.  
 
coffee and cocoa, the market has been developing a lot, but physical is also fairly volatile, which has 
led several manufacturers to buy the commodity directly on the futures exchange.  
To sum up, on the one hand, open interest positions are a fraction of the physical market, but on 
the  other  hand  open  interest  positions  do  not  capture  the  intra-day  activities  on  futures  markets. 
Futures  markets  volumes  provide  that  information.  Volumes  in  maturities  within  one  year  from 
trading day have now become multiples of the physical production, which shows signs of very intense 
activities. However, the analysis with volumes include types of transactions, from arbitrages between 
maturities to pure hedging, that help to improve the channelling of information about underlying 
physical  markets  into  futures  markets  with  no  actual  involvement  of  movements  in  underlying  
physical  commodities  (99%  of  these  contracts,  including  pure  hedging  positions,  are  offset  before 
maturity). Therefore, the comparison between transactions that are only done to exploit information 
about trades in underlying physical markets and actual physical production (which is not a measure 
of  physical  trade)  may  overestimate  the  weight  of  futures  over  physical  markets.46  Physical 
production  is  a  very  conservative  proxy  of  size  and  volumes  of  underlying  physical  market 
transactions. 
1.3.2  Shedding light on price trends and implications 
Commodities prices trends have historically been under the lens of regulators and the broader public 
due to their immediate implications for day-to-day life and the availability of cheap essential goods. 
There are three important factors that typically fall under scrutiny: price volatility; price correlation 
with non-supply/demand factors; and price spikes, which may have strong political implications for 
food commodities, for example (especially for low-income users). 
Price volatility 
From looking at historical price trends, volatility is nothing new in commodities markets (Reinhart 
and Wickham, 1994) and ‘boom-and-bust’ cycles are common in historical price patterns (Cashin, et 
al., 2002). Due to its regular frequency, the long-term impact of commodities prices volatility has often 
been overlooked. Volatility is harmful for the economy and affects economic growth, as it reduces 
incentives for physical capital accumulation (Tiago et al., 2011). Volatility may affect the price pattern 
of commodities in the short-term or become a more structural long-term issue. Evidence of structural 
long-term volatile patterns has not been confirmed by the academic literature. Gilbert and Morgan 
(2010) find that long-term structural volatility is still relatively low, but that new factors now form part 
of the equation, in particular biofuel production, index investing, and climate change. Figure 25 also 
confirms that  volatility is  still  in line  with  the  historical trend, but is on a rise in the short term. 
Whether more volatile patterns will be the norm in the years to come cannot be ascertained (Lee et al., 
2012). 
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accurate  term  of  comparison,  as  often  futures  contracts  lie  behind  a  single  physical  transaction,  which  are 
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Figure 25. Historical real price volatility, 1925-2010* 
 
Source: Author’s calculation from Bloomberg, IMF, Morgan Stanley Commodities. Note: *Ten-years annualised 
rolling volatility.47 Annual data. 1915=100 
A long list of endogenous and exogenous factors, assessed in this report, such as supply cuts or 
restrictions to trade that have also caused food crises, have pushed volatility up in the last 10-15 years. 
As  Table  19  suggests,  in  recent  years  volatility  has  increased  and  remains  stably  above  pre-crisis 
levels. The volatility peak was reached in 2008-2009 both for the food prices index and a general 
commodity return index (compiled by Thomson Reuters, Jefferies, Commodity Research Bureau). 
Table 19. Volatility analysis and S&P 500 correlation48 
Periods 
TRJ-CRB Total 
Return Index 
volatility* 
FAO Real Price Index 
volatility** 
CRB-TR Index / S&P 500 
Annualised correlation 
2000-2007  0.16  0.25  0.01 
2008-2012  0.22  0.53  0.42 
2008-2009  0.26  0.65  0.37 
2010-2012  0.18  0.45  0.55 
Source: Author’s calculation from Thomson Reuters – Jefferies CRB index website, FAO Stats, IMF and Yahoo 
Finance. Note: Equally weighted averages of 1 year rolling volatility, as measured in footnote 47. *Daily data. 
**Monthly data. 
Since  inventories  are  more  unpredictable  factors  for  agricultural  and  soft  commodities,  low 
inventory  levels  and  historically  low  stock-to-use  ratios  (especially  for  agricultural  and  soft 
commodities;  see  the  following  chapters)  can  drive  volatile  patterns,  but  there  are  also  other  key 
factors. Macroeconomic and money demand-driven factors are also leading drivers of price changes 
for  all  commodities  (including  agricultural  ones;  see  Gilbert,  2012).  However,  the  role  of  supply-
driven issues, such as inventory levels and supply constraints due to delivery issues or government 
policies, should not be underestimated (see following chapters). 
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        , where j is any individual annual observation. 
48 See footnote 47.  
 
Correlation is not causation 
Another important element, which has come up in the aftermath of the collapse of major financial 
institutions, is the growing correlation between commodities prices and financial indexes (see Table 1 
and Figure 26 for preliminary evidence). 
Figure 26. CRB-TR & S&P 500 7 and 20 days volatilities and correlation, 1994-2012 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation from CRB-TR, Yahoo Finance. 
Medium-term volatility spiked in 2009, but is now gradually going back to pre-crisis levels for 
both  7  and  20  days  time  range.  Correlation  with  financial  indexes,  however,  remains  on  average 
higher than over the past two decades. Unravelling the set of underlying causes that have caused this 
growing  correlation  is  no  easy  task.  Correlation  does  not  mean  causation  (i.e.  one  is  causing  the 
other’s movement), but rather it may have been driven by a common underlying factor that pushes 
both variables in the same direction. The two variables, however, may still be moving in the same 
direction  independently.  Conclusions  reached  by  some  authors  (among  others,  Schumann,  2011; 
Finance Watch, 2012; UNCTAD, 2012) that financial investors are causing prices to move erratically 52 | SETTING THE SCENE: THE STRUCTURE OF COMMODITIES MARKETS 
 
because financial indexes are correlated to commodities indexes, may ultimately prove wrong (see 
Section 1.4). A light earthquake may cause two buildings to fall down, one over the other, but this 
does not mean that the first building caused the collapse of the other. Both buildings may have been 
built with similar, poor construction materials and so may have fallen at the same time when the light 
earthquake hit. How the collapse happened has established an apparent link between the two that 
may not exist. The following sections and chapters on the single commodities markets will look at the 
interplay between financial and non-financial variables to clarify this link and assess the long-term 
impact on commodities price formation. 
Price spikes 
Market prices are a zero-sum game, where one party gains and the other one loses. In principle, if the 
price  formation  mechanism  is  not  affected  by  illegal  practices  or  distorted  incentives,  price  levels 
should not be a factor for distortion in the marketplace. However, not all commodities are the same 
(i.e. essential goods) and not all market participants can participate in the market with the same level 
of means. The initial allocation (distribution) of resources matters, especially when there is a minimum 
level of rights and standard of life to be preserved. The 2007-08 spike in food prices is a case in point. 
As confirmed above, highly volatile patterns and short-term price spikes in some food commodities in 
2008 and 2009 generated anger and riots in many emerging markets, where income is barely enough 
to survive. These were also fuelled by other important political reasons that are not the subject of this 
report. Figure 27 confirms that prices of food commodities (in real and nominal terms) have reached a 
medium-term peak recently, due to important demand and supply factors that are discussed in the 
following sections. 
Figure 27. FAO real and nominal Food Price Index, 1990-2013 
 
Source: FAO Stats. 
If we look at long-term real prices for the commodities in our report, there is a generalised 
growth of spot prices, but only five commodities markets have an annual average real price above 
historical levels (from 1975; see Figure 28). Common underlying factors that have boosted prices are 
discussed in following sections. Each commodity has its own market dynamics, however, so it may 
not be appropriate to bundle them in one analysis as price spikes may have been driven by significant 
trends in supply and demand fundamentals.  
 
Figure 28. Long-term nominal and real spot prices for sample commodities, 1975-2012 
     
     
     
   
 
Source:  Author’s  elaboration  from  World  Bank.  Note:  World  Bank  Manufactures  Unit  Value  Index  deflator 
(representing 15 commodities countries with ad hoc weights, with base year=2005). Dashed line compares 
2012 real price with historical trend. 49 
                                                            
49 For crude oil, average spot price of Brent, Dubai and West Texas Intermediate, equally weighted; for natural 
gas, average between natural gas (Europe) import border price, including UK (as of April 2010 includes a spot 
price component; between June 2000 - March 2010 excludes UK), and natural gas (U.S.), spot price at Henry Hub, 
Louisiana; for iron ore (Brazil), VALE (formerly CVRD) Carajas sinter feed, contract price, f.o.b. Ponta da Madeira 
1% Fe-unit for mt, prior to year 2010 annual contract prices; for aluminium and copper, LME cash forwards; for 
wheat, no. 1, hard red winter, ordinary protein, export price delivered at the US Gulf port for prompt or 30 days 
shipment; for corn, no. 2, yellow, f.o.b. US Gulf ports; for soybean oil, crude, f.o.b. ex-mill Netherlands; for sugar, 
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More  historical  price  trends  (see  Figure  29)  confirm  a  recent  heating  up  in  price,  but 
commodities  have had  noticeably  higher spikes  over the last century, both in price and volatility 
levels. In addition, before 2005, price patterns have been at a historical bottom for more than a decade 
and appear still below levels reached with the end of the Bretton Woods system and the oil crises 
during the 1970s. (next page) 
Figure 29. Historical real prices (1915=100) 
 
Source: Morgan Stanley Commodities from Bloomberg and IMF. Note: Front-month rolling futures annual prices, 
CPI deflated. 
Similar patterns in volatility and higher price levels can be traced back to the  first oil crisis 
around 1973-74, which kept prices of agricultural at a higher level for some years (Radetzki, 2006; 
Wright,  2011), and  for  most  of  the  1980s.  Oil  prices,  in  particular,  have  reached  almost  the  same 
historical peaks of the second oil crisis (1979-1980), which has raised some fundamental questions 
about the sustainability of its production. Finally, there are often some important misconceptions over 
price levels. While volatility, which manifests itself in sharp price jumps or drops, should to some 
extent worry policy-makers, high price levels are not necessarily bad per se. Prices provide incentives 
for  producers  to  increase  cultivation  areas  and  productivity  as  the  population  grows  and  supply 
strives to keep up. Higher prices may increase local production and self-sufficiency. Very often in the 
past, prices have been subsidised by government actions that have reduced over time the incentives to 
invest in innovation to increase productivity. Policy actions should take a cost/benefit approach when 
dealing with measures that can affect the ‘regular’ market price formation and should rather focus on 
abating barriers that do not allow prices to efficiently reflect actual market circumstances. 
1.3.3  The growth and development of commodities index investing and other financial 
players 
New developments in financial markets during the last five to seven years have paved the way to a 
new form of investment that spans across asset classes. The rise of index investing in futures markets 
has touched upon all asset classes and grown very rapidly in commodities, reaching over $200 billion 
of net value (over $366 billion, as sum of long and short positions) in March 2013, following CFTC 
statistics (Table 20).  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
International Sugar Agreement (ISA) daily price, raw, f.o.b. and stowed at greater Caribbean ports; for cocoa, 
International Cocoa Organization daily price, average of the first three positions on the terminal markets of New 
York  and  London,  nearest  three  future  trading  months;  for  coffee,  equally  weighted  average  between 
International  Coffee  Organization  indicator  prices,  other  mild  Arabicas,  average  New  York  and 
Bremen/Hamburg markets, ex-dock, and Robustas, average New York and Le Havre/Marseilles markets, ex-
dock.  
 
Table 20. Total index investing in US commodities futures markets at March 2013 
US Futures Market1 
Notional Value 
(US$bn) 
(Notional Value > US$0.5bn)2  Long  Short  Net L (S) 
Subtotal (>US$0.5 billion)  224.3  -65.6  158.7 
Subtotal (<US$0.5 billion)  1.5  -0.4  1.1 
Total Notional US Mkts  225.8  -66.1  159.8 
Total Not'l Non-US Mkts  61  -14  46.9 
Total All Markets  286.8  -80.1  206.7 
Source: CFTC Index Investment data (28 March 2013). 
The  exchange-traded  side  of  this  business,  in  particular,  has  soared  in  the  last  three  years, 
reaching  more  than  $200  billion  of  assets  invested  in  2012.  There  are  also  a  number  of  products 
tracking indexes that are offered in the OTC space, which are captured in vast amounts by the CFTC 
statistics (above). As Figure 30 suggests, most of the index investing in commodities (over 85%) is 
concentrated  on  precious  metals,  while  a  very  small  part  is  directed  at  agriculture  and  industrial 
metals.  
Figure 30. Global commodity exchange-traded products (ETP) assets to March 2013 
(quarterly, U$bn) 
 
Source: ETF Securities (2013). 
Markets for commodities exchange-traded products have been growing rapidly since the onset 
of the financial crisis and they were reinvigorated in 2012, reaching an historical peak since their initial 
diffusion back in the early 2000s. However, most of these activities are concentrated in precious metals 
(in particular, gold), which may explain the nature of this type of investing as  a tool to diversify 
investment risk in complex portfolios.  
Key characteristics 
Index investing is an easy way to become exposed to a commodity without owning any underlying 
asset or without a commitment to deliver or buy any of them with daily margin calls (on  futures 
markets). It can be considered one of the two main types of informed trading, with some particular 56 | SETTING THE SCENE: THE STRUCTURE OF COMMODITIES MARKETS 
 
characteristics (Masters, 2008). A clear distinction must be made with other non-commercial trading. 
First, even though often fully collateralised transactions by clients, indexes offer a position across a 
range of commodities without using expensive margin positions in futures markets or directly owning 
the commodity (with their storage risks and opportunity costs). Second, investors typically take a 
passive long position through these instruments on a basket of commodities. 50  
Third, investors tend to hold these positions for a long period. This last aspect, in particular, 
differentiates them from classical informed traders, actively exploiting single pieces of information. 
There is no interest in trading the commodity, but rather in taking a position in these markets. 
There are thousands of indexes available in the market, but roughly 80-90% of the assets are 
almost equally invested to track two big families of indexes: the Standard & Poor’s GSCI (Goldman 
Sachs  Commodity  Index51; 24 commodities),  whose  main index gives a strong weight to energy 
commodities; and the Dow Jones -UBS52 (20 commodities),  whose main index has a more balanced 
composition (Table  21). Both  indexes  were  not been originally designed to be industry standard 
benchmarks  for  commodities  investing,  but  were  adapted  later  when  markets  started  to 
spontaneously request these products. 
Table 21. S&P GSCI and Dow Jones-UBS composition 
  Energy  Agriculture  Industrial 
metals 
Precious 
metals 
Livestock 
S&P GSCI  70.5%  14.7%  6.6%  3.5%  4.7% 
UBS-Dow Jones  31.92%  32.26%  17.29%  12.99%  5.54% 
Source: Standard & Poor’s Dow Jones Indices (2011, 2012b). 
The index value is determined by a complex formula that takes into account futures markets 
prices and other reference prices (S&P, 2012). In addition, the futures contracts (‘designated contracts’) 
that are included in the formula are influenced by the level of investment support in the index family, 
which is currently set for the GSCI at $230 billion. Should investment estimates in the index family go 
above  this  threshold,  this  would  trigger  changes  in  the  underlying  combination  of  the  basket  of 
futures contracts that represents the liquidity in underlying futures markets. These futures contracts 
prices  are  then  weighted  by  factors  such  as  world  production  or  volume  of  transactions.  Finally, 
indexes are updated every year (typically in January). The rebalancing usually creates some market 
activity  around  the  date,  as  these  products  tracking  the  indexes  through  the  OTC  swap  shift  a 
significant amount of money from a commodity to the other. However, as these indexes cover a basket 
of commodities, the actual amount involved may not produce important changes in specific markets. 
Nevertheless,  as  the  products  tracking  single  commodities  are  growing  fast,  the  composition  and 
rebalancing of these products may produce important market changes in individual markets once 
reached a significant size for that underlying market.  
The  design  of  the  index  and  those  companies  involved  in  this  process  (i.e.  updating  the 
formula) are not those companies that design and sell the product that tracks the pattern of the index. 
The instruments through which investment are channelled are units of funds that track these indexes, 
which are marketed on exchanges  or OTC. The most common way  of trading these products are 
standardised funds units traded on exchange, which are easy to buy and sell. However, the range of 
ETPs is much broader and non-commodities ETPs are the biggest part of the market. Disregarding 
                                                            
50 As new indexes combining both long and short positions emerge (3rd generation indexes), the situation may 
move towards a more balanced combination of long and short positions. 
51 Originally designed by Goldman Sachs and now acquired by Standard & Poor’s, which licenses them to those 
interested in tracking these widespread indexes, whether through funds units or index units. 
52 In July 2012, Standard & Poor’s and CME Group have launched a joint venture called Standard & Poor’s Dow 
Jones  Indices  through  which  the  two  companies  will  produce  investable  indexes,  bringing  together  the  two 
biggest commodities index families.  
 
ETPs assets with exposures on precious metals, the size of ETPs in the commodities treated in this 
report goes down to roughly $38 billion (Figure 31).  
Figure 31. Breakdown of commodities ETPs per underlying exposure, Q3 2012 (US$ million) 
 
Source: Blackrock ETP Landscape. 
Since the fund may be unable (for costs and type of risks) to take a direct position in different 
futures  or  physical  markets  to  replicate  the  return  of  the  index  (with  minimal  errors;  so  called 
“physical replication”), the funds can also signs an OTC swap agreement with an investment bank 
that  ensures  the  perfect  replication  of  the  index  in  exchange  of  a  constant  flow  of  liquidity  from 
investors (through the fund) to the bank (physical replication). The bank will then take exposure in the 
futures markets using most of the financial flows (and collateral) coming from the fund, and by rolling 
over their futures positions held to ensure that the index is tracked with precision over time.  
Figure 32 shows the process through which investments in indexes are channelled through OTC 
and  ETP  products  into  futures  markets,  through  the  OTC  swaps  that  funds  sign  with  financial 
institutions. 
Figure 32. Index investment flows in futures markets 
 
Source: Author. 58 | SETTING THE SCENE: THE STRUCTURE OF COMMODITIES MARKETS 
 
Index  investments  bring  important  benefits  to  markets  by  offering  an  easily  marketable 
exposure to an asset class with lower transaction costs than those (direct and indirect costs) involved 
in investing directly in futures markets or in holding the physical commodity. New players can enter 
the  markets  and  bring  additional  liquidity,  increasing  futures  market  access  globally  for  all 
commodities market participants, whether physical or financial entities with an interest in physical 
assets. Their typically long and stable position favours those commodity firms (especially producers) 
that take short positions to hedge main business exposures. It also dilutes the dominant weight of the 
large physical players in the futures markets by also allowing small players to enter the market and 
take exposure. 
Discussion about the impact that this market development is producing on futures markets and, 
indirectly, on physical trades is more controversial. Empirical analyses are typically based on CFTC 
positions  of traders in US futures  markets by type  of entity (commercial and non-commercial)  or 
purpose of investment (index investment, managed money, etc.)53. Across all US futures market, index 
investments have significantly increased their total position. For instance, in wheat futures contracts, 
index investments account for more than 20% of total positions in the market (Figure 33).  
Figure 33. Wheat futures contract (% of open interest by category) 
 
Source: CME Group from CFTC data (July 2012). 
However, CFTC data may be controversial since the ‘commercial/non-commercial distinction’ 
underestimates  commercial  positions  taken  through  dealers  hedging  OTC  positions,  while  ‘index 
investing’ positions are available only for some futures contracts. In addition, by looking closely at the 
data, the series experience significant jumps until 2010-11, which may be signal of misreporting or 
new additions. From 2009, new Commitment of Traders (COT) data collected by CFTC shows instead 
a more granular overview of futures markets by type of trader going back to mid-2006. Type of trader, 
however, does not  give  a  clear-cut distinction between pure commercial hedging and speculation 
(informed and uninformed trading). The CFTC reporting splits data into ‘managed money’, ‘swap 
dealers’,  and  ‘producers-users’.  Managed  money  traders  are  investment  funds  (including  hedge 
funds), i.e. participants engaging in futures trades on behalf of investment funds, but also investment 
trusts operated for the purpose of trading commodities (commodity pools). Commodity pools might 
also  include  non-financial  players.  Managed  money  traders  are  typically  net  long,  but  in  some 
markets their net position might be short (as for natural gas in 2012; Figure 34). Swap dealers are 
largely financial institutions holding long positions, mainly to hedge (offset) derivatives contracts in 
OTC markets or to offer index funds products. Finally, producers-users are purely commercial players 
that usually have a net short position in futures markets in order to hedge price risk. 
                                                            
53 The methodology of collection does not ensure that statistics may include some level of double-counting.  
 
Figure 34. Types of traders in futures markets, 2012 (% total open interest) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from CFTC. Note: sum of long and short positions in 2012. 
From the beginning of data collection (2006), however, the balance between categories of traders 
has not changed  much. Managed money and  swap  dealers still  represent  over 50% of total  open 
interest, while producers-users’ share is around 21%, as is that of ‘other reported’ and ‘non-reported’ 
positions (Figure 35). The entry of financial players in US commodities futures markets in the United 
States had been fuelled by deregulation in the early 2000s and was already a stable presence before the 
recent financial crisis. 
Figure 35. Open interest by type of trader, 2007-2012 
 
Source: Author’s calculation from CFTC. Note: weighted average (by total open interest of corresponding contract 
each year) of 9 commodities futures contracts positions. Cocoa - ICE Futures US, Coffee C - ICE Futures 
US, Copper - Grade #1 - COMEX, Corn – CBOT, Crude oil – NYMEX, Natural gas – NYMEX, Soybean oil 
– CBOT, Sugar No. 11 - ICE Futures US, Wheat - (Chicago, Kansas, Minneapolis). 
By  looking  at  net  positions  (difference  between  short  and  long  open  positions)  of  futures 
participants a different picture emerges. As Figure 36 suggests, commodities users and producers in 60 | SETTING THE SCENE: THE STRUCTURE OF COMMODITIES MARKETS 
 
2012  are  on  average  net  short  and  major  counterparty  to  other  trading  intents  (e.g.  speculation) 
represented by financial counterparties. 
Figure 36. Net positions by type of trader, 2012 
 
Source: Author’s calculation from CFTC. Note: Difference between equally weighted average of long and short 
positions in 2012. 
For  crude  oil  and  natural  gas,  instead,  commodities  producers  and  users  hold  a  small  net 
position (more balanced), while managed money and swap dealers are respectively net long and net 
short for crude, and respectively net short and net long for natural gas. Crude oil is the only futures 
contract where swap dealers are net short. Overall, net positions in crude oil and natural gas contracts 
are small in relation to the total size of the futures markets. Producers and users are more involved 
most likely in spread trading. In fact, another characteristic of trading futures is the possibility to take 
advantage  of  a  change  in  price  relationships  (‘spread  trading’,  as  defined  by  the  CFTC  glossary), 
which also includes the essential tool of risk-free arbitraging for the liquidity of futures markets. This 
category mainly includes the so called ‘calendar spread’, trading spreads between maturities of the 
same futures contract (i.e. March versus July for corn futures). Spread trading has also been more or 
less stable since the beginning of data collection, but with large shares of the total open interest in 
crude oil and natural gas, where regional differentials play an important role for commodities users 
and  producers  (Figure  37).  Both  commercial  and  non-commercial  market  participants  are  active 
(calendar) spread traders.  
 
Figure 37. Spread trading, 2012 (% total open interest) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from CFTC. 
More  microstructural  analysis,  with  high-frequency  data  on  open  interests  and  volumes,  is 
needed to assess the nature and the potential impact of spread trading. Unfortunately, the short data 
sample (from 2006) does not allow a long-term empirical analysis  on market implications of such 
practices. 
Evidence so far 
Controversial evidence emerges around the impact of index investing and other financial positions on 
commodities futures markets, and thus on physical trades. No clear-cut evidence can currently point 
to commodities index investments as the cause of a bubble or more volatile trends in commodities 
markets, by inflating the value of futures contracts with continuous roll-over of long futures positions 
that exercise upward pressures on prices (see, among others, Irwin and Sanders, 2010). Büyüksahin 
and Harris (2011) do not find any evidence that financial positions drove crude oil price changes 
during  the  historical  peak  in  July  2008.  Gilbert  (2010,  2012)  shows  that  trend-following  informed 
trading is generally benign, and that index investments may even reduce volatility, by bringing stable 
flows  of  investments  to  markets  (see  also  Gilbert  and  Pfuderer, 2013).  However,  Gilbert  (through 
Granger causality tests) and others (among them, Mayer, 2009 and Tang and Xiong, 2010) find that 
index  investments  and  non-commercial  trading  have  indeed  pushed  food  prices  upwards.  Index 
investments appear to have been merely channelling information on macroeconomic factors into the 
price formation mechanism of futures contracts, however, which may not be necessarily a bad thing 
per se because it reduces probability of an unpredictable event when the information will be inevitably 
pushed  into  prices.  Some  temporary  distortion  in  conjunction  with  the  entry  of  non-commercial 
traders in the market and increased correlation with financial assets has been spotted too (Tang and 
Xiong, 2010; Silvennoinen and Thorp, 2010), but it appears only to be a temporary departure from 
fundamentals (see Vansteenkiste, 2011, assessing  oil  markets). As a result, this partial inflationary 
impact  seems  more  driven  by  macroeconomic  fundamentals  and  has  been  so  far  quantitatively 
negligible, also due to daily margin calls (if margin account drops below maintenance level due to a 
drop in prices), which put a cap on the potential expansion of the market into futures, and to the 
ultimate benefit that a passive long position across commodities can generate over time.  
The assessment of the reasons behind the growth of financial positions, and in particular index 
investing following the recent 2008-09 financial crisis (Figure 30) is more interesting. Two important 
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1.  Growing funding needs of financial institutions and business diversification (sell-side).  
2.  Diversification of risk strategies (buy-side). 
First,  the  implications  of  the  financial  crisis,  such  as  soaring  risk  aversion  (private  sector 
deleveraging) and increasing capital and collateral needs to restore trust in the financial system, have 
caused liquidity to dry up and balance sheets to shrink.54 Exchange-traded products in funds units, 
backed by a basket of commodities or an OTC swap, can raise liquidity for financial institutions 
(Ramaswamy, 2011; De Manuel and Lannoo, 2012) in exchange  for tracking an index, which  also 
typically generates excess returns for the bank. The fund manager, if it is not the bank, gets the 
transaction fee, while the financial institution benefits from the liquidity flows and generates excess 
returns. 
A second way monetary policies have influenced and led developments in this area is by 
pushing  money  into  the  system  to  support  the  deleveraging  process  and  risk  aversion.  With  a 
deleveraging process that fosters risk aversion and does not allow cash to en ter in the credit market, 
capital markets play the role of allocating this hoard of liquidity that looks for risk diversification 
across asset class.  The distinctive passive position of index investor reflects this underlying issue of 
asset diversification in a low-return and high-risk environment. To support this market behaviour, the 
academic  literature  (among  others,  Gorton  and  Rouwenhorst,  2004)  has ,  until  recently,  strongly 
supported the view that commodities markets could have a  counter-cyclical nature, so they could be 
considered an excellent tool to ensure diversification in portfolio management. 
1.4  Interaction with financial assets: an empirical analysis of non-commercial positions 
As mentioned earlier, several authors have established a link between non-commercial positions in 
commodities  and  financial  assets,  claiming  that  such  positions  have  been  driving  the  growth  of 
futures markets, causing the transfer of volatile patterns from financial to non-financial assets. The 
empirical analysis starts from the conclusions of Frankel’s (2006) work, who found empirical support 
for the claim that low interest rates push real commodity prices up. Most notably, he confirms the 
findings of the  economic theory (see section 1.2.4) on the negative impact of interest rates on the 
opportunity cost to carry on inventories of the commodity. This implies that monetary policies have a 
direct impact on commodities prices, at least through interest rates, thus establishing an intrinsic link 
between  financial  and  non-financial  assets.  Moreover,  the  exchange  rate  is  another  transmission 
channel,  representing  the  response  function  of  the  joint  action  of  interest  rates  and  changes  in 
monetary aggregate,  such  as M2 also in the end influenced by real interest rates. Changes in the 
monetary aggregate would also capture unconventional central bank actions, which have become a 
tool frequently used to improve the transmission channel of monetary policies. Figure 38 shows how 
the dollar exchange rate has gradually devalued since 2002, as a result of bold cuts to nominal interest 
rates  set  by  the  central  bank  (and  its  effects  on  interbank  rates)  that  started  a  new  period  of 
expansionary monetary policies. 
                                                            
54 Even if in a regional area such as the Eurozone the reduction of banks’ balance sheet has been contained by 
repeated ECB interventions, the reduction of collateral available in the system has anyway increased the funding 
needs of financial institutions.  
 
Figure 38. Broad Dollar Index (inflation adjusted)55 and interbank interest rate (rhs), 1994-2012 
 
Source: Federal Reserve.   
Looking at  non-commercial positions across the  commodities in  our sample, early evidence 
points at these positions as the channel that delivers the effects of monetary policy decisions. There 
appears to be a distinct pattern in which expansionary monetary policies seem to play an important 
role for the growth of non-commercial (and commercial) positions, in particular the quantity of money 
(M2)56, as a proxy of these policies57. 
Due to misreporting in CFTC data, only a selected sample of non -commercial  and commercial 
positions for a selected contract (crude oil, WTI) can be used for a more long-term analysis (with some 
strong caveats). Index positions, instead, are only available from 2006 and would not offer a sufficient 
time period for a longer-term analysis. Among other important factors that can influence commodities 
prices, over the long term the impact of monetary policies has often been unpredictable (Cooper and 
Lawrence, 1975), which calls for a deeper investigation into their effects across asset classes, especially 
for commodities markets. 
VEC analysis: monetary policies and commercial positions 
In order to investigate in more depth the relationship between non-commercial positions and M2, for 
which a simple linear combination does not fit, a more sophisticated empirical analysis is required. 
The following dataset (for crude oil US futures contract on NYMEX)58 includes monthly data from 
January 1986 to December 2011: 
  Total (or only short) commercial positions (log of open interest). 
  Total (or only long) non-commercial positions (log of open interest). 
  Log of S&P 500, VIX index (implied volatility of S&P 500). 
  Log of M2 (monetary aggregate) and the Fed interbank interest rate (here called, ‘Fed funds’). 
                                                            
55 The Broad Dollar Index is a weighted average of the foreign exchange values of the U.S. dollar against the 
currencies of a large group of major U.S. trading partners including 26 countries. The index weights, which 
change over time, are derived from U.S. export shares and from U.S. and foreign import shares. For more details, 
please see http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2005/winter05_index.pdf.  
56 M2 consists of M1 (essentially, currency and similar in circulation, demand and other checkable deposits), plus 
savings deposits, time deposits, and money market funds, less individual retirement accounts.  
57 By injecting liquidity in the system and keeping interest rates l ow, central banks potentially create an increase 
of the amount of M2 in the system. 
58 The only contract for which CFTC data on commercial and non-commercial futures positions gives a long-term 
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The  dataset  of  futures  positions  for  crude  oil  (commercial  short  and  non-commercial  long), 
despite changes to reporting criteria over the years, is the only CFTC legacy reports that shows no 
jumps  in  the  series  since  the  beginning  of  data  collection  from  CFTC  in  1986,  which  allows  an 
assessment  of  long-term  effects  of  monetary  policies  before  and  after  the  beginning  of  the 
expansionary era. Additional empirical analysis would be needed in the coming years, when the set of 
more granular data (available since 2006) will be sufficiently large to assess long-term effects, as this 
dataset may underestimate the impact of swap dealers on non-commercial long positions. Moreover, 
the analysis uses monthly data, which do not permit the assessment of more short-term patterns. The 
results of this analysis, therefore, should be interpreted as an assessment that is primarily valid over a 
sufficiently long time period. 
Variables are stationary only in first difference (integrated of first order) and cointegrated (with 
stationary residuals), so linear regressions may be spurious and some Granger causality tests may give 
misleading results. Engel and Granger (1987) showed that the use of a simple linear regression with 
unit-root  variables  (even  if  de-trended)  can  generate  numerous  cases  of  spurious  regression  so, 
provided  that  a  cointegration  relation  actually  exists  among  the  variables,  the  estimation  of  this 
relation is indeed quite powerful in avoiding misleading conclusions. The Vector Error Correction 
(VEC) model might be the best model to deal with variables subject to the same stochastic trend. VEC 
is an extension of a Vector Autoregressive Model (VAR) for variables that are non-stationary in levels, 
but stationary in their first difference (first-order integration, I(1)).59 This model is particularly useful 
as it can take into account any relation of cointegration among two variables, i.e. they share the same 
stochastic trend.60  
The first step checks cointegration among the variables (see  Output #1 in the Annex). First, a 
linear regression between commercial positions and M2 appears spurious, as hinted at by very high t-
statistics and R-squared. Second, a test for the existence of a relationship of cointegration is performed. 
The  Dickey-Fuller  test  for  unit  root  rejects  the  hypothesis  (of  unit  root),  so  residuals  of  the 
cointegration equation (M2 regressed on commercial positions)  are  stationary and thus the two 
variables are cointegrated, as originally suspected. The two variables move with the same stochastic 
trend and adjust through a process of error correction that is described in the Annex (see Output #2).  
The VEC analysis (described in Output #2) for the relation between the number of commercial 
positions in the crude o il futures market and M2 shows that the cointegration equations for both 
variables  are  statistically  significant.  Most  notably,  commercial  positions  react  much  faster  to 
equilibrium shocks (8% rate) compared to M2, whose coefficient is negligible. This supports the thesis 
that commercial positions are affected by monetary policy actions much more than the other way 
around. The coefficient b 1,  which  weights  the  impact  of  the  cointegrated  (lagged)  variable  on  the 
dependent, is non-significant for M2, i.e. the lagged value of commercial position has no link with M2. 
The same is not true for commercial positions, as the lagged value of M2 is statistically significant. 
With this modified Granger, the conclusion is that M2 Granger-causes commercial positions and not 
vice-versa. 
We apply the same approach to non-commercial positions and M2. As shown by Output #3, 
non-commercial positions adjust to equilibrium with M2 at an 18% rate. It therefore appears that are 
the  non-commercial  positions  ‘to  follow’  changes  in  M2.  This  is  confirmed  by  the  cointegrating 
coefficient of M2, which is not significant, hinting at the indifference of M2 towards the distance from 
equilibrium with non-commercial positions. 
Finally, the same approach is used to assess the relationship between  non-commercial long 
positions,  which  represent  passive  speculative  investments  that  would  supposedly  divert  futures 
markets from their fundamentals, and commercial short positions (a classic commodities hedge for 
                                                            
59 Testing hypotheses concerning the relationship between non-stationary variables is based on OLS regressions 
with data that had initially been differenced (Granger and Newbald, 1974). Although this method is correct in 
large  samples,  taking  into  account  cointegration  provides  more  a  powerful  analysis  tool,  as  it  doesn’t  lose 
information on long run equilibrium and on levels. 
60  While  a  deterministic  trend  is  treatable  by  either  regressing  the  variable  on  time  (trend  stationary)  or 
eliminating the seasonality, to treat a stochastic   trend and make the series stationary it is possible to just 
differentiate the variables.  
 
final users). The initial test (Output #4) confirms that the regression is spurious and residuals are 
stationary, so variables can be considered cointegrated.  The VEC analysis (Output #5) gives some 
interesting results. The cointegrating equation of a non-commercial long position has a statistically 
significant (at 1%) negative coefficient, which suggests that these positions react at deviations from 
equilibrium with commercial short positions. The opposite is not true. The cointegrating coefficient is 
significant at 5%, but with a very low positive coefficient. This points to an unstable equilibrium, so 
we could potentially ignore it. As a result, commercial short positions Granger-cause non-commercial 
long. Taking into account the findings in earlier sections, the growth of commercial players and the 
general  interests  in  physical  commodities  markets  in  the  last  decade,  with  the  quick  and  intense 
development  of  international  trade,  have  proved  fertile  ground  to  promote  the  growth  of  non-
commercial  positions  by  providing  liquidity,  which  could  be  accessed  at  very  low  costs  due  to 
accommodating monetary policies. This finding is in line with ample evidence showing, despite the 
potential to be harmful for price formation through herding behaviours, limited distortive effects of 
financial positions on commodities price formation. 
Taking stock from the new CFTC disaggregated reporting  
While the previous long-term price formation analysis with the legacy reports should be still valid 
over  a  long-term  database  (from  1986),  the  growth  of  passive  investments  together  with  other 
(typically long) swap dealers positions in recent years requires further analysis with the new CFTC 
reporting system that  was launched in 2009 and goes back to 2006. The new reporting, therefore, 
disaggregates  data  on  futures  open  positions  in  three  main  categories  of  traders,  as  discussed  in 
previous  sections.  The  analysis  uses  the  new  CFTC  dataset,  which  includes  weekly  data  on  open 
positions for the three most liquid futures contracts in the US (crude oil, natural gas, and corn). The 
analysis in the previous section is replicated by running Granger causality tests. The Dickey-Fuller test 
suggests  that  variables  are  not  cointegrated  and  Granger  causality  tests  shall  not  thus  lead  to 
misleading results. Different lags for each futures contract have been considered, in line with lag-order 
selection statistics. 
Table 22 confirms the results of the previous analysis but it qualifies it further. It confirms that 
M2  leads  producers  positions,  which  points  at  the  potential  impact  of  prolonged  expansionary 
monetary policies on non-financial assets (through expansion of monetary base). However, from 2006, 
data for crude oil confirms an impact of the monetary base on the size of financial players’ positions in 
futures markets, while the impact of the monetary base only affects producers/users’ positions for 
natural gas and corn futures positions. Due to their constant growth in crude oil futures markets, non-
commercial positions have become the main mean to transfer effects of policies and events that affect 
the monetary base. 
Table 22. Granger causality tests 
Variables  Granger causality  Reversed 
IndependentDependent 
Crude 
oil 
Natural 
gas 
Corn 
Crude 
oil 
Natural 
gas 
Corn 
M2SD/MM long  Yes*  No  No  No  No  Yes*** 
M2Producers short  No  Yes*  Yes*  No  Yes*  No 
Producers shortSD/MM long  Yes**  Yes**  Yes**  No  No  No 
Note:  *1%,  **5%,  ***10%  significance.  ‘SD/MM’  stands  for  ‘Swap  dealers/Managed  money’.  See  Output  #10, 
Output #11, Output #12, in Annex. 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
Most notably, the analysis on the disaggregated futures positions confirms the results of the 
earlier vector error correction model by ascertaining the role of producers/users position in guiding 
swap  dealers  and  managed  money’s  long  positions  (and  not  viceversa)  for  the  top  three  futures 
contracts (by size of open interest). Financial futures positions still complement non-financial ones and 
are shaped by the latter. Therefore, the nature and the role of non-commercial players’ participation in 
commodities markets appears benign and essential for the development of commercial positions, and 66 | SETTING THE SCENE: THE STRUCTURE OF COMMODITIES MARKETS 
 
thus attention should rather focus on short-term market practices led by non-commercial players that 
could potentially lead to damaging herding behaviour (Boyd et al., 2013). Short-term price trends and 
market  practices  shall  be  subject  to  more  detailed  analysis,  which  would  require  more  detailed 
information about traders’ behaviours (e.g., data on volumes by category of trader). 
The relationship between futures positions and financial indexes 
In addition to the findings  emerging  in the previous section,  Granger causality tests  may  help to 
explore how policies (monetary, in particular) have gradually influenced the relationship between 
commodities and financial indicators, as they provided fertile ground for passive investments to grow 
due to the rising demand of commercial players. From 2006 to 2011, for instance, the S&P 500 appears 
to  Granger-cause  index  positions,  and  not  vice-versa  (Output  #6).  To  understand  better  this 
relationship with S&P 500, a set of Granger causality tests is performed. Due to its characteristics, the 
model tests the ‘causal’ link between commercial, non-commercial, and non-commercial long with the 
indicator of volatility of S&P 500, the VIX. Data are weekly and, over the period 1992-2011, only open 
interest positions in the United States crude oil futures contract from CFTC are available with no 
misreporting. The test is performed for three time periods: 
(a)  1992-2011 
(b)  1992-2001 
(c)  2002-2011 
As mentioned earlier, expansionary monetary policies were a key driver for the devaluation of 
the dollar, which began in 2002 and has recently reached a historical low since early 1990s (Figure 38).  
As Table 23 shows, interesting results emerge. Non-commercial positions are not linked with 
VIX, but  non-commercial  long positions (including index investing)  and commercial positions  are 
(Output #7, Output #8, and Output #9). The fact that none of the positions Granger-causes volatility 
on  S&P  500  may  point  to  a  one-way  relationship.  Most  interestingly,  the  relationship  between 
commercial/non-commercial long positions and the VIX does not exist before 2002, but emerges with 
the beginning of the devaluation era with expansionary monetary policies. 
Table 23. Granger causality test summary 
Dependent Variable  Independent Variable  1992-2011  1992-2001  2002-2011 
Commercial  VIX  Yes*  No  Yes*** 
VIX  Commercial  No  No  No 
Non-commercial  VIX  No  No  No 
VIX  Non-commercial  No  No  No 
Non-commercial Long  VIX  Yes***  No  Yes 
VIX  Non-commercial Long  No  No  No 
Note: *1% **5% ***10% significance (p-value). 997 observations. See Annex for more details. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
To sum up, the birth of massive non-commercial positions appears to be driven by the growth 
of commercial players and the expansion of international markets, as well as ‘financialisation’, which 
entails greater access to finance through new technologies. The growth of non-commercial positions, 
and  in  particular  long  passive  investments  (index  investing),  was  supported  by  expansionary 
monetary policies (and cheap credit) that have helped to improve access to finance and to promote 
massive changes across asset classes. The analysis therefore confirms Frankel’s earlier (2006) findings, 
which were limited in scope to links between interest rates and broader commodities indexes. The 
analysis here takes for granted the link with interest rates and develops further work on the monetary 
base  (M2).  Finally,  this  long  period  of  easy  access  to  finance  has  also  contributed  to  the  rise  in 
correlation  between  financial  and  non-financial  assets,  as  the  analysis  on  the  VIX  clearly  shows. 
Considering developments in other commodities futures markets, the key findings of this analysis, 
which relies on crude oil futures contract positions, could potentially be extended to other markets. 
However, the lack of reliable information over a sufficiently long period calls for prudence in using 
this  data  for  more  long-term  analyses.  Nevertheless,  the  following  chapters  look  into  single 
commodities markets, performing additional empirical analyses that, in part, confirm the findings of 
this section.  
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2.  ENERGY COMMODITIES 
2.1  Crude oil markets 
Crude oil is by far the biggest commodity market in the world. Its production was valued at over $2.7 
trillion at 2012 average prices.61. Its use in industrial applications was developed in the 19th century, 
in particular after the discovery of a basic refining technique (boiling the product) to refine crude as 
kerosene. The invention of the combustion engine (originally designed for ethanol and biodiesel fuels) 
and the discovery of huge reservoirs (such as Spindletop in 1901) that made the United States the 
biggest producer in the world have radically changed the role of crude oil (Downey, 2009). While the 
basic refining technique today is still the core process to transform crude oil into fuels that can be used 
in combustion engines, the market has undergone significant changes in the last 150 years. At the end 
of the 19th century, several applications in which crude oil could be used were developed  –  for 
transport, in particular – and the long-term strategic importance of controlling this commodity became 
clear. Since John D. Rockfeller became a quasi-monopolist in oil extraction and fuel production around 
1890  with  his  Standard  Oil  Company,  which  was  eventually  split,  due  to  antitrust  concerns,  into 
several  competing  firms  that  are  still  important  today  (e.g.  Exxon,  Chevron,  ConocoPhillips),  the 
market has developed at an incredible pace. Due to its low production costs in relation to the yields in 
energy production, crude oil is the main source of fuel for transport and other industrial applications 
(Figure 39).62 Crude oil is also a major source of energy supply (24%), with over 3 million tonnes used 
in 2010 to meet increasing energy demand (IEA, 2012b). 
Figure 39. Crude oil uses, 2010  
 
Source:  Author’s  elaboration  from  EIA  (2011).  *Note:  Agriculture,  commercial  and  public  services, 
residential, etc. 
While the Middle East and South American regions, with their significant reservoirs, now drive 
production,  the  industry  has  also  undergone  several  changes  and,  despite  major  oil  companies 
holding only 14% of global crude production and 24% of global refinery capacity, international trade 
has developed at some pace as main oil producers have gradually nationalised their oil industries and 
pushed them to compete with global flows. 
                                                            
61 At 2012 average spot price of Brent, Dubai and West Texas Intermediate, equally weighed (World Bank). BP 
data on production. 
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Political instability and military conflicts over the years have put oil supply under severe strain, 
and historical prices illustrate these events rather well. In the short term, Figure 40 shows that, starting 
in the late 1990s, oil prices have risen dramatically until today, only interrupted by the 2008 financial 
crisis. The figure also shows that WTI and Brent prices, which have historically been very close to each 
other,  have  diverged  significantly  for  regional  components  that  will  be  discussed  in  following 
sections.  
Figure 40. Real oil prices in the United States (WTI), Europe (Brent) and the Middle East (Dubai), 1982-2012   
 
Source: World Bank Commodity Price Data. Notes: Crude oil, U.K. Brent 38` API, f.o.b. U.K ports, spot price; 
Crude oil, Dubai Fateh 32` API, f.o.b. Dubai, spot price; Crude oil, West Texas Intermediate (WTI) 40` 
API, f.o.b. Midland Texas, spot price. Annual prices. 
This short-term pattern, driven by demand from emerging markets and political instability in 
core oil countries, is also reflected in an unstable underlying long-term trend that started with the first 
oil crisis in 1973, after the Yom Kippur crisis (Figure 41).   
Figure 41. Historical crude oil real spot prices, 1861–2012 ($2011/barrel) 
 
Source: BP Stats. Note: 1861-1944 US Average, 1945-1983 Arabian Light posted at Ras Tanura, 1984-2011 Dated 
Brent (Platts).  
 
From 1973, and after the end of the fixed exchange rates regime of Bretton Woods, real prices 
saw only a few years of stable and low prices. The era of long-term stable prices ended then. With the 
war in Iraq in the early 2000s and greater Chinese participation in global trade (completed with its 
entry  in  the  WTO),  prices  have  begun  to  rally  again,  reaching  another  historical  peak  after  the 
financial crisis. On top of supply cuts, this time demand played a greater role and the Organization of 
the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which took over control of the supply chain from the 
United States in 1973, has been unable to offer price stability and to keep up with demand increases in 
an open global economy. Over the years, the difficulty of Saudi Arabia to cover other (even within 
OPEC) countries’ supply cuts shows the difficulty of controlling supply (if a tight control has been 
ever exercised) with strong demand pressures.  
2.1.1  Product and market characteristics: a market structurally subject to instability 
Petroleum,  often  simply  denoted  ‘oil’,  is  “a  complex  mixture  of  liquid  hydrocarbons,  chemical 
compounds  containing  hydrogen  and  carbon  occurring  naturally  in  underground  reservoirs  in 
sedimentary rock” (IEA et al., 2005). When discussing oil, one commonly distinguishes between the 
primary commodity (unrefined crude oil) and the secondary commodity (refined products, such as 
gasoline  and  lubricants).  While  crude  oil  is  the  most  important  primary  oil  commodity,  other 
feedstock  oils  are  also  used  to  make  oil  products.  The  oil  industry’s  reference  unit  is  barrels 
(abbreviated bbl, or simply b), but the volume of oil is sometimes also expressed in cubic metres or 
litres. The specific gravity or density of the liquid is needed to assess its energy content. 
Qualities 
The qualities of crude oil vary widely depending on the place of origin. A distinction is being made 
between heavy (e.g. Mexican Maya oil) and light crudes (e.g. Nigerian Bonny Light), depending on 
the density, i.e. the presence of more (heavy crude) or less (light crude) carbon atoms in hydrocarbon 
molecules. Light crude usually has a higher value because it can yield more high-value, lighter refined 
products, such as gasoline. 
Crude oil generally finds its final use once it is refined, e.g. gasoline in transportation. Besides 
hydrocarbons, unprocessed crude oil sometimes contains impurities such as salts, metals (that may 
require desalting) or sulphur (that may require desulphurisation).63  
Important properties for evaluating crude oil include (IEA et al., 2005): 
  Relative density (depends on light and heavy fractions in the crude) 
  Viscosity (i.e. the oil’s resistance to flowing) 
  Pour point (i.e. the lowest temperature at which a liquid still behaves as a fluid) 
  Water content 
  Sulphur content 
  Paraffin and asphaltene content (wax as percentage of mass) 
  Presence of contaminants and heavy metals 
The pricing of crude oil depends largely on the above properties, as they will influence the 
processing and product output. The crude oil price is not only dependent on the energy content of the 
fuel, but is also influenced by the processing requirements. From an economic perspective, density 
(through  a  gravity  indicator  developed  by  the  American  Petroleum  Institute  (API)  and  sulphur 
content are the most important characteristics, given their impact on refined products properties. The 
API index ranges from 0⁰ to 100⁰. Most of the crude oil in the market is between 30⁰ and 39⁰ (referred 
to as ‘intermediate’). Above 39⁰, crude becomes more expensive; ‘lighter’ crude ideal for gasoline and 
for gas production has a very high API. Cheaper crude has an API below 25⁰, and can be used for 
construction materials or chemicals. The sulphur content can also lower the value of crude oil, because 
it affects the energy content, produces higher levels of pollution and corrodes metals (Downey, 2009). 
                                                            
63 IEA et al. (2005, p. 169): “The concentration of sulphur in crude oils varies from below 0.05% to more than 5% in 
some crudes – generally the higher the density of the crude oil, the greater the sulphur content. Low-sulphur 
crudes are often referred to as sweet crudes, while high-sulphur varieties are sour crude.” 70 | ENERGY COMMODITIES 
 
Crude with lower sulphur content is denominated ‘sweet’ crude (below 1% of the total weight). The 
removal and disposal of sulphurs is expensive and is usually done at the end of the refining process. 
Primary  oil  commodities  also  include  other  hydrocarbons  such  as  natural  gas  liquids.64  Oil 
fulfils the characteristics of a search good. As the primary commodity is typically transformed into 
fuels or prepared for feedstock use through a refining process, it qualifies as a raw intermediate good  
(see the table in the Annex for a further distinction between primary and secondary oil products) . 
Qualities can be easily assessed ex ante. Oil is a combustible fuel and cannot be recycled. However, in 
non-energy  use,  when  oil  is  used  as  a  feedstock  to  manufacture  petrochemicals,  these  secondary 
commodities  such  as  plastics  may  be  recyclable.  Production  shows  equivalent  characteristics  to 
mining and extraction of minerals and metals, but the costs involved might be lower in relative terms. 
Oil production (extraction) sites cannot be converted to extraction of other commodities. However, 
production  companies  may  also  be  involved  in  extraction  activities  of  other  fossil  fuels  (such  as 
natural gas). Also, refineries cannot be easily converted to production of other refined products from 
oil.  
Storage 
Crude oil can be easily stored for long periods. The high storability and cheap transportability, mainly 
through pipelines and ship carriers, make crude oil the ideal commodity for international trade. It is 
also generally believed that, with our oil-intensive economies, crude oil follows the economic cycle 
(see Section 2.2.3).  
Oil stocks are important for the operation of the global oil supply system. Stocks balance supply 
and demand and ensure the security of supply by sending a clear signal to the market that the net 
importing countries will be able to fight back and cause losses by releasing these stocks. One can, 
therefore, distinguish between three kinds of stocks (adopted from IEA et al., 2005): 
1.  Primary stocks held in refinery tanks, bulk terminals, pipeline tankage, barges and tankers and 
ship bunkers for commercial purposes by the suppliers (e.g. producers, refiners, importers) or 
for strategic purposes by governments (e.g. US Strategic Petroleum Reserve) or by stockholding 
organisations (e.g. EBV in Germany); 
2.  Secondary stocks in small marketing facilities and retail establishments; and 
3.  Tertiary stocks held by end-consumers (e.g. power plants, industrial entities or consumers in 
the residential/commercial sector) 
Production and consumption 
In 2012, world oil production amounted to 89.9 million barrels a day, i.e. around 33 billion barrels a 
year (IEA, 2013). Apart from a significant drop during the second oil crisis (1979-1980) and despite 
supply cuts in some regions, global production has been steadily growing on average since 1965 to 
meet  a  soaring  demand,  in  particular  from  emerging  markets.  The  inability  to  keep  up  with  this 
soaring  demand  in  recent  years,  due  to  the  rigidity  of  supply  and  lower  yields  from  important 
production fields, has put the market in a constant deficit, which is reflected in highly volatile and 
upward-moving price patterns. 
                                                            
64 IEA et al. (2005, p. 170): “Natural gas liquids are liquid hydrocarbon mixtures, which are gaseous at reservoir 
temperatures and pressures, but are recoverable by condensation and absorption. Natural gas liquids can be 
classified according to their vapour pressure [...] A natural gas liquid with a low vapour pressure is a condensate; 
with an intermediate pressure, it is a natural gasoline, and with a high vapour pressure it is a liquid petroleum 
gas. [...] Natural gas liquids include propane, butane, pentane, hexane and heptane, but not methane and ethane, 
since these hydrocarbons need refrigeration to be liquefied. The term is commonly abbreviated as NGL.”  
 
Figure 42. World (net) production and consumption, 1965-2012 (kbbl/day) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from BP. Note: Net production is expressed as % of total production. 
The share of the 12 OPEC member countries65 is considerable, amounting to 42% of world oil 
production in 2011 (IEA, 2012 b) and 43.4% in 2012 (BP Stats) . OPEC produced 35.7 mb/d, 82% of 
which  was  ‘conventional’  crude  oil.  Among  the  non-OPEC  producers  (48.9  mb/d),  the  share  of 
‘conventional’ crude is two percentage points lower  than the OPEC producers, largely due to the 
growth of unconventional supplies, particularly in North America (tight light oil and Canadian oil 
sands). 
Saudi Arabia (13.43% of world production) and Russia (12.4%) are the largest oil producing 
countries, accounting for more than a quarter of the world oil production. As shown in  Figure 43 
below, other relevant producing countries include the United States (10.37%), China (4.84%), Canada 
(4.36%),  and  Iran  (4.29%).  Notably,  China  and  Canada,  for  the  first  time  since  the  1980s,  have 
produced more crude oil than Iran, which is the second producer in the Middle East.  
                                                            
65 Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United 
Arab Emirates and Venezuela. 72 | ENERGY COMMODITIES 
 
Figure 43. Top fifteen producers, 2012 (%) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from BP Stats. 
Technically  recoverable  oil  resources  are  still  considerable  –  totalling  5,871  billion  barrels 
(Figure 44). At 2011 levels of oil consumption, these resources would be sufficient to meet world oil 
demand for the next 185 years at the current consumption rate. This rough estimate, however, does 
not take into account expected demand growth and whether technically recoverable resources are 
economically and/or environmentally viable. Reserves estimates are in general not reliable, especially 
in  non-OECD  countries,  because  they  may  not  account  for  upcoming  developments  in  new 
technologies and exploration techniques (or other external factors) for extracting conventional or non-
conventional  oil.  By  only  considering  official  proven  reserves,  at  the  2011  rate  of  production,  the 
world’s reserves would last for another 55 years (IEA, 2012b). This becomes 46 years if we discount 
current consumption rate (Figure 44).  
Figure 44. Proven reserves, 1990-2011, and stock-to-use ratio, 2002-2011 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from EIA, OPEC.   
 
New  explorations  and  the  increase  in  oil  production  in  non-OPEC  countries  have  been 
increasing forecasts of proven reserves over yearly consumption, despite higher demand, and storage 
accumulation to meet new demand. Among non-OPEC countries, production has been growing in 
recent years in both Asia and Africa to meet lower or steady production levels in key OPEC countries 
(e.g. Saudi Arabia). 
Unconventional oil 
IEA has estimated that 54% of technical oil resources come from unconventional oil (Table 24). While 
the  Middle  East  holds  the  lion’s  share  of  the  remaining  conventional  oil  resources  (42%),  most 
unconventional oil resources are located in the Americas (59%).  
Table 24. Remaining technically recoverable oil resources by type and region, end 2011 
(billion barrels) 
 
Source: IEA (2012b, p. 101). Note: EHOB, extra-heavy oil and bitumen. 
The  ‘unconventional  revolution’  in  oil  may  have  important  geopolitical  implications, 
resembling those that shale gas exerted on natural gas markets. However, an important obstacle to 
their  development  is  the  relatively  low  energy  return  on  investment  (EROI);  the  energy  costs  to 
produce the commodity is still very high, even though the gap with crude oil has been narrowing in 
the last decades due to technological advancements in production. There are  three main  types of 
unconventional oil (Downey, 2009): oil extracted from sands (e.g. bitumen); coal-based oil; and shale 
oil.  
Oil from sands is heavy, with high asphaltene content and an API gravity below 15⁰. While its 
extraction is not very complex, sands need to be treated with a two-phase process requiring high 
amounts of water and energy. First, the heavy oil must be separated from sands and other impurities 
through a complex process that may involve the use of a solvent (such as propane) to reduce oil 
viscosity. Second, when the bituminous substance is extracted, a process involving high amounts of 
energy  upgrades  the  oil  to  a  higher  API  gravity,  with  fewer  impurities,  before  being  sent  to  a 
conventional refinery. The blending of this bituminous substance with light products is less expensive. 
Natural gas is generally used to produce energy for this heating process. 
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Oil can also be extracted from coal through a process that transforms the solid fuel into gas by 
heating  it.  Gas  is  then  liquefied  mainly  through  a  process  called  ‘Fischer-Tropsch’,  which  uses 
catalysts (like cobalt) and heating. Alternatively, coal can be directly converted to a liquid through 
carbonisation (the Karrick process) or hydrogenation (Bergius process), which respectively use super-
heating in the absence of air (in a retort) and a hot stream of pressed gases (dry process), together with 
catalysts and heavy oil/solvents (pumped into a reactor with hydrogen pressure), to convert the coal 
into liquids. These processes use a lot of energy, though they produce natural gases as by-products. 
As a result, if crude oil prices continue to increase and coal prices remain stable, oil sands may become 
an important source of unconventional oil, but at a high cost in terms of energy. 
Finally, shale oil is oil extracted from sedimentary rock and has high kerogen content. Kerogen 
is rich in hydrocarbon molecules, but has insufficient hydrogen to be like crude oil. It is extracted 
through different processes that involve high temperatures and hydrogen is added after extraction. 
Hydrogen also requires an energy-intensive process to separate it from oxygen, available together in 
water. 
International trade 
Oil is the largest traded commodity worldwide, either through crude oil or through refined products. 
Crude oil is transported via pipelines or ships (e.g. on very large crude carriers).  
Roughly 47% of the oil produced is traded interregionally (Figure 47; in IEA 2012b this figure is 
48%), and large crude carriers (cargoes) dominate interregional trade. The Middle East is the biggest 
exporting region (20.7 mb/d), and its exports are expected to increase in the future. China is expected 
to become the world’s largest oil importer, overtaking the United States where demand is decreasing 
and indigenous production is on the rise (IEA, 2012b). As of today, however, China is still behind the 
United States (Figure 45).  
Figure 45. Top ten exporters (left) and importers (right), 2011 (mt) 
 
Source: IEA (2012). 
When  looking  at  net  imports  (the  difference  between  exports  and  imports),  however,  the 
difference between the United States and China is smaller. Europe is the biggest net importer of oil in 
the world (Figure 46).  
 
Figure 46. Key net importers (by country/regions; kb/d) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from BP Stats. 
International trade in crude oil has been growing at an incredible pace, even though exports 
have gone down in relation to total production during the financial crisis. It appears that international 
trade has a strong pro-cyclical nature. This trend has accelerated as a result of oil-intensive emerging 
economies expanding their boundaries and entering the global market as significant trade partners. 
Figure 47. Value of production and international trade ($bn, %) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from World Bank, OPEC and BP Stats. Note: World Bank prices are average spot 
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International trade is estimated at almost $1.5 trillion globally, and growing. The market is very 
volatile, however, and depends heavily on the economic cycle and the volatility of exchange rates. 
2.1.1.1  Supply characteristics: ever-evolving market mechanisms  
The nature of oil supply and its market structure finds its roots in over a century of political history, 
full of geopolitical events that have shaken the market equilibria several times. As a consequence, four 
important periods in the history of crude oil supply can be identified.  
  1870-1911  (the  advanced  world  understands  the  importance  of  crude  oil  for  economic 
development). 
  1931-1971 (the United States leads the expansion of international markets for crude oil). 
  1973-1986 (OPEC takes the lead in pricing in international markets, but with strong geopolitical 
pressures to limit supply cuts). 
  1986-today (markets-based oil pricing systems supported by price assessments). 
From  1870  to  1911,  the  world  discovered  the  importance  of  crude  oil  for  daily  life  and  its 
implications for global trade and geopolitical power. The period ended with the split of the quasi-
monopolist  Standard  Oil  into  over  30  competing  companies  that  immediately  began  geographical 
diversification. This situation led to a long period of international trade development, mainly through 
four  former  Standard  Oil  subsidiaries  (Exxon,  Mobil,  Chevron,  and  Texaco)  and  three  other 
international oil companies (Royal Dutch Shell, Anglo-Persian Oil Company, then renamed BP, and 
Gulf Oil), the so-called Seven Sisters. Other firms, such as Total, ConocoPhillips and ENI, soon arrived 
in the international markets. From 1931-1971, under the strong influence of production outputs set by 
the United States (through the Texas Railroad Commission; see Downey, 2009), major oil companies 
gained  near  total  control  of  the  international  supply,  becoming  the  main  concessionaries  of  oil 
exploration and extraction in many countries around the world. Concessions were typically made on a 
50/50 split of the revenues, as in the case of Saudi Arabia and Chevron. This period of stability for 
crude  oil  markets  was  helped  by  the  oversupply  of  the  United  States  and  the  currency  stability 
granted  by  the  gold  standard.  However,  when  the  gold  standard  fell  under  the  pressure  of  an 
unmanageable convertibility and the spare crude oil capacity of the United States (which was already 
stagnant in 1970) intended to control market prices resulted insufficient to manage the supply output, 
the  system  quickly  collapsed.  For  the  first  time  in  history,  US  production  started  to  decline  and 
continued to do so during the 1970s, and also from mid-1980s until the commercialisation of non-
conventional oil in recent years, which has brought production up to the 1992 level (Figure 48).  
Figure 48. US crude oil production, 1965-2012 (kb/d) 
 
Source: BP stats.  
 
The main oil-producing countries (such as Iran), which took over from the United States as the 
top global producers and agreed to control supply through OPEC (established in 1960), decided to cut 
supply and show their power to exert sudden and deep economic pain in more advanced economies. 
Exploration  and  production  concessions  were  renegotiated  (e.g.  ENI  in  Iran)  and  gradually 
withdrawn in several cases. Oil production was nationalised through local state companies in several 
countries. The regime of posted prices by the US supply (which helped multinational oil companies to 
consolidate their position) was gradually replaced by a system of administered prices run by OPEC 
(Fattouh, 2011). The gradual shift of control over supply officially began with the first oil crisis and the 
Yom Kippur war in 1973, and ended in 1979 with the Iranian Islamic revolution and the overthrow of 
the Shah. Since then, OPEC has managed to control supply and adjust production to meet soaring 
demand  from  advanced  and  emerging  markets.  A  marker  price  (Arabian  light)  was  used  as  a 
reference  posted  price  to  which  a  negotiated  differential  was  applied.  The  system  was  held  by 
common agreement between OPEC to manage supply together.  Although it worked for a few years, 
the cartel often suffered from cheating by members that wanted to produce more and offer direct 
supply to third parties, rather than through a long-term contract with oil majors that could resell it, 
adding a price differential. As a result, a refinery netback pricing was introduced that limited the 
revenues accruable by the oil majors that were required to pay royalties in relation to the price that 
they were able to charge to final users. This system, which was introduced in 1984 also to guarantee 
stable  revenues  for  the  refining  industry  suffering  capacity  issues,  was  replaced  in  1986  with  the 
current system – a formula netback pricing. OPEC (and non-OPEC) crude producers sell their crude at 
a free-market crude oil benchmark price with differentials (see Section 2.1.4). 
Following the 2008-09 crisis, which has signalled a shift in power towards emerging countries, a 
new period for the oil industry may emerge. As the spare capacity in OECD countries continues to 
decline, the gradual replacement from non-OPEC countries and non-conventional sources, which are 
more widespread across the world, may lead to further changes in the oil pricing systems and in the 
role of price differentials. Steadily growing Asian demand may speed up the process of reform of 
current sources of formula pricing provided by futures exchanges, which are already suffering from 
regional  issues.  Whether  this  reform  would  determine  a  more  limited  role  for  price  differentials 
depends on how much of the market more liquid regional benchmarks are able to cover. The different 
grades and varieties of crude oil would always need to be based on differentials to take into account 
its heterogeneous nature. 
Industry organisation 
The exploration, extraction and production of crude oil are capital-intensive activities; oil producers 
must  sustain  significant  initial  sunk  and  fixed  costs  to  run  operations.  Capital  requirements  are 
generally on the rise and, while accessible reservoirs continue to be extensively exploited, producers 
are now turning more to offshore or unconventional oil (e.g. oil sands). The amount of capital invested 
by the oil and gas industry is significant, especially in the upstream market, and continues to grow 
over the years (Table 25). 
In  recent  years,  the  capital  invested  in  exploration  and  production  has  been  increasing 
substantially  due  to  the  need  to  improve  new  ways  of  extraction  (e.g.  deepwater  drilling)  and  a 
general reduction in spare capacity of conventional oil. The five oil majors (BP, Chevron, ExxonMobil, 
Shell and Total) will invest over $120 billion in the upstream in 2013 (Argus Media, 2012), while the 
industry altogether is set to reach the historic threshold of $500 billion (Table 25). 
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Table 25. Oil and gas industry investment by company (nominal dollars) 
 
Source: IEA (2012b). 
Exploration  and  production  (upstream)  are  subject  to  high  uncertainty  and  need  constant 
investment.  Special  contractors  (e.g.  drilling  rig  firms),  who  provide  specialised  expertise  and 
equipment, typically support upstream activities (in particular, production). The need for capital has 
historically  prompted  consolidation  in  upstream  markets,  where  multinational  companies  and 
nationalised oil companies can put more financial and political resources on the table. Concentration, 
however, might be more diluted when non-conventional oil is considered. Supply characteristics also 
push for vertical integration and partial horizontal integration with natural gas production. Costs of 
capital are also important for the downstream refining activities, with new refining activities costing 
roughly $1 billion per 100,000 barrels a day of capacity.  
Figure 49. Upstream capital expenditure (CAPEX) estimates 
 
Source: JP Morgan Commodities Research  
 
As  a  result  of  these  supply  characteristics,  supply  elasticity  is  rather  low  in  the  short  and 
medium  term,  as  producers  find  it  difficult  to  adjust  production  levels  upwards  at  short  notice 
(lengthy  authorisation  procedures  or  exploratory  seismic  work  may  be  needed,  for  instance,  for 
drilling  and  connecting  wells  to  pipelines).  Consequently,  many  large  and  complex  non-OPEC 
projects can take between 5 and 15 years to go from approval to production, meaning the supply 
response is slow even if they receive immediate approval. Downward adjustment is sticky as well. 
Reservoir and wellbore characteristics may not allow simply restarting production later on. Strategic 
behaviour  by  producers,  especially  within  the  OPEC  cartel,  adds  to  the  issue  of  supply-side 
inelasticity and the inability to face sudden production changes. 
Demand  and  supply  rigidity  in  the  short  term  (‘bilateral  price  rigidity’)  typically  causes 
temporary price instability, not only for oil but also for other commodities such as raw materials.  The 
reasons can be summarised as follows:  
i)  Production  cannot  be  quickly  modified,  as  capacity  increases  tend  to  take  place  in  large 
increments – typical for heavy industries where scale considerations are important. 
ii)  Costs structure; if production requires large upfront investment, sunk costs will dominate direct 
costs, meaning that additional capacity that is created will tend to be used to spread the indirect 
cost on a larger production base.66  
iii)  Only some OPEC countries, notably Saudi Arabia and the other Arab Gulf producers, make 
large-scale investments to create capacity to be used for stand-by; this behaviour is essential to 
counteract  the  structural  instability  of  prices,  which  is  the  spontaneous  tendency  of  the 
market.67  
Note also that investments in non-OPEC production were slow to respond to the oil price rise of 
2000-07 because oil companies use conservative price assumptions in their investment planning. Also 
note that non-OPEC producers invariably maximise production, irrespective of price, because of the 
need to recoup the significant capital expenditure of oil exploration/production. Non-OPEC crude oil 
producers can thus be considered ‘price-takers’. OPEC producers, by contrast (and Saudi Arabia in 
particular), actively adjust production levels in response to prices. Investment by OPEC producers 
does not respond to higher demand quickly (if at all) because OPEC producers can better maximise 
revenue by producing less oil in a capacity-constrained market at a higher price than by  meeting 
demand at a lower price. 
On  top  of  supply  rigidities,  demand  is  equally  rigid  as  oil  satisfies  essential  needs  with 
considerable lead time (transport, heating with low price elasticity), taxation often isolates consumers 
from immediate impact, energy expenditure is often a small part of overall expenditure in OECD 
countries and is often subsidised in developing countries, and demand is often influenced by macro 
trends such as income and weather. As a result, given short-term supply and demand constraints, 
prices may be undetermined within a broad margin. Existing supply and demand will react seriously 
only if prices reach very high or very low levels. Given a prevailing price discovery mechanism (see 
below), the mechanism will generate a specific price; but the same balance or imbalance between 
demand  and  supply  would  prevail  even  with  higher  or  lower  prices.  The  so-called  ‘marked 
fundamentals’, demand and supply, will normally validate whatever price has come to prevail. This 
price may be influenced by factors that are totally unrelated to oil fundamentals (for example, the 
value of the dollar relative to other currencies) and change accordingly; fundamentals will not be able 
to counteract this. 
Freight  costs  are  relevant,  but  due  to  the  high  outright  price  of  crude  in  connection  with 
sustained demand and the ability to easily store and ship the product, they are far less significant than 
for natural gas, for example. The relative share of transportation costs has declined significantly in 
recent years, due to high oil prices and decreasing transportation costs, inter alia due to excess tanker 
                                                            
66 Oil exploration and production activities are dominated by sunk costs. When a new field is discovered or new 
capacity is added, this will tend to be used to the maximum level that is compatible with the preservation of the 
long-term value of the field. A physical optimum exploitation rate typically applies to preserve the long-run value 
of the field.  
67 Note also that the OPEC quota system may lead to lower prices but would rarely affect price stability. 80 | ENERGY COMMODITIES 
 
tonnage. To give an example, shipping oil from Cushing in Oklahoma (a major trading hub for crude 
oil and the price settlement point for West Texas Intermediate on the New York Mercantile Exchange) 
to Europe costs around $13-14/bbl. This means that the current spread between the WTI crude oil 
price and Brent Crude (at time of writing, well above $14) may be unsustainable and driven by more 
fundamental issues (see Section 2.1.4). 
Midstream (oil transportation) and downstream (refining and distribution) are typically less 
concentrated but competition also relies on government intervention, both at an infrastructural and a 
regulatory level. Lower concentration at these two levels is mainly due to still high oil reserves and 
limited costs of transportation. However, OPEC’s 42% market share in production is also able to exert 
some market power at lower levels of the value chain, especially in the case of Saudi Arabia.  
2.1.1.2  Demand characteristics: will the world remain oil-dependent? 
Crude  oil  was  at  the  heart  of  the  economic  development  of  the  last  century.  Economies  still  rely 
heavily on crude oil today as a main source of energy and chemicals used in day-to-day life. Even 
though the world (and in particular, more developed economies) is moving towards more reliance on 
more  sustainable  alternative  sources,  it  may  still  be  some  decades  before  crude  oil  and  derived 
products become secondary resources. The lack of substitutes, especially for transportation fuel, feeds 
a solid and steadily growing demand. 
The share of oil in global total energy demand has been decreasing, from over 45% in 1973 to 
around 32% of primary world energy demand in 2010 (IEA, 2012b). It is generally believed that the 
relative  share  of  oil  in  the  energy  mix  of  will  decrease  further  to  25-27%  by  2035.  However,  the 
demand for oil is still projected to rise in absolute terms, at a compound annual growth rate of 0.5%-
0.8%  between  2010  and  2035  in  the  IEA’s  current  and  new  policies  scenarios.  Only  under  the 
assumption of an ambitious global decarbonisation agenda (450ppm) would the annual growth rate 
be negative (-0.4%).  
The  demand  side  may  experience  some  level  of  concentration  in  market  structure,  but  the 
impact on competition and distribution bottlenecks is limited to regional or country-specific factors. 
Non-OECD countries mainly drive oil demand growth today, due to higher rates of economic growth 
and  their  oil-based  manufacturing  economies  (especially  for  transport).  Oil  demand  in  the  OECD 
countries, by contrast, is expected to decline at a compound annual rate of between -0.6% and -2.1% to 
2035. 
 
Figure 50. World oil demand by region; mn bbl/d 
  
 
Source: IEA (2013). 
In 2011, the world’s oil demand amounted to 88 million barrels per day (mb/d; BP stats). While 
oil is used all across the world, the top oil consuming countries in 2011 were the United States (23 
mb/d, i.e. 25.3% of world oil demand), the EU-27 (15.9%), China (11.4%), Indonesia (5.0%), India 
(4.0%), Saudi Arabia (3.7%), Russia (3.4%), and Brazil (3.0%). The non-OECD world accounts for 43% 
of world oil demand (IEA, 2012b). In recent years, oil demand has grown rapidly in many emerging 
economies (especially in Asia) and this trend is expected to continue in the future. Despite a forecasted 
slowdown in consumption in 2013, China remains a leading driver of this growth, as its economy has 
expanded over the years in favour of an oil-intensive manufacturing economy and thus requires a 
relatively low-cost and constant  energy supply (see Figure 51). Brazil and India have also  shown 
important signs of growth, but at much lower rates. 
Figure 51. China, Brazil and India Consumption, 1965-2013 (kbbl/d) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from BP Stats and IEA (2013). 
The share of oil in total primary energy demand varies across countries. In the OECD world, it 
is  at  a  fairly  high  36%.  In  the  non-OECD  world,  it  is  on  average  ten  percentage  points  lower. 
Accordingly, the share of oil in total primary energy demand in the BRICs is still below the OECD 
average (e.g. Russia 20%, India 24%, China 17%), with the exception of Brazil (40%). Numbers suggest 
that growth in oil consumption for emerging markets will continue in the coming years (Chatham 
House, 2012). 
Oil use is complex and involves both energy and non-energy uses.68 By far the most important 
global user is the transport sector, accounting for more than half of world oil demand, as shown in  
Figure 39). Both the construction and industrial sectors account for roughly 17%. Power generation, in 
steady decline over the last decade, is responsible for 7%. The share of the transport sector is projected 
to increase even more in the future to well above the current 50%, due to development in emerging 
economies.  
                                                            
68 IEA et al. (2005) distinguished between: (i) the transformation sector (e.g. electricity and heat production, oil 
used to produce gas in a gasification plant), (ii) energy industries in the energy sector, (iii) the transportation and 
distribution of oil (limited), (iv) the various sectors and branches of final consumption (industry, residential, etc.), 
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Figure 52. World oil demand by sector in the IEA’s New Policies Scenario 
 
Source: IEA (2012b). Notes: Other includes non-energy use, including feedstock for industry. 
The  demand  for  liquid  fuels69  will grow exponentially in non -OECD countries (Figure  53), 
while it will be more or less stable in advanced economies, though its composition may be subject to 
important changes as renewable fuel production is increases and becomes more widespread. 
The availability of substitutes for oil varies widely across uses. In transport, substitutes exist in 
principle (biofuels, natural gas vehicles, biogas, hydrogen and electric power). These substitutes are, 
however, not readily available and would require  huge investments (e.g. infrastructure needs of 
electric cars) or change in land use (for biofuels). Due to its high energy density, oil will probably 
remain cost-competitive compared to most alternatives, even if oil prices remain high. Fuel and 
feedstock switching is in principle possible in industry, using gas or biomass or making increased use 
of recycling, for example. Oil, which is mainly used for space heating in buildings, can be substituted 
by gas, electric power and renewables such as biomass or solar thermal. Numerous substitutes such as 
gas,  nuclear,  coal  and  renewables  exist  in  power  generation,  where  oil  is  generally  not  very 
competitive. 
Figure 53. Liquid fuels consumption by region and sector, 2008-2035 (mb/d) 
   
Source: Author’s elaboration from EIA (2011). 
The demand elasticity to the price of oil depends on the sector. In the transportation sector, 
elasticity  is  quite  low,  at  least  in  the  short  and  medium  term,  given  the  lack  of  readily  available 
                                                            
69  ‘Liquid  fuels’  are  all  petroleum  products,  natural  gas  liquids,  biofuels,  and  liquids  derived  from  other 
hydrocarbon sources (coal to liquids and gas to liquids).  
 
substitutes.  In the industrial sector, long-term elasticity is moderate, but as some substitutes may 
require changes in the manufacturing process (e.g. new equipment, new chemical processes), this will 
often not be the case in the short and medium term. In the construction sector and power generation, 
elasticity is generally high as a number of substitutes are available. However, elasticity may be lower 
in the short term due to significant sunk costs for oil users (oil-fired power plants, heating systems, 
etc.) and long lead times with high capital costs for substitutes (especially nuclear power). Elasticity in 
the power sector is higher if spare capacity is high (e.g. in coal- or gas-fired power plants) or trade is 
possible (e.g. in the interconnected European electricity market). 
2.1.1.3  Key product and market characteristics 
The interesting combination of particular product characteristics and historically strong geopolitical 
factors has shaped market characteristics as described below: 
  Crude oil cannot be recycled, but petrochemicals products (plastics) are. 
  It has high substitutability, especially in some uses (such as transport fuel), and can be used in 
several areas, from energy to construction and chemicals. 
  Highly capital-intensive production, due to a lack of convertibility to alternative products (only 
natural gas is typically extracted jointly with oil), has prompted partial vertical (to refining) and 
horizontal (to natural gas) integration in the industry. 
  Long-term storability and low freight costs (compared to the underlying value) makes crude oil 
an ideal product for global trade, which exposes it less to the economic cycle as it becomes less 
dependent on consumption in single regional areas. 
  Supply and demand elasticities are very rigid in the short/medium term. 
  Demand elasticity is low and can only adjust to price in the long term (making oil security a 
strategic objective for all governments across the world). 
  Market concentration is medium-to-high in the upstream (exploration and production), mainly 
due to the high investments needed, while concentration is much lower in the downstream 
(transportation and distribution). 
  Demand still comes mostly from advanced economies, but the astonishing growth of emerging 
markets is the only current driver of growth and will be so for future consumption levels. 
  On the supply side, emerging markets have accrued an important share of conventional oil 
production, but future growth may mainly come from non-conventional sources (even though 
dependence from key oil producers is here to stay). 
  Driven by new developing economies, future demand will be still strong though production 
may  not  grow  at  the  same  speed,  increasing  the  reliance  on  non-conventional  sources  of 
production. 
Table 26. Product and market characteristics 
 
Recycling/ 
Production 
convertibility 
Substitutes/
Horizontal 
integration 
Alternative 
uses/ Vertical 
integration 
Capital 
intensity  
Storabi-
lity 
Freight 
costs 
incidence 
Elasticity 
to price/ 
demand 
Concen-
tration 
BRICs 
weight 
Future 
Consumption/ 
Production 
Demand 
side 
None  High  High 
High  High  Medium 
Low 
Medium 
High  High 
Supply 
side 
Low  Medium  High  Low 
Mediu
m 
Medium 
Note: ‘BRICs’ is used as an alternative term to define ‘emerging markets’. 
Source: Author. 
2.1.2  Exogenous factors: measuring the impact of policy factors 
Government  intervention  in  oil  markets  takes  various  forms  and  occurs  both  on  the  supply  and 
demand side. Interventions differ significantly between the OECD, OPEC, and the rest of the world. A 
notable exception is aviation, where kerosene is exempt from taxation virtually everywhere. 84 | ENERGY COMMODITIES 
 
In OECD countries, supply side royalties and taxes in different jurisdictions have a large impact 
on  upstream  investments.  As  part  of  its  efforts  to  encourage  governments  to  phase  out 
environmentally harmful subsidies, the OECD and the IEA have put together a fossil fuel subsidy 
inventory  covering  both  the  production  and  consumption  of  fossil  fuels.70  The OECD inventory 
measures the extent of favourable treatment with reference to national  tax benchmarks. It provides 
some evidence that a favourable tax treatment for the oil i ndustry is quite common in gas-producing 
OECD countries. As regards the demand side, OECD governments tend to impose very high taxes on 
the consumption of refined products (fuels) because of the collateral effects combined with the low 
demand elasticity (linked to transport means). This situation over time may have an  (intentional) 
impact on consumption, prom pting  the  search for alternative source s  of fuel,  and  thus  on crude 
production. Other incentive policies also have an important impact on demand. For example, the 
European industrial policy to promote diesel engine technology over gasoline has led to a significant 
misalignment  between  dies el  and  gasoline  demand  on  the  one  hand,  and  European  refinery 
production capacity for the two fuels  on the other. Europe has accumulated a  significant deficit of 
diesel production capacity and  thus a surplus of gasoline capacity that has caused problems in the 
sector. 
As a result, government intervention in upstream markets is channelled through agreement on 
royalties or with direct exploration and production through state-owned companies (less common). In 
OPEC and the non-OECD world in general, extraction and refining is often nationalised. Supply-side 
intervention also extends to the issue of ‘resource nationalism’, whereby countries with significant oil 
reserves limit or completely refuse access to those reserves by the private sector – in the Middle East 
including  Saudi  Arabia,  Mexico,  South  America,  and  Africa.  The  lack  of  access  to  these  low-cost 
reserves plays a major role in explaining why the marginal cost of oil production is at the current 
level. OPEC production agreements have a direct impact on supply, especially when Saudi Arabia 
alters  production;  royalties  and  taxes  in  different  jurisdictions  have  a  large  impact  on  upstream 
investment; moratoria on drilling have a direct impact; licensing of acreage for upstream exploration 
and  production  is  controlled  by  governments;  and  resource  nationalism  prevents  exploration  and 
production by private-sector companies in large areas of the world.  
In the downstream market, taxation or subsidies for fuel products (e.g. gasoline) are the main 
means of intervention. In OECD countries, taxation is typically much higher than in other countries to 
stimulate  changes  in  consumption  habits  (to  more  environment-oriented  habits)  and  reduce  the 
dependence on oil. As Figure 54 illustrates, taxation can increase spot gasoline prices by a factor of 
more than three, discouraging consumption in the long term and so indirectly affecting demand and 
supply of the physical commodity. 
Figure 54. UK gasoline price with and without taxes 
 
Source: JP Morgan (2011). 
 
                                                            
70 To access the database, please see http://www.oecd.org/site/tadffss/.   
 
In  oil-producing  or  emerging  countries,  however,  taxation  is  often  negative  (i.e.  prices  are 
subsidised) and governments intervene to reduce prices at the pump or for industrial uses (in Saudi 
Arabia, for example, the intervention was estimated at around $45/bbl in 2011). Fuel subsidies have a 
major impact on demand, keeping it artificially high. This raises questions over the negative economic 
and environmental consequences. 
Table 27. Key exogenous factors 
Government intervention  Other external factors 
High  Economic cycle, exchange rates and military conflicts 
Source: Author. 
Other political factors, which often lead to the formation or dissolution of governments, have 
been the source of important political instability and military conflicts in recent years (e.g. in Iraq, 
Libya  and  Nigeria).  Other  countries,  such  as  Saudi  Arabia,  have  repeatedly  intervened  to  fill  the 
supply gap, but often the magnitude of the intervention has been insufficient to prevent price and 
volatility spikes. 
Finally, crude oil production and consumption is also affected by a long list of external factors, 
such as economic crises or policy decisions. The effects of the economic cycle and monetary policies 
are reflected in oil price trends mostly through the evolution of exchange rates and credit expansion 
(see the following section). 
Figure 55. Five-year rolling Pearson correlation WTI front-month and S&P 500 
 
Source: Author’s calculation. Note: daily data. 
As Figure 55 shows, before 2002 the five-year rolling Pearson correlation between the natural 
logarithm of WTI front-month and the S&P 500 financial index has always been positive or negative at 
a more or less regular intervals. Since 2002, when expansionary monetary policies started to depress 
the strength of the dollar and expand credit, the correlation between prices and a financial index that 
should be only randomly correlated to another asset has become steadily positive (above 60%). As 
mentioned in Chapter 1, no conclusions can be  drawn about causal relationships from correlation 
analyses, and certainly this cannot be interpreted as showing that the financial index leads prices in 
commodities.  Rather,  as  mentioned  above,  it  appears  that  an  underlying  common  variable  has 86 | ENERGY COMMODITIES 
 
gradually prompted variables, only occasionally positively correlated, to move in the same direction 
for a prolonged period of time with a stable positive correlation. This analysis also finds support in the 
analyses carried out for other commodities markets.  
2.1.3  Empirical analysis: the crucial link with the economic cycle 
The empirical analysis of price formation in crude oil markets looks at relationships between front-
month WTI price and key variables (such as inventories). The analysis is done on WTI front-month 
futures contract, which can be seen as a close approximation of spot prices of crude oil delivered at 
Cushing, Oklahoma. The Brent front-month futures price, representing the benchmark price for more 
than 60% of global trade, was also used. However, the futures contract (front-month) published by 
ICE  may  not  necessarily  be  a  close  approximation  of  the  Dated  Brent  final  price  (physical  price) 
pricing actual deliveries at the Sullom Voe terminal in the North Sea. Financial layers with the support 
of price assessments to calculate differentials may cause wide divergences with the original Brent 
futures front-month contract. 
The dataset has the following characteristics: 
  Monthly data from 01/01/1994 to 31/12/2011. 
  Natural logarithm (from now on simply ‘log’) of front-month WTI NYMEX price and Brent ICE 
(‘spot  price’),  differentiated  to  avoid  spurious  regressions.  Prices  are  deflated  using  the  US 
Producer Price Index (PPI) published by the Federal Reserve (‘the Fed’). 
  Log  US  ending  stocks  excluding  SPR  of  crude  oil  (thousands  barrels)  provided  by  the  US 
Energy Information Administration and EU-16 including Norway (provided by Argus Media). 
  Log Price-adjusted Broad Dollar Index published by the Fed. 
  Log of OECD leading composite indicator, as average of de-trended, smoothed and normalised 
component series calculated for the United States (to capture the economic cycle).71 
  Log of the monetary aggregate M2, seasonally adjusted data published by the Fed. 
  Log of Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 500 index. 
  Log of the effective Fed funds rate (interbank interest rate), not seasonally adjusted. 
The log of WTI front-month appears to be a unit root, as the Dickey-Fuller suggests, so variables 
in the model are differentiated. A simple linear model of differentiated variables seems to fit well the 
dataset.  Main  misspecification  tests  (normality,  heteroskedasticity,  and  the  Ramsey  test  for 
misspecification) on the linear regression model confirms the validity of the model. As described by 
Output #10 (for WTI) and Output #11 (for Brent), the regression provides straightforward and similar 
results for both WTI and Brent (Table 28).  
 
                                                            
71 The composite leading indicator is a times series, formed by aggregating a variety of component indicators 
which show a reasonably consistent relationship with a reference series (e.g. industrial production IIP  up to 
March 2012 and since then the reference series is GDP) at turning points. The OECD CLI is designed to provide 
qualitative  information  on  short-term  economic  movements,  especially  at  the  turning  points,  rather  than 
quantitative measures. Therefore, the main message of CLI movements over time is the increase or decrease, 
rather than the amplitude of the changes. The OECD’s headline indicator is the amplitude adjusted CLI. The 
component series for each country are selected based on various criteria such as economic significance; cyclical 
behaviour; data quality; timeliness and availability. For the US indicator, the components are: dwellings started 
(number; Bureau of the Census); net new orders for durable goods (USD – million; Bureau of the Census); share 
prices,  NYSE  composite  (2005=100;  Bureau  of  the  Census);  consumer  sentiment  indicator  (normal  =  100; 
University of Michigan); weekly hours of work, manufacturing (hours; Bureau of Labor Statistics); purchasing 
managers index (BS) (% balance; Institute of Supply Management); spread of interest rates (% per annum; Federal 
Reserve).  More  information  is  available  at 
http://www.oecd.org/std/clits/oecdcompositeleadingindicatorsreferenceturningpointsandcomponentseries.ht
m.   
 
Table 28. WTI and Brent regressions output 
Independent variable 
(WTI) 
Coefficient 
(t-test) 
Independent variable 
(Brent) 
Coefficient 
(t-test) 
US Inventories 
-0.53*** 
(-2.64) 
EU Inventories 
-0.5** 
(-2.41) 
Broad Dollar Index 
-1.46*** 
(-2.9) 
Broad Dollar Index 
-1.36*** 
(-2.84) 
US OECD Demand 
7.24*** 
(2.66) 
US OECD Demand 
11.86*** 
(4.83) 
China Demand 
3.97** 
(2.47) 
China Demand 
4.13*** 
(3.10) 
Note: ***1%, **5%, *10% significance. 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
The model is consistent with most of the theoretical background analysis in this section and in 
Chapter 1. First, the crude oil price shows a negative relationship with inventories, while exogenous 
factors,  such  as  exchange  rates  and  the  economic  cycle,  are  positively  related.  Chinese  demand 
(estimated in a model without US demand) seems to influence oil price, but the US domestic demand 
effect prevails. 
Futures contracts seem to provide a well-functioning driver of inventory levels. The basis (i.e. 
the difference between a spot or front-month contract and a purer futures contract) of both futures 
contracts with delivery in 4 and 12 months Granger-causes levels of inventories with a significant first 
lag (see Output #12). Results are robust and confirm the efficiency of the futures market in reflecting 
the underlying physical market.  
The  findings  (in  the  Annex)  also  confirm  a  strong  link  with  financial  indexes,  but  the 
relationship with the S&P 500 needs further specification. Despite Output #13 suggesting that the S&P 
500 Granger-causes the crude oil price (unilaterally) by regressing separately the S&P 500 on the crude 
oil price (with a linear regression) and vice-versa (with an ARCH model),72 this relationship seems to 
be significant both ways (see Output #14). A different approach can be used to confirm this analysis. 
A sample of monthly data from January 1983 to December 2001, when cuts to nominal interest rates 
started a period of expansionary monetary policies reflected on to  the devaluation of the dollar, is 
tested to assess whether the relationship existed before 2002. Another test is run on monthly data from 
2002 to 2011. As Output #15 shows, an ARCH autoregressive to model first-differentiated front-month 
prices as a dependent variable confirms that S&P 500 and oil prices were not statistically linked before 
the beginning of the credit-easing era (1983-2001), while they were in the following period (2002-2011). 
The results are confirmed by using  a dataset based on  Brent front-month futures prices (see Output 
#16). This result confirms the empirical analysis in Section 1.4, and in particular that the relationship 
with the financial index strengthened from the beginning of the dollar devaluation.  
These results point to a significant impact of monetary policies on oil price formation, through 
interest rates and the expansion of the monetary base (with the effects on exchange rates), pushing oil 
prices and financial indexes in the same direction. These policies have also  had an impact on the size 
                                                            
72 Due to unit root with differentiated levels, the ARCH model seems to fit the dataset better. The power of the 
ARCH model consists in the joint estimation of a mean equation and a separate variance equation, in which, by 
being able to model the behaviour through which past realizations of the error term influence the present one, the 
model allows for heteroskedasticity of the error term. In the simplest case of the ARCH (1) model used in this 
section, the variance equation is estimated in the following way ht=a+a1*e2t-1 where e is the error term of the mean 
equation. The GARCH (generalised autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity) model, instead, introduces an 
autoregressive term of the variance equation. To test for the presence of ARCH effects in the series, a Lagrange 
Multiplier (LM) test (which tests the variance equation whether a and a1 are significant) can be used. As ARCH 
effects clearly emerge from the test in this dataset, an ARCH (1) model is used to understand the impact of key 
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of futures markets and index positions (as discussed in previous sections; see in particular Section 1.4). 
This result confirms other findings on the broader impact of monetary policies through the exchange 
rate on the demand of oil (Schryder and Peersman, 2012). 
2.1.4  Market organisation: prospects and challenges for benchmark prices  
The development of market organisation in crude oil markets has undergone several changes over the 
years.  Since  the  end  of  posted  prices,  at  the  end  of  the  1980s,  market-based  solutions  have  been 
developed  but  they  are  under  continuous  evolution.  The  pricing  of  physical  crude  oil  today  is  a 
complex web of financial and physical transactions, which result in a combination of futures, forward, 
and spot prices traded on open platforms, OTC, or assessed by price reporting agencies (PRAs). This 
system relies on pricing formulas. 
Crude  oil  prices  (typically  sold  FOB)  are  formed  through  long-term  contracts  or  spot 
transactions with delivery a few business days after the conclusion of the deal. In the latter, in effect, it 
is a ‘forward’ because spot cargoes for immediate delivery are rare due to logistical issues of making 
the commodity immediately available (especially  if  delivered seaborne).  Often, the price of an oil 
cargo is linked to the time of loading. Crude oil can be traded at sea (by acquiring ownership of an 
entire vessel or lots of it) or at a terminal where the crude oil will be made available FOB through 
vessels or pipelines to the buyer (the typical physical delivery of futures contracts). There are two 
important factors that need to be taken into account in the pricing formula: location and crude quality 
(mainly density and sulphur content).  
As mentioned above, crude oil is extracted in several different locations across the world and 
sold  in  a  global  market.  Therefore,  differentials  are  usually  assessed  (by  PRAs)  and  applied  to  a 
benchmark price (an average) that reflects the standard quality of crude oil. Three futures contracts 
are widely adopted as benchmark price for crude oil: 
1.  Brent blend (traded on Intercontinental Exchange, ICE). 
2.  West Texas Intermediate (WTI; traded on NYMEX). 
3.  Dubai (is the Oman crude oil contract traded on Dubai Mercantile Exchange, DME).   
Each is used to price physical transactions in a different location. WTI is used for oil shipments 
or local transactions in North America. Brent is used today for oil imported in the European Union, 
and for most seaborne oil cargoes as it is a benchmark based on cargo delivery in the North Sea. 
Finally, the Dubai benchmark is used for crude oil spot transactions in Asia and Africa (together with 
the Nigerian Bonny Light). 
Published spot market prices, which rely on a combination of public prices and assessments, are 
also used in long-term supply contracts as a reference price. This system directly links prices under 
long-term supply contracts to prevailing spot  market prices. Price reporting  agencies also publish 
several  official  price  differentials  used  in  the  pricing  formulas  of  state-owned  oil  producers  each 
month  (Saudi  Arabia,  Iran,  Iraq,  Libya,  Egypt,  Nigeria,  Mexico,  etc.).  The  differentials  applied  to 
averages of benchmark crudes (so called ‘pricing formula’) are a central feature of the oil pricing 
system and are used by oil companies and traders to price cargoes under long-term contracts or in 
spot market transactions, by futures exchanges for the final settlement of their financial contracts, by 
banks and companies for the settlement of derivative instruments such as swap contracts, and by 
governments for taxation. 
Formula pricing may have important advantages (Fattouh, 2011):  
  It takes into account the large variety in crude oils by adding a (positive or negative) premium 
to  the  reference  price  adjusted  periodically  to  reflect  differences  in  the  quality  of  crudes, 
location and refinery demand, as well as other demand and supply factors of the various types 
of crudes. 
  It provides price flexibility to hedge from specific price risk, as it usually also accounts for time 
lags between the date of purchase of the cargo and the date of delivery at destination (e.g. 
Dated Brent). 
  It reduces the possibility to squeeze markets for less liquid benchmarks. 
However, this system adds a level of discretion on how the price is assessed that increases the 
overall complexity of how the physical price is determined. In addition, benchmarks may rely on  
 
markets with limited volumes of production, such as WTI, Brent (the biggest with less than 1.2 million 
barrels a day of production, out of over 89 million produced globally) and Dubai, thus setting prices 
for markets with higher volumes of production elsewhere in the world.  
Table 29. Liquidity of underlying physical markets, Q1 2010  
 
ASCI  WTI CMA + 
WTI P-Plus 
Forties  BFOE  Dubai  Oman 
Production (mb/d)   736  300-400  562  1,220  70-80  710 
Volume Spot Traded (mb/d)  579  939  514  635  86  246 
Spot trades per month  260  330  18  98  3.5  10 
Spot Trades Per Day   13  16  <1  5  <1  <1 
Spot Buyers per Month   26  27  7  10  3  5 
Number of Different 
Spot Sellers per Month  
24  36  6  9  3  6 
Largest 3 Buyers % of 
Total Spot Volume  
43%  38%  63%  72%  100%  50% 
Largest 3 Sellers % of 
Total Spot Volume  
38%  51%  76%  56%  100%  80% 
Source: Fattouh (2011, p. 28). 
For instance, Brent blend prices help pricing for roughly 70% of the international trade in oil (a 
physical market worth around $1 trillion every year), but the value of the underlying market is $52.6 
billion a year (around 5%), assuming an underlying production of 1.2 million barrels per day at a 
settlement price of  $120 per barrel. 
As  underlying  physical  markets  become  thinner  and  thinner,  the  price  discovery  process 
becomes more difficult although methods to overcome this have been applied. It also opens space for 
squeezes in the physical market directly, rather than the futures market. PRAs, therefore, may be 
unable  to  observe  enough  genuine  arms-length  deals  and  would  need  to  rely  more  on  general 
information  based  on  pure  research.  Furthermore,  in  thin  markets,  the  danger  of  squeezes  and 
distortions increases and, as a result, prices could then become less informative and more volatile, 
distorting consumption and production decisions.  
Spot price formation: the case study of Brent crude oil pricing 
While physical delivery of WTI is done at a price very close to the settlement price of the front-month 
futures contract traded on NYMEX (plus or less a differential), with delivery in different varieties and 
quantities at Cushing (Oklahoma) through pipelines, or through an index for sour crude published by 
Argus (Argus Sour Crude Index, ASCI),73 the spot price of Brent blend  (Dated Brent, published by 
Platts) is a more complex assessment  that is based on transaction data, forward contracts, and non -
publicly available information linked together by several financial layers . Additionally, as Brent is 
mainly  a  seaborne  crude  oil,  the  standard  delivery  of  a  Brent  shipment  is  600,000  barrels  so 
participation in the underlying market is limited to big players, even th ough other contracts are often 
made  available  separately  for  delivery  in  lower  amounts.   To  ensure  constant  liquidity  in  the 
underlying physical market, the calculation of Brent price at delivery was expanded in 2002 to  two 
other North Sea markets (Forties and Oseberg) and in 2007 to Ekofisk (with Oseberg, two Norwegian 
oil fields). Identifying the spot price of these different key regional crude oils is more complex and is 
typically done through financial layers comprising prices of forward contracts and r elated financial 
                                                            
73 In recent years, the Argus Sour Crude Index has emerged as a benchmark for US crude oil imports from Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq. It is a daily volume-weighted average price index of aggregate deals done for three 
component  crude  grades.  The  three  crude  oil  grade  components  are:  Mars,  Poseidon  and  Southern  Green 
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instruments. These separate layers have been developed to improve the efficiency of hedging price 
risk and to make the market more liquid.  
As  a  result  of  the  seaborne  nature  of  Brent  crude’s  physical  delivery,  which  requires  the 
predisposal  of a schedule  for delivery in the following month, there are at least three interlinked 
markets in addition to the other derivatives and CFDs built around them:  
  Brent futures contracts (traded on ICE). 
  25-day Brent forward (the ‘paper BFOE market’).  
  Dated Brent (published by Platts). 
Futures contracts on Brent are traded on ICE in London with expiry dates of up to seven years 
and daily settlement based on a weighted average of traded price over three minutes at a specific time 
of  day.  When  the  contract  reaches  the  expiration  date,  the  investor  can  notify  (within  one  hour) 
whether he/she wants to cash-settle (as happens in 99% of the cases) at the ICE Brent Index price for 
the day following the last day of the futures contract. The index is calculated on data collected from 
the forward market that is linked to the futures contract.74 
If the trader opts for physical delivery, a sort of exchange of futures for forward delivery will 
apply.75 First, when the contract expires the month bef ore the delivery month (on the 15th day of the 
month before the delivery month for the old ICE futures contract), the futures contract becomes a 
forward BFOE OTC contract with delivery in the next month but without a precise date of delivery (a 
loading schedule within a 2-3 day range). The producers should then forward a notice for the delivery 
schedule of the commodity to the buyers (holding the forward) to announce the final date of loading 
of the commodity onto a vessel provided by the buyer at the North Sea terminal. In the meantime, the 
forward contract can be traded OTC by the holder in a market that has very few participants, with 
prices assessed by PRAs76 and a very high lot size for each contract ( the standard size is a cargo of 
600,000 barrels).  When the notice arrives ,  the forward contract becomes a  Dated  Brent physical 
contract (wet crude), because the date of loading is scheduled, which gives valid legal possession over 
the oil lot. Otherwise, the forward contract can also be netted out before (cash settlement). Originally, 
the notice had to arrive at least 15 days before delivery. This is why the old futures contract expiration 
is on the 15th day of the month before the delivery month,77 in order to allow up to the full following 
month for delivery.  
However, this notice period has widened over the years to the current 25 days, in line with the 
changes to the evaluation window made by Platts for the underlying spot price (Dated Brent) because 
of the limited liquidity in the underlying market and  the risk of squeezes.78 The daily assessment of 
the 25-day forward BFOE is done through the Market on Close methodology, which takes into account 
only trades with specific characteristics (e.g. firm bid and offers or completed transactions) collected 
all day long are put together 30 minutes before the end of the trading day (Platts 2013). In these 30 
minutes,  only  adjustments  to  submitted  bid  and  offers  are  allowed,  in  line  with  Platts’ 
incrementability and repeatability guidelines.79 The final price assessment, which re flects end of the 
day value, is finally published at 16:30 hours  (depending on location).  
                                                            
74  The  index  is  calculated  on  the  first  and  second-month  weighted  average  of  cargo  trades  in  the  25-days 
underlying  forward  (BFOE),  plus  a  spread  (positive  or  negative)  between  the  two  months  cargo  trades  as 
published by PRAs (Fattouh, 2011) 
75 It is a similar concept to the standard exchange of futures positions for physical transactions (EFPs), which is 
typically done before expiration date between a party that wants to transform its position in a physical holding 
and another one with a matching physical position that wants to have a long position in futures markets instead. 
76 “Reflecting the value of a cargo with physical delivery within the month specified in the contract.” (Platts, 2013, 
p. 2) 
77 See Fattouh (2011) for the analysis of slink 
78 On 6th January 2012, Platts changed the timing window for North Sea crude cargoes (each cargo is 600,000 
barrels) in its Dated Brent benchmark calculation from 10-21 days to 10-25 days ahead. This means that the 
physical price is estimated in a window of days up to 25, which would include two additional cargoes to the 
assessment. 
79 For a more detailed explanation of the Market on Close (MOC) methodology, please see Platts (2013), p. 6.   
 
To meet the change to 25 days in the assessment window and so to support the expansion of the 
notice period to at least 25 days before delivery, ICE has introduced a new futures contract (Brent NX), 
which expires on the 25th calendar day preceding the first day of the futures contract month to meet 
developments in underlying markets. However, the old contract (15th day) is still very liquid and it 
will take some time to replace it. The new assessment of the physical price (Dated Brent) is based over 
a 10- to 25-day window assessment of end-of-trading day prices of trades of BFOE cargoes collected 
by Platts with relevant criteria for liquidity purposes (average size, etc.), expands the set of physical 
transactions that are part of the assessment (about two cargoes of 600,000 barrels), and also changes 
the  25-day  BFOE  forward  (as  its  secondary  trading  is  based  on  the  new  Dated  Brent  price).  The 
delivery time (with the new Dated Brent) in the following month for the old futures contract might be 
now less than 20 days. 
Nevertheless,  rather  than  a  pure  physical  transaction,  the  Dated  Brent  should  be  more 
accurately seen as a forward contract with delivery between 10 and 25 days ahead (Downey, 2009). 
Dated Brent will be a floating price even during the delivery window. The divergence with the first 
month  futures  contract  shows  some  seasonal  patterns,  since  the  delivery  point  is  regularly  under 
maintenance every year, but the spread has been widening in general in recent months, as liquidity of 
underlying physical remains a concern for the market (Figure 56). 
Figure 56. Dated Brent vs Brent first-month futures contract intermonth spread (bbl), 2011-2012 
 
Source: Platts. 
On a particular date, the price of Dated Brent will reflect the price of oil delivery between 10 
and 25 days ahead, and will roll over one day every day. For instance, on September 28th, the price 
will reflect delivery between October 7th and 21st. During the loading window (at least three days) and 
from 25 days before, the buyer will be exposed to the floating Dated Brent price with no possibility to 
fix the price by buying the corresponding BFOE forward for that month (already expired). The best 
way to hedge would be to buy the following forward month (fixed price, implied 25 days), but there 
would still be exposure to basis risk between the BFOE forward and Dated Brent. 
In this case, another financial layer comes into play. Contracts for Difference (CFDs) allow the 
buyer to receive the price of the Dated Brent in exchange for the next-month forward price (a swap), 
so the total cost for the buyer will be the forward month at the day in which he/she wanted to hedge 
plus or minus the differential between the forward (held by the buyer) and the Dated Brent at the day 
of delivery. Whether a buyer is receiving physical delivery of a futures contract or is purchasing it 
himself,  he  would  eventually  need  to  get  into  a  CFD  to  hedge  basis  risk  at  delivery  date.  The 
alternative can be a Dated to Front Line (DFL) contract, which is a swap between the Platts Dated 
Brent  and  the  ICE  Brent  futures  front-month  prices.  However,  most  of  the  transactions  involve 
forwards, as they are seen as a closer approximation of the final Brent spot price (dated). Being based 
on an OTC market, with few traders and significant trade size, the transparency of such transactions is 92 | ENERGY COMMODITIES 
 
low  and  trades  are  not  linked  to  a  system  for  the  immediate  delivery  of  the  commodity  or  to 
inventories of BFOE oil. 
Brent can be delivered in any of the four grades and the Forties quality is usually delivered, 
which is cheaper with a 44° API. PRAs publish the ‘de-escalator’, to discount the lower quality grade 
from the final price. Quality of delivered crude oil comes with the notice of the loading schedule. 
Finally,  there  is  another  kind  of  price  transformation  that  is  regularly  used  for  pricing  of 
physical  transactions.  For  instance,  exports  pricing  of  oil  to  Europe  (and  also  sometimes  to  other 
regions) from Saudi Arabia relies on a Brent futures weighted average price of all trades (BWAVE), 
published on a daily basis.  
 
Box 5. Price reporting agencies (PRAs) in crude oil price formation mechanisms: the right of judgement 
Behind the complex interaction between futures and forward contracts lies the important role of price 
reporting agencies (PRAs) in assessing prices for key underlying physical markets. Over the years, PRAs 
have been an important tool for providing greater transparency in physical commodities markets where 
there are no legally binding transparency obligations for counterparties. Their price assessments have 
also  helped  price  formation  in  adjacent  futures  markets  when  illiquid  market  conditions  emerged. 
Recently, their role in some crude oil prices has been attracting considerable attention. At the November 
2010 G20 summit in Korea, leaders called for a more detailed analysis on “how the oil spot market prices 
are assessed by oil price reporting agencies and how this affects the transparency and functioning of oil 
markets” (IEA et al., 2011, p. 6). In an earlier report in 2009, IOSCO recommended that “futures market 
regulators  should  encourage  private  organisations  that  collect  relevant  fundamental  commodity 
information to adopt best practices and should evaluate what improvements are appropriate to enhance 
fundamental cash market data and develop recommendations for improvements” (IOSCO, 2009, p. 12). 
In particular, to address the core concern about price assessments using information that may not reflect 
cash markets, IOSCO (2012) has called for measures to enhance the transparency and integrity of such 
tools. Notwithstanding that methodologies to collect information and assess prices vary among markets 
to reflect differences in product characteristics and interaction between supply and demand, a set of 
common standards and best practices could be harmonised across the PRA industry.  
Combining data reliability, transparency and enforcement in an environment in which there is no 
legal obligation, so information is instead disclosed by companies on a voluntary basis, requires sound 
policies. In illiquid market conditions, PRAs may need to exercise careful editorial judgement to avoid 
rumours or market expectations based on low-quality information feeding into their price assessment 
when an insufficient number of arm’s length transactions is available. “In the event of a wide bid/offer 
spread, Platts will not average the bid and offer. Platts will evaluate market conditions and establish an 
assessment that in its editorial judgment reflects the transactable level of Dubai and Oman. Unusually 
high or low price deals will be scrutinized by Platts to discern whether the deal is fit for assessment 
purposes.” (Platts 2013, Dubai-Oman price assessment methodology, p. 15).  In effect, PRAs such as 
Argus  only  exercise  judgement  when  limited  information  is  available  about  confirmed  transactions. 
Actionable  bids  and  offers,  and  other  market  data  such  as  spread  trades  to  include  spread  values 
between  grades,  locations,  etc.  (see  Argus,  2013),  would  feed  price  assessments.  Editorial  judgement 
using  available  market  data  relies  on  a  strict  application  of  a  methodology  that  should  protect  the 
assessment from the improper influence of market rumours, even if it may rely on transactions carrying 
lower quality information (such as spread trades based on arbitrage or outlier transactions). To ensure 
that judgement is impartial and accurate and the information disclosed voluntarily by companies is true, 
tests  are  usually  applied  to  confirm  the  details  of  the  transactions  and  their  alignment  with  normal 
trading behaviour. Tests would also make sure that participants and the justifications behind trading 
actions  are  credible.  Conflicts  of  interest  policies,  in  addition,  are  typically  adopted  to  create  an 
environment of sufficient impartiality. 
Like credit rating agencies, PRAs work in reputational markets that already provide incentives to 
comply with high quality standards. However, internal enforcement of methodologies requirements and 
external enforcement on the quality of information voluntarily disclosed by commodities firms might be 
a complex task that requires a minimum set of legal obligations. All entities that produce an assessment 
of prices (based on judgment) to be used for actual transactions should comply with common standards. 
Full transparency of methodologies, governance, and access to underlying data become crucial aspects 
for regulators to ensure the smooth functioning of the market. A regulatory framework for the provision 
of price assessment services and for the reliability of the information that firms are voluntarily disclosed  
 
(e.g. market manipulation rules in the case of  false or  deceiving information) might ensure effective 
supervision by reducing monitoring costs and creating ‘public accountability’ for the performance of 
price formation mechanisms. Harmonised standards, through a common set of guidelines that may be 
voluntarily adopted or become listing requirements for products based on price assessments (IOSCO, 
2012), appear to be a viable compromise to ensure reliability of benchmarks administrators, calculators, 
and  publishers  for  submitters  that  want  to  avoid  liabilities  in  the  use  of  their  data.  However,  legal 
obligations  should  be  appropriately  weighted  to  avoid  prices  assessed  by  PRAs  becoming  legally 
binding  mechanisms  of  price  formation.  The  voluntary  nature  of  the  disclosure  by  commodities 
companies and the right of judgement by the PRA would preserve mechanisms of competition among 
price assessors and so benefit the provision of efficient price formation mechanisms, in line with IOSCO 
(2012, p. 34). Excessive administrative and liability costs may reduce incentives to provide information 
voluntarily, even though a liquid price formation mechanism is in the interest of commodities firms. The 
principles  proposed  by  IOSCO  (2012)  recognise  the  importance  of  PRAs  and  some  of  the 
abovementioned concerns, and suggest so far80 the implementation of the following guidelines: 
  Full transparency of the methodologies criteria used for price assessments (including how and 
why judgement is used) and data collection to increase public accountability. 
  An open process of consultation when changes are proposed to the market. 
  Standardised and transparent procedures for data submission and reliability (bona fide). 
  Strict requirements for assessors and tight supervision of a direct supervisor. 
  Organisational requirements (such as audit trails, identification, management and disclosure of 
conflicts of interest rules). 
  Open procedures for complaints. 
  Detailed information readily available to financial markets authorities. 
  External auditing to check adherence to methodology.  
Recent principles published by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) push this 
regulatory action even further (driven by recent scandals, such the potential LIBOR and Dated Brent 
manipulations),  by  proposing  to  regulate  the  users  of  benchmarks  as  well  on  top  of  administrators, 
publishers, calculators, and submitters (ESMA, 2013). Legal obligations such as running a due diligence 
on  administrator  and  calculation  agent  may  be  unnecessarily  burdensome  and  create  strong 
extraterritorial impact, on top of the high cost to supervise millions of transactions that regularly use 
recognised benchmarks for their pricing (e.g. mortgage contracts or physical forward sales). 
Finally, a deeper look into market mechanisms that impede the development of more liquidity 
benchmarks, causing overreliance on price assessments, is needed. In effect, the natural tendency of the 
market (due to the nature of the commodity) to trade crude oil differentials structurally reduces the 
liquidity of underlying physical markets. A less fragmented supply behind key liquid benchmarks, by 
aggregating supply of crude with similar characteristics, would reduce the reliance on paper markets 
rather  than  pure  spot  transactions.  Increasing  competition  and  accessibility  to  a  common  market 
infrastructure (with more physical hubs and delivery points, for instance) of underlying physical supply 
would  favour  the  creation  of  sounder  and  more  efficient  price  formation  mechanisms.  Regulatory 
reforms (both for OTC derivatives and other financial instruments), through the objective of ensuring 
greater transparency in commodity derivatives, may become a catalyst to prompt more accountable and 
efficient oil pricing systems, with a limited number of financial layers and greater competition among 
physical players. The recent initiative by PRAs to introduce a voluntary code to harmonise best practices 
for price reporting organisations (PROs) is certainly a signal that the market participants are ready to 
discuss how best markets can move to the next stage of development.   
 
                                                            
80  The  IOSCO  review  and  national  regulatory  reviews  are  still  ongoing.  “In  the  event  that  IOSCO's  review 
concludes that implementation has been ineffective, or that further steps are required to achieve the principles’ 
overall objectives, IOSCO will consider other options, such as recommending direct governmental regulation of 
PRAs  by  an  appropriate  authority  with  expertise  in  energy  markets  and/or  the  creation  of  non-government 
statutory self-regulatory organizations (both alternatives may require careful evaluation of the risks and benefits 
of such regulation by authorities responsible for energy matters and legislative action.” (IOSCO, 2012, p. 9) 94 | ENERGY COMMODITIES 
 
Benchmarks divergence: temporary syndrome or long-term market development 
In recent years, as part of their continuous process of reorganisation, oil markets have experienced 
interesting developments around their most commonly used benchmarks. These changes have been 
reflected  in  a  striking  divergence  between  Brent  spot  (front-month  futures)  and  WTI  spot  (and 
futures), as illustrated in Figure 57. It appears that both indexes have recently been reflecting regional 
problems with pipeline (WTI) and seaborne (Brent) delivery, whether oversupply or supply shortage. 
Figure 57. Brent-WTI nominal prices divergence 
 
Source: EIA, Thomson Reuters and World Bank. 
The  WTI  benchmark  has  historically  been  an  important  benchmark  for  international  oil 
markets, in particular when the capacity of its infrastructure (based on a complex web of pipelines in 
the United States) was high enough in relation to the available supply. Growing demand and greater 
supply converging at a point of delivery (Cushing, Oklahoma) that has limited capacity and flexibility 
to support the international trade has diminished the role of WTI to reflect global trade, and aligned 
the benchmark with the regional balance of supply and demand, which is in oversupply due to oil 
imported  from  Canada  to  meet  high  refinery  demand  in  part  of  the  country.  Inventories  have 
therefore been constantly growing, pushing prices downward vis-à-vis the Brent price and causing 
prices to ultimately diverge (Figure 58).   
 
Figure 58. Weekly US ending stocks excluding SPR of crude oil, January 2010 – November 2012 (k/barrels) 
 
Source: EIA. 
However, as a futures contract, WTI is still very liquid with a high number of active investors 
trading the standard contract (1,000 barrels). Delivery allows the flexibility of different lots, thanks to 
the  pipeline  infrastructure,  which  diversifies  the  number  of  physical  traders.  WTI  futures  market 
liquidity reflects the maturity of the market compared to Brent futures contracts (Figure 59), but it 
may fail to reflect the infrastructural issues that have caused the two indexes to take different paths.  
Figure 59. Brent-WTI Volumes and open interest (contracts) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from ICE and CME Group. 
While the United States continues not to solve its infrastructure bottleneck to redirect the oil 
glut towards the international markets, the WTI will hardly regain its status of global benchmark for 
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Figure 60. BFOE Production Volumes (kb/d) 
 
Source: Spencer (2012) from BP, RBA, Statistics Norway, UK Department of Energy and Climate Change. 
Even  though  its  seaborne  nature  attracts  today  over  70%  of  international  trade,  the  Brent 
benchmark does not seem to be in much better shape. Despite the recent additions to the underlying 
physical  market  (the  latest  one  with  Ekofisk  in  2007),  production  volumes  behind  the  Brent  have 
declined  at  a  high  rate,  opening  a  discussion  about  the  stability  and  vulnerability  of  its  price 
formation. 
For a market based on a web of forward transactions among a few big market participants (and 
split between four market locations) that are used to assess  market prices, a constant liquidity  of 
supply  is  essential  to  keep  price  formation  mechanisms  orderly.  A  market  with  delivery  through 
interconnected pipelines, in contrast, may not require the same level of liquidity as it does not rely on 
multiple financial layers, with futures front-month that usually do the job well and drive prices, and 
thus liquidity, in the underlying physical market. It can be easily delivered to the trader that requires 
delivery.  In  addition  to  this  structural  difference  between  the  two  markets,  there  is  a  constant 
underlying reduction of oil supply from the North Sea that could continue to undermine the quality of 
the benchmark.  
However, the Brent futures contract is the futures market with the biggest underlying physical 
market  (BFOE  market)  currently  available  to  support  international  benchmarks.  North  Sea  crude 
loading, though in slight decline, continues to be around 2 mb/d (Figure 61). 
Figure 61. North Sea (BFOE) crude loaded (kb/d) 
 
Source: ICE (2013) from Bloomberg data.  
 
To sum up, crude oil markets are once again looking at developments that, combined with new 
non-conventional oil discoveries, may produce structural changes that reshuffle the current market 
equilibrium.  The  infrastructure  issues  and  the  potentially  more  difficult  issue  of  dropping  spare 
production  capacity  suggest  that  future  scenarios  for  crude  oil  markets  are  still  susceptible  to 
important changes, which may bring up another reshuffling of current benchmarks, and perhaps the 
emergence of new ones in fast-developing areas. 
A way forward? 
A smooth price formation mechanism is a crucial tool to contain volatility, an important threat in 
capital-intensive industries. In industries with long investment lead times, volatility may impede the 
formation of stable expectations over future prices in investment decisions. This can affect both large-
scale corporate investment in, and individual consumer decisions on, energy-consuming equipment, 
producing lock-in effects that can last years. Volatility occurring around an identifiable trend line, 
however, would  not be as much of a problem. Investors  would still be able to form expectations 
concerning the future of prices and factor in the volatility as a random element of risk that can be 
addressed with the appropriate financial techniques (within the process of financialisation discussed 
in  Chapter  1).  The  problem  arises  when  the  pattern  of  price  changes  is  distorted  by  ‘natural’ 
developments and no stable trend is detectable. 
Volume of production is a necessary condition for a benchmark’s success, but volumes are not 
the only factor that can affect the functioning of a benchmark price. Among these factors are: 
  physical supply fragmentation; 
  market  accessibility  for  supply  and  an  efficient  delivery  system  (e.g.  through  pipelines  or 
seaborne); 
  a liquid futures market and investors accessibility; and 
  competition among commercial oil users. 
As illustrated by Figure 62, oil markets rely on three pillars: supply security, price discovery 
and competition. 
Figure 62. Stable and efficient oil markets 
 
Source: Author. 
The  natural  tendency  of  crude  oil  markets  to  trade  differentials,  due  to  the  nature  of  the 
commodity,  may  reduce  the  liquidity  of  underlying  physical  markets.  Fragmentation  of  supply 
sources may affect physical supply security, and so the efficiency of price formation, if the supply is 
not  properly  channelled  into  the  underlying  physical  market  backing  benchmark  prices.  A  less 
fragmented supply behind key liquid benchmarks, by aggregating crude with similar characteristics, 
would  reduce  the  reliance  on  paper  markets  rather  than  pure  spot  transactions.  Increasing 
competition and accessibility to a common market infrastructure of underlying physical supply (with 
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more physical hubs close to supply areas and delivery points, for instance; see Luciani, 2011) would 
help the creation of sounder and more efficient price formation mechanisms. Whether one or multiple 
suppliers, accessibility of supply to the underlying physical market and stability of production (also 
linked to political stability) are essential factors to secure oil supply. An appropriate delivery system, 
ideally supported by major pipeline infrastructures, is crucial. Forms of public-private partnership to 
revamp investments in market infrastructure and aggregate supply, which is not immediately in the 
interest of producing countries, would be beneficial to price formation. For instance, Brent developed 
as an international benchmark during the 1980s partly thanks to tax support provided by the UK 
Government to those companies trading in the spot market for Brent (Fattouh, 2011).  
A better price discovery system that attracts and stabilises demand against volatility and price 
risk (demand security) through a liquid futures market contributes to the long-term development of 
global liquid benchmarks. However, massive investments would be needed to build a proper delivery 
system and the overall infrastructure (including significant storage capacity in the area and a fast 
delivery system) needed to run a global exchange. Finally, changes in the form of trading and its 
transparency may improve and secure price discovery. For instance, the introduction of take-or-pay 
contracts (as was done for natural gas) could increase demand security (Luciani, 2011). Transparency 
of underlying physical markets at global level may be unreliable if there is no effective mechanism of 
enforcement. It can be rather dangerous to undertake policy actions on the basis of information that 
cannot be considered reliable and can therefore be used with strategic intent by producing countries, 
in particular. For instance, data on crude oil storage is subject to strategic behaviours by producing 
countries that often provide false or misleading information. 
With regards to increasing competition in supply and demand, the reduction of entry barriers 
for  suppliers  and  greater  competition  on  the  demand  side  would  produce  beneficial  effects  in 
addressing incentives to provide the market with the required supply for its efficient functioning. In 
addition,  market  power  (essentially  due  to  entry  barriers)  at  upstream  and  downstream  levels 
typically  produces  an  effect  of  double  marginalisation,  i.e.  the  imposition  of  a  (monopolistic  or 
oligopolistic) mark-up by both producers and retailers of oil and its finished products. Greater vertical 
integration would increase benefit end-users and minimise the distortion in distribution caused by 
double marginalisation in favour of end-users (Luciani, 2011). 
Table 30. Market organisation 
Physical market setting  Pricing complexity  Liquidity futures 
market 
Delivery points 
Oligopolistic 
(low liquidity) 
High  High 
High 
(US, EU, Middle East) 
Source: Author. 
To conclude, the market for crude oil relies on an oligopolistic setting with a pricing system that 
is a complex web of forward and futures contracts, and low liquidity. Futures markets, in contrast, are 
liquid and provide delivery points in the main regional areas, but in different blends and often at 
additional cost. 
    
 
2.2  Natural gas markets 
Natural gas is a fundamental resource for the world’s energy supply in its lightest form (methane), 
and can also be found in other forms of hydrocarbons (mainly ethane, propane and butane). It is the 
second biggest commodity market by value of production, with a value of $1.24 trillion in 2012.81 In its 
conventional form, it is typically found on top of oil  and water reservoirs  underneath the earth, 
because natural gas is a hydrocarbon  like crude oil but with a  hydrocarbon molecule that has only 
four or fewer carbon atoms. Natural gas can be transformed into liquid only at very low temperatures 
(up to -161.6° Celsius, depending on the number of carbon atoms). Natural gas is also greener in terms 
of emissions  production and damaging substances  for the environment. In its most common form 
(methane), it is mainly used for electricity and heating systems, while in other forms is widely used for 
petrochemicals, plastics, and blending for gasoline fuel. Those extracting oil are also those involved in 
the extraction of natural gas. Once it is pulled out of the ground, it is cleaned  of impurities (such as 
water and other gases) and then transported through a  network of pipelines. However, it can also be 
transformed in liquid form (liquefied natural gas, or LNG) and sent to more distant locations where 
pipelines cannot reach. 
Natural gas can be found in conventional formations, as described above, or in ‘unconventional’ 
ones, such as shale (a very soft rock that may contain high quantities of natural gas). After recent 
significant  discoveries  (especially  in  the  United  States),  the  term  ‘unconventional’  may  become 
obsolete. Other unconventional forms are deep rock formations or non-porous sands that require very 
deep drilling and more effort to bring the gas up to the field. Because of this supply unpredictability, 
natural  gas  price  trends  now  follow  regional  differences  rather  than  a  common  global  trend  (see 
Figure 63).  
Figure 63. European and US natural gas real prices, 1960-2012 ($2005/mmbtu) 
 
Note: Natural Gas (Europe), average import border price, including the UK. As of April 2010 includes a spot price 
component. Between June 2000 - March 2010 excludes the UK. Natural Gas (US), spot price at Henry Hub, 
Louisiana. 
Source: World Bank. 
                                                            
81 Price is the 2012 annual average ($10.26 mmbtu; equally weighted) of: Natural Gas (Europe), average import 
border price, including the UK (as of April 2010 includes a spot price component and between June 2000 - March 
2010 excludes the UK); Natural Gas (US), spot price at Henry Hub (Louisiana); and Natural gas LNG (Japan), 
import  price  c.i.f.  (recent  two  months'  averages  are  estimates).  Data  on  price  collected  from  World  Bank 
Commodities Database. Global production in 2012 estimated at 121,101 million Btu (BP Statistics).  100 | ENERGY COMMODITIES 
 
After showing similar price movements, reflecting strong and uniform growth across the globe, 
natural gas prices in Europe and the United States have begun to discount the large discovery of shale 
gas in the United States. While prices in Europe have continued to climb, as energy supply security is 
scattered  across  the  continent,  US  natural  gas  prices  have  fallen  since  2009.  After  the  commercial 
exploitation  of  enormous  shale  gas  reservoirs,  US  and  EU  prices  have  diverged  and  are  likely  to 
stabilise at two different price levels in the short term. This new plateau may also stabilise in the long 
term, as US demand is gradually replaced by solid demand from Asia.  
2.2.1  Product and market characteristics: a promising future? 
The composition and quality of natural gas82 varies depending on the place of origin. 83 Before natural 
gas can be used commercially, it must undergo a process to remove undesirable components. After 
processing, natural gas fulfils the characteristics of a search good as the calorific value (i.e. the heating 
value) and other parameters affecting distribution and combustion can be readily measured at the 
delivery point (by using a gas chromatograph, for example), limiting transaction costs. Commercial 
contracts require that the gas be delivered within a certain specification range. The composition of 
natural gas (which determines its heating value) may be changed to fit transport purposes (to LNG) or 
end-use requirements. 
Natural gas is a combustible fuel and cannot be recycled. However, following non-energy use, 
especially  when  gas  is  used  as  a  feedstock  for  chemical  products,  the  resultant  products  may  be 
recyclable. Production is equivalent to mining and extraction firms, so gas production (extraction) 
sites cannot be converted to extraction of other commodities. Gas is sometimes a by-product of oil 
production  (associated  gas).  Gas  production  companies  are  often  also  involved  in  oil  extraction 
activities. Natural gas processing plants cannot be easily converted and, even if a much easier refining 
process than oil products is required, separation of natural gas from water and other hydrocarbons 
may require different treatments and ad hoc equipment. 
LNG is natural gas cooled down to approximately -160° Celsius. Once liquefied, its volume is 
about  0.17%  that  of  gaseous  natural  gas,  meaning  its  energy  density  is  about  600  times  higher.84 
Furthermore, LNG weighs merely 45% of the equivalent volume of water (IEA, 2004). This gives LNG 
a volume and weight advantage, making it easier to store and transport. However, liquefaction is 
highly capital intensive85 and storage facilities are required both after liquefaction a t the exporting 
terminal as well as before regasification at the importing terminal (discussed further below). 
Compressed natural gas (CNG) is natural gas compressed to a higher pressure (usually 220 
atmospheres) and stored in containers designed for that purpose. It is used as a fuel for road transport 
vehicles,  especially  in  public  transport.  Its  volume  is  approximately  0.4%  that  of  natural  gas  at 
standard pressure (thus its energy density is around 250 times higher). 
 
                                                            
82 Natural gas “comprises gases, occurring in underground deposits, whether liquefied or gaseous, consisting 
mainly of methane. It includes both ‘non-associated’ gas originating from fields producing hydrocarbons only in 
gaseous form, and ‘associated’ gas produced in association with crude oil as well as methane recovered from coal 
mines (colliery gas)” (IEA, 2004). 
83 Consequently the average calorific value of natural gas varies across countries (all in mJ/cm): Netherlands 
35.40, Russia 37.83, Algeria 39.17 and Norway 42.51. For 2009, the IEA (Golden Rules, 2012) estimates the global 
average gross calorific value of natural gas at 38.4 mJ/cm (at 15°C at a pressure of 101.325 kilopascals). 
84 Also, “the composition of LNG is usually richer in methane (typically 95%) than marketable natural gas which 
has not been liquefied. … Calorific values for re-gasified LNG range from 37.6 mJ/cm to 41.9 mJ/cm” (IEA, 2004). 
85 Chevron’s Wheatstone LNG project in Australia is budgeted at A$29 billion. Construction began in late 2011; 
first LNG shipments are expected for 2016.  
 
Storage 
Storage is an essential element of the natural gas supply chain for three main reasons: 
  Demand  variability:  it  would  not  make  economic  sense  to  build  enough  production  and 
transmission capacity to meet peak demand. 
  Price volatility: storage can be an attractive instrument to hedge against the commercial risk of 
very high prices during peak demand and limit the market power of suppliers. 
  Risk of supply disruptions: as natural gas is often transported over long distances and across 
national borders, storage provides the possibility to reduce the risk of supply disruptions that 
may otherwise occur for technical, political or commercial reasons. 
Gas storage facilities can be grouped into two categories: seasonal and peak. Seasonal storage 
facilities  are  built  to  store  huge  volumes  of  natural  gas  for  peak  demand.  Peak  storage  sites  are 
commonly smaller, but are able to react quickly to sudden changes in demand. Storage of natural gas 
in  unliquefied  and  uncompressed  form  has  huge  space  requirements,  and  storage  costs  are  site-
dependent. Commonly used sites are (1) depleted oil and gas fields (a cost effective option, especially 
used  for  seasonal  storage),  (2)  acquifers,  and  (3)  salt  cavities  (relatively  small  but  very  good 
withdrawal rates allow for peak shaving activities) (IEA, 2004). Storage above ground is relatively 
rare, with LNG storage facilities being a notable exception.  
The key characteristics of storage are summarised in Table 31. Working capacity is the amount 
of gas can be injected, stored and delivered in a given storage site. Deliverability refers to the rate of 
injection and withdrawal per unit time, here expressed as million cubic metres per day. 
Table 31. Key storage characteristics 
 
Source: Le Fevre (2013). 
LNG offers potential for storage, as gas in its liquefied form has a much better energy per unit 
of  volume  ratio.  Liquefaction  is  costly,  however,  and  gas  would  need  to  be  permanently  kept  at 
around -160° Celsius. LNG storage is thus mainly used for peak shaving. Note that LNG import and 102 | ENERGY COMMODITIES 
 
export terminals also contain storage, which may add to their business case as traders can exploit the 
storage. 
Storage facilities require significant amounts of ‘cushion gas’ to maintain the required operating 
pressure, which adds to the capital costs of a storage project (Table 32).  
Table 32. Typical capital and operating costs for storage facilities 
 
Source: Le Fevre (2013). 
Investments in storage are not necessarily market-driven. In response to the January 2009 gas 
crisis, for example, the European Union has adopted a gas supply security regulation, stipulating that 
EU member states have to be able to deliver gas for at least 30 days of average demand, as well as in 
the case of an infrastructure disruption under normal winter conditions. Gas storages were identified 
as a vital means to meet this target.  
In addition, storage facilities are needed to ensure the safe operation of the gas transmission and 
distribution networks. They may also serve market developments by providing ‘wheeling, parking 
and loaning’ at major interconnections, for example. Storage is also for commerce, such as for the 
management of take-or-pay contracts (Le Fevre, 2013). 
Production and international trade 
Production of natural gas has more than tripled since 1970, and it continues to grow as new sources 
are  explored  and  new  technologies  improve  extraction  practices.  As  with  other  standardised 
commodities with full control over supply, production and consumption have been growing without 
significant imbalances (no more than a 2% of global production per year in over 40 years). 
Figure 64. Natural gas production and consumption balance, 1970-2012 (bcm, % rhs) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from BP stats. 
  
 
The most important gas producing countries in 2011 were the United States (651 bcm, roughly 
20% of global production) and Russia (607 bcm, or roughly 19%), as illustrated by Figure 65. Other 
notable  producing  countries  include  Canada  (4.64%),  Qatar  (3.5%),  Iran  (5.65%),  Norway  (3.03%), 
China (3.15%), Saudi Arabia (2.76%), Indonesia (2.38%) and the Netherlands (2.41%). Production in 
Brazil (0.5%) and India (1.4%) is rather low.  
Figure 65. World gas supply by region, 2011 (bcm) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from OPEC. 
Exporting  countries,  however,  are  scattered  across  the  world,  with  Eurasia,  Norway  and 
newcomers such as Qatar among the top exporters (Figure 66). 
Figure 66. Exports by region (%) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from OPEC. 104 | ENERGY COMMODITIES 
 
On the import side, while Russian and US imports  have declined in line with  the growing 
internal production to achieve a more balanced position in the medium term, European and Asian 
demand has been increasing in the last five years (Figure 67) as a result of important decisions, such as 
the end of nuclear energy power in Japan and new Chinese policies to increase energy diversification. 
Figure 67. Imports by region (bcm) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from OPEC. 
As  natural  gas  becomes  one  of  the  key  sources  of  energy  production  in  the  old  continent, 
European  dominance  in  natural  gas  imports  grows,  and  so  the  continent’s  dependence  on 
international markets. The international market for natural gas has been growing steadily in the last 
decade, and in 2011 was worth almost $400 billion (Figure 68).  
Figure 68. International trade for LNG, 1999-2011 ($bn) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from World Bank, OPEC, and BP. Note: Price used in this chart is a simple average 
of: Natural Gas (Europe), average import border price, including the UK (as of April 2010 includes a spot  
 
price component and between June 2000 - March 2010 excludes the UK); Natural Gas (US), spot price at 
Henry Hub (Louisiana); and Natural gas LNG (Japan), import price c.i.f. (recent two months' averages are 
estimates). Data on price collected from World Bank Commodities Database. 
The value of today exports is almost 35% of total production value, while in 1999 it was only 
around 20%. Also due to fast developments in technologies for LNG tankers and gas transportation, 
natural gas is the market that has experienced the fastest growth (in relative terms) of international 
trade in the last decade. 
Gas reserves and stocks 
Technically recoverable natural gas resources are still abundant – totalling 790,000 bcm (Table 33). At 
2011 levels of gas consumption, these resources would be sufficient to meet world gas demand for the 
next 235 years.86 Eastern Europe/Eurasia (mainly Russia) and the Middle East together hold 58% of 
the remaining conventional gas resources, but only 17% of the remaining unconvention al gas 
resources. 
Table 33. Remaining technically recoverable natural gas resources by type and region, end 2011 (in tcm) 
   
Total  Unconventional 
   
Conventional  Unconventional 
Tight 
Gas 
Shale 
Gas 
Coalbed 
methane 
E. Europe/Eurasia  131  43  10  12  20 
Middle East   125  12  8  4  - 
Asia/Pacific  35  93  20  57  16 
OECD Americas  45  77  12  56  9 
Africa  37  37  7  30  0 
Latin America  23  48  15  33  - 
OECD Europe  24  21  3  16  2 
World  421  331  76  208  47 
Source: IEA WEO, 2012 
While  there  are  only  limited  conventional  natural  gas  resources  left  in  OECD  countries, 
discoveries of unconventional resources (especially shale gas) have radically changed the picture. This 
holds  particularly  true  for  the  United  States  (mainly  shale  gas),  Canada  and  Australia  (coalbed 
methane), but also potentially in the future for China (huge shale gas resources) and India. Europe 
also has some shale gas resources (in Poland, the United Kingdom and Ukraine, for example).87 
As a result of the abundant gas reserves, supply -side elasticity to demand is fairly high in the 
long term. However, for producers it may be difficult to adjust production levels upwards at short 
notice  (a  lengthy  permitting  process,  exploratory  seismic  work  may  be  needed,  drilling  and 
connecting wells to pipelines will take time, etc.). Downward adjustment is sticky as well (reservoir 
and wellbore characteristics would often not allow simply restart ing production later; associated gas 
depends on combined oil and gas business case).  
The impact of abundant supply in the United States, for instance, has caused a sharp increase in 
the stock-to-use ratio (Figure 69), which may be subject to a rebalance as the  supply adjusts to new 
levels of demand and supply capacity. 
                                                            
86 This is, of course, a rather crude estimate, as demand is expected to rise in the future, technically recoverable 
does not mean economically and environmentally viable, and resource estimates are generally quite uncertain, 
especially in non-OECD countries.  
87 See also Annex. 106 | ENERGY COMMODITIES 
 
Figure 69. US stock-to-use ratio 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration form BP stats. 
Gas transportation 
Freight costs are significant due to the low energy density and may, in some cases, exceed exploration 
and extraction costs. Gas trade is still dominated by pipelines, which are characterised by high fixed 
costs and long lead times. LNG is gaining market share, especially over long distances. Distribution 
networks require important upfront investments, but they may reduce total transportation costs once 
the network is up and running. 
Pipelines account for 68% of total gas trade (IEA WEO, 2012), dominating gas trade especially 
over smaller distances. In long-distance high-pressure pipelines (made of steel, with diameters of 40 to 
120  centimetres),  gas  moves  at  roughly  30  km/h.88  Construction  costs  vary  widely  both  across 
countries and time, depending inter alia on labour costs and the market price of steel. High fixed costs 
and long lead times are key, especially when pipelines span over a number of politically unstable 
countries, and so the transit dimension becomes important (Yafimava, 2011). 
 
   
                                                            
88 Source: Total website.  
 
Box 6. Liquefied natural gas (LNG): a long-term solution for gas transportation? 
As gas resources are distributed all around the world, and most continents cannot be connected to each 
other  by  pipelines,  LNG  infrastructure  will  play  a  central  role  in  determining  to  what  extent  the 
globalisation of gas markets takes place. While pipelines generally remain the most common means of 
gas trade, LNG is already responsible for 42% of interregional gas trade (IEA WEO 2012). Global LNG 
trade volumes more than doubled between 2000 & 2010 (JRC 2012), clearly exceeding the increase in gas 
demand.  
LNG regasification terminals are technologically more flexible than pipelines and therefore give 
less  leverage  to  suppliers.  Yet,  at  the  same  time,  LNG  liquefaction  facilities  are  destination-flexible, 
meaning  that  producers  can,  in  principle,  export  to  any  country  with  available  LNG  regasification 
capacity.  
Planning and building an LNG liquefaction terminal takes 4-6 years, and they are expected to run 
for at least 20 years (with corresponding amortisation). Depending on the assumptions being made about 
amortisation and discount rates, liquefaction costs some $2-3 per mmbtu. Global regasification capacity 
represents roughly 2.5 times the global liquefaction capacity (JRC, 2012).  There is therefore potential 
competition for LNG among consumers. 
The total transportation capacity of the world’s LNG fleet (some 360 vessels in early 2013), with an 
average capacity of approximately 150,000 square metres, is around 54 mcm.89 Shipping via LNG vessels 
is relatively fast; while faster LNG vessels may reach some 50 km/h, LNG vessels commonly travel at an 
average of 35km/h. Shippers may adjust their speed based on their expectations about the development 
of  the  gas  price.  The  number  of  shipping  days  and  the  associated  time  to  conclude  the  transaction 
between trading partners of course vary widely depending on the distance. Some averages for common 
trading partners are reported below (transport and regasification costs in brackets; Argus Media): 
  1  day  for  shipments  from  Algeria  to  France  and  Spain  (transport  and  regasification  costs  per 
mmbtu: ~$0.15). 
  7 days for shipments from Indonesia to South Korea and Japan (~$0.80). 
  8-9 days from Nigeria to France or Spain (~$0.90). 
  8-9 days from Australia to Japan and South Korea (~$0.90). 
  13-14 days from Oman and Quatar to South Korea and Japan (~$1.50). 
  20 days from from Algeria to South Korea (~$2.00). 
Insurance costs are about 2% of total shipping and storage costs. 
Henderson (2012) presents data on the hypothetical case of future large-scale LNG exports from 
the  United  States.  He  assumes  liquefaction  of  natural  gas  to  cost  approximately  $3/mmbtu. 
Transportation on an LNG vessel from the United States to Europe is around $1.3/mmbtu, from the 
United States to Asia (through the Panama Canal) would be approximately $3/mmbtu. Regasification 
costs are some $0.4/mmbtu.  
Table 34. The delivered cost of US LNG exports to Europe and Asia ($/mmbtu) 
 
Note: For the Asian figures Henderson assumes that the Panama Canal will be able to service LNG vessels as of 2014. 
Source: Henderson (2012, based on Cheniere Energy data). 
Since LNG requires only limited connection to pipelines and, on average, lower investments in 
infrastructure than for crude oil, costs of transport are a key factor in LNG price. Due to this differential, 
LNG price has been significantly diverging from benchmark prices (Figure 70), though this difference 
may stabilise in the future. 
                                                            
89 More precise data on LNG can be found in Argus Media’s ‘Global LNG’ monthly, for instance. 108 | ENERGY COMMODITIES 
 
Figure 70. LNG price versus US and EU benchmarks, 1960-2012 (nominal prices) 
 
Source: World Bank. Note: Natural Gas (Europe), average import border price, including the UK. As of April 2010 
includes a spot price component. Between June 2000 - March 2010 excludes the UK. Natural Gas (US), spot 
price at Henry Hub, Louisiana 
Due  to  its  easy  transportability  and  flexibility  to  environment  with  no  relevant  pipelines 
infrastructures, LNG demand in areas such as China and Japan has been steadily increasing over the 
years and these areas have become the main source of demand for LNG global production (Figure 71). 
Figure 71. Global LNG delivery  (by region; mcm/day) 
 
Source: Waterborne LNG from Rogers (2011).  
 
The future of LNG is still uncertain. On the one hand, sustained demand from the East would 
keep demand solid for some time. On the other hand, new exploration and discovery of unconventional 
sources of natural gas may cast doubt on the sustainability of this continuous market expansion.  
 
Natural gas can be also  compressed to form CNG,  which provides the advantage of fewer 
infrastructure requirements than for LNG and pipelines. The disadvantage is that is requires more 
space than LNG due to its lower energy density. Thus, while CNG could not compete with LNG at 
high volumes, it  may be  a promising transport option for  small and remote  gas fields (so called 
‘stranded gas’). However, seaborne CNG transportation technology has not yet reached commercial 
scale.90 
2.2.1.1  Supply characteristics: a competitive international market 
Natural gas is produced in all of the world’s regions. Exploration and extraction of natural gas are 
capital intensive, as gas producers must sustain initial sunk and  subsequent fixed costs (generally 
somewhat higher for offshore and unconventional gas). For a more detailed discussion, see the section 
on crude oil. 
The  gas  industry  can  be  divided  into  three  parts  –  upstream,  midstream  and  downstream. 
Upstream  activities  refer  to  natural  gas  exploration  and  production.  The  midstream  gas  business 
includes the gathering system, processing, compressor stations, LNG terminals, underground storage 
facilities, as well as the gas transmission grid, hubs and market points. The downstream oil sector is a 
term commonly used to refer to the selling and distribution of natural gas to consumers. Note that 
midstream activities are often also grouped with downstream activities.  
Upstream industry structures differ widely around the globe. While the United States is best 
known for its so called ‘(super)majors’ – large ‘fully integrated’91 multinational oil and gas companies 
(e.g.  Chevron,  ExxonMobil,  ConocoPhilips,  and  Hess  Corporation)  –    it  is  also  home  to  a  lot  of 
‘independents’  –  small  oil  and  gas  companies  focusing  on  the  upstream  business    (e.g.  Apache 
Corporation,  Devon  Energy,  and  Pioneer  Natural  Resources).92  The US historically had regulated 
wellhead  prices  which  were   completely  abolished  in  1989.  Taken  together,  this  creates  a  truly 
competitive upstream industry that is able to secure investments in high -risk projects, such as those 
that  eventually  resulted  in  the  ‘quiet’  shale  gas  revolution  that  was  originally  driven  by  the 
independents. Producers are publicly listed or privately held companies (see 0). 
In  Europe,  large  integrated  oil  and  gas  companies  dominate  the  upstream  industry,  with 
smaller independent energy companies being a rather rare phenomenon.93 Apart from  the United 
States and Canadian companies who are often also active in Europe, important producers include BP, 
BG, DONG Energy, EBN, ENI, OMV, Shell, Statoil and Total. While European producers are generally 
publicly listed, in some countries governments still own a substantive share (67% of Statoil  is owned 
by the Norwegian government and the Italian government holds  a 30% ‘golden share’ in ENI). For 
most  Europe-based  producers,  exploration  and  production  activities  in  other  parts  of  the  world 
exceed those in Europe, given Europe’s limited endowment with natural gas. 
In most other parts of the world, resource-rich countries usually control oil and gas producers, 
and they control the largest share of proven world natural gas reserves. Unlike the United States and 
European  majors,  their  upstream  activities  are  generally  focused  on  their  home  country.  Notable 
examples  in  the  Middle  East  inlcude  Saudi  Aramco,  the  National  Iranian  Oil  Company,  Qatar 
Petroleum, Iraqi Oil Ministry, Kuwait Petroleum Corporation and Abu Dhabi National Oil Company. 
Russia’s most important gas producer is Gazprom, but Rosneft also has significant reserves. Major 
African gas companies include Sonatrach (Algeria) and Nigerian National Petroleum. Asia is inter alia 
                                                            
90 http://www.investmentu.com/2012/May/cng-natural-gas-transportation.html. 
91 The major explore for and produce oil and gas around the world, own pipelines and tankers, and sell these 
products directly. 
92 Canadian producers include Nexen and Vermilion Energy. 
93 Of course, exceptions exist, e.g. UK-based Cuadrilla Resources. 110 | ENERGY COMMODITIES 
 
home to Petronas (Malaysia), Pertamina (Indonesia) as well PetroChina (large shale gas reserves). In 
the non-US Americas, Pemex (Mexico) and Petroleos de Venezuela feature among the most prominent 
examples.  
In  most  OECD  countries  and  all  of  the  European  Union  (as  well  as  parts  of  the  Energy 
Community), the organisation of the gas market has been affected by the liberalisation/deregulation 
agenda  and  especially  the  so-called  ‘unbundling’  requirements.  The  main  idea  behind  this  is  to 
separate the competitive part from the uncompetitive (natural monopoly) part of the industry. As a 
consequence, vertically integrated companies were (and are) required to sell their transmission assets 
(full-ownership unbundling) or at least create some form of independent transmission operator (legal, 
functional  and  accounting  unbundling).  Requirements  for  distribution  systems  go  in  a  similar 
direction, but are generally less advanced. So far, the United States has been far more effective in 
ensuring third-party access to pipelines and storage facilities than the European Union, which is still 
struggling to provide “clear, non-discriminatory, timely and repeatable” market rules (JRC, 2012).  
In the non-OECD world, things look considerably different and the gas industry is often in the 
hands of one or a few vertically integrated state companies. Yet, reforms are on the way, notably in 
China, where wellhead and transport prices are currently tightly regulated. More to the point, the 
Chinese government wants to implement a comprehensive pricing reform by 2015. Key components 
of the reform are a complete deregulation of wellhead prices and the setting of a maximum wholesale 
price linked to the price of imported fuels, including a 10% discount to encourage gas use. In the two 
provinces  where  the  pricing  reform  has  already  taken  effect  on  a  trial  basis,  it  has  resulted  in 
wholesale prices of $11-12/mmbtu. (IEA WEO 2012) 
Liberalisation  has  had  an  impact  across  all  of  the  gas  supply  chain.  Upstream,  regulated 
wellhead prices were only abolished completely in the United States in 1989. Midstream, third-party 
access to pipelines and storage makes a difference, allowing for the entry of new market participants. 
Downstream,  unbundling  requirements  for  distribution  system  operators  may  create  more  retail 
competition. The different levels influence each other. In particular, decisions taken in a number of 
major economies to prohibit long-term take-or-pay contracts for distribution system operators (e.g. in 
the United States in 1984 and Germany in 2010) heavily constrain companies that are active in the 
midstream  business. In  Germany, for example, midstream companies found themselves unable to 
pass the prices of their often oil-indexed LTC on to consumers, once spot prices were significantly 
lower. 
If there were a global gas market, market concentration on the supply side (upstream) would be 
very low as gas resources are abundant and large numbers of companies are active in the upstream 
gas business. Yet, due to high transportation and storage costs, gas markets remain rather regional, 
and pipelines with high sunk costs and long lead times often bind buyers and sellers to each other. 
The LNG ‘revolution’ is currently changing the picture (increasing destination and origin flexibility). 
Regional differences remain  significant, though.  While  the United States has a highly competitive 
upstream  industry  including the (super) majors as  well as independents, in  Europe the upstream 
industry is more concentrated (with strong historical incumbents complemented by the US majors). In 
the other parts of the world – which control the largest share of proven gas reserves – the market is 
commonly in the hands of one or few state-controlled companies.  
The demand side (midstream and downstream) suffers from natural monopoly problems (gas 
networks  and  storage).  Liberalisation  efforts  (unbundling  and  deregulation)  have  created  some 
competition in OECD countries (especially the United States and the United Kingdom), but market 
concentration is still high in many markets. Vertical integration is still dominant in most other parts of 
the world, where market concentration is thus very high. 
A list of the price formation factors for LTC, sales and wholesale gas markets on the supply side 
(Horstmann, 2011) follows: 
  Oil price (LTC). 
  Coal price (substitute in power generation). 
  Exploration and production costs. 
  Transport and storage. 
  Taxes.  
 
2.2.1.2  Demand characteristics: dealing with high elasticity 
Natural gas is a major energy source, representing 22% of world energy demand in 2010 (IEA WEO, 
2012). The demand for gas is projected to rise in the future, at a compound annual growth rate of 0.7-
1.9% between 2010 and 2035, depending on the scenario (IEA WEO, 2012).  Most growth will come 
from  non-OECD  countries  due  to  their  higher  rates  of  economic  growth  and  currently 
underdeveloped gas markets. 
In 2011, the world’s gas demand amounted to 3,361 bcm (IEA MTGMR, 2012).94 While natural 
gas is used all across the world, the top natural gas consuming countries in 2011 were the United 
States (690 bcm, 20.5% of world gas demand), the EU-27 (489 bcm, 14.5%), Russia (483 bcm, 14.4%), 
Iran (150 bcm, 4.5%), China (132 bcm, 3.9%), and Japan (121 bcm, 3.6%).95 
Currently, the non-OECD world accounts for 52% of world gas demand (IEA WEO , 2012). In 
recent years, gas demand has grown rapidly in many emerging economies (especially in Asia) and 
this trend is expected to continue in the future (see below). However, the share of gas in total primary 
energy demand is still much lower in the BRICs, with the exception of Russia (Brazil 9%, Russia 55%, 
India 8%, China 4%). 
Figure  72  demonstrates that, while  sectorial  gas use varies by region, po wer generation is 
generally the largest consumer of natural gas.  Natural gas is also used in buildings (mainly for space 
and water heating), in industry (e.g. steel, glass, paper, fabrics, brick), in energy sectors other than 
power generation (oil and gas industry operations), for non-energy use as a raw material (e.g. paints, 
fertiliser, plastics) and in transport (natural gas vehicles). 
Figure 72. 2011 World sectorial gas demand by region (in bcm) 
 
Source: IEA Medium-Term Gas Market Outlook, 2012. Note: ‘Other’ includes energy industry own use, transport 
and losses; ‘industry’ includes fertiliser. 
Numerous substitutes for natural gas exist for most uses. The degree of substitutability of gas in 
power generation is, in principle, very high as a power system can be entirely based on other sources 
such as nuclear, hydro or coal.96 However, investments in most forms of power-generation are rather 
capital intensive (especially nuclear) and thus rather long -term (some 15 years for a combined cycle 
gas turbine, or around 50 years for nuclear). In addition, the construction of new gener ation capacity 
requires certain lead times; nuclear projects especially may take decades until they are finally built. In 
                                                            
94 Natural gas figures are reported in various units. This chapter gives volume data in billion cubic metres (bcm) 
and energy data in million British thermal units (mmbtu, sometimes also denoted MBtu). When volume data is 
given, it refers to natural gas at 15°C at a pressure of 101.325 kilopascals. 
95 Data are from IEA Medium-Term Gas Market Outlook, 2012. 
96 An example of a national power system that does not rely much on natural gas but rather coal is that of Poland. 
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heating, the second largest user of natural gas in the OECD, gas can be substituted by oil, electric 
power, and biomass. In industry, substitutes for substitute natural gas can be produced from lignite or 
biofuels. As regards transport, oil, biogas, hydrogen and electric power are possible substitutes. Note, 
however, that transport is a globally irrelevant gas user at the moment.  
Generally,  the  demand  elasticity  to  price  is  relatively  high  due  to  the  large  number  of 
substitutes available for natural gas.  However, elasticity may become lower in the short term due to 
significant sunk costs for natural gas users (gas-fired power plants, heating systems, etc.) and long 
lead times and high capital costs for substitutes (especially nuclear power). Elasticity in the power 
sector is higher if spare capacity is high (e.g. with old coal-fired power plants in the United States) or 
trade is possible (e.g. in the interconnected European electricity market). 
Natural gas demand is affected by a large number of variables at different time frames.97 On an 
(intra)daily basis, gas demand varies according to temperature (e.g. more space heating if  it is cold), 
time of the day (more water heating in the morning when people take a shower) as well as the 
workday/holiday schedule (less industrial demand during public holidays and weekends).  
Gas  demand  is  also  influenced  by  seasonality  (increased  demand  for  heatin g  in  winter), 
geography/climate  (more  demand  for  heating  in  colder  areas),  as  well  as  level  of  economic 
development (higher gas consumption in more prosperous regions). 
Long-term  drivers  causing  changes  in  gas  demand  are  related  to  “policy,  geopolitics, 
economics,  technology  and  environmental  concerns”  (IEA  ETP,  2012).  The  International  Energy 
Agency has identified the following key drivers (IEA ETP, 2012): 
  Access to supply and infrastructure (availability of gas, fuel production from other sources, 
upstream and downstream infrastructure, distribution networks). 
  Economic  development  (increased  gas  consumption  due  to  increased  demand  for  heating, 
electricity, and industrial goods). 
  Competiveness of natural gas prices versus other sources (e.g. coal, nuclear, biogas, hydrogen). 
  Environmental  impact  of  using  other  forms  of  energy  (greenhouse  gas  emissions,  which,  if 
internalised, also affect the competiveness of natural gas vis-à-vis other sources). 
  Changes  in  technology  (efficiency  in  power  generation  or  combustion  processes,  electric 
heating, natural gas vehicles). 
In  the  very  long  term,  climate  change  may  also  affect  gas  demand  through  its  impact  on 
temperatures (‘global warming’) and weather patterns. 
Factors that may affect the demand side are:98 
  Temperature (heating). 
  Weather (seasonality). 
  Timing affects of consumer behaviour (time of day, holidays). 
Long-term influencing factors are: 
  Product substitution. 
  Economic changes. 
  Political decisions and policies (e.g. environmental policies). 
  Expansion and decommissioning of existing gas producing/transport capacity. 
Consider this fragment from Horstmann’s presentation (2011): 
Customers  build up supply portfolios geared towards hub price levels and  forward quotations. High 
availability of volumes decreases value of flexibility. Mix of different price elements requested but all 
based  on  forward  price  level:  fixed  prices  for  different  maturities,  gas  price  indexation,  options,  oil 
indexation (but oil indexed at much lower levels compared to LTC). Majority of customers request offers 
from multiple suppliers, unfortunately rather based on opaque tender processes rather than the market 
place (via exchanges or broker screens). 
                                                            
97  Effects  may  also  vary  depending  on  the  level  of  analysis  (individuals,  households/  firms,  countries  and 
regions).  
98 See also the previous section on product characteristics.  
 
2.2.1.3  Key product and market characteristics 
Product and market characteristics for natural gas provide a challenging array of key drivers of price 
formation: 
  The product is non-renewable or recyclable, and production cannot be converted to alternative 
commodities (only partially to crude oil extraction, but not refining). 
  Product substitutability is high, which increases the incentives for international firms to expand 
horizontally. This type of integration, however, is still infrequent and limited to crude oil. 
  Natural gas is mainly used for electricity production, but it can also be used for a few other 
purposes  (production  of  plastics,  etc.).  Partial  alternative  uses  and  a  capital-intensive 
production  create  incentives  to  integrate  business  vertically.  Most  natural  gas  firms  are 
vertically integrated. 
  Storability is long but stocks are subject to seasonality and may be subject to unpredictable 
patterns in terms of new peaks during the consumption season. 
  Freight costs have an important impact on total costs, but they may be a valid substitute to 
long-term and large investments in infrastructures (such as new pipelines) for some regions. 
  Elasticity  of  demand  is  very  high  and  adjusts  quickly  to  developments  in  the  fundamental 
interaction between supply and demand through market prices. Supply is slightly more rigid as 
it requires a capital-intensive producer to adjust quickly an expensive production process, but 
full control over supply greatly simplifies the implementation of this decision. 
  The international market for natural gas is fairly competitive, even though the nature of the 
commodity has naturally created small oligopolistic settings in regional markets. 
  Emerging  markets  are  gradually  shifting  to  natural  gas,  as  infrastructures  become  ready  in 
several areas, and energy strategies require these countries to focus on independence through 
source diversification. 
  Demand and supply of natural gas are projected to be higher in the future, in particular if new 
cheap  sources  of  gas  are  discovered  and  can  be  exploited  with  limited  impact  on  the 
environment. 
Table 35. Product and market characteristics 
 
Recycling/ 
Production 
convertibility 
Substitutes/ 
Horizontal 
integration 
Alternative 
uses/ Vertical 
integration 
Capital 
intensity 
Stora-
bility 
Freight 
costs  
Elasticity 
to price/ 
demand 
Concen-
tration 
BRICs 
weight 
Future 
Consumption/ 
Production 
Demand 
side 
None  High  Medium 
High  Medium  Medium 
High 
Medium 
High  High 
Supply 
side 
Low  Medium  High  Medium  High  High 
Source: Author. 
2.2.2  Exogenous factors: the key role of government actions 
Government intervention on the supply side of natural gas is most pronounced in those countries 
where  gas  production  is  still  nationalised.  In  OECD  countries,  governments  sometimes  provide 
significant tax breaks to the upstream gas industry, for example in the United States where this has 
arguably been important in laying the foundations for the shale gas revolution. Regulated wellhead 
prices  may  have  a  negative  impact  on  production  rates.  In  the  United  States,  this  practice  was 
abolished as early as 1989; China has recently started the liberalisation process. (IEA WEO, 2012). 
On the demand side, governments of gas-producing countries sometimes provide subsidies to 
keep the price of natural gas artificially low, stimulating demand. Regulated gas retail prices are still 
common  even  in  OECD  countries,  which  is  potentially  positive  for  demand,  but  negative  for 
investments. A carbon price would increase the competitiveness of gas vis-à-vis coal, but in the long 
run might favour nuclear or renewables wherever these sources are substitutes. As carbon prices are 
either  non-existent  or  relatively  low  (even  in  the  European  Union),  the  impact  of  this  form  of 114 | ENERGY COMMODITIES 
 
government intervention has so far been limited. The OECD has recently published a comprehensive 
fossil fuel subsidy report (OECD, 2012).99 
Natural gas demand i s affected by a large number of exogenous factors such as economic 
development  (and  crises)  or  policy  decisions  which  particularly  matter  when  they  affect  the 
competitiveness of natural gas vis-à-vis its substitutes, in the field of environmental policy (c limate 
change, air pollution), for example, as well as industrial and innovation policy (promoting renewables 
or nuclear power, direct government spending toward innovative technologies).  
Major disasters, such as Fukushima, may also play a role in influencing gas demand. 
New rules, such as the Regulation on Energy Market Integrity and Transparency (REMIT), play 
an important role in improving levels of physical markets price transparency for regulatory purposes 
(i.e. market monitoring purposes) , but  also has an important role in improving transparency   of 
fundamentals  (e.g. gas production capacities, unplanned outages and planned maintenance ,  etc.). 
Transparency of fundamentals is different from price transparency but is also important for efficient 
and  effective  markets.  The  European  Union’s  3rd  Energy  Package  has  already  brought  in  new 
transparency of fundamentals requirements for natural gas (and power), and regulators, such as the 
Agency  for  the  Cooperation  of  Energy  Regulators  (ACER)  and  its  predecessor  the  European 
Regulators’  Group  for  Electricity  and  Gas  (ERGEG),  develop  important  regulatory  technical 
guidelines on fundamental gas and electricity data. 
Table 36. Exogenous factors in natural gas markets 
Government intervention  Main other external factors 
High  Oil prices, natural disasters 
Source: Author. 
2.2.3  Empirical analysis: weighing fundamentals 
This section describes the results of the empirical analysis of natural gas markets. Data is monthly 
from 1st January 1994 to 31st December 2011. The dataset includes the settlement price of front-month 
contract  traded  on  NYMEX.  Prices  are  transformed  in  natural  logarithms  and  deflated  using  the 
producer price index (PPI) published by the Federal Reserve. Data on US inventories are collected 
from  the  weekly  working  gas  in  underground  storage  provided  by  the  Energy  Information 
Administration (EIA) and also expressed in natural logarithms. The natural logarithm of the OECD 
leading  composite  indicator100  for  the  United  States  (average  of  de -trended,  smoothed,  and 
normalised component series) is used to capture the effect of demand and thus the economic cycle.  
First, this section tests the fundamentals, i.e. the relationship between prices and key underlying 
factors, identified for natural gas as inventories and demand represented by the economic cycle ( due 
to  its  fundamental  use  in  electricity  markets).  To  achieve  meaningful  results,  a n  autoregressive 
integrated  moving  average  (ARIMA)  model  was  estimated,  after  having  t ested  the  Box -Jenkins 
methodology,  which  includes  model  identification  and  model  selection  through  the  analysis  of 
autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation paths of the log real front-month price. Parameters are also 
estimated using the maximum log like lihood estimation, and the model has been checked through 
analysis of residuals. 
As a result of this analysis, ARIMA (3,1,0), i.e. integrated of order 1 with 3 lags autoregressive 
and moving average equal to 0, appears to fit the dataset best. 
The  analysis  finds  that  the  front -month  (‘spot  price’)  has  a  significant  relationship  with 
inventories and the economic cycle (see Output #17). The sign is negative for inventories and positive 
for demand factors, which confirms the important role of demand and supply fundamentals. 
                                                            
99 http://www.oecd.org/site/tadffss/ 
100 For more info http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?QueryId=6617.   
 
Table 37. Regression output 
Independent variable  Coefficient (t-test) 
US Inventories 
-5.1*** 
(-8.23) 
US OECD 
7.24*** 
(2.66) 
Note: ***1%, **5%, *10% significance 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
The results confirm that underlying factors affecting supply and demand are drivers of price 
movements. Since gas prices are regional benchmarks, the impact of exchange rates has not been 
included. 
The analysis also tests the impact of the futures curve on spot price. 
A  VAR  Granger  causality  test  was  run  between  two  variables  and  three  lags  taken  in  first 
difference to minimise risks of spurious regressions. This test (see Output #18) between spot price and 
futures contract with 4th delivery month maturity, i.e. the difference between the 4 delivery month 
futures contract negotiated on NYMEX and its front-month contract, suggests that the futures curve 
(contango  or  backwardation)  may  be  driving  spot  prices,  but  the  significance  is  at  10%  and  the 
coefficient is very low (below 0.1). However, this finding confirms the importance of the futures curve 
in  price  formation  and  its  ability  to  absorb  information  about  underlying  physical  markets  and 
transfer this to inventory levels through the basis. 
The same test was run against financial variables to measure the level of financialisation. Data 
in logarithms of the dollar monetary base (M2; seasonally adjusted stock value, published by the 
Federal Reserve System), interbank interest rate (Effective Federal Funds rate), and Standard & Poor’s 
500 financial index (at close) are tested against the spot price. No statistically significant link emerged 
between any of these indicators and prices of natural gas (see Output #19). 
2.2.4  Market organisation: a European and a US model? 
There are various kinds of natural gas prices, whether wholesale prices (hub prices, border prices, city 
gate) or end-user prices (industrial, household). Components of natural gas prices include the cost of 
gas supplies, transmission, distribution and storage costs, retailer's margins and taxes. Both wholesale 
and retail prices vary widely across regions, and regulated prices are still common in the non-OECD 
world.  Competing  fuels  include  oil,  electricity,  coal  (see  Section  2.2.1),  whose  price  development 
therefore impact on gas prices. 
There are three price formation mechanisms:  
1.  Gas-to-gas competition based on offer and demand in wholesale and sales markets.  
2.  Oil-indexed LTCs for importing gas based on worldwide oil markets/FX.  
3.  Regulated prices.  
There is no such thing as a global natural gas price,101 as shown in Figure 73. Until 2006, average 
natural gas prices in  the United States, Europe and Asia were correlated w ith the oil price.  This 
correlation ended for US gas prices as early as 2006. European gas prices have deviated significantly 
from oil price developments since 2010, and at the moment only Japanese LNG import prices follow 
oil prices.  
                                                            
101 As a consequence, each region has one or several price benchmarks that are only partly linked to one another. 
For  North  America,  Henry  Hub  (a  distribution  hub  located  in  Louisiana)  prices  are  generally  taken  as  a 
benchmark.  When  talking  about  European  gas  prices,  one  usually  distinguishes  at  least  between  BAFA  CFI 
(average German border import prices as reported by BAFA - Federal Office of Economics and Export Control) 
and NBP (National Balancing Point: The British virtual gas hub operated by TSO National Grid, covering all entry 
and exit points in mainland Britain. The British virtual gas hub operated by National Grid, covering all entry and 
exit points in Great Britain). For Asia, Platt’s JKM (Japan Korea Marker) may serve as a proxy. 116 | ENERGY COMMODITIES 
 
Figure 73. Natural gas real prices in the United States, Europe and Japan, 1992-2012 
 
Source:  World  Bank  Commodity  Price  Data.  Notes:  Europe:  average  import  border  price  and  a  spot  price 
component, beginning April 2010 including the UK; during June 2000 - March 2010 prices excludes the 
UK;  US:  spot  price  at  Henry  Hub,  Louisiana;  Japan:  import  price,  CIF.  Data  in  $2005/mmbtu  and 
$2005/bbl. Annual prices. 
Figure 74. Global gas price linkages 
 
Source: Rogers (2012). 
While the oil price is still highly relevant for wholesale price formation in continental Europe, 
through long-term contracts (indispensable tools to finance a costly network infrastructure), and the  
 
OECD  Pacific,  one  should  not  forget  that  most  parts  of  the  world,  namely  those  that  are  not  as 
dependent on imports, follow a different logic. Gas-to-gas (between gas supplies) competition on spot 
markets is prominent in North America, the United Kingdom and parts of continental Europe (e.g. the 
Netherlands), representing one third of global gas demand (Figure 74). Prices in many other parts of 
the world are regulated, however, and may even be set below supply costs to reach specific policy 
objectives. 
In late 2012, world gas markets can be described as follows (adapted from Rogers, 2012): 
  North  America  is  a  largely  self-sufficient  gas  market  with  Henry  Hub  prices  of  around 
$3.50/mmbtu.  
  Europe has a ‘hybrid’ gas market: 
o  Hub spot prices range from $8/mmbtu to $14/mmbtu. 
o  Oil-indexed contract prices are at $11-$13/mmbtu, meaning buyers will only satisfy their 
take-or-pay  commitments  and  purchase  additional  demand  on  sport  markets,  while 
trying to renegotiate their long-term contracts. 
  Asia has highly heterogeneous gas prices: 
o  LNG contract prices range from $4/mmbtu to $18/mmbtu. 
o  Spot cargoes arrive at around 15$/mmbtu (in Japan – at times linked to European hub 
spot prices with a transport margin and premium). 
While gas producers respond to price signals, it is difficult to adjust production levels at short 
notice.  In  case  of  increasing  demand,  production  cannot  be  stepped  up  at  short  notice  but  needs 
longer lead times. The reason is that the process for granting permits, exploratory seismic work, and 
drilling and connecting wells to pipelines will take at least six months, usually longer. In addition, 
productivity rates of existing and planned wells are subject to uncertainty.  
If  demand  declines  and  prices  fall  below  the  short-run  marginal  costs  of  production,  an 
immediate halt to production may not be an option as reservoir and wellbore characteristics will often 
not allow simply restarting production once prices go up again. In addition, gas is sometimes a by-
product (associated gas) of oil production, so even if low gas prices make production uneconomic, the 
combined oil and gas business case may look different. Also, companies may hedge their production 
at higher gas prices, one of the factors that explain why US gas production remained constant even 
when US gas prices fell below $2/mmbtu (IEA WEO, 2012). Furthermore, producers sometimes have 
to accept obligations to produce certain minimum volumes, perhaps as part of the licensing process.  
The majority of internationally traded gas is traded under long-term contracts, usually 10-25 
years  (IEA  WEO,  2012).  Gas  prices  are  often  indexed  to  the  oil  price  (oil  products  or  crude  oil), 
limiting the possibility for arbitrage.102 While this was logical in the 1970s when burning gas was an 
alternative to using oil in both power generation and heating, nowadays this logic has become 
obsolete in most parts of the world. 
As with oil, traded market price transparency for natural gas is high because traded market 
prices (i.e. spot prices and forward delivery prices) are identified and published by a range of price 
reporting agencies, as well as by commodity futures exchanges to a limited extent. In addition to the 
traded markets, much natural gas is sold under long -term supply contracts, where transparency is 
mixed. Outside of the United States, many long-term gas contracts have historically been indexed to 
oil prices. But since the precise formulas are hardly ever made public, and since there is a wide range 
of ways that oil indexation is achieved in practice (e.g. indexed to various specific crudes, and/or to a 
combination of different oil products such as fuel oil and gasoil in bespoke proportions), levels of 
transparency for oil-indexed contracts is relatively low. In recent times, there has been a move toward 
greater use of indexation for spot gas prices in long-term contracts. While again the precise formulas 
used are confidential to the counterparties and not released, gas indexation arguably improves the 
                                                            
102 Excluding the possibility of renegotiation, there are two scenarios that limit arbitrage opportunities. First, if 
spot prices are higher than oil-indexed prices, the annual contract quantity level (ACQ) represents the maximum 
availability of oil-indexed imports. Second, if spot prices are lower, take-or-pay clauses represent the minimum 
level of oil-indexed imports. 118 | ENERGY COMMODITIES 
 
degree of price transparency for long-term contracts because transparency in the spot gas markets is 
high and gas-on-gas indexation provides a high price correlation, unlike gas-to-oil indexation.  
In traded natural gas markets, pricing is straightforward with contracts generally agreed on an 
absolute price (fixed price) basis. They can also sometimes be agreed in reference to a natural gas fixed 
price in a neighbouring market (a cross-border basis trade), or a fixed price for a different time period 
(e.g. a Q4-Q1 spread contract), but usually with a fixed price market at its centre. This type of contract 
takes  into  account  regional  differences,  since  its  use  is  driven  by  the  aim  to  maintain  a  stable 
relationship due to high sunk costs invested in pipelines and networks to link with the other party. 
Financial instruments do not normally play a direct role in the pricing of a physical product. To 
the extent that financial contracts in natural gas are actively traded, their primary purpose is as tools 
for the management of price risk (e.g. swaps, options, etc.). While most LNG is traded under long-
term contracts, just like internationally traded pipeline gas, there has been a shift to more flexible 
arrangements, partly as a result of very liquid markets (Figure 75). Besides North American projects, 
Rogers (2012) expects Australia, Qatar and Nigeria to become the most important players in global 
LNG supply. 
Figure 75. World short-term LNG trade, 2000-2011 
 
Source: IEA WEO (2012). Note: Short-term means trade under contracts of four-year duration or less, including 
spot transactions. 
Transportation and trade may be affected by government intervention both positively, through 
pipeline  subsidies,  and  negatively,  by  failing  to  provide  the  regulatory  incentives  for  network 
expansion or export restrictions (the United States is very reluctant to grant export licences for natural 
gas). (Trade) wars as well as resource nationalism come to mind. Also, long-term gas supply may 
increase as a result of government spending on innovations in drilling or exploration technologies. But 
governments may also enter into (free) trade agreements, facilitating the transportation of natural gas 
across national borders. 
In Europe, gas pricing is undergoing major changes. The traditional oil product-linked gas is 
increasingly being questioned in the European Union, and the price for oil, as a competing source of 
energy, no longer plays a role in several major European wholesale markets. It is reasonable to expect 
that hub-based pricing will gradually take over. This poses challenges to existing long-term contracts, 
some of which may become untenable. The period up to 2014-15 is often considered a transitional one, 
which may eventually result in a new pricing and contractual gas framework. Yet, how this will look 
is still uncertain, partly because it does not only hinge upon economic fundamentals, but also has an 
important legal dimension. Here, the outcome of the antitrust case that the European Commission has 
brought forward against Gazprom may question the practice of oil-indexed gas pricing. 
  
 
Figure 76. European trading hubs and connectivity 
 
Source: Rogers, 2011. 
Granted, the future is always uncertain, but with a view to gas pricing it nevertheless seems 
worth pointing to major market developments.  Rogers (2011) singles out four of them: 
  Asian Natural Gas and LNG demand. 
  US Future Shale Gas Production Growth and potential scale of North American LNG exports. 
  Timing/slippage of new non-North American LNG projects. 
  Production versus pricing policy for European pipeline gas suppliers post oil-indexation. 
As a consequence, drawing upon scenario analyses, Rogers (2012a) points to the key challenges 
for major players: 
  European  pipeline  suppliers  will  have  to  hope  for  high  Asian  demand,  otherwise  the 
availability of LNG will effectively push down European prices. Large-scale North American 
LNG exports could de facto imply a price ceiling for pipeline suppliers as well. 
  The commercial viability of North American LNG exports depends on high Asian demand and 
a European hub (NBP) ‘target price’, maintained at the expense of volume sold by European 
suppliers. 
  US upstream gas producers are vulnerable to low Asian demand when US production is high, 
even when European pipeline suppliers maintain a target supply floor. This does not make for 
“an attractive environment for upstream producers as it perpetuates the problems observed in 
2011  of  supply-driven  inventory  surpluses  and  low  prices  [...]  an  intensely  competitive 
environment”. 
  For  Asian  LNG  producers  and  buyers,  low  Asian  demand  would  imply  finding  ‘new 
customers’ in the Atlantic Basin markets (or delaying projects in anticipation of such). 
Finally, in order to handle important changes such as greater production flexibility and risk 
management  of  a  more  competitive  environment  (with  liberalisation),  futures  markets  are 
indispensable tools to deal with seasonality factors. As mentioned above, there is no global benchmark 
price for natural gas, but rather a futures index for Europe (NBP run by ICE) and a futures contract for 
the United States (Henry Hub natural gas traded and cleared on NYMEX). Futures markets, however, 
play a limited role for pricing of spot natural gas transactions through long-term contracts. The size of 
open interest over physical market is in a low range (see Section 1.3.1).  120 | ENERGY COMMODITIES 
 
Table 38. Natural gas market organisation 
Physical market setting  Pricing complexity  Liquidity futures market  Delivery points 
Competitive  Medium  Medium  Limited (EU, US) 
Source: Author. 
Due to multiple sources of natural gas spread across different locations, the physical market 
setting is fairly competitive, and complexity is limited to pricing formulas for long-term contracts. 
Futures  markets  are  liquid  but  benchmark  for  specific  regional  areas;  no  global  benchmark  has 
emerged. Delivery points for the futures contract are limited to a few regional locations set by the 
exchange, but this does not affect the efficiency of market structure since futures for this commodity 
reflect fundamental changes in their respective region.  
121 | 
 
3.  RAW MATERIALS AND INDUSTRIAL METALS 
3.1  Iron ore market 
Iron ore is one of the biggest commodities market in the world (second only to crude oil), and its 
yearly production is valued at around $300 billion.103 As with other mineral ores such as bauxite, iron 
ore is an example of a commodity that has one main use – the production of steel. Up to 98% of the 
iron ore produced worldwide is used for steel production (Yellishetty et al., 2010).104 It therefore plays 
a crucial role in commodities markets as  the principal source for steel production, which represents 
95% of all metals production (Yellishetty et al., 2010). However, the commodity has particular product 
and market characteristics that other commodities do not have. Like few other raw materials, iron ore 
does not have a  fully-fledged global  liquid futures  market that  can  ensure control over an ever -
changing market environment, because it has been unable so far to develop a globally recognisable 
physical spot price. Market organisation is evolving, however, from a swap-based market to a futures-
based market as new benchmark prices for physical markets develop (e.g. The Steel Index 62% for 
Chinese iron ore, or the IODEX 62% CFR-North China price run by Platts; Figure 77).  
Figure 77. IODEX (62% CFR North China) Spot Price 
($/tonne) 
Figure 78. Iron ore nominal prices ($/tonne) 
   
Source: Platts.  Source:  World  Bank.  Note:  Iron  ore  (Brazil),  VALE 
(formerly  CVRD)  Carajas  sinter  feed, 
contract price, f.o.b. Ponta da Madeira. Unit 
dry  metric  ton  unit  (dmtu)  for  mt  1%  Fe-
unit.105  
 
   
                                                            
103 At January 2013 value of TSI Iron ore CFR China 62% Fe ($147.5/tonne). 
104 The remainder (typically, with magnetite content above 70%) is mainly used to wash coal form ashes (in heavy 
media process) and for cement manufacturing. In form of hematite, this ore can also be used for the preparation 
of electrodes. 
105 Prior to year 2010, only annual contract prices. 
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The  old  price  setting  based  on  long-term  yearly-renewed  contracts  changed  in  2010,  after 
pressure from the market. It has led, on the one hand, to a reduction of the assessment period for 
many long-term (volume) contracts to even earlier than a month (Figure 78), while new spot prices 
(indexes) have emerged around key consumption areas and have also become references for several 
long-term (volume) contracts (Figure 77). Prices, in the meantime, have become more volatile and 
reached a historical peak, also in real terms (Figure 79).  
Figure 79. Iron ore real price ($2005) 
 
Note: Iron ore (Brazil), VALE (formerly CVRD) Carajas sinter feed, contract price, f.o.b. Ponta da Madeira. Unit 
dry metric ton unit (dmtu) for mt 1% Fe-unit. Prior to year 2010 annual contract prices. 
Source: World Bank. Note: Source: World Bank. 
The structural shift in real prices is so prominent that it may not only reflect the growth of 
emerging  economies,  but  also  the  changes  in  the  market  microstructure  and  price  formation 
mechanisms.  The  jump  in  price  also  factors  in  the  growth  of  spot  transactions  versus  long-term 
(volume-based) contracts.  More flexible market solutions come at a cost to be  charged by mining 
companies in the short term due to high fixed and sunk costs. 
3.1.1  Product and market characteristics: the key industrial commodity 
Iron ore is a ‘pure’ intermediate commodity that in general cannot be recycled (except for some uses, 
e.g. coal washeries), though its main derived product (steel) can be re-used for similar or alternative 
uses without losing its original properties as a metal. Steel scrap is the only viable alternative material 
used for steel production. Additionally, as with other mining operations, the production of iron ore 
(extraction and the first refining process) cannot be  converted to other raw  materials. It is  highly 
dependent on steel demand.  
There are at least six categories of ores (hematite and magnetite are rare ores with the highest 
iron content of 70%, on average) from which iron ore can be commercially extracted (the iron content 
should be at least above 25%). Alternative uses of these fines are very limited. Iron ore is mined in two 
forms: lump, and fines. However, it can also be sold in pellets, which increase productivity in steel 
production because the fire in the furnace can escape through the air flows created by the material.  
Production 
After a long period (1968-2002) below 1,000 megatonnes, world production of iron ore has more than 
doubled  since  then,  as  China  entered  the  WTO  in  2001  and  implemented  the  removal  of  tariff 
restrictions by 1st January 2004. Production spiked in 2011 at over 2,000 megatonnes (2 billion tonnes).  
 
Figure 80. Iron ore world production (megatonnes) 
 
Source: Australian Bureau of Resources and Energy Economics (ABREE 2012). 
Today, China is by far the biggest importer, and the second biggest producer, in the world 
(Figure 81). China is second only to Australia, which produces roughly 25% of global production, and 
ahead of Brazil (20% of global production). 
Figure 81. Top four iron ore producing countries, 2004 and 2011 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from ABREE (2012). 
Despite being one of the biggest producers on earth, China is still a net importer of iron ore due 
to its large manufacturing economy, as well as the low quality of its iron ore production (taking into 
account  its low-quality ores, its real production  should be  halved to around  200 megatonnes; see 
Figure 83). This makes the country a price-taker at the global level. In 2011, China held a 60% global 
share of imports in iron ore, with 65% of net imports as a percentage of world imports (IMF, 2011), 
despite its position as second largest producer, and its consumption has not eased much since the 
collapse of financial markets in 2008 and resulting spillover effects on the global economy. 124 | RAW MATERIALS AND INDUSTRIAL METALS 
 
Figure 82. Importers by countries and regions, 
2011 (mn/t) 
Figure 83. Chinese Iron ore demand, 2000-2017F 
 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from ABREE (2012).      Source: CRU. 
International trade 
International trade and the emergence of new economies based on heavy industries have played a key 
role in market structure developments in iron ore and the new pricing mechanisms. Before the early 
2000s, the size of iron ore production and cross-border trade was a small fraction of its peak in 2011. 
Figure 84. International trade ($mn) 
 
Source: Author’s calculation from World Bank and Australian Bureau of Resources and Energy Economics (ABREE, 2012). 
The size of exports vis-à-vis production levels  grew to around 50%  towards the end of the 
1990s.  Due  to  its  supply  concentration,  the  growth  of  iron  ore  as  a  seaborne  market  has  also 
contributed to the growth of its cross-border trade. 
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Box 7. China’s entry in the World Trade Organisation 
China’s entry in the WTO is perhaps the most important event for international trade in the last two 
decades.  After  a  15-year  process,  China  was  admitted  to  the  WTO  on  11th  November  2001  after 
requesting to resume as contracting party of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1986 
and requesting to enter the WTO in 1995, when the institution was established.  Commitments to remove 
tariffs and other restrictions, already started before the accession, were mostly met by the end of 2004 
when China became a fully-fledged global trade partner in the WTO. The opening up of its economy 
began back in 1979 (Rumbaugh and Blancher, 2004) and had since gathered pace . Entry in the WTO has 
led China to reconsider, among other commitments, the following (WTO, 2001): 
  Discriminatory practices between Chinese and non-Chinese WTO members. 
  Dual-pricing practices for domestic and export products. 
  Price controls to protect domestic firms. 
  Updates to current regulatory framework to reach international standards. 
  Full right to export and import in the country. 
  Export subsidies for agricultural product. 
Despite some exemptions from these commitments (cereals, tobacco and minerals, among others), 
the deadline for the implementation of these commitments was three years from accession (December 
2004). Since 2001, China has been easing many of these restrictions, even though there are several areas 
where further improvements are needed. Agricultural policies, renewable energy technologies, electronic 
payments and insurance regulation are some of the key areas (USCBC, 2010). 
China has become the third largest global exporter and is very close to overtaking the United 
States (Table 39). Despite losing ground, the European Union remains well ahead of China as global 
trade partner, however. 
Table 39. Top global exporters and China (% of total exports) 
  2001  2003  2011 
European Union  40.1%  42.0%  35.1% 
United States  13.1%  10.9%  9.6% 
Japan  5.8%  5.6%  4.2% (4th) 
China  3.9% (5th)  5.2% (4th)  9.5% (3rd) 
Source: Author’s elaboration from World Bank. 
The gigantic growth of China is also clearly reflected in net imports. In particular, the explosion is 
visible for net imports in raw materials and metals, reaching around 14% and 30% of global imports, 
respectively.  
Figure 85. Chinese net imports (% of world imports) 
 
Source: IMF (2011, p. 4). 126 | RAW MATERIALS AND INDUSTRIAL METALS 
 
Active global trade accounts are also reflected in consumption levels, with China becoming the 
top global consumer of iron ore, aluminium, copper, and soybean oil in 2011. It is among the top three 
global consumers for crude oil (2nd), wheat (2nd), corn (2nd), sugar (3rd), and natural gas (4th). No major 
levels of consumption emerge for cocoa and coffee, but the Chinese weight is constantly growing over 
time in these markets too. 
Table 40. China’s ranking in key commodities markets, 2001-2011/2012 
  Production 
(top 10; % tot) 
Consumption 
(top 10; % tot) 
Exports 
(top 10; % tot) 
Imports 
(top 10; % tot) 
  2001  2011/2012  2001  2011/2012  2001  2011/2012  2001  2011/2012 
Crude oil 
7th  
(4.4%) 
5th  
(4.9%) 
3rd 
(6.3%) 
2nd  
(11.1%) 
no  no  n/a 
2nd 
(14.9%) 
Natural 
Gas 
n/a 
(1.2%) 
6th 
(3.1%) 
n/a 
(1.1%) 
4th  
(4.1%) 
no  no  n/a 
10th  
(1.2%) 
Iron ore  n/a 
2nd  
(22.9%) 
n/a 
(13%) 
1st  
(50%)  
no  no  n/a 
1st  
(60.2%) 
Aluminium 
2nd  
(13.5%) 
1st  
(41.8%) 
n/a 
1st  
(41.5%) 
no  no  5th *  10th  
Copper  n/a 
1st 
(26.4%) 
n/a  1st   no  no  n/a  1st  
Wheata 
2nd  
(16%) 
2nd  
(7.7%) 
2nd 
(18.5%) 
2nd  
(17.9%) 
no  no  no  no 
Corna 
2nd  
(19%) 
2nd 
(15%) 
2nd 
(1.8%) 
2nd 
(22.4%) 
no  no  no  no 
Soybean 
oila 
4th  
(12.4%) 
1st 
(26.2%) 
2nd 
(14.7%) 
1st 
(28.9%) 
3rd   1st   no  no 
Sugara 
5th  
(5.2%) 
4th  
(7.2%) 
5th 
(6.7%) 
3rd 
(9%) 
no  no  7th   4th  
Cacao  no  no  no  no  no  no  9th   8th  
Coffee  no  no  no  no  no  no  no  no 
*In  2003.  a2012  estimate.  Source:  Author’s  calculation  from  IMF  Database,  BP,  OPEC,  ICSG,  USDA  and  other 
governmental authorities. 
For agricultural commodities, such as wheat and corn, not much has changed in the last decade in 
terms of consumption levels, as the population is gradually stagnating and alternative use of biofuels 
production is still in early development. Overall, however, China has become the top global commodities 
consumer. It is unquestionable that China, over time, will need to make more efficient use of current 
resources as the energy-intensive nature of its manufacturing economy and its ageing population will 
put additional unstable pressure on commodities prices if the country does not increase its independence 
from external provision of low-cost resources. The more China increases in size, the more its weight on 
commodities markets may become unsustainable (at least in the short term) if competing global players 
do  not  reduce  consumption  levels.  This  situation  might  be  seen  as  an  incentive  to  finally  increase 
efficiency in the use of global resources, but it will take years before relevant changes may see the light.  
3.1.1.1  Supply characteristics: a Cournot equilibrium? 
Due to its remote location from areas of consumption, most of the iron ore used for international trade 
is seaborne, accounting for roughly 50% of global iron ore production. Fines make up most of this 
(67%),  while  lump  ores  (15%)  and  pellets  (11%)  play  a  smaller  role.  Global  proven  reserves  are 
estimated at 170,000 megatonnes (USGS, 2012), which would last for roughly 80 years at the current 
production/consumption rate. However, iron can be found in several types of ores that are quite 
common on earth and which still need to be explored. Additionally, efficiency in the production of 
steel and its increasing substitution  with  other  metals (e.g. aluminium) could  potentially ease the 
pressure on increasing production. The substitutability of the product is limited to steel scrap on the 
demand side. Iron ore is mainly treated and used for steel production, and its final usability is limited. 
Despite its direct use for steel, vertical integration with steel producers is very limited. Production  
 
requires a huge amount of capital and stable flows to cover high fixed costs (mainly energy costs), on 
top of the limited storability of these ores. The storability period for this commodity varies among the 
different types of iron ore produced. In general, though, iron ore is limited since the commodity is 
bulky  and  its  properties  require  costly  storage  facilities  and  huge  capacity  (which  may  reduce 
commercial viability). The flexibility of production to demand is limited, which does not attract steel 
producers. As storage of iron ore is costly and storability is limited, supply becomes more rigid and 
freight costs become a key item of the total price charged to end-users. 
On the supply side, iron ore mining companies are typically large companies also involved in 
the extraction of other important minerals and raw materials (e.g. BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto). A few 
producers are vertically integrated with steel producers to exploit economies of scale, while others 
rely on long-term contracts (3-5 years). Integration with the steel industry has historically been limited 
due  to  national  interests  in  keeping  supply  national  and  therefore  fragmented,  thus  limiting 
economies of scale. Iron ore production is instead fairly integrated horizontally with other mining 
activities of raw materials (e.g. copper). Integration is a key feature of capital-intensive production 
with high fixed costs. Barriers to entry are high, mainly due to:  
  Exploration costs (for good quality iron ore). 
  Extraction costs (licenses, transport, infrastructure). 
  The need for ‘deep pockets’ (acquisition of local mining companies).  
  A  complex  pricing  system  (periodic  negotiations  about  reference/benchmark  price  for  the 
different ores and regions). 
Table 41. Top ten producers, 2011 
  Million 
tonnes 
% World 
Vale   309  17 
Rio Tinto   181  10 
BHP Billiton   159  8.2 
Arcelor Mittal   50  2.7 
Anglo American   46  2.6 
Fortescue   39  2.1 
Metalloinvest   38  2.1 
Cliffs   37  2.1 
System Capital   31  1.7 
NMDC   30  1.7 
Source: Storm (2011) from Raw Materials Group. 
Figure 86. Market share of seaborne trade 
 
Source: Crowson (2011) from Raw Materials Group. 
Despite initial investment constraints, iron ore capacity and the marginal cost of production are 
reasonably predictable in the short term. In addition, low demand elasticity (Chang, 1994; Hellmer, 
1997), concentration in seaborne iron ore (the top three control roughly 65% of the global seaborne 
market; Figure 86), the homogenous nature of the product, and the system of long -term contracts 
(meaning  one  or  a  few  regional  prices  prevail  in  international  trade),  ensure  that  the  market 
organisation  of  supply  follows  an  oligopolistic  model  à  la  Cournot  (Cournot,  1838;  Farrell  and 
Shapiro, 1990; Hellmer, 1997; Warell and Lundmark, 2008). Each firm knows and assumes as ‘fixed’ 
(in that period) the quantity of output the other firms will produce, and acts accordingly. Therefore, 
firms end up setting the quantity as a reaction function  of other firms’ production, which can be 
estimated through data on mine capacity. Brazil is deemed to exploit a first-mover advantage in the 
European market (Hellmer, 1997) and Australia may have the same role in the Asian market. The 
ability to move the market by setting quantities is certainly more relevant for top companies that 
control  most  of  the  seaborne  iron  ore  market.  However,  transaction  costs  (e.g.,  the  need  of  high 
production volumes) may lead to deviations from equilibrium, and may ultimately reduce incentives 
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The oligopolistic setting is often influenced by external factors, such as freight industry capacity 
and easier (cheaper) connectivity between regional areas. Freight costs are an important part of the 
seaborne iron ore price and can expose the market to unprecedented volatile patterns. For instance, 
freight costs (C3) in 2008 went down from 200% of FOB Brazil iron ore price to less than 10% in 
roughly six months (Figure 87). In other periods, it was more convenient to buy iron ore from Brazil 
and ship it to China instead of buying Chinese iron ore (Figure 88). However, recent changes with the 
increase in capacity of the freight industry have stabilised costs of freight for some time and ensure 
easy connectivity at the global level. This may increase the accessibility of new regional areas to the 
global market and reduce space for an oligopolistic setting as marginal costs become less predictable, 
so players can more easily defect to increase their profits. Small producers may even agree to non-
profitable prices to win contracts, potentially creating a market imbalance that can move the market 
away from a Cournot equilibrium. 
Figure 87. Freight cost (C3) as a % of FOB Brazil price 
 
Source: ICAP. 
Figure 88. Price differential China and Brazil ($/tonne)* 
 
Source: ICAP. *Including C3 freight cost106 
Globalisation  also  increases  the  likelihood  that  liquid  spot  prices  may  emerge  and  increase 
competition with other reference benchmark prices. These two factors can have a long-term impact on 
the supply setting. As a consequence, this static model would gradually become more dynamic (also 
on the basis of the lower profitability and stagnating demand) and induce big players to foster further 
industry consolidation to reduce the threat on seaborne trades of new regional markets. As today, 
production is geographically concentrated in a few countries, but things may change.  
Finally, additional supply constraints are technological barriers to improving the production 
chain and making more efficient use of resources. Production also generates pollution, including CO2 
emissions, while energy consumption requires access to cheap energy. 
3.1.1.2  Demand characteristics: rigidity versus pro-cyclicality 
In line with supply characteristics, demand is also inelastic and, despite the large vertically integrated 
steel producers, steel manufacturers are price-takers and fragmented among regional areas. Demand 
is clearly inelastic at least in the short run, however. Over longer periods, prolonged downward cycles 
could put the industry at risk of oversupply if market conditions do not stabilise in the medium term. 
For this reason, over the years the market has developed forms of long-term contracts to deal with 
supply and demand rigidity and to limit this instability. Contracts have been used to get credit from 
the banking system and develop production further. Emerging markets are also leading countries in 
the production process, and also through the constant growth of demand, which will drive future 
production and consumption (Figure 89).  
                                                            
106 C3 Freight cost is the benchmark cost of ship transport for bulk commodities from South America to Asia.  
 
Figure 89. China and rest-of-the-world (ROW) iron ore consumption and seaborne demand 
 
Source: BHP Billiton Iron Ore Growth and Outlook (2012). 
Although the global economy has reduced its  rate of growth, demand forecasts still remain 
solid, with seaborne iron ore demand growing at a faster pace as Chinese demand consolidates. 
3.1.1.3  Key product and market characteristics 
Key product and market characteristics of iron ore reflect a market for raw materials with: 
  High sunk costs. 
  Limited alternative uses and storability of the commodity. 
  Rigidity of supply. 
  Inelastic demand with limited cyclical patterns. 
  Moderate, but growing, industry concentration. 
  Emerging markets as important players on the supply and demand side. 
  Future consumption/production that is not going to slow down soon and that, together with 
the  development  of  cross-border  trade,  has  been  driving  significant  changes  to  market 
structure. 
Table 42. Key product and market characteristics 
 
Recycling/ 
Production 
convertibility 
Substitutes/ 
Horizontal 
integration 
Alternative 
uses/Vertical 
integration 
Capital 
intensive 
production 
Stora-
bility 
Freight 
costs 
incidence 
Elasticity 
to price/ 
demand 
Concen-
tration 
BRICs 
weight 
Future  
Consumption/ 
Production 
Demand 
side 
None  Low  Low 
High  Medium  High 
Low 
Medium 
High  High 
Supply 
side 
Low  Medium  Medium  Low  High  High 
Source: Author. 
3.1.2  Exogenous factors 
Government  intervention  is  mainly  limited  to  countries  where  the  government  owns  the  mining 
companies  (e.g.  India)  or  to  some  countries  where  demand  is  far  higher  than  production.  Some 
restrictions to trade are applied in countries where demand is very high, such as China (10%) and 
India (10% on lump and 5% on fines). India may become a net importer now the Supreme Court has 
blocked  mining  activities  that  it  claims  are  illegal.  However,  government  intervention  in  other 
countries  has  also  followed  other  directions.  Most  iron  ore  companies  are  private  or  have  been 
privatised  in  the  last  two  decades,  so  government  interference  is  much  lighter  than  in  other  raw 
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in infrastructure to increase capacity and distribution. Several projects have been financed, or have 
been proposed, to create iron ore pipelines in continental regions and production facilities typically 
need  access  to  railways  and  commercial  ports  to  ship  materials  promptly.  However,  the  role  of 
governments  to  ensure  that  the  country  can  benefit  from  its  own  resources  is  still  important. 
Governments (such as Brazil) have therefore sponsored privatisation of national companies to achieve 
greater economic efficiency (Schmitz, 2004). On the demand side, government intervention in iron ore 
is more occasional and not of a relevant size. 
Table 43. Key exogenous factors 
  Government intervention  Main other external factors 
Demand side  Low  Economic cycle 
Political instability  Supply side  Medium 
Source: Author. 
Global actors, such as the European Union, are increasingly looking for cooperation to promote 
discipline in international  trade through dialogue and WTO dispute settlements (EU COM, 2011). 
Other  initiatives  to  promote  global  standards,  to  reduce  barriers  to  trade  and  to  limit  political 
instability may also result in a less volatile environment. Finally, as for other raw materials and base 
metal production, environmental standards are important to reduce pollution and make production 
sustainable in the long term. Anecdotal evidence shows the environmental impact of production can 
have long-term implications, not only for the local population through negative externalities (costs), 
but  also  for  the  profitability  of  the  company.  Efficiency  in  the  use  of  resources  and  minimum 
environmental  requirements  could  become  global  standards  across  commodities  markets  for 
international trade. 
3.1.3  Market organisation: designing a new market structure 
Pricing  of  iron  ore  in  physical  markets  has  historically  been  done  through  LTCs  that  are  revised 
periodically. After the collapse of the annual pricing system in 2010, LTCs are still used for volumes 
(typically up to five years) but the price is revised periodically or is continuously linked to benchmark 
spot  prices.  LTCs  with  long-term  volumes  objectives  are  ‘bankable’,  so  they  can  be  used  to  find 
financing and develop new mining and processing facilities that can improve capacity and efficiency 
in production and processing (Rogers and Robertson, 1987). LTC prices were originally revised every 
three to five years, then each year, but more recently even quarterly or monthly revisions have been 
introduced for contracts in Brazil. On the  one  hand, LTCs reduce fluctuations in price and  move 
attention to the quality of the end product and long-term investments. There are many pricing models 
for LTCs and they can also rely on spot markets reviewed at a regular period. On the other hand, 
LTCs carry the costs of private negotiations if the difference in contractual power among the two sides 
and the information asymmetry are very high (the principal-agent model). Therefore, in a scarcely 
competitive environment, LTCs may help consolidation and rent creation, so ultimately increasing 
costs for end-users. Spot prices contracts107, instead, allow parties to exploit short -term returns on 
investments, and to  reduce the dependency from contractual power and so the  relative size of the 
counterparty negotiating the price. However, spot prices are exposed to bigger  fluctuations as the 
market  develops,  and  standardisations  and  other  practices   are  required  to  make  sure  that  the 
exchanged underlying product has standard qualities once the set of potential buyers and sellers 
widens. If not properly designed, market prices may paradoxically result in higher prices for  end-
users. 
                                                            
107 Anecdotal evidence estimates the number of spot transactions and LTCs based on a spot price to be roughly 
50% of global transactions, with China being the leading actor.  
 
Table 44. LTCs versus spot markets 
LTCs  Spot 
Pros  Cons  Pros  Cons 
Lower volatility  Information asymmetry  Price efficiency  Higher volatility 
‘Bankable’  Deep pocket  Market accessibility  Fragmentation 
Source: Author. 
LTCs used to differ among regions (Warell and Lundmark, 2008). Iron ore LTCs for Japanese 
firms  relied  strongly  on  security  of  supply,  stable  prices,  and  a  long-term  relationship  based  on 
mutual cooperation, with infrequent revisions. European LTCs, however, have been more open to a 
market price with more frequent revisions (through a yearly spot contract, referred to as ‘evergreen’). 
In regional areas where internal demand is constantly higher than supply, such as China, and 
industry concentration both on the demand (from the steel industry) and supply side is fairly low, 
spot prices have been emerging and are becoming a benchmark price for international trade. Pricing 
of iron ore LTCs is currently in constant motion to develop new pricing models. These prices are 
usually indexes, such as the Metal Bulletin Iron Ore (MBIO), which is based on a tonnage-weighted 
calculation of actual transactions normalised on iron ore content and freight of 62% iron (in Qingdao, 
China). Transactions from 58% to 66% are also eligible, and data is submitted by all segments of the 
industry – producers, consumers and other traders. Use of the index is limited to a small part of the 
market (mainly in China) and it has sometimes experienced difficulties in ensuring the quality of the 
iron ore delivered to users, but its diffusion worldwide will most likely continue. Other benchmark 
prices that may become global reference prices have been developed. For instance, The Steel Index 
(TSI) iron ore 62% Fe is used as a reference spot price for spot transactions on the Chinese mainland 
and for most swap transactions currently cleared on the Singapore Exchange (SGX). Platts IODEX is 
widely used as a basis for LTC pricing. 
As physical market pricing develops, cash-settled swaps (over-the-counter bilateral transactions 
that are reported and centrally cleared on exchange) and futures markets (exchange-traded futures 
contracts) strive to emerge at global level. As today, the SGX is the top global exchange (followed by 
CME Group and Singapore Metal Exchange) in terms of iron ore swap trading (clearing) volumes. 
Despite losing market share to newcomers, SGX has increased the volume of OTC iron ore swap on its 
platform from 5,000 to 20,000 lots (over 10 megatonnes) in just over a year. 
Figure 90. SGX Iron ore swap monthly volume (bars) and open interest (line) 
 
Source: SGX. 
While SGX and CME Group contracts track the TSI index, SMX refers to the MBIO index. All 
swap and futures contracts are cash-settled, as it is very premature to think about any warehouse 
system for iron ore. However, the market is still in evolution and – despite several initiatives that are 
gradually taking place – there is no global liquid futures market for iron ore yet. SGX, CME Group 
and SMX have launched futures contracts, but it may still be too early to draw any conclusion on their 
degree of development. It is unlikely that a single global price will prevail, as it would not reflect the 
diversity of the world steel market.  132 | RAW MATERIALS AND INDUSTRIAL METALS 
 
Table 45. Key market organisation factors 
Physical market 
setting 
Pricing 
complexity 
Liquidity 
swap/futures market 
Delivery 
points 
Oligopoly  Low  Low  None 
Source: Author. 
Forward  markets  are  estimated  at  165  megatonnes  per  year  (roughly  8.3%  of  total 
production),108 which suggests growing activism to push markets to the next stage of development. 
 
 
   
                                                            
108 ICAP from undisclosed source.  
 
3.2  Aluminium market 
Aluminium  has  become  a  key  commodity  for  sectors  like  construction,  transport,  aliments,  new 
technologies and infrastructures over the years. It is one of the largest industrial metals markets, with 
yearly production valued at around $107 billion in 2011.109 Its widespread use, in car manufacturing 
or the beverages industry for instance, is due to special characteristics.  
Figure 91. Aluminium usage by sector (% of total production) 
 
Source: Alcoa. 
The most important characteristics are low specific gravity (and low relative weight) at normal 
temperature,  the  ability  to  mix  with  other  metals,  resistance  to  corrosion,  and  high  electrical  and 
thermal  conductivity.  Its  use  continues  to  grow  but  at  historically  low  real  prices,  due  to  greater 
industry capacity that has temporarily pushed markets in oversupply (Figure 92). Its diffusion is also 
led by its recyclability and high substitutability with steel or copper.  
Figure 92. Aluminium LME cash real prices, 1960-2012 ($2005/tonne)  
 
Source: World Bank. 
                                                            
109 Aluminium price from World Bank (2011 average price of LME 3-month cash) and data on production from 
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The historical negative relationship between the cash price of aluminium and real interest rates 
(Frankel,  2006)  also  makes  aluminium  tightly  related  to  the  economic  cycle,  a  sign  of  the  key 
fundamental  role  that  this  metal  has  obtained  in  our  economies,  especially  for  transport  and 
construction sectors.   
3.2.1.1  Product and market characteristics: the key potentials of aluminium 
Aluminium  is  produced  from  a  raw  material  called  bauxite,  which  is  transformed  into  a  refined 
material (alumina) and then into primary aluminium. The production of primary aluminium involves 
three stages. The first is the mining of bauxite, which is mainly located in South America, West Africa 
and Australia. The bauxite is mainly extracted with explosives and is then crushed and cleaned from 
impurities.  After  this  first  processing,  bauxite  is  sent  to  alumina  refineries  that  produce  alumina 
through  the  Bayer  process.  This  is  typically  done  close  to  the  mining  area.  The  process  involves 
several  chemicals  and  results  in  alumina  hydrate  crystals  that  are  then  calcinated.  Alternative 
processes (such as the Bayer-Sinter or Nepheline-based processes) typically require more energy and 
produce more residues, but they allow the use of a variety of aluminous materials with additional 
impurities, and residues can be used for some construction materials, such as cement. The final part of 
the process is the smelting of alumina into primary aluminium, which is the final product used across 
sectors in day-by-day life. Smelting takes place in several countries across the world, usually close to 
the area of consumption. Primary aluminium is produced mainly through the Hall-Hérroult process, 
which  requires  the  electrolysis  of  alumina  through  carbon  cathode,  molten  cryolite,  and  a  carbon 
anode that allows the metal to split from other components. Finally, the liquid metal is mixed with 
alloy in large furnaces to complete the production of aluminium. The process produces different types 
of gases, mainly fluoride fumes and hydrocarbons, which require specific treatment for environmental 
protection (Luo and Soria, 2007). 
Figure 93. Primary and secondary aluminium production chain 
 
Source: Author. 
As a consequence of a complex production process, the main costs are: 
  Alumina. 
  Energy. 
  Labour and administration (e.g. licences). 
  Carbon (e.g. cathodes and anodes). 
  Other (e.g. chemicals and spares).  
 
As Figure 94 shows, in addition to the raw materials, additional variable costs now account for 
an average of 46% of production costs. As well as smelting inefficiencies that are a function of scale 
(on a small scale, inefficiencies are negligible), differences among countries (’location factor’) depend 
on the level and variability of input costs and the ability to combine them with flexible production 
processes over time (Blomberg and Jonsson, 2007). A peak of 30% in electricity costs has been reached 
in Europe, which is one of the reasons that production of primary aluminium has been gradually 
moving  towards  Asia  and  the  Gulf  countries,  where  energy  and  labour  costs  are  lower  and  less 
viscous. Smelters in Europe are gradually moving from long-term contracts with energy providers to 
contracts in which prices are linked to a market price, which may increase flexibility in electricity 
provision,  but  also  expose  the  producer  to  risks  that  were  not  necessarily  hedged  in  derivatives 
markets before.  
Figure 94. Main production costs 
 
Source: Alcoa (2011) from CRU International. 
Roughly  45%  of  the  energy  is  lost  during  the  production  process,  on  top  of  the  additional 
energy required (13kWh/Kg), in relation to the theoretical value required by the electrolytic process of 
6.34 kWh/Kg (Luo and Soria, 2007). New technologies have so far been unable to offer a more efficient 
process, but the industry is constantly investing to improve the energy efficiency of the production 
phase.  
Figure 95. Production of aluminium components, 2011 (kt) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from ABREE (2012). Thousands of tonnes (kt). 136 | RAW MATERIALS AND INDUSTRIAL METALS 
 
Production  also  requires  a  large  amount  of  resources  from  the  upstream  (Figure  95).  On 
average, four tonnes of bauxite are needed to produce two tonnes of alumina, from which in turn 
roughly one tonne of primary aluminium can be produced.  
As mentioned above, aluminium can be sourced without losing its original properties (such as 
its light weight and conductivity) through indefinite recycling of old and new scrap. ‘Old scrap’ is the 
old finite product present with high aluminium content (from cars to drinks cans). Aluminium can be 
extracted  from  products  with  high  or  low  aluminium  content,  whether  alloys  or  pure  high-grade 
aluminium.  ‘New  scrap’  is  mainly  residues  of  the  primary  aluminium  production  process  that 
undergo  a  light  refining  process  before  they  can  be  re-used.  Recycling  is  a  key  element  of  the 
aluminium industry with great potential for savings of resources, reducing the need for space, and 
raising  awareness  of  the  environment  (Blomberg  and  Soderholm,  2009).  Recycling  also  allows  for 
significant energy savings because it requires only 5% of the energy needed to produce one tonne of 
primary  aluminium.  The  recent  rise  in  prices  has  further  increased  the  appetite  for  secondary 
aluminium,  which  also  internalises  the  costs  of  extraction  and  of  refining  the  raw  materials. 
Aluminium can also substitute other metals, such as zinc, copper, HR steel and stainless. Aluminium 
has  been  gradually  increasing  the  total  share  of  the  market  and,  indeed,  replacing  some  of  these 
metals in various applications.  
Production 
Global production and consumption have been gradually increasing over time, in particular since 
2001  and  around  the  period  when  emerging  markets  (led  by  Chinese  demand)  emerged  as  fast-
growing global commodities traders. The compound annual growth rate (CAGR) between 2001 and 
2012 reached 5.9%, perhaps a rate never seen before for the same time scale. 2012 production stood at 
over 45 megatonnes, and imbalances (production minus consumption) have historically never reached 
significant levels. Even recently, the constant surplus for the last four years is still low relative to 
global production. If the surplus continues, reinforced by unloading of accumulated reserves, it may 
have a bigger impact on the sustainability of the imbalance that cannot be quantified.  
Figure 96. Aluminium historical production and consumption levels, 1968-2011 (kt) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from ABREE (2012), Economist Intelligence Unit, Angel Research. Note: Thousands 
tonnes (kt).  
 
Production of bauxite and alumina has also reached historical highs with astonishing rates of 
growth, especially for bauxite (Figure 97). 
Figure 97. Historical production by production chain component, 1968-2011 (kt) 
 
Note: Data on secondary aluminium until 2009. 
Source: Author’s elaboration from ABREE (2012). 
It is interesting to note that the production of secondary (recycled) aluminium has declined in 
the last two observations (2008-09), which points to specific conditions in the aluminium recycling 
industry that may not simply depend on demand factors. 
Emerging markets, such as China, are active producers  of primary aluminium at the global 
level. They produce over 75% of primary aluminium (with Chinese production at above 51%, mostly 
used for internal demand; Figure 98). 
Figure 98. 2011 Top ten producers (by country) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from USGS (2012b). 138 | RAW MATERIALS AND INDUSTRIAL METALS 
 
The weight of emerging markets is even greater for the mining and refining of raw materials 
(bauxite  and  alumina),  which  is  mainly  located  in  these  countries.  However,  anecdotal  evidence 
shows  that  bauxite  is  a  very  common  material  that  can  potentially  be  extracted  in  several  world 
regions, which may reduce potential bottlenecks in the mining sector in the future if these arise from 
one or more emerging markets.  
International trade 
The picture changes if we consider the global trade of aluminium, which is mainly concentrated in 
advanced economies, both in terms of exports and imports (Figure 99). China’s 50% share of world 
production is directly used to satisfy internal demand, mainly in the construction and transportation 
sectors.  However,  internal  Chinese  demand  continues  to  grow  at  astonishing  rates  and  China 
imported 35% of global production of bauxite in 2010, mainly from Indonesia (Moss, 2011). In 1970, 
China produced only 1% of global production; the figure was 4.4% in 1990, 11.5% in 2000, 20.2% in 
2003, and 51% in 2011. This growth, which now shows signs of a gradual slowdown, may actually 
change China’s position from being almost independent to become a major net importer. 
Figure 99. 2011 Top ten exporters (left) and importers (right) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from ABREE (2012). kt 
Major exporters are producers that have limited internal demand, such as Russia (with 35% 
market share of total exports by the top ten).110 Imports, on the other hand, are mainly driven by the 
manufacturing and construction industries.  The biggest importers, with  comparable  shares of the 
import market, are the United States, Japan and Germany, where the biggest car manufacturing 
industries  and  construction  companies   also  reside.  Europe  currently  imports  almost  50%  of  
aluminium consumption.111 With only a small amount of net imports,  China has so far not been  an 
active partner  in the global aluminium trade. Additionally, international trade for aluminium has 
increased in absolute terms, but in relative terms has dropped by 10% from 2004 (see Figure 100). 
The drop also reflects the increase of domestic demand in emerging economies that have 
ultimately become producers of primary aluminium to reduce dependence from foreign production. 
                                                            
110 The Netherlands appears among the biggest exporters due to the biggest aluminium warehouse in Europe 
being located in Vlissingen. 
111 Data from Alcoa, undisclosed source.  
 
Figure 100. International trade ($bn) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from ABREE (2012) and World Bank. 
Storage 
Primary aluminium can be safely stored almost indefinitely, which makes the costs of storage a key 
item for saving in the risk management of the commodity and does not strongly impact global trade.  
Figure 101. Freight cost (Panamax voyage rate) as % of FOB bauxite price, 2006-2011 
 
Source: ICAP. 
As shown in Figure 101, at the highest peak of volatility the weight of freight costs were around 
25% of the FOB price, but this only lasted for a short period (on average, the historical cost is around 
10% of the FOB Bauxite price). As with all heavy materials requiring space, freight and transportation 
costs are an important part of the total shipping costs. 140 | RAW MATERIALS AND INDUSTRIAL METALS 
 
Supply characteristics: the marginal costs dilemma 
On  the  supply  side,  big  producing  companies  are  often  horizontally  integrated,  so  they  are  also 
involved  in  mining  other  important  metals  such  as  iron  ore  or  copper  (e.g.  Rio  Tinto).  But  most 
importantly, producers are vertically integrated to reap the benefits of economies of scale and scope. 
Production of primary aluminium is capital intensive because it requires a lot of energy to smelt the 
refined product, on top of high labour and chemicals costs. The cost of alumina is between 35% and 
44% of total operating costs (CRU International, from Alcoa, 2011). As a consequence, producers need 
control  over  marginal  costs  and  the  best  way  to  ensure  some  degree  of  independence  is  vertical 
integration with upstream markets. The ‘putty-clay’ technology used in aluminium production, or 
rather the inability to produce with alternative inputs, does not allow short-run flexibility in input 
prices, increasing the exposure to external factors. For instance, the significant exposure to electricity 
costs in the smelting industry has pushed producers over time to enter into long-term contracts with 
power operators. More market-based solutions have only recently been introduced into the European 
aluminium market, which may reduce costs on average (due to greater competition among power 
companies), but make it difficult to find enough capacity from a single power company and may 
increase  the  need  for  producers  to  access  alternative  markets  (such  as  commodity  derivatives)  to 
manage more volatile prices via hedging instruments. Due to supply fragmentation and the lack of a 
European market for electricity, power companies are increasingly reluctant to engage in long-term 
contracts with energy-intensive industries. The situation may expose the aluminium supply to more 
volatile short-term contracts, which may increase costs if the liberalisation of the European energy 
market does not eventually deliver in terms of a single market and consolidation of the electricity 
industry. 
Figure 102. Top ten aluminium companies by production output, 2011 (kt) 
 
Source: Bloomberg, CRU. 
Market  concentration  is  high  at  the  regional  level,  but  very  limited  and  fragmented  across 
regions if we consider aluminium as a global market. However, primary aluminium is not a seaborne 
market  (production  of  primary  aluminium  is  often  close  to  consumption  areas),  so  regional 
divergences may be important to define the relevant market and to evaluate fragmentation.  
As Figure 101 illustrates, the top ten companies produce around 50% of total global output. 
Despite high concentration at the regional level and a quasi-oligopoly at the global level, a Cournot 
model does not accurately describe the market setting (as it does for iron ore), where firms influence 
prices by setting the production quantity. Due to the less predictable input costs during the refining 
process, capacity and marginal costs are not as predictable as for raw materials (the bauxite market 
may have similar characteristics to that of iron ore and predictable capacity and marginal costs) and 
regional  differences  in  smelting  efficiencies  ensure  that  players  compete  with  each  other  to  some 
extent on input costs (marginal costs). 
More interestingly, despite the low amount of energy required and the current availability of 
scrap,  the  supply  of  recycled  aluminium  shows  low  own-price  elasticity  due  to  the  high  costs  of  
 
collecting scrap. This elasticity was estimated to 0.21 (Blomberg and Soderholm, 2009). The refining 
and re-smelting industries are at the core of this market, as the main parties involved in the recycling 
process. Low elasticity of supply would potentially affect any government policy aimed at providing 
financial support to aluminium production from scrap. Indirect support to reduce costs of collection 
might not be much more effective, as demand also lacks flexibility.  
Demand characteristics: a role for product substitution? 
As  a  consequence  of  the  important  components,  short-term  metal  demand  is  typically  inelastic 
(Geman,  2005),  and  demand  for  aluminium  appears  to  follow  this  trend  even  though  recycled 
products or other metals substitutes (e.g. steel or copper) can effectively substitute aluminium in most 
of its uses.  
Figure 103. Global demand for primary aluminium, 2013 (megatonnes) 
 
Source: Alcoa (2013). 
 
Emerging markets are increasingly leading both demand and supply of aluminium, but Europe, 
the United States and Japan are maintaining their influence due to the size of their car manufacturing 
industries and leading positions in sectors such as defence and aerospace. The progressive extension 
of  aluminium  for  additional  uses,  e.g.  in  innovative  technologies,  transport  and  green  power 
solutions, will put strong pressure on future demand. Interesting qualities have made aluminium an 
indispensable metal for transport (e.g. aircrafts, trains, cars) and buildings (e.g. skyscrapers). 75% of 
all aluminium ever produced is still in use today, giving a strong indication of its crucial role in our 
economies (Bertram et al., 2009; Bruggink and Marthchek, 2004). In 2004, over 2.4 million tonnes112 
were consumed by car manufacturing in Europe, Japan and the United States (roughly 8% of global 
production), and this was only for one type of transport. A global estimate of total aluminium used in 
2011 for car manufacturing, assuming that the global production of cars was around 60 million (not 
including  commercial  vehicles;  data  from  the  International  Organization  of  Motor  Vehicle 
Manufacturers, 2012) and that manufacturers use on average between 140 and 145 kg of aluminium 
per car, which applies to  the United States and Europe (Ducker Automotive studies), would give a 
range of between 8.4 and 8.7 million tonnes per year (between 16.0% and 16.6% of global primary and 
secondary aluminium production113). 
                                                            
112 Author’s elaboration from Luo and Soria (2007). 
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Figure 104. Stock-to-use ratio (%) and net production (kt)* 
 
*Yearly average of LME closing stocks. 
Source: author’s elaboration from WBMS and LME.  
As Figure 104 suggests, net production has an impact on the stock-to-use ratio due to reduced 
or higher consumption adjustments. The low flexibility of supply to adapt to new demand creates 
short-term imbalances and spikes in stocks. Even though the stock-to-use ratio implicitly follows the 
economic cycle (through consumption), inventories of the main trading venue (representing up to 15% 
of  global  production)  are  still  around  10%  of  consumption.  In  relation  to  future  demand  and 
production, it is reasonable to say that both will continue to grow (though perhaps at a lower pace). 
Alcoa forecasts a surge in demand that will almost double its value by 2020 (Figure 105). New 
technologies and growing environmental constraints may increase the use of recycled products to 
support such strong demand. This will especially be the case in countries where consumption is high 
and recycling very low because of inefficient waste management (e.g. China). As long as this demand 
pressure does not materialise, high inventory levels in the medium term may affect the market when 
they are finally released into the system. Looking over a long time period (from the 1980s), real prices 
are still low, which may suggest that an upward price adjustment may be coming, despite the process 
of inventory accumulation. Operating costs, in particular for refining and smelting, are constantly 
growing due to high energy and labour costs. This could potentially produce a cut in available supply 
in some areas and so an additional impact on price. 
  
 
Figure 105. Demand forecast (mnt) 
 
Source: Alcoa (2013). 
Key product and market characteristics 
Demand  and  supply  of  aluminium  are  characterised  by  strong  uncertainties  over  drivers  of 
underlying  fundamentals.  Both  show  elements  of  rigidity  to  price  and  flexibility  to  adapting  to 
growing demand. Key aspects can be summarised as below: 
  The product can be recycled indefinitely but supply is extremely rigid (both for primary and 
secondary aluminium). 
  Aluminium can be used for several purposes and its intrinsic properties (e.g. its light weigh) 
can give it a preferential advantage over substitute materials in specific applications. 
  Supply is typically horizontally and vertically integrated in order to generate economies of scale 
and scope, able to meet the requirements of a high capital-intensive production process. 
  Low degradation allows long periods of storage and so low storage and transportation costs. 
  The market is fairly concentrated at the regional level, but the quasi-oligopolistic setting strives 
to  impose  its  anti-competitive  effects  because  of  the  difficulty  in  predicting  competitors’ 
marginal costs and adjusting quantities accordingly. 
  Emerging markets have acquired a key role, both on the demand and supply side.  
  Future  demand  and  production  adjustments  are  expected  to  be  very  high,  with  a  CAGR 
between 2010 and 2020 of at least 6.5% (Alcoa, 2013). 
Table 46. Key product and market characteristics matrix 
  Recycling/ 
Production 
convertibility 
Substitutes/ 
Horizontal 
integration 
Alternative 
uses/ Vertical 
integration 
Capital 
intensive 
production 
Stora-
bility 
Freight 
costs 
incidence 
Elasticity to 
price/ 
demand 
Concen-
tration 
BRICs 
weight 
Future  
Consumption/ 
Production 
Demand 
side 
High  Medium  High 
High  High  Medium 
Medium 
Medium 
High  High 
Supply 
side 
Low  High  High  Low  High  High 
Source: Author. 
3.2.1.2  Exogenous factors: the weight of the economic cycle 
Exogenous factors also play an important role in the market for aluminium. Government intervention 
is  important  in  sustaining  the  recycling  process  and  new  forms  of  waste  management  to  reduce 
unnecessary costs for the economy and the environment. Climate and energy policies can also have 
major implications for primary aluminium production because of their impact on power costs. Other 144 | RAW MATERIALS AND INDUSTRIAL METALS 
 
forms of intervention tend to limit the export of the commodity, especially in countries where internal 
production  may  not  meet  internal  demand  redirected  to  the  domestic  economy  (e.g.  India). 
Additionally, a great number of bauxite mines are state-owned (Ericsson, 2010). Overall, government 
intervention is currently limited. However, political  instability remains a  key risk factor for those 
materials (in particular, bauxite and alumina) that are produced in emerging markets. 
Table 47. Exogenous factors 
Government intervention  Main other external factors 
Medium 
Economic cycle (e.g. interest rates) 
Political instability 
Source: Author. 
Another key fundamental aspect, particularly for metals due to their key role in our economies, 
is the adjustments caused by the economic cycle and its underlying drivers. As  Figure 106 below 
suggests, aluminium prices have historically been strongly positively related to the economic cycle 
(represented by the OECD Composite Leading Indicator).   
Figure 106. S&P 500 and VIX five-year rolling correlation with LME real cash price (monthly) 
 
Source: Author’s calculation from OECD, Yahoo Finance, and Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE). 
Price  correlation  with  the  volatility  index  (VIX),  which  is  a  measure  of  risk  aversion  and 
alternative measure of the cycle, has been consistently below zero since the middle of 1998, showing a 
stable link between metal prices and the economic cycle. As risk aversion grows, due to the negative 
economic cycle, prices appear to move in the opposite direction. The lag-one data is used for the VIX 
since the speed of adjustments to market shocks is certainly higher for a continuous market price than 
for a general indicator of market volatility.   
Moreover,  price  correlations  converged  to  zero  when  the  financial  crisis  erupted  with  its 
disruptive  effects  for  the  financial  system  in  September  2008.  Aluminium  prices,  instead,  have 
increasingly shown a strong positive correlation with the S&P500 but not with its implied volatility, 
which points to an underlying different driver influencing the economic cycle or the price directly that 
has  caused  two  variables  that  have  previously  shown  no  correlation  (or  a  negative  one)  to  be 
positively correlated since 2002. This factor may be explained better by our earlier analysis on the 
impact  of  monetary  policies  on  financial  indexes  and  non-commercial  positions  in  commodities 
markets. These policies may have led apparently unrelated variables to respond in a similar way to 
adjustments  in  the  economic  cycle  (see  Chapter  1).  This  also  confirms  the  historical  relationship 
between metal prices and interest rates (Frankel, 2006).  
 
3.2.1.3  Empirical analysis: assessing interaction between fundamentals and financialisation 
The dataset used for the empirical analysis includes: 
  Monthly data from 1/1/1994 to 31/12/2011. 
  Front-month  LME  forward  contract  price  (log,  deflated  with  US  PPI,  and  transformed  in 
difference to minimise cointegration issues). 
  LME inventories (log). 
  Dollar  exchange  rate  (log  of  a  price-adjusted  broad  dollar  index  provided  by  the  Fed,  to 
measure the strength of the dollar versus a basket of 26 relevant currencies). 
  US OECD leading composite indicator (log, as explained before). 
Due to the presence of a unit root in the real price time series and volatility clustering suggested 
by the differentiated price series, this analysis uses an autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity 
(ARCH) model and a generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model to 
allow for heteroskedasticity in the residuals. As suggested by Output #20 (summarised in Table 48), 
the analysis confirms the theory (expressed in the descriptive part) that trends in the aluminium price 
are influenced by inventories, exchange rates and, most importantly, by the economic cycle. 
Table 48. Regression output 
Independent variable  Coefficient (t-test) 
LME Inventories 
-0.13*** 
(-3.07) 
Broad dollar index 
-0.73** 
(-2.21) 
US OECD index 
6.63*** 
(4.47) 
Note: ***1%, **5%, *10% significance 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
A Granger causality analysis is performed to ascertain the strong link between inventory levels 
and the futures curve for aluminium. This could confirm the link between inventory accumulation 
and the futures curve, which is the main reason behind huge accumulation in recent years. The test, 
illustrated  in  Output  #21,  shows  that  the  different  bases  between  front-month,  15-  and  27-month 
contracts drive inventory levels. The test also finds a strong causal relationship of the convenience 
yield on inventories, which confirms the theoretical framework of the storage theory (discussed in 
Chapter 1). 
However, this would still not answer the question of what factors are driving spot prices and 
thus the market in a contangoed or backwarded situation. We also explore the level of financialisation 
of  the  commodity,  i.e.  the  link  between  front-month  LME  contract  prices  (‘spot  prices’)  and  key 
financial indicators. These indicators are: M2, S&P 500, and the interbank interest rate published by 
the Fed. A Granger causality test provides interesting results. As suggested by Output #22, all three 
financial indicators influence prices, which show how monetary policies have affected the price of the 
commodity. M2, in particular, also Granger-causes S&P500, but no positive or negative relationship 
could be established (see Output #23). This brings us to the conclusion that expansionary monetary 
policies (through their effect on exchange rates and interest rates) are key drivers for both financial 
indexes  and  commodity  prices.  This  would  also  explain  the  sudden  increase  in  correlation  at  the 
beginning of the 21st century (Figure 106), which corresponded to a decline in the currency in which 
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Figure 107. Dollar Broad Index and interbank interest rates, 1994-2011 (rhs)  
 
Source: Federal Reserve. 
Exchange rates and interest rates as underlying factors linking commodity prices to financial 
assets is also made clear in Output #24. S&P 500 and aluminium prices appear to affect each other (see 
also Output #25), suggesting that there may be one or more common variables that make them move 
in the same direction. The results of regressing spot prices on S&P 500 before and after 2002 (see 
Output  #26)  confirm  previous  analyses,  though.  From  1994  to  the  end  of  2001,  no  link  emerges 
between S&P 500 and spot prices. From 2002 to 2011, however, the relationship changes and becomes 
statistically significant, with a positive sign. The more the financial index grows, the more the LME 
forward cash price moves in the same direction with a coefficient of 0.57. 
3.2.1.4  Market organisation: the impact of financial deals and warehouse rules 
The physical price can be formed through bilateral contracts, but is more frequently formed through 
cash forward contracts, traded on LME. The pricing complexity of the cash contract is fairly low and, 
most  of  the  time,  even  bilateral  transactions  rely  on  the  publicly  available  benchmark  price.  The 
futures (forward) market is fairly liquid and active, and accounts for over 15% of the value of global 
production  (Table  18).  The  standardised  product  characteristics  of  metals  permit  the  quick 
development of trading platforms with futures contracts trading these underlying commodities.  
 
Figure 108. Basis and convenience yield (rhs), Q2 2003-Q1 2012 ($/tonne) 
 
Source: Author’s calculation from LME and the Fed. Note: ‘Basis’ calculated as differential between cash forward 
and the maturities mentioned above. 
The low degradation of the metal, additionally, makes the ‘cheapest-to-deliver’ model the most 
successful (Geman, 2005). As a result, LME has built a system of warehouses over the years spread 
widely across the world (with roughly 740 licensed warehouses), making delivery very cheap. This 
model of delivery dramatically reduces the impact of freight and transportation costs for those using 
these contracts in pure physical transactions. However, recent issues linked to delivery of aluminium 
out  of  specific  warehouses  and  the  sudden  growth  of  stocks  have  raised  questions  about  the 
organisational rules set by the exchange and potential conflicts of interest with important financial 
institutions, which hold majority stakes in two of the largest warehouses in the United States and in 
Europe. Certainly, the underlying trend to accumulate aluminium comes from the drop in demand 
(and the negative economic cycle) and the strong net production surplus during the recent financial 
crisis, due to the inability in the short term to adjust production downwards (see above). A strong 
contango (spot prices much lower than forward prices) and the low interest rates, which keep the 
convenience yield (i.e. the total cost of  holding a commodity) at a very low level and offer great 
opportunities for carry trades,114 lead this underlying trend.  Figure 108 shows how the drop in  the 
convenience yield, caused by a sudden halt in global  demand and zero interest rates, has pushed the 
curve into a prolonged and strong contango, which is driving accumulation of inventories and in-store 
delivery and storage of aluminium . As a result, inventories behind LME aluminium contracts  were 
worth more than 11% of the yearly global production in 2011. 
While the absolute number may be still considered in a reasonable range (but not so common 
for industrial metals), the growth of cancelled warrants, i.e. metal that is requested for delivery, 
signals real p roblems in loading out aluminium from warehouses. In fact, t he  sheer  increase in 
inventories, as showed in  Figure  109,  and the recent spike in cancelled warrants in at least two 
locations (Detroit for the United States and Vlissingen for the European Union)  may also  tell us an 
additional story. 
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Figure 109. LME inventories and cancelled warrants (rhs) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from Alcoa and LME Sword. 
When  interest  rates  reached  almost  zero  across  the  advanced  economies  in  2007-08,  the 
opportunity for a big carry trade emerged. Historically low aluminium prices, due to the financial 
crisis, have also made it easy to exploit a stable contango in the futures/forward curve. Accumulation 
has  occurred  due  to  inventories  being  maintained  in  LME  warehouses,  financed  by  financial 
institutions at very low interest rates, in order to resell when demand picks up again (with the end of 
the  oversupply  that  increased  with  the  economic  crisis).  This  carry  trade  has  allowed  an 
unprecedented amount of aluminium stocks to flow into LME warehouses, especially in 2009 (Figure 
110). 
Figure 110. Aluminium flows in LME warehouses 
 
Source: LME Sword. 
Accumulating aluminium in LME warehouses was a rather smooth process, but the unloading 
process has caused several issues. Despite the recognised of the LME warrants system (see Box 3),  
 
aluminium is currently stuck in long queues at delivery, specifically in the two locations mentioned 
above. The delivery bottleneck is represented by cancelled warrants,115 which were almost none when 
the accumulation of inventories began in 2008 (Figure 109). Delivery requests in specific consumption 
areas, such as Detroit in the United States and Vlissingen in the  Netherlands, have waiting time of 
respectively 355 and 272 days on average (CRU, 2013) and there is no sign that this trend can be soon 
reversed, especially if demand will pick up again in the future months.  
The reasons of this delivery cut are at least twofold. First, since users pay for the storage even if 
the metal is put in a queue to be loaded out,  warehouses have  incentives  only  to increase  metal 
accumulation (load-in) and so to reduce their load-out rate to the minimum level set by the exchange. 
Second, the rules set by LME for sponsored warehouses allowed a very low daily delivery rate. Before 
April 2012, the delivery rate was based on the size of the warehouses, i.e. 1,500 tonnes for warehouses 
with space of 7,500 m 2 or more (roughly all warehouses, Europe Economics 2011), 1,200 tonnes for 
5,000 m2, and 800 tonnes for 2,500 m2. This system created the incentive to accumulate supply in one 
place, slowing down the delivery of the commodity (due to the low delivery out rate) and increasing 
the storage time for users. Specific warehouses located close to consumption areas have been stocked 
with massive quantities of aluminium over time. Detroit and Vlissingen, which also represent the 
closest points to the two of the biggest car manufacturing areas and general aluminium consumption 
areas in the world, stored over 1 million tonnes of aluminium each in September 2012, and also had 
the highest number of cancelled warrants. This problem in the system may have also contributed to 
keeping  aluminium  prices  above  the  level  that  a  four-year  surplus  in  net  production  might  have 
pushed them. 
As a result of strong pressures from users and after the conclusions of a study commissioned by 
the LME itself (Europe Economics, 2011), the LME’s Board decided to increase the minimum delivery 
out rate. A new system, implemented in April 2012, calculates the minimum loading-out rate on the 
overall amount of metal stored in the warehouse rather than the size in m2 of the warehouse (as for the 
old system).  
Table 49. Minimum delivery out of LME warehouses 
Warehouse company’s tonnage stored per location  Minimum delivery out 
Up to 300,000 tonnes  1,500 tonnes 
300,000 to 600,000 tonnes  2,000 tonnes 
600,000 to 900,000 tonnes  2,500 tonnes 
More than 900,000 tonnes  3,000 tonnes 
Source: LME (2011). 
Irrespective  of  whether  the  chosen  level  for  the  delivery  out  rate  is  sufficiently  high,  and 
notwithstanding the fact that these LME rules need to give incentives to warehouses to stay in the 
network, which is the core aspect of the LME business model, the system may still give incentives to 
warehouses to concentrate stocks in one place, because above a certain threshold of tonnage stored 
(900,000 tonnes) the minimum delivery out rate freezes. A system based on a minimum percentage of 
the total metal in storage (without thresholds) has been ruled out on the claim that it would increase 
operational costs for warehouses at an unsustainable level. Europe Economics estimated these costs at 
a minimum of $255 million for 2010 for a warehouse with 1 million tonnes and a minimum delivery 
rate of 50,000 tonnes. While it cannot be challenged that these extra operational costs are high, the 
solution applied by the exchange assumes that warehouses are unable to set their own capacity (in 
                                                            
115 Metal that is requested for delivery. In particular, holder that has metal on warrant decides to ship the metal 
out and notifies the warehouse holding warrant of the desire to cancel. The warehouse requires payment of out 
charges for loading before cancelling the warrant. It then gives the holder of cancelled warrant notice of when the 
shipment can be made. At this point, a book-keeping entry is made in LME stocks moving from ‘on warrant’ to 
‘cancelled warrant’ but is still reported in total stocks. Rent continues to accrue on the cancelled warrant until it 
shipment date arrives. The holder of cancelled warrant must pay all accrued rent before metal is shipped. Once 
shipped, total cancelled warrants reported by LME are lowered by the amount shipped and total stock declines 
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competition)  as  a  function  of  a  minimum  delivery  rate  calculated  as  a  percentage  of  their  total 
capacity. As rental fees are applied also on metal units waiting to be delivered, this model creates the 
incentive for the warehouses’ owners not to deliver no more units than the minimum quantity set by 
LME rules, which indirectly become a maximum delivery rate, in order to extract higher fees from 
aluminium users. Nonetheless, the rules of the exchange have to balance the right of the users to get 
delivery as soon as possible, and the incentives for the warehouses to be part of the LME network or 
otherwise compete freely among each other, which may not ensure the current capillarity of the LME 
warehousing network.  
Additionally, the delivery rules set by the exchange will be now subject to periodic review 
(every  six  months)  by  a  Committee  that  should  fall  under  the  UK  Financial  Conduct  Authority’s 
supervision. However, the process shall be complemented by a conflicts of interest policy in relation 
to the final decision eventually approved by the Board. In fact, the owners of important warehouses in 
main  consumption  areas  (such  as  in  Detroit  and  Vlissingen)116  are  mainly  important  financial 
institutions and commodities trading houses that also run a legitimate business of financing users to 
store aluminium in their warehouses, but most importantly had altogether a significant shareholding 
in LME (but with no official majority within the Board) 117 before the recent merger with the Hong 
Kong Exchange, in which some of them keep an interest but diluted in its quasi-dispersed ownership.  
Figure 111. Regional premia over LME cash, 2008-2012 ($/tonne) 
 
Source: Alcoa from month-end pricing – Platts Metals Week and Metal Bulletin. 
As a consequence of the delivery issue caused by the joint effect of cash-and-carry trades and 
LME delivery rules, regional premia over the LME aluminium cash price in the physical market, have 
soared  to  unprecedented  levels,  partially  compensating  the  drop  in  the  nominal  price  due  to  the 
period of oversupply (Figure 111). As premia are strongly influenced by the costs of the alternative 
way to source aluminium (LME cash forward), regional premia have partially followed the increase in 
cost of storage in main regional locations, which have soared due to the long queues to get metal out. 
Regional premia are now more than 15% of the nominal cash price.118  
                                                            
116 In particular, warehouses in Detroit are owned by Metro Group (owned by Goldman Sachs) and Henry Bath 
(owned by JP Morgan), while those in Vlissingen are owned by Pacorini (owned by Glencore) and Metro Group.  
117 58 shareholders, including financial institutions, with single shareholdings below 11%. 
118  The cost of storage for additional 355 days of storage is roughly $160/tonne ($45 cent per day; tariff in 
Vlissingen and Detroit in March 2013), which corresponds to an addition al cost of roughly $160 million only in 
the US (with 1 million tonnes of cancelled warrant). Cost of storage is roughly 50% of the cost that is indirectly 
  
 
Figure 112. US premium and cancelled warrant in North America, 1999-2012 
 
Source: CRU (2013) 
On top of the negative effects of a delivery system that does not reflect the characteristics of the 
underlying physical market, this situation could ultimately end up affecting the price formation of 
LME aluminium cash contract as a global benchmark price, so restricting users’ access to an important 
hedging tool and finally increasing the cost of the commodity for final users.  119 Moreover, a well 
functioning  delivery  system  provides  an  efficient  tool  to  support  supply  adjustments  when 
disequilibrium in the physical market between demand and supply emerges. 
More generally, when a system of physical delivery is put in jeopardy, either by external factors 
or internal policies, this situation may produce disruptive effects on the price formation of all cash and 
futures (forward) contracts in relation to their convergence with physical spot prices, even for those 
contracts  that  are  typically  cash-settled.  Convergence  is  the  only  element  of  the  non-arbitrage 
condition that has made futures contracts so important for commodities hedging. Therefore, some 
commodities firms may be unable to hedge on the futures market due to the uncertainty around the 
final price of the commodity caused by physical delivery problems. Spot prices, therefore, may have 
only started to price the information of a badly functioning cash and forward market, so increasing 
volatility and pushing premia away from a pure result of supply and demand interaction. In addition, 
the overreliance on the price formation of regional premia can deteriorate the value of the benchmark 
and so its liquidity, which may ultimately replace a transparent setting offered by the liquid cash 
forward market with a more opaque price formation mechanism based on assessed regional premia. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
discounted into regional premia, on top of other loading out charges and indirect costs for not being able to get 
delivery when requested. 
119  The London Metal Exchange has announced, on July 1st, 2013, the intention to change the minimum loading 
out  rate  for  its  warehouses  under  strong  pressures  from  users.  The  consultation,  available  at 
http://www.lme.com/news-and-events/press-releases/press-releases/2013/07/lme-consults-on-changes-to-
warehouse-policy-to-cut-queues/, proposes to increase the minimum loading out rate for warehouses with more 
than 100 days queues, by imposing an additional tonnage to the amount of metals loaded in (1,500 tonnes more 
than what has been loaded in for warehouses, that under 2012 rules, deliver out a minimum of 3,000 tonnes). If 
load-in rate is higher than minimum load-out rate, the warehouses are obliged to deliver out the excess. Rates will 
be calculated on a 3-months basis. Once implemented, the rules shall gradually reduce queues in main location, 
but it is not quantifiable the amount of time needed to bring queues below 100 days. 152 | RAW MATERIALS AND INDUSTRIAL METALS 
 
Table 50. Key market organisation factors 
Physical market setting  Pricing complexity  Liquidity futures market  Delivery points 
Oligopolistic  Low  High  High 
Source: Author. 
The overall market organisation is based on an open oligopolistic setting in the physical market 
for supply with low complexity in the pricing system, which relies heavily on a cash forward market 
run by LME. Liquidity in futures markets is high and the exchange model allows delivery in several 
regions across the globe.     
 
3.3  Copper market 
Copper is a key commodity in several sectors of advanced and developing economies, from transport 
to new technologies (such as electronic devices) and monetary systems (see Figure 113). The yearly 
production  value  can  be  estimated  at  around  $  161  billion.120  It  is  used  in  car  manufacturing, 
construction materials, plumbing, and many other sector s  of the manufacturing industry.   Copper 
improves energy efficiency, in particular in the distribution system.  The production of copper from 
scrap does not affect its properties such that secondary copper typically cannot be distinguished from 
the primary one. Competition between materials also ensures that resources are depleted in a more 
efficient and sustainable way.  
Figure 113. Refined copper usage by sector 
 
Source: Raw Materials Group. 
Over  the  years,  copper  has  gained  a  more  important  role  in  ensuring  high-energy  efficient 
standards in the design of motors and devices for industrial use. Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
between 70-80% of the copper ever produced is still in circulation (similar to aluminium). In the last 
decade, despite its intrinsic cost, copper consumption has gone well beyond historical peaks as its use 
has become widespread. At the same time, however, this situation has exposed the commodity to the 
economic cycle. As a result, the copper price has swung significantly in the last decade, dropping to 
around $3,000/tonne in 2008 and then climbing up to more than $10,000 at the beginning of 2011. 
Copper is frequently analysed as an important measure of the state of the global economy. 
Figure 114. LME copper real cash price (left) and 20-day rolling annualised volatility (right) 
   
Source: Author’s calculation from LME and World Bank (MUVI). 
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The market has developed a more stable pattern recently as the economic cycle has stabilised, 
even though demand remains weak and is mainly reliant on Chinese growth. The demand trend has 
expanded by many times in the last decades, however, thanks to the development of new electronic 
mechanisms and new construction techniques. 
3.3.1.1  Product and market characteristics: a quasi-precious metal? 
Copper is in the same group of the periodic table as silver and gold (Group 11), typically produced as 
a semi-final product with  unique characteristics. On the one hand, copper and its alloys (such as 
bronze, an alloy made mainly of copper and tin) are resistant to corrosion both in the open air and 
seawater. Its application in outdoor architectural components is widespread, as well as for plumbing 
supplies and seawater industrial plants. On the other hand, copper is a very malleable metal with the 
highest  rate  in  nature  of  both  electrical  and  thermal  conductivity.  Its  easy  formability,  resistance, 
easily  identifiable  colour  and  intrinsic  value,  and  its  difficulty  to  counterfeit,  make  it  a  suitable 
material for the creation of money (i.e. coins). Its use is therefore widespread across monetary systems 
around the globe and in electricity networks. Finally, copper has a unique antimicrobial attribute that 
makes this metal a component of almost any organism on earth (Michels, 2006; CDA, 2010). Used in a 
balanced way and combined in alloys with other natural components, copper can be beneficial to 
human health. This use of copper is still developing, as scientific studies discover new important 
properties  and  combinations  of  the  metal.  All  of  these  important  properties  have  made  copper  a 
successful commodity since it was discovered more than 4,500 years ago, during the Bronze Age. 
Production process 
The production process is capital intensive and requires high-energy consumption. The main costs of 
production  are  energy,  labour,  administration  (e.g.  licenses),  transportation  from  remote  locations 
(ores have an average copper content of 1%), and solvents. Additionally, copper production depends 
on  the  price  of  copper  itself  and  prices  of  closer  substitutes,  such  as  aluminium.  The  process  to 
transform ores into refined products, ready to be used in multiple industrial sectors, involves four 
stages (Figure 115).  
Figure 115. The copper production process 
 
Source: Author. 
First, copper ores are mined and crushed in open pits, often in very remote locations. Then, 
crushed ores are subject to a milling process typically done close to the mine by the same operator,  
 
since crushed ores contain only 1% or less copper. The cost of transport for sale of non-milled copper 
ore with such a low copper content would be prohibitive. As a consequence, mining companies are 
typically integrated with milling activities. Once ores are extracted, there are two potential milling 
processes to transform them in products with a higher copper concentration. The most widely used is 
the flotation process for copper sulphides (e.g. chalcopyrite or chalcocite), which consists of a process 
of separation from most of the sulphides through flotation and the addition of anionic collectors such 
as xanthates. Flotation of copper oxides (such as azurite) is still under development and does not give 
good production results. Therefore, a second production process has been developed over the years – 
‘leaching’. An alternative to the smelting process, this is a hydrometallurgical process that allows the 
extraction of copper from different types of ores (mainly oxidised due to exposure to air or to chemical 
substances, such as mines dumps) by immerging the product in sulphuric acid. The process, which 
increases the efficiency of copper production as it allows ores with high levels of impurities to be 
treated, is split into two types of treatment. First, the electrowinning process allows the extraction of 
copper through the immersion of an inert anode and a cathode in a solution with acid, so that copper 
is deposited on the cathode when electricity is channelled in the solution and the anode melts. This 
process can produce cathodes that do not need smelting and so can be sent directly to wire mills. A 
second  leaching  process  is  the  precipitation  of  copper  with  special  solutions,  typically  hydrogen 
sulphide. The copper cement is then sent to furnaces for smelting. Both leaching processes are referred 
to as SX-EW, which today represents roughly 15-16% of total refined copper production (Figure 116).  
Figure 116. Copper production outputs 
 
Source: Crowson (2011) from Raw Materials Group. 
As  for  other  metals  production,  these  first  two  steps  of  production  may  have  a  strong 
environmental  impact  because  they  produce  high  levels  of  gases  or  chemical  residues  that  need 
specific and costly treatment, on top of the significant amount of water wasted in the process. 
After mining and milling, if ores are not treated through SW-EX, copper concentrates (with 
roughly 28% of copper content) reach the smelting process, in which they are processed into furnaces 
at high temperatures together with other substances (typically silica dioxide and coke). The resulting 
matte  and  slag  is  processed  by  blowing  air  in  the  molten  matte  to  remove  sulphur  dioxide  and 
removing acids to increase the purity of the product to 98% with the production of blisters. Blistered 
copper is put in anode furnaces to remove oxygen by blowing natural gas into it to produce a 99% 
copper product. The final step of production is refining through electrolysis; the product with the 
highest copper content is immerged into a solution with anodes and cathodes. Copper migrates to the 
cathodes and produces pure copper products that are then shaped into the most suitable forms for 
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Production and consumption 
As Figure 117 shows, mining of copper ores (and the first transformation of ores into concentrates) is 
concentrated in key regional areas, such as South America, South-East Asia, and Oceania. Chile is the 
leading producer, with over 34% of total global copper ore production. 
Figure 117. Geographical location of copper production processes and mine production (kt) 
   
Note: 2010 data. 
Source: Crowson (2011) and author from Raw Materials Group Database and Raw Materials Group, Stockholm.  
The final refining process is mostly done close to consumption areas, with greater geographical 
concentration in fast-growing manufacturing economies and metal-producing countries. As a result, 
China has overtaken Chile as the leading smelting and refining area in the world (Figure 118). 
Figure 118. Geographical location of refined copper production (kt)   
   
Source: Author’s elaboration from International Copper Study Group (ICSG). 
As for other key industrial metals, the production of copper has grown at astonishing rates over 
the  years,  following  the  expansion  of  the  global  economy  and  the  emergence  of  new  developing 
markets (Figure 119). In 2011, copper production reached almost 20 megatonnes.  
 
Figure 119. Refined copper and ores production, 1970-2011 (kt) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from ICSG. 
Ore production, however, stabilised and slightly decreased in 2011 due to exposure to different 
factors.  Among  these  factors,  lack  of  water  to  process  ores,  climatic  changes,  input  costs,  long 
procedures  to  get  permits  and  a  general  reduction  of  copper  grades  into  ores  (Figure  120)  have 
amplified the impact of volatile patterns and sluggish demand, and showed how long term factors 
affect ore production. This has also led key global mining firms to present new plans of investment 
($4.58 billion) in the world biggest mine (Escondida, Chile), where production fell by 25% in 2011 due 
to lower copper grades121. 
Figure 120. Copper grade in ores 
 
Source: Rio Tinto (2012). 
Copper  has  a  high  degree  of  substitutability  in  some  areas,  such  as  components  for  car 
manufacturing, with aluminium. As Figure 121 shows, copper and aluminium prices are consistently 
positively correlated, with significant positive peaks of up to more than 90%.  
                                                            
121  BHP  Billiton  and  Rio  Tinto  are  leading  investors  in  this  project,  with  respectively  $2.6  and  $1.4  billion 
investments,  as  owners  of  57.5%  and  30%  of  the  mine.  See  press  releases  available  at 
http://www.riotinto.com/media/18435_media_releases_21641.asp  and 
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Figure 121. Rolling 250-day correlation with aluminium LME cash price, 1989-2011 
 
Source: Author’s calculation from LME. 
Copper is also 100% recyclable, both from high-grade and low-grade scrap. As for aluminium, 
scrap from both copper manufacturing and from used products is suitable for new refined copper. 
Production with scrap reduces input and environmental costs, as well as energy consumption. If it is 
not in a pure state, however, collecting old copper scrap may be expensive. As a consequence, in the 
United States, for instance, only 15% of recycled copper came from old scrap in 2010 (CDA, 2012). 
Overall secondary refined copper production suffered a significant drop in recent years, from which it 
only  recovered  in  2010-11  (Figure  119).  While  production  of  refined  copper  continues  to  drop  in 
western economies, China is increasing its scrap use so much that, as efficiency in the production 
process improves, global production of refined copper has soared since 2003, to up to 19% of global 
production in 2011 (Figure 122). 
Figure 122. Secondary copper production by regional areas, 1970-2010 (kt, %) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from ICSG.  
 
As production of refined secondary copper continues to decline in America and Europe, Asia 
(led  by  China)  has  taken  over  its  production,  bringing  down  costs  of  sourcing  the  commodity. 
Roughly 65% of total secondary copper production is in Asia, which also reflects the role achieved by 
China as a leading actor in the global economy. 
Due to its widespread industrial use in the economy, copper is also typically considered as a 
measure of the state of the global economy. Net production reacts to changes in industrial production 
with surplus/deficit, such as in 2008 and 2009 with a surplus led by the economic crisis, but levels are 
still  small  vis-à-vis  total  production.  Consumption  has  been  increasing  in  developing  countries, 
neutralising the effects of the on-going crisis affecting more advanced economies. 
Figure 123. Copper production and consumption, 1992-2012 (kt) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from LME and ICSG. 
Copper concentrates are also traded in the global seaborne market, where Chile is a leading 
exporter and China is the biggest net importer, together with Japan (Figure 124). 
Figure 124. Copper concentrates major exporters (left) and importers (right), 2010 (kt) 
 
Source: Adapted from World Metal Statistics October 2011, World Bureau of Metal Statistics in Crowson (2011). 160 | RAW MATERIALS AND INDUSTRIAL METALS 
 
China’s high dependence on copper concentrates imported from abroad is one of the reason the 
country has been expanding production from copper scrap to meet sustained demand and for exports 
of final products with high copper content (e.g. electronic devices). 
International trade 
Exports and imports of refined copper in international markets also reflect the importance of China, 
which is importing refined copper as much as the Chilean production. Countries, like Japan, import 
copper concentrates for refined copper production to satisfy not only domestic consumption but also 
demand in international markets (see Figure 125). 
Figure 125. Top 10 exporters (left) and importers (right), 2011 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from 2012 WBMS Yearbook. 
Some  other  countries,  like  Brazil  and  US,  are  net  exporter  of  copper  concentrates  but  net 
importer  of  refined  copper,  which  suggests  a  less  developed  domestic  production.  Overall, 
international trade is roughly 42% of global production (see Figure 126).  
Figure 126. International trade ($bn) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from ICSG, 2012 WBMS Yearbook, World Bank Commodities Database.  
 
While  exports  levels  have  slightly  increased  from  2007,  in  relative  terms,  the  size  of 
international trade over production has dropped by more than 5% with the deepening of the economic 
crisis  in  advanced  economies.  It  also  reflects  the  underlying  growth  of  domestic  production  in 
emerging markets, such China, Taiwan and South Korea, which have invested in supporting their 
domestic industry for refined copper. 
Supply characteristics: towards more concentration? 
As  for  other  industrial  metals,  production  of  copper  is  capital-intensive  and  this  makes  supply 
respond  slowly  to  demand  changes.  If  demand  is  weak  and  the  imbalance  between  supply  and 
demand is moderately low, production continues. The costs of stopping production would be higher 
than those of producing and accumulating reserves to be sold when demand picks up. Copper can be 
stored for long periods with limited degradation or oxidation. From its start, a mine needs 10 to 15 
years to develop, which reduces incentives to invest in exploration rather than in expanding current 
infrastructures. Production of refined copper products requires high initial sunk and fixed operating 
costs.  The  production  of  copper  consists  of  a  series  of  physical,  chemical  and  electrochemical 
processes. A high amount of capital is required due to costs of energy, labour, and chemicals (with 
water)  needed  to  produce  refined  copper  respectively  through  pyrometallurgy  (furnaces)  and 
hydrometallurgy (solvent extraction and electro-winning). 
With some exceptions (such as Japanese firms), most mining companies are also involved in 
smelting and refining copper ores into final product (Figure 127). The level of vertical and horizontal 
integration is high, as several companies are involved in mining and refining similar metals.  
Figure 127. Copper market concentration, 2010 (kt) 
   
Source: Raw Materials Group. 
For now, strong market concentration is limited to regional areas, especially in mining copper 
ores. On the  global scale,  concentration  on the supply side  in international  trades is  growing. As 
markets become even more global, the need for greater economies of scale has increased concentration 
even further. The potential merger of Glencore and Xstrata would create the second largest player in 
the copper industry, with more than 1.2 megatonnes of refined copper produced each year. In 2010, 
the top ten copper companies had gained roughly 60% of the market share, while the top three had 
30% and the largest, 11% (Ericsson, 2010). It is important to define the relevant markets, and the 
seaborne market may be considered developed enough to be defined as ‘global’. 
Demand characteristics: overreliance on China? 
Demand for copper typically derives from industrial products, which is why copper can be used as a 
tool to measure the pulse of the economy and its key sectors. Demand elasticity to price depends on 
the sector. For copper-intensive transport sectors or new technologies industries, price elasticity is 
considered to be very low. Higher elasticity may be found for thermal uses. During the crisis, net 
production has created a surplus of supply, as demand is still weak. However, surplus is lower than 
before the crisis and may move into negative territory again (Figure 129). As a result, there is heavy 162 | RAW MATERIALS AND INDUSTRIAL METALS 
 
reliance in the market on growth developments in China, which will be driving demand of copper 
even more in the coming years (Figure 128).  
Figure 128. Refined copper and GDP per capita (left) and demand forecasts (right) 
   
Source: Rio Tinto (2012). 
Supply and demand fundamentals show signs that the market is trying to find a more long-
term  balance  and  organisation.  Contradictory  market  trends  give  mixed  feelings  about  the  future 
demand and supply patterns. On the one hand, China  will not be able to drive demand through 
growth  forever,  and  its  greater  reliance  on  scrap  refining  is  a  sign  that  the  country  is  seeking 
independence. On the other hand, the lack of incentives on the supply side has delayed investments in 
new sites and exploration rather than in existing mines, and the widespread reduction of copper grade 
in ores may cause a further cut of copper concentrates supply and instability in the medium term.  
Key product and market characteristics 
Product and market characteristics for copper are not too different from other industrial metals, and 
the market can be summarised as having the following: 
  Limited production convertibility but high substitutability and recyclability of the final product. 
  Unresponsive supply to demand changes but strongly vertically and horizontally integrated 
industry  (to  reap  benefits  of  economies  of  scale  and  scope  to  outweigh  a  capital-intensive 
production). 
  Low degradation, which increases storability. 
  Reasonable freight costs, as refined copper industry is located close to consumption areas. 
  Partial demand elasticity to price, depending on the industrial use. 
  High weight of emerging markets, both on the demand and supply side. 
  High future demand forecasts and supply forecasts, depending on the level of constraints that 
supply may experience in the extraction of the raw material. 
Table 51. Product and market characteristics matrix 
 
Recycling/ 
Production 
convertibility 
Substitutes/ 
Horizontal 
integration 
Alternative 
uses/ 
Vertical 
integration 
Capital 
intensive 
production 
Stora-
bility 
Freight 
costs 
incidence 
Elasticity 
to price/ 
demand 
Concen-
tration 
BRICs 
weight 
Future 
Consumption/ 
Production 
Demand 
side 
High  Medium  High 
High  High  Medium 
Medium 
Medium 
High  High 
Supply 
side 
Low  High  High  Low  High  Medium 
Source: Author. 
3.3.1.2  Exogenous factors: economic cycle and political instability 
Being an indispensable metal for key sectors of the economy, copper is usually subject to some level of 
control  from  governments  across  the  globe.  As  nationalism  remains  an  unpredictable  factor 
discouraging private sector development and incentives to invest in the long term in many countries, 
state control in most countries consists of tariffs to increase or reduce incentives to export (as in the 
case of China who is in continuous search of additional supply).   
 
Political instability and government intervention are not the only exogenous factors. Climate 
change may affect extraction of copper ores in harsh locations. For instance, mining and milling close 
to the open pits requires the abundant availability of water.  
Table 52. Key exogenous factors 
Government intervention  Main other external factors 
Medium  Economic crisis, climatic changes, political instability 
Source: Author. 
Finally,  refined  copper  production  is  directly  affected  by  the  economic  cycle  and  industrial 
production, which is still balanced overall at the global level. 
Figure 129. Net production, stocks and real prices (kt, $/tonne) 
 
Source: Author from LME and World Bank (MUVI deflator). 
As Figure 129 suggests, stocks of copper react to changes in supply and demand interaction (net 
production). Prices reflect both stock levels and historical levels of net production, which have been 
smoothed by China’s entry as a global trade partner. 
3.3.1.3  Empirical analysis: a solid price formation mechanism 
For the empirical analysis the following set of data has been used: 
  Monthly data from 30/06/1992 to 31/12/2011. 
  Log of LME front-month price (‘spot price’) differentiated and deflated using US PPI published 
by the Fed. 
  Log of LME copper inventories. 
  Log of price-adjusted broad dollar index provided by the Fed. 
  Log of OECD Composite Leading indicator (trend restored) for China. 
  Log of OECD composite leading indicator (trend restored) for the OECD countries. 
Due to the presence of unit root in the series of real prices and volatility clustering emerging 
from the differentiated price series, an ARCH(1) model appears to fit best the characteristics of the 
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As suggested in Output #27, the empirical analysis seems to confirm fundamentals as drivers of 
price formation. In particular, Table 53 shows that inventories have an inverse relationship with price, 
as  a  result  of  the  interaction  between  demand  and  supply.  Demand  indicators  (both  for  OECD 
countries  and  China)  have  a  strong  positive  relationship  with  price,  confirming  the  strong  link 
between market trends in copper and the global and regional economic cycle. 
Table 53. Regression outputs 
Independent variable  Coefficient (t-test) 
LME Inventories 
-0.12*** 
(-4.6) 
Broad dollar index 
-1.02*** 
(-2.98) 
China OECD Index 
2.43** 
(1.94) 
OECD index 
9.07*** 
(4.44) 
Note: ***1%, **5%, *10% significance. 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
In addition, the model finds a negative relationship between the exchange rate and cash prices, 
as  indicator  of  the  impact  of  currency  devaluation/revaluation  on  the  price  of  the  commodity  in 
global markets. 
With  the  same  dataset,  a  Granger  causality  analysis  assesses  the  relationship  with  financial 
indexes, as emerged clearly from the previous analysis run for aluminium. Also in this case, the model 
seeks  to  find  a  relationship  among  the  LME  front  month  copper  contract  price  and  the  log  of: 
monetary base (M2), S&P500, and interbank interest rate (FedFund). As illustrated by Output #28, the 
model finds a relationship again with M2, but none with S&P500 and FedFund. This result may point 
to the low degree of financialisation as the futures curve strives to move in contango, even with a low 
convenience yield, perhaps due to solid pressures on the demand side that keeps financial deals away. 
However, when splitting the two periods 1994-2001 and 2002-2011, results are in line with previous 
analyses  on  financialisation.  As  suggested  by  Output  #30,  no  relationship  emerges  between  spot 
prices and the financial index between 1994 and 2001. However, a relationship with a positive sign is 
found during the following period (2002-2011). The analysis, therefore, confirms what has been found 
already for other commodities markets (such as oil and aluminium), and in broader empirical analysis 
run in the first chapter. 
By using a different dataset of daily data from 01/04/2003 to 31/12/2011, the Granger causality 
test  shows  a  statistically  insignificant  relationship  between  inventories  and  convenience  yield 
(calculated, as described in Chapter 1, by using an average annual cost of storage provided by LME 
and  the  daily  3-month  Fed  discount  rate).  Even  though  the  test  does  not  reveal  a  direct  causal 
relationship between convenience yield (as a driver) and inventories, the convenience yield (which 
can be seen as the incentive to pile up inventories) seems to drive volatility, in particular with the first 
and second lag (Output #29). Due to the characteristics of the data, it was not possible to find another 
model that could establish the sign of the relationship between the convenience yield and volatility. 
3.3.1.4  Market organisation: a mature market infrastructure 
Like the aluminium market, the physical copper market relies on bilateral contracts and on a forward 
cash contract for spot pricing of the commodity. Even in this case, the high degree of storability has 
favoured the ‘cheapest-to-deliver’ LME model, which is the global benchmark for copper. However, 
despite cheap credit in this sector, no massive stock accumulation with financing operations has been 
pursued by market operators, since prices are not at historical lows (as with aluminium) with less 
prominent contango  of spot-futures price curves. As explained in  Section 1.2.4, convenience  yield 
drives  accumulation  of  stocks  by  pushing  the  futures-spot  curve  in  contango/backwardation  by 
increasing/decreasing the incentives to hold the commodity. As Figure 130 suggests, in recent years  
 
copper has not been in a prolonged contango period as for aluminium. The basis has only very briefly 
become negative, as convenience yield was positive most of the time.  
Figure 130. Basis and convenience yield (rhs) 
 
Source:  Author’s  elaboration  from  LME  and  the  Fed.  Note:  ‘Basis’  calculated  as  the  difference  between  cash 
forward and the maturities mentioned above. 
As the convenience yield grows, the basis becomes negative so the curve is in backwardation. 
When the convenience yield remains around zero, the curve typically moves into contango, or close to 
it. The crisis has caused a drop in the convenience yield (with low interest rates and drop in global 
demand), but the curve has not radically switched into contango (as with aluminium), as the demand 
for the commodity seems to be resilient enough. Should demand of copper consistently drop and the 
convenience yield remains close to zero, the curve may switch in strong contango and conditions for a 
carry trade (as for aluminium) may ultimately emerge. If then the market does not fall in oversupply, 
the market  may not follow the same path. However, there are signs that the market is gradually 
moving in oversupply and demand is slowing down, which is pushing cash forward price down and 
may ultimately drag the market in strong contango if demand does not pick up. LME inventories, 
meanwhile, have more than doubled from roughly 300,000 tonnes in December 2012 to 650,000 tonnes 
in June 2013 and have reached a peak on a five years time scale. 
Pricing complexity is typically very low, even if the calculation of regional premia and freight 
costs  (typically  by  specialised  reporting  agencies)  may  add  complexity  in  reflecting  relevant 
characteristics. Copper producers and users can enter into hedging strategies through an active and 
liquid futures market on LME or CME. LME warehouses are spread across the world, which makes 
delivery very cheap, reducing the impact of freight and transportation costs for those using these 
contracts for physical transactions. 
Table 54. Copper markets organisation 
Physical market setting  Pricing complexity  Liquidity swap/futures market Delivery points 
Oligopolistic  Low  High  High 
Source: Author. 
As concentration increases, the physical market setting will remain oligopolistic. This is the case 
for  all  commodities  markets  with  capital-intensive  production.  However,  despite  market 
concentration,  barriers  to  entry  are  high  because  of  government  interventions  and  other  external 166 | RAW MATERIALS AND INDUSTRIAL METALS 
 
factors that increase volatility in the short term. These factors mean that even deeper pockets are 
required to enter these markets and to survive in the long term. 
Finally, commodities indexes, replicating the value trend of underlying commodities, have been 
very  active  for  copper  and  other  metals.  However,  these  indexes  have  always  been  synthetic 
replications (except for one physical ETF run by ETF Securities in London), i.e. the financial institution 
offers similar returns to  the underlying and hedges itself  in the commodities futures  markets.  To 
reduce  exposure  to  counterparty  risk  (company  hedging  in  the  underlying  futures  market)  and 
improve the quality of the index, as futures markets may not be always efficient, a recent proposal for 
the  introduction  of  physical  exchange-traded  notes  may  be  a  new,  important  development  (SEC, 
2012).  This  type  of  product  structuring  would  require  the  purchase  of  an  underlying  basket  of 
physical copper to be kept in storage and generate returns for those investing in the note or fund. On 
the one hand, dealing with all costs linked to keeping copper in storage, rather than using futures-
based indexes, may result in lower returns if the provider of the index is unable to access storage 
facilities, insurance and financing at reasonable costs. On the other hand, if the index provider is also 
the owner of the LME-sponsored warehouse and provider of financing, incentives may emerge to 
pursue  market  practices  that  discriminate  against,  or  increase  barriers  to  supply  access  to  their 
warehouses to, other metal users. Overall, however, starting up these operations requires the purchase 
of a quantity of physical copper that would only affect a very tiny part of global production, so the 
systemic effects are negligible122.  
                                                            
122 In 2010, ETF securities launched a physical ETF on copper in London that has today around $47 million of 
assets  under  management.  It  is  certainly  a negligible  number  compared  to  the  $161 billion  of  yearly  copper 
production.   
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4.  AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES 
4.1  Wheat market 
Together  with  rice  and  corn,  wheat  is  one  of  the  most  important  and  widely  traded  cereal 
grains, used mainly in the production of human food (e.g. bread). It was already being planted and 
harvested thousands of years ago, and it is the main input in the production of flour for bread, cakes 
and other types of food. Wheat is also one of the oldest futures contracts on the Chicago Board of 
Trade (since 1877). Its yearly global production, worth around $172 billion (USDA data), is assigned to 
different uses. Among others, feed for livestock has become an important use (roughly 18%), and 
roughly 70% of production is used for human food products (Figure 131). Waste, at roughly 4% of 
total production, is in line with historical averages. 
Figure 131. Main wheat uses, 2009 
 
Source: FAO Stats.  
Wheat is typically harvested once per year during the summer season. However, on a global 
scale, harvests of different varieties and in different countries are spread across the solar year. The 
quality of the harvest depends on a long list of factors, which makes prices typically more volatile 
than metal or energy commodities (Figure 132).   168 | AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES 
 
Figure 132. CBOT Wheat real price, 1980-2012 ($/bushel) 
 
Source: CBOT and World Bank (MUVI deflator $2005, rescaled to 2012). 
Weather conditions, government policies (e.g. export bans or subsidies programmes), consumer 
preferences (e.g. meat consumption linked to growth in disposable income), fertiliser prices, and the 
prices of grain substitutes (e.g. rice) are some of the factors that have an impact on wheat prices, on 
top of supply and demand factors. Finally, there is also some level of substitutability among different 
classes of wheat, which may further complicate pricing on international markets. As a result of the 
complex interactions between factors, along with macro price trends for other commodities (not only 
agricultural), wheat prices exhibited significant volatility at the peak of the recent financial crisis. Over 
the past six years, wheat has been affected by a strong underlying economic cycle, the effects of a drop 
in advanced economy demand, and the prolonged and sustained growth of emerging markets (led by 
China).  
4.1.1  Product and market characteristics: the key food commodity 
Wheat is typically considered a  homogeneous product that can be produced  on most arable land 
located in most of the world’s regions. Wheat does have some homogeneous characteristics, but it can 
be distinguished by country of origin and end use (Laroue, 1991).  The country of origin provides 
certain  attributes  such  as  the  specific  environment  the  wheat  was  grown  (which  ensures  certain 
milling characteristics), an efficient grading and inspection system, and location, which helps buyers 
minimise  freight  costs.  These  attributes  receive  premia  or  discounts  relative  to  the  international 
market’s  benchmark  price.  Moreover,  wheat  comes  in  multiple  varieties  or  classes,  which  exhibit 
diverse milling characteristics.  
Wheat can be denominated ‘winter’ wheat if planted during the autumn and harvested in the 
summer. This type of wheat is cultivated in warmer areas. ‘Spring’ wheat is planted in the spring and 
harvested in late summer in those regions that experience harsh winter conditions. The most liquid 
wheat futures contract is the Chicago Board of Trade Soft Red Winter Wheat futures contract, which 
prices low-protein winter wheat grown in the US Midwest and South. Overall, within the two broad 
categories of winter and spring wheat, there are at least five important classes: 
  Hard red spring wheat 
  Durum wheat 
  Hard red winter wheat 
  Soft red winter wheat 
  Soft white spring wheat 
  Soft white winter wheat 
Hard and durum wheat have a high protein and gluten content, perfect for producing high-
quality bread flour or semolina used to produce pasta. Most global production is hard wheat, with a 
global harvest occurring during summer in both the northern and southern hemispheres. Soft wheat is  
 
usually considered lower quality and is used to prepare flour for cakes and pastries, or bread and 
pasta with a low gluten content. Both  hard and soft wheat can have several alternative uses. For 
example,  high-gluten  hard  wheat  can  be  used  for  cosmetics  and  shampoo,  while  wheat  starch 
predominant in soft wheat may be used for biodegradable plastics, alcohol (e.g. whisky) and ethanol. 
Wheat protein can be a meat substitute and is typically a main component of pure cereal products. 
When wheat is harvested, the grain is separated from the stalks and chaff. The stalks are used for 
various marginal applications, such as furniture. On farms, livestock are often turned loose to graze 
wheat fields after planting and root development in the autumn until grain production in the spring, 
and also after harvest to clean up leftovers. Such alternative uses are a small part of total production, 
however, making up not more than 3% (Figure 133). 
Figure 133. Other uses of wheat and waste, 1961-2009 (% of total production) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from FAO Stats. 
Production 
Global demand continues to grow steadily due to population growth and alternative uses, while the 
level of production has grown non-linearly because of the multiple (unpredictable) variables acting on 
production (Figure 134). A continuous short-term adjustment trend to multiple variables generates 
supply/demand imbalances that can reach significant amounts (as in 2008 and 2009). 
Figure 134. Wheat production and consumption, 1960-2012 (kt) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from USDA. 170 | AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES 
 
However, production is spread around the globe, which helps to minimise supply disruptions 
due to adverse weather in particular regions and to support resource allocation towards countries 
with insufficient production through the development of international trade. As Figure 135 shows, 
production  is  evenly  spread  among  advanced  and  fast-growing  emerging  economies  that  want 
independence and food security (e.g. China and India). The European Union is the biggest producer 
(20%), followed closely by China, India and the United States.  
Figure 135. Top producers (left) and consumers (right), 2012 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from USDA. 
However, due to their demographics, domestic production in China and India is insufficient to 
cover domestic consumption. These countries are increasing investment in agriculture to secure food, 
but  structural  issues  (such  as  availability  of  arable  lands)  may  impede  them  to  reach  full 
independence. 
Storage and freight 
Once harvested, wheat is stored for long periods of time (though typically less than one year). Storage 
is an important component, and inventories are essentially driven by short-term supply and demand 
imbalances. The major harvest season is during the northern hemisphere spring and early summer. 
Storage and wheat futures are the components that take a crop produced once per year and assure 
that it is allocated efficiently throughout the year. Figure 136 confirms that wheat stocks are subject to 
the expectations from the summer harvest and consumption over the year, reaching their minimum 
during April to June, immediately before the major harvest begins.  
 
Figure 136. Non-seasonally adjusted CBOT inventories, 2001-2012 (Toledo, Chicago, St Louis, k/bushels)123 
 
Source: CBOT. 
Like production, stocks are also exposed to underlying trends that shape incentives in the long 
run. Production, yields and acreage are key long-term drivers of domestic supply, which drives stocks 
levels together with demand trends. The 2008-09 spike in stocks reflects a surplus of over 82 million 
tonnes over a two-year period due to good production and the drop in global demand due to the 
financial crisis. Prior to that, the major drop in stocks reflected global growth driving consumption 
over the world’s ability to produce. In general, global ending stocks for wheat are highly volatile, by 
following  net  production  (Figure  137).  Production  surpluses  can  build  stocks  very  quickly  while 
disappointing harvests can reduce excess stocks very quickly. 
Figure 137. Net production and global ending stocks (kt) 
 
Source:  Author’s  elaboration  from  USDA.  Note:  ‘net  production’  is  the  difference  between  production  and 
consumption. 
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Wheat can be stored safely in a cool and dry place with relatively constant temperatures and 
closely controlled moisture levels. Aeration systems and various grain protectants are indispensable 
items. Once these minimum requirements are met, storability time can be quite significant. The bulky 
nature of wheat and acceptable storability make it a commercially viable commodity for international 
shipping and for global markets. Seaborne freight costs are a key cost item in international trade and 
can reach unexpected levels due to capacity constraints or bottlenecks in the distribution channels 
(Figure 138). 
Below 13% moisture, wheat can also be stored for a few years, and many governments have 
built strategic reserves to face sudden supply shocks or exogenous events. 
Figure 138. Panamax voyage rate as percentage of Wheat CBOT front-month futures (FOB) 
 
Source: ICAP. 
International trade 
The main importers of wheat are mainly low-income countries located in areas with too little rainfall 
to cultivate high-yields crops or in countries where arable lands are too small for their needs. 
Figure 139. Top exporter (left) and importer (right) countries (kt), 2012 
 
Source: USDA. 
  
 
Western countries are the leading exporters, together with Russia and few other developing 
countries (e.g. Argentina, Ukraine). China is a net exporter, but supply and demand accounts are 
almost balanced there. Production in many developing countries (including China) is gradually falling 
behind  demand,  creating  opportunity  for  further  development  of  international  trade.  Fostered  by 
vigorous  export  programmes,  international  wheat  trade  is  now  valued  at  around  $42  billion  (as 
exports value), which is roughly 20% of the total production value (Figure 140). The total turnover 
value of international trade (exports and imports value) is estimated at around $70 billion. 
Figure 140. Wheat international trade (exports value, $bn) 
 
Source: Author’s from USDA and World Bank. 
As a result, competition among agricultural multinationals (such as the US-based Cargill and 
the  Asia-based  Wilmar)  has  escalated.  The  two  key  aspects  in  the  development  of  international 
markets for grains are quality and diversification. Grain quality is crucial in global trade and often 
relies  on  the  systems  of  inspection  and  infrastructure  available  in  the  exporting  country,  which 
ultimately may give a competitive advantage to domestic rather than foreign firms (Larue and Lapan, 
1992). Growth of alternative uses, such as in energy, is also gradually transmitting the uncertainty 
present in energy and environmental policies into the grain markets, especially ethanol blend quotas 
(Irwin and Good, 2009) and green emission commitments.  
4.1.1.1  Supply characteristics: dealing with frequent imbalances 
For planting, cultivation and harvesting, wheat requires arable lands, water, machinery, labour and 
some products derived from crude oil and natural gas (such as fertilisers). For most final uses, wheat 
requires a minimum of processing to clean it and make it available mainly in the form of flour for food 
or feed production. 174 | AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES 
 
Figure 141. Wheat processing chain 
 
Source: Author. 
Planting and harvesting of wheat involves various production costs that are usually split into 
four categories. In addition to seeds and machinery, fertilisers have become an essential tool to ensure 
the  high  production  yields  needed  as  the  number  of  farms  and  the  amount  of  arable  land  has 
decreased  substantially  over  the  years.  With  the  growth  in  demand,  transgenic  wheat  and  new 
fertilisers used to increase yields are gradually gaining acceptance, though so far have encountered 
fierce  hostility  due  to  the  use  of  wheat  in  food  production.  Inland  transportation  costs  are  an 
important cost item, especially in countries without sufficient infrastructure. 
Figure 142. Wheat main production costs* 
 
Source: ICAP. *2011 estimates. 
The benefits of a product that grows spontaneously from the earth with mainly water and sun 
only balances out partially the fixed costs for machinery and land rents. In addition, sunk costs are  
 
limited and are often quickly outweighed by the growth in the underlying value of the land, which 
ultimately  affects  incentives  to  invest  in  efficient  production  systems.  The  possibility  to  convert 
production to alternative cultures (e.g. corn) increases opportunity costs. 
Variable costs can also be significant (for fertilisers, processing and distribution costs, etc.), and 
are often related to external conditions that may cause a supply/demand imbalance. Cost uncertainty 
has led farmers to continue to rely on elevators or big trading houses, which typically buy the crop 
before it is harvested and hedge that crop on active futures markets. The crop may be purchased in 
different locations and be subject to premia and/or discounts to benchmark prices. Spot transactions 
involve the purchase of wheat (and grains in general) often shortly after harvest from the field or at 
any time of the year from the farm’s silos after some general processing.  Actual access to the land can 
occur via direct supply contracts or through subcontracting to specialised farming companies (Oxfam, 
2012).  
To exploit economies of scale and scope, the major international commodity firms (the ‘ABCD’ 
– Archer Daniels Midland, Bunge, Cargill, and Louis Dreyfus), which account for roughly 60% of the 
US grain trade and roughly 75% of milling capacity (Oxfam, 2012), have gradually integrated their 
horizontal (across products) and vertical (from production to distribution) business models. Market 
concentration is low at the production level, characterised by myriad farmers and small cooperatives 
around the world. Greater market concentration emerges at the distribution level, with a few global 
commodity  firms  who  channel  production  flows  into  the  global  economy.  Vertical  integration  is 
accomplished through strong relationships with big farms, which receive an array of services such as 
access  to  risk  management  tools  through  global  futures  markets.  Horizontal  expansion  or 
consolidation  is  often  made  through  acquisitions  of  important  national  firms    (for  example,  the 
acquisition of the state-trading enterprise Australian Wheat Board by the US multinational Cargill and 
the acquisition of GrainCorp, and Australian wheat company, by ADM). Consolidation will likely 
continue due to increased global competition and the need for international trading firms to manage 
and  implement  complex  risk  management  procedures  because  their  profile  is  exposed  to  several 
exogenous factors. 
Figure 143. Wheat stock-to-use ratio, 1960-2012 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from USDA. 
The  historical  importance  of  food  security  and  the  governance  of  the  market  consolidation 
process have always exerted pressure towards more concentrated markets, whether concentration was 
driven from the demand side (e.g. the creation of a Government monopsony through a state-trading 
enterprise (STE) or a subsidy programme with minimum price) or the supply side (e.g. an oligopolistic 176 | AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES 
 
setting). Government controls and strong global consolidation have been historical stabilisation factors 
for trade flows, subject to significant supply constraints. Attention focused on global concentration has 
helped  ensure  significant  competition  that  is  essential  to  the  continued  development  of  the 
international market. 
On top of this underlying trend in the global market structure, the stock-to-use ratio has been 
trending down over the long-term (Figure 143), adding additional pressure to supply and demand 
balances. This trend could eventually be offset by new technological advancements in agriculture that 
will  increase  yields  and  minimise  waste.  Future  production  may  increase  due  to  more  efficient 
planting (including using biogenetics) and harvesting processes, especially in developing areas like 
Eastern Europe and Africa. Finally, climate change could also drive changes in productivity, which 
could shift global production and supply chain management. 
4.1.1.2  Demand characteristics: an uncertain outlook 
Both foreign and domestic demand for wheat has been steadily growing over the years.  Growing 
populations in emerging markets and economic growth have led to increased growth in consumption 
in recent years. Despite their populations still growing, consumption is declining both in the European 
Union and the United States (Figure 144). 
Figure 144. Wheat consumption by region (% total and kt) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from USDA. 
Lower consumption has been led by the decline in feed and seed uses. Seed use, in particular, 
has declined from 11% of total use in 1960 to roughly 5% in 2009 (FAO stats). Alternative crops, such 
as  maize  and  soybeans,  have  gradually  expanded  their  share,  due  in  part  to  their  use  in  the 
production of energy (see 0). 
    
 
Despite a strong trend for globalisation, foreign demand for wheat remains below 20% of global 
production (Figure 140). Food security is still an important government objective, which can affect the 
use  of  foreign  supply  to  meet  domestic  needs.  Changing  political  environments  and  agricultural 
policies may become drivers of change in foreign demand and domestic supply in the future. Several 
factors can affect demand in the short and long run. In the short run, consumers’ preferences relying 
on disposable income, reactions to market information, and alternative uses (e.g. industrial feed and 
seed uses linked to increased consumption of meat) drive demand patterns. In the longer term, dietary 
changes, new technologies and alternative uses, among others, can drive important changes in market 
structure.  
The use of wheat for energy production (as ethanol) may remain very low in relative terms 
(Figure 145) as long as global weighted average yields stay around 3 tonnes per hectare (author’s 
estimates from USDA).  
Figure 145. Future uses of wheat (forecast) 
 
Source: OECD-FAO Stats. 
Assuming  that  1  tonne  of  wheat  can  produce  0.336  m3  of  bioethanol,  current  wheat  yields 
would produce only 1 m3 per hectare, while sugar beet can produce up to 5 m3 per hectare in the 
United  Kingdom  (Strathclyde  University).124  Technological  changes  in  energy  production  from 
alternative sources,  driven by climate change and CO 2  emissions  policy  actions,  may  change  this 
scenario. While wheat is unlikely to play a significant part in energy production, it can still be affected 
by the use of other crops in energy production. In such scenarios, wheat could become even more 
essential in ensuring food security. 
All  current  underlying  trends  assume  continued  world  population  growth  and  continued 
economic  development,  which  would  continue  to  put  pressure  on  demand  for  food  and  feed  for 
livestock (Figure 146 and Figure 145). 
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Figure 146. World population by community, 1950-2050 
 
Source: Bunge (2012) from United Nations. 
While urbanisation will continue to expand in emerging markets, rural areas are undoubtedly 
experiencing  population  loss  and  the  reduction  of  arable  lands,  also  led  by  increasing  yields  and 
average farm size. 
4.1.1.3  Key product and market characteristics 
The product and market characteristics put wheat, together with similar row crops, into a group of 
commodities that naturally have more price volatility compared to energy and metal markets.  In 
particular, wheat markets can rely on the following characteristics: 
  A renewable product with high convertibility of production to alternative cultures, as well as 
alternative uses. 
  Production not concentrated, though it is partially integrated with elevators and trading houses 
further along the marketing channel. There is a lack of producer control over supply since it 
depends on variables outside human control in many scenarios during the harvest season. 
  Low  capital-intensive  activity  that  depends  strongly  on  the  value  of  the  underlying  land, 
shaping incentives for long-term investments in rural areas, while on-going variable costs for 
dealing with storage and risk management are not irrelevant for the business model. 
  Sufficient storability for international markets. 
  Very low concentration at the farm level, but higher concentration at the distribution level due 
to economies of scale and scope requested by international markets. 
  Low demand elasticity as a main food ingredient, but higher demand elasticity when used in 
alternative ways (e.g. for feed or energy). 
  High supply elasticity. 
  Growing demand from emerging markets, which often have limited supply and strive to ensure 
food security. 
  Stable consumption in the coming years, but supply will likely be subject to further short-term 
constraints caused by endogenous (e.g. growth of substitutes, such as corn, for alternative uses) 
and exogenous (e.g. reduction in government market price support mechanisms) factors. In the 
long term, supply should benefit from higher yields and the market entry of new arable lands. 
  
 
Table 55. Product and market characteristics matrix 
 
Recycling/ 
Production 
convertibility 
Substitutes/ 
 Horizontal 
integration 
Alternative 
uses/ 
Vertical 
integration 
Capital 
intensive 
activity 
Storability 
Freight 
costs 
incidence 
Elasticity 
to price/ 
demand 
Concen-
tration 
BRICs 
weight 
Future 
Consumption/ 
Production 
Demand 
side  Renewable  Medium  High 
Low  Medium  Medium 
Low 
Medium 
High  Medium 
Supply 
side  High  High  Medium  High  High  Low 
Source: Author. 
4.1.2  Exogenous factors: assessing the role of government policies 
As mentioned above, demand and supply of wheat are subject to several exogenous factors. In order 
to  ensure  food  security  (a  primary  need  for  their  citizens)  and  for  land  and  rural  management, 
governments play an important exogenous role in affecting agricultural commodities. Government 
intervention into the wheat market has taken several forms over the years, from market price supports 
and incentives, to export  programmes, to  more  neutral mechanisms such as support programmes 
based  on  arable  lands  and  historical  receipts  (e.g.  the  new  Common  Agricultural  Policy  in  the 
European Union). In a market that continues to become more global and open to trade flows, a single 
sudden decision to ban wheat exports – as Russia did after the 2010 drought – or to add a levy on 
imports can have significant repercussions for prices, at least in the short term. Due to their pervasive 
action,  changes  to  subsidy  programmes  require  a  phased  approach.  Government  intervention  in 
wheat markets has been justified by the existence of imperfect competition in international markets 
(Corden, 1991), where monopsonistic STEs deal with an oligopolistic international trade market. In 
recent  years,  however,  policies  within  the  WTO  have  trended  towards  open  global  markets. 
Governments  have  responded  with  accommodating  policies,  such  as  the  privatisation  of  the 
Australian  and  Canadian  Wheat  Boards.  The  European  Union  has  been  decoupling  payments  to 
producers from payments linked to the production of a specific crop after the reform of the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) in 2003. However, the size of this programme is still significant. The CAP 
budget, directed to all commodity sectors, amounted to $78.2 billion (€60.8 billion) in 2012, roughly 
double the value of EU wheat production in the same year ($41 billion). Even though this amount 
accounts  for  less  than  1%  of  EU  GDP,  it  is  still  a  significant  amount  in  agricultural  commodities 
markets, where arable lands are 60% crops (Eurostat in 2007)125 and production value is typically low 
in absolute terms. As a result, any additional decoupling in the  European Union or reduction in US 
export subsidies could influence market developments. The EU decision to decouple payments from 
production quotas or direct price support (to be fully implemented with the new reform in 2013; see  
Box 8) together with the decision to increase support to the development of rural areas, may trigger 
interesting market developments. The OECD (2004) measured the effects of decoupling resulting in a 
reduction in arable land and a reduction in export subsidies, and found that consumers would benefit 
from greater competition. Markets are still internalising the long-term effects of this decision, resulting 
in  a  gradual  reduction  of  export  flows  from  Europe   due  to  lower  production   subsidies.  Direct 
government interventions on  market prices have been decreasing over the years, but in the form of 
direct payments to producers they are still significant in many regions (see  Box 8). As today, the 
European Union does not provide direct market support to wheat production, and the United States 
has reduced its support to roughly $1.1 billion.  The implications of these rapid changes in subsid y 
programmes are still to be fully understood. Lower protection for farmers in the European Union does 
not only mean lower use of land (Hermans et al., 2010), but also consolidation at the local level led by 
greater competition among regional areas within Europe and  beyond. This process may ultimately 
benefit final consumers, despite the potential for more volatile patterns as the market begins new 
developments.  
The gradual reduction of harvested lands after the oversupply and quality problems in the 
1980s, with subsidies based on the quantity of commodity produced (the n taken over by quotas), is a 
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broader  phenomenon  affecting  both  the  European  Union  and  the  United  States  as  a  result  of 
technological changes and consolidation of farms (Figure 147).  
Figure 147. Arable acreages (kt) 
 
Source: Author’s from USDA. 
As long as reduced acreage is offset by increases in yield and greater production, this process 
may  be  beneficial  for  consumers  in  terms  of  quality  and  cost.  However,  this  is  not  a  foregone 
conclusion; yields in Europe and the United States struggle to exceed those reached during the 1980s 
(5 and 3 tonnes per hectare, respectively). 
Figure 148. Wheat production yields (tonne/ha) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from USDA. 
Subsidies  and  other  interventions  may  also  affect  incentives  to  invest  in  agricultural 
infrastructure.  Structurally  low  prices  and  high  land  values  for  prolonged  periods  can  distort 
investment incentives. This is perhaps one of the reasons the European Union has decided to build a 
second  pillar  of  investment  for  greater  development  of  rural  areas.  The  US  market-oriented  
 
programme does not explicitly tackle this issue yet. China, meanwhile, has been massively investing 
in agricultural infrastructure and has gained ground compared to western economies with respect to 
agriculture, with the ambitious intent to overcome significant obstacles (e.g. water supply and loss of 
agricultural lands) and become self-sufficient rather than a huge importer of agricultural products. 
Finally, the effects of state interventions depend in many ways on the incentives. Export subsidies, for 
instance, ensure high volumes but may have perverse effects on quality (Larue and Lapan, 1992). 
Overall,  greater  market-oriented  supply  and  demand  interaction  improves  income  transfer  and 
consumers’ welfare (OECD, 2004). However, following sudden exposure to market conditions, it can 
take several growing seasons for all market adjustments to occur, increasing volatility in the short 
term. 
Box 8. The evolution of government intervention in agriculture in Europe and the United States  
Government intervention into agricultural markets has played a significant role in the development of 
agricultural markets. In 2011, global support to agriculture reached over $252 billion (OECD, 2012), mainly 
concentrated in the two biggest subsidies programmes (by budget) by the European Union ($78 billion) 
and  the  United  States  ($74  billion).126  Including  indirect  support  through  investment  in  research, 
marketing and rural areas, the amount of resources allocated to agriculture in OECD countries soared to 
over $400 billion in 2011 (34% of total production value; Figure 149).127 
Figure 149. Total support estimate (US$mn) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from OECD Library. 
Among the countries and regions most active in governmental support to agriculture, the European 
Union is the only one that has consistently reduced is support to agriculture, which dropped below $120 
billion  in  2010.  Both  China  and  the  United  States,  the  two  biggest  economies  in  the  world  after  the 
European Union, have increased the size of their intervention in agricultural markets in absolute terms. 
                                                            
126 Including support for rural areas development, research, marketing and indirect transfers (disaster relief, etc).  
127 There are three aggregates of government subsidies used in the OECD statistics. The total support estimate 
(TSE) is the broadest indicator of support, representing the sum of transfers to agricultural producers individually 
(the PSE) and collectively (the GSSE), as well as budgetary subsidies to consumers. The general services support 
estimate (GSSE) measures the  monetary transfers associated to public financing of services such as agricultural 
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Figure 150. Total support estimate (TSE) by region (US$mn) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from OECD Stats. 
Only  China  appears  to  have  increased  its  government  contribution  (direct  and  indirect)  to  the 
economy in 2010, both in relative (GDP) and absolute terms. The European Union, in contrast, has further 
reduced  its  direct  and  indirect  contribution  after  the  historical  peak  in  1998  (Figure  151).  China  has 
overtaken the European Union in size of total intervention, both in absolute and relative terms. Chinese 
intervention almost doubled in 2010, to $90 billion. Additionally, despite commitments towards a more 
market-oriented intervention, the United States has gradually substituted old direct support to producers 
(only $30 billion out of $147 billion) with indirect measures that may only partially reduce distortive 
effects on agricultural markets. 
Figure 151. PSE (left) and TSE (right) over total local production value (%) 
   
Source: Author’s elaboration from OECD. 
The rationale used for government intervention are threefold: 
  Ensuring food production under fair conditions. 
  Promoting a sustainable use of resources. 
  Preserving rural areas. 
The achievement of these three objectives is considered a public good (i.e. goods that are non-rival 
where  the  use  by  one  person  does  not  exclude  another’s  use)  and  non-excludible  (people  cannot  be 
excluded from using it). Under this line of reasoning, subsidy programmes have been activated to protect 
domestic prices from global trade flows, to promote environmentally friendly production practices, and to  
 
encourage investment in historical rural heritage. However, such interventions  (in particular, volume-
based incentives) may create significant distortions to market equilibrium and may adversely affect long-
term  investment  incentives.  As  a  result  of  significant  distortions  that  have  emerged  over  the  years, 
subsidies to support output or to guarantee minimum prices are being used less and less by governments 
around the world  
Today, such supports account for less than 30% of global subsidies. Such reductions have helped 
foster the development of a global and competitive market for agricultural commodities. The long-term 
objective is to remove obstacles and align domestic prices as much as possible with international ones. 
Such  a  result  would  likely  benefit  emerging  economies,  but  could  offer  new  challenges  to  the  more 
advanced countries that control most of the global food supply. 
The European Union Common Agricultural Policy  
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was first introduced in a much smaller European Union (with six 
countries)  in  1962.  Since  then,  the  CAP  has  expanded  (as  the  European  Union  grew)  and  has  been 
progressively modified since the late 1980s to adapt its programme to important market developments. 
The CAP is still today the biggest item in the EU budget, but its relative weight has gradually decreased 
over time from over 60% to 32% of the EU budget in 2013. Total resources (including research and rural 
areas development) amount to $120 billion, of which $103 billion (€74 billion) are direct payments and $17 
billion indirect support to agricultural markets (not to producers).  
Figure 152. EU CAP expenditure (€bn) 
 
Note: 2007 constant price. 
Source: European Commission. 
A multitude of interventions have been pursued over the years, but the most  notable reforms 
started at the end of the 1980s when the distortive effects of subsidies based on volume of production 
or minimum market price caused oversupply and bad long-term incentives. In 1988, after the start of 
the 1986 WTO Uruguay Round, a ceiling on EU d irect payments to farmers and a limit to quotas 
were introduced to help limit oversupply. This was the beginning of a more market-oriented CAP, 
the process of which will still take years to be completed.  Exceptions still exist (e.g. fruits and some 
vegetables), but most of the market support subsidies have been gradually removed.  From 1992 
(with  the  MacSharry  reform) ,  the  CAP  introduced  some  adjustments  to   face  the  issues  of 
overproduction and the problems with quotas. Measures to support prices or levels of production for 
specific commodities were cut and replaced by fixed payments  based on land area and animals in 
2002 (as the year of reference), and payments based on current planted area and animals (Figure 153).  
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Figure 153. EU CAP direct support expenditure ($mn) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from OECD. 
In  2003,  the  European  Union  decoupled  subsidies  from  a  particular  production  and  linked 
payments to compliance with specific rules about the quality of product and the environment. The reform 
did not include sugar subsidies (of which the European Union is the biggest producer), which have been 
reformed in 2005 by reducing resources given for guaranteed prices.  
Since  the  2003  reform,  the  amount  of  decoupled  payments  is  almost  70%  of  all  direct  support 
provided by the European Union to agricultural producers (Figure 153). The decline in support prices has 
reduced the gap with world market prices and the exportable surplus in some commodities; the European 
Union has become a net exporter of beef, for example (EU COM, 2009). It also caused a slight drop in 
production for all crops in the European Union in 2009-10, while consumption kept growing. This may 
have contributed to price spikes and volatile patterns. 
The CAP today is therefore radically different from what it was in 1962, and the 2013 reform aims 
at  changing  its  nature  even  further.  Besides  the  cuts  to  total  expenditures,  the  reform  is  going  to 
strengthen the second pillar, i.e. investments in development of rural areas, and complete the phasing out 
of the direct market support programme. From 2019, the basic payment scheme will introduce a uniform 
payment per hectare (capped to €300,000 per year), which will be supported by additional resources for 
those that comply with ecological practices and organic production procedures (known as ‘greening’). 
Additional resources would be also set aside for areas with natural constraints, young and small farmers 
(to balance the strong consolidation process in act), limited coupled payments, and cross compliance (e.g. 
with  environmental  rules).  Finally,  the  ‘new’  CAP  would  promote  further  investments  in  rural 
development, among other innovation, low emissions, and ecosystems. The standard 50% EU co-funding 
would be increased to 85% in less developed areas. 
The US subsidies programme 
The  subsidies  programme  has  been  developing  in  the  United  States  since  1934,  through  the  constant 
reform (every five year) of the original farm bill. The 2008 Food, Conservation, and Energy Act is the 
current farm bill applicable to agricultural markets, which should be reformed by the end of 2013. After 
several reforms over the years, today the programme includes direct payments based on pre-determined 
rates  and  historical  production  (since  1996),  guaranteed  minimum  prices  (with  support  to  exports), 
counter-cyclical payments, and yield and revenues insurance. The programme also introduces grants for 
production of biofuels, which can cover up to 30% of the cost of developing refineries for production of 
advanced  biofuels,  and  tax  breaks  for  producers  of  cellulosic  biofuel.  In  addition,  in  1985  the  US 
Department of Agriculture  (USDA) introduced the Export Enhancement Programme (EEP) to support 
with cash payments exports to specific countries at competitive prices. Support was limited in terms of 
disbursement and tonnage after the Uruguay Round and ultimately halted in 1996 (but only officially 
cancelled in 2008). On top of these direct interventions, there are investments in research and marketing,  
 
investments in rural areas, and additional programmes for indirect support to the agricultural industry. 
Theyearly budget in 2011 was $147 billion, of which $31 billion was direct payments (Figure 154) and $116 
billion indirect payments. The funding of indirect payments includes $40 billion directly from taxpayers 
(minus $5 billion back to consumers) and $75 billion from the government for marketing, research and 
infrastructure (such as direct aids, loans, insurance, disaster relief, etc.). 
Figure 154. US direct support expenditures ($mn) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from OECD Stats. 
Direct payments are below 10% of the total production value, but when including indirect 
support the share rises to 39.4%. Interventions have been redistributed with general programmes 
(such as disaster payments) and subsidies for specific commodities production, such as corn, wheat, 
cotton, rice and soybeans. 
Figure 155. US agricultural Subsidies, 1995-2010 
 
Source: Environmental Working Group. 
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food and energy production (roughly 55% of US agricultural subsidies; Figure 155). As a consequence, 
subsidies  (and  so  prices)  have  a  dual  policy  for  agricultural  products  sold  in  domestic  markets  and 
abroad, with potential distortive effects in international markets. 
The acknowledgement by governments of the direct and indirect impact of subsidies policies on 
long-term investment incentives have gradually shifted the focus of these programmes over the years 
from pure market support to indirect producers’ income and revenues support with fixed payments, crop 
insurance and disaster relief, among other interventions. More time, however, is needed to understand the 
full spectrum of effects that government interventions generate in these markets. 
 
Another issue is that most of global production is priced against the US dollar in international 
markets,  which  can  expose  producers  and  merchants  to  exchange-rate  risk.  As  suggested  by  the 
empirical data, the strength or weakness of the dollar is a key driver of price formation in wheat. The 
dollar, then, becomes an additional vehicle to channel the effects of expansionary monetary policies on 
commodities markets that have been generally considered anti-cyclical.   
Table 56. Key exogenous factors 
Government intervention  Main other external factors 
Medium  Weather, exchange rates, oil prices, fertilisers, lands value 
Source: Author. 
Finally, crude oil prices have become an increasingly important factor in agricultural markets. 
The widespread use of petroleum-based fertilisers and the impact on incentives to produce energy 
from agricultural production (e.g. from ethanol) have increased the importance of oil prices in the 
discovery  of  prices  for  several  commodities.  The  price  of  agricultural  commodities  may  be 
increasingly correlated to oil prices in the short run. The more oil prices increase, the more wheat and 
other  related  crop  prices  could  rise  as  this  increases  fertiliser  costs  and  the  incentive  to  produce 
biofuels.   
4.1.3  Empirical analysis: dispelling myths and understanding the reality 
Empirical analysis of the wheat market proves challenges since wheat is affected by multiple factors, 
with none really prevailing in the long run. This analysis uses the following dataset: 
  Monthly data from 1/1/2002 to 31/12/2011. 
  Log  of  front-month  CBOT  Wheat  futures  contract  (deflated  with  US  PPI  published  by  the 
Fed).128 
  Log of price-adjusted broad dollar index (published by the Fed). 
  Log  of  CBOT  inventories  in  Chicago,  St  Louis  and  Toledo  (seasonally  adjusted,  12  months 
trend).129 
The Box-Jenkins methodology leads to model identification and selection through the study of 
the autocorrelation and partial a utocorrelation paths of the time series of the logarithm real front -
month price (‘spot price’). Parameter estimation using the maximum loglikelihood estimation and 
model checking through the anlysis of the residuals finally point at the ARIMA (1,1,0), i.e. integrated 
of order 1 and autoregressive of first order, to fit the characteristics of the dataset. As suggested by 
Output #31, the front-month wheat futures contract seems to be significantly affected by the exchange 
rate  (negative  relationship),  which  is  a  common  feature  in  our  empirical  analysis  across  many 
commodities.  The  model  suggests  that  inventories  offer  a  slightly  positively  influence  (with  10% 
significance level). Inventories of wheat, which are affected by several exogenous supply factors, are 
                                                            
128 Results of the empirical analysis are confirmed also by using the December wheat futures contract price for the 
reference year. 
129 Due to incompleteness of data over the covered period, data on inventories from warehouses in Ohio and 
Mississippi have been removed from the dataset.  
 
key  drivers  of  price  formation  in  the  short  term.  Stockpiles  reports  can  surprise  markets  as  an 
endogenous response to supply and demand patterns. 
Table 57. Regression output 
Independent variable  Coefficient (t-test) 
CBOT Inventories 
0.12* 
(1.8) 
Broad dollar index 
-2.01*** 
(-2.70) 
Note: *10% **5% and ***1% significance. 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
ARIMA models, Granger causality tests, and GARCH models (for volatility analysis) have been 
used, but no other statistically significant link was found. This suggests that these factors are relevant 
as a whole, but it  is difficult to measure singular impact. No significant link could be found, for 
instance,  with  oil  prices.  The  use  of  wheat  for  biofuels,  in  addition,  is  still  a  small  percentage  to 
suggest a growing link with crude oil prices.  
Furthermore, Box-Jenkins applied to a different dataset from 1/1/1990 to 31/12/2011 (monthly 
real price data from World Bank) suggests an ARIMA model with a 6-month seasonal component 
(SARIMA)  to  account  for  higher  prices  during  the  harvesting  season.  The  seasonal  difference 
correlation functions suggest a second-order autoregressive factor (2,1,0,6). 
Table 58. SARIMA outputs 
Independent variable  Coefficient (t) 
OECD indicator 
4.25** 
(2.1) 
SOI index 
.0013** 
(2.25) 
Broad Dollar Index 
-1.02** 
(-2.35) 
Crude oil price 
0.12** 
(2.13) 
Note: ***10% **5% and *1% significance. See Output #32, Output #33, Output #34, Output #35, Output #36. 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
As suggested by Table 58, the economic cycle (represented by OECD indicator for US demand) 
and  the  exchange  rate  are  key  drivers  of  price  formation  for  wheat  markets,  with  positive  and 
negative relationship, respectively. The crude oil price also has a modest positive impact on wheat 
prices, which confirms a weak link with energy price. In this case, however, the link is most likely led 
by transport fuels and fertilisers, rather than biofuel markets. The weather index is very weakly linked 
to spot prices; it is difficult to capture weather with broad indicators. An ARCH model is used to test 
the  relationship  with  Chinese  demand.  Output  #38  shows  that  Chinese  demand  is  statistically 
significant at 10% with a low coefficient. This relationship, however, may gain strength in the coming 
years, as China’s role in global agricultural markets continues to grow. 
The  dataset  is  also  used  to  test  links  with  financial  indicators.  A  linear  regression  of 
differentiated  levels  (Output  #36)  suggests  a  positive  relationship  over  the  whole  period.  But  the 
analysis also confirms what has been found in the empirical analysis in previous sections. The link 
between spot prices and S&P 500 does not emerge for the period before 2002 (1990-2001). However, a 
positive relationship emerges in the following period (2002-2011; Output #37). 
Finally, a linear regression (Output #39) shows links between spot prices and both commercial 
(short)  and  index  positions  (long)  during  the  period  2006-12.  However,  a  Granger  causality  test 
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growth of futures markets, i.e. commercial positions appear to drive levels of index positions while 
the opposite is not confirmed (Output #40). This relationship is significant for three consecutive lags.  
Table 59. Linear regressions outputs 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 
D.lnspot  D.lnspot  D.lnspot  D.lnspot  D.lnspot 
D.lntotindex  0.327*  0.00471  0.0473  0.0429  0.0375 
 
(0.110)  (0.114)  (0.109)  (0.108)  (0.109) 
D.lncommercial 
 
0.421*  0.364*  0.338*  0.327* 
   
(0.0641)  (0.0621)  (0.0615)  (0.0615) 
D.lnsp500 
   
0.558*  0.398*  0.373* 
     
(0.103)  (0.111)  (0.114) 
D.lncrudeoil 
     
0.197*  0.153** 
       
(0.0565)  (0.0599) 
D.lnDollarEx 
       
-0.608** 
         
(0.254) 
Constant  0.00229  0.00253  0.00250  0.00184  0.00164 
 
(0.00311)  (0.00290)  (0.00277)  (0.00275)  (0.00276) 
Observations  294  294  294  289  285 
R-squared  0.029  0.155  0.232  0.254  0.264 
Note: standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.1. 
Tests for the regression 5 are available in the Annex (Output #41). 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
Table 59 suggests that index positions lose statistical significance when additional (statistically 
significant) variables are added to the regression. This suggests a very limited role for index positions 
in front-month futures prices. More important, and always statistically significant, is the impact of 
commercial  positions,  which  confirms  the  earlier  analysis  on  the  role  of  commercial  positions  in 
driving the growth of commodities futures markets. 
4.1.4  Market organisation: the essential role of futures markets 
Pricing of wheat contracts in the bilateral (OTC) spot market has limited complexity. Spot or forward 
contracts are often designed around a global benchmark price, which is referenced from a futures 
contract in most cases. Farmers seek price stability for their production (i.e. protection from droughts 
or  overproduction),  especially  in  commodities  influenced  by  many  endogenous  and  exogenous 
variables. They typically agree to a price before harvest, which is based on the price of a referencing 
futures  contract,  plus  a  premium  or  discount  based  on  quality  and  local  attributes.  This  type  of 
contractual interaction helps both farmers that do not want exposure to unforeseen exogenous factors 
and the big trading houses that want to secure significant stocks for storage and trade. Grain elevators 
and trading houses competing for product from farmers have been quite creative in offering farmers a 
wide variety of products. Consider this example of a product with an embedded call option – a farmer 
sells wheat for $5.00 to an elevator, but has a provision that if the futures price goes to $8.00 per 
bushel, the elevator will allow the farmer to capture 75% of the price increase.  This producer ‘pricing 
power’ (also for small farms) rarely exists outside the United States; a liquid and active futures market 
has existed in the United States for more than a century supporting such innovative products. In 
Europe, even with milling wheat futures contracts at LIFFE increasingly becoming a local benchmark, 
market practices still lack access to more sophisticated risk management tools and procedures. Often 
only spot transactions after harvest are available to small farmers who harvest and deliver their grain 
to local elevators, which may expose them to unnecessary risks.   
 
As  a  consequence,  futures  markets  are  an  indispensable  tool  for  managing  risk  in  both 
international markets as well as domestic markets. It is not a coincidence that the first standardised 
futures contract in the United States was on grain, negotiated on the Chicago Board of Trade. The 
development of international markets for grain is deeply linked to the development of liquid futures 
markets. Delivery points for both US and European futures are typically regional, though delivery is 
rarely taken (less than 1%) and the threat to deliver is used to ensure that contracts converge with spot 
prices at the futures contract’s maturity. A broader network of warehouses would make sure that 
deviations from convergence with spot prices are minimised. As a consequence, for instance, CME 
Group (running the Wheat CBOT futures contract) has expanded the network of delivery warehouses 
in its delivery region over the years to ensure sufficient deliverable supply and diverse liquid markets. 
Recently the LIFFE has decided to add an additional delivery points (the second point after Rouen, 
and  both  located  in  France)  as  the  contract  has  gained  market  share  and  represents  a  bigger 
underlying  physical  market.130  As the futures contract grows in importance, its warehousing and 
delivery system must adapt to the underlying market.  As a consequence, additional storage capacity 
and delivery points are most likely needed, in Europe in particular. 
Table 60. Wheat market organisation 
Physical market setting  Pricing complexity  Liquidity futures market  Delivery points 
Competitive (local) 
Oligopolistic (global) 
Low  High  Limited (EU, US) 
Source: Author. 
Commodities exchanges are also working to introduce new contracts (such as the Black sea 
wheat contract for Russian wheat), which might take longer than expected due to difficulties in a 
fragmented  regional  environment  to  ratchet  up  liquidity  to  a  commercial  level.  Some  of  the 
international trade is typically allocated through international auctions in sealed envelopes delivered 
to main government bodies in charge of delivering or purchasing the commodity in global markets. 
Transparent procedures for the allocation of significant amounts of commodities through auctions or 
bilateral negotiations, which does not mean transparency of details of private bilateral transactions, 
are crucial for efficient price formation and functioning of international markets. 
To sum up, wheat market organisation relies on a complex combination of incentives influenced 
by several exogenous factors, which can ultimately affect market trends both in the short and long 
term.  However,  over  the  years,  physical  trading  in  wheat  has  become  much  more  open  and 
international and it will likely develop further in that direction, especially if major producers continue 
to relax market price support programmes and allow domestic prices to be realigned to global prices.  
Prices will likely continue to be volatile, driving the most successful market participants to continue 
developing innovative risk management tools. 
   
                                                            
130 In particular, LIFFE announced the expansion of storage capacity in Rouen from November 2014 and the 
addition  of  one  delivery  point  in  Dunkirk,  both  points  located  in  France.  See  the  full  notice  at 
https://globalderivatives.nyx.com/sites/globalderivatives.nyx.com/files/mo2013-09_-
_milling_wheat_futures_contract_-_additional_storage_capacity.pdf.  190 | AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES 
 
4.2  Corn market 
Corn (or maize) is a grain plant originally from Central America that has been cultivated since the 
early  age  of  human  kind.  It  is  harvested  once  a  year  in  several  countries,  mainly  in  Europe,  the 
Americas,  and  East  Asia.  Corn  was  poorly  cultivated  until  the  19th  century,  when  more  was 
discovered  about  the  several  uses  that  could  make  of  corn,  whether  for  food,  feed  or  biofuels 
production. In 2012, yearly production was valued at around $254 billion and is growing due to the 
increase in harvested areas and new techniques to extract more from corn processing and to make the 
ground produce more with the use of genetically engineered seeds. There are many uses for corn, but 
it is mainly used for animal feedstock, processing and feed for biofuels and other products, and in the 
food industry (Figure 156). Corn use has steadily increased with the growth of the global economy in 
recent years. Corn processing and feed (more at the beginning of the century) have become primary 
uses for the commodity, rather than pure food uses. 
Figure 156. Global corn uses, 1961-2009 (tonnes) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from FAO Stats. 
Corn is the most produced grain, mostly because it has the highest yield in terms of co-products 
that can be produced out of the primary commodity. It can be used as a feedstock, food (especially in 
meals with high-protein content), and in particular for the production of bioethanol (which is also 
included in the corn processing and partially in feed uses in the chart above). Corn is usually planted 
in spring and harvested from the end of the summer for sweet corn (to keep the moisture content 
high) to the autumn (or beginning of the winter season) for drier field corn, used for a more industrial 
production. 
Because  of  the  link  of  production  with  annual  harvesting,  corn  prices  may  have  a  slight 
seasonal pattern. In particular, they tend to be structurally higher close to and during the harvesting 
period, and are accelerated to the top if forecasts for stocks and production are very low.  
 
Figure 157. Corn real and nominal prices, 1960-2012 ($2005/tonne and $/tonne) 
 
 
Source: World Bank. Note: Maize (US), no. 2, yellow, f.o.b. US Gulf ports. Real prices are annual and nominal 
prices are monthly data. 
As for other grains, volatility is very high due to structural factors, such as limited control over 
supply and stocks, and the influence of several external factors (such as the weather or government 
interventions). After more than three decades of nominal prices floating in a stable range, in more 
recent years, nominal and real prices have been moving faster and with a strong upward trend. The 
increase also coincides with the beginning of more widespread production of corn-based alternative 
fuels to support more sustainable energy policies. In real terms, prices today are close to the historical 
peak in the 1970s (Figure 165). 
4.2.1  Product and market characteristics: seeking long-term sustainability 
Corn is another example of a crop (cereal) that is produced in several countries, but mainly in the 
United States, China, Brazil, and the European Union. There are several varieties of corn, but  the 
properties are more or less the same for the two main varieties of corn: sweet and field corn. Sweet 
corn is used for human food and has high sugar content. It should be eaten fresh and can only be 
stored  for  a  couple  of  days,  without  special  processing.  It  can  be  found  in  different  varieties, 
depending on the sugar content. Field corn is left for more time in the field to reduce the level of 
moisture. It is mainly used for animal feed and feedstock chemicals (and so ethanol production). 
A small part of corn production (roughly 14%) is directly channelled to human food uses, while 
almost all of the rest is used for for livestock feed or biofuels (ethanol or biomass) and biogas through 
processes that allow the simultaneous production of ethanol and co-products used for livestock feed. 
Like other agricultural commodities, corn is not recyclable, but is renewable.  
Corn is processed immediately after harvesting, before being stored or further refined. Three 
different processes are typically used to process corn for ethanol and feed production (Rausch and 
Belyea, 2006). First, wet milling is a capital-intensive process that splits the corn’s kernel into its main 
components, including germ, fibre and starch. This process needs high amounts of fresh water and 
energy (e.g. for steeping in weak sulphur acid, evaporation, hydrocyclones and centrifuge) but it has 
high processing yields. Several co-products can be produced, such as dried germ, corn gluten meal 
(for  the  food  industry),  starch  for  fermentation  (ethanol),  corn  gluten  feed,  and  crude  corn  oil.  A 
bushel of corn can produce 2.5-3 gallons of ethanol. The more dried product is typically used for feed. 
A more diffused process, due to its high yield for ethanol production (around 3 gallons per bushel of 
corn),131 is the dry-grind process, which is less capital intensive but produces a lower amount of co-
products. In fact, only one co -product can be produced because the kernel is not fractionated but 
crushed and mixed with amylase. This co-product is usually a feed with high protein content and high 
fibre (so less good for ruminant s), which has high moisture content (up to 70%) and needs to be 
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consumed within days. A more dried product, by contrast, could be stored for long periods. As a 
consequence, corn processing industries that produce ethanol are generally placed close to animal 
industries, since by selling feed they can recoup most of the ethanol production costs. Finally, dry 
milling is used to produce corn products for human consumption. It requires less water and modest 
kernel moisture. Co-products contain low amounts of fibres and proteins, which make them suitable 
for breakfast cereals, among other products. 
Corn is affected by supply and demand patterns of substitute products, such as soybean. Often, 
substitutability depends on several factors impacting the value of co-products. In particular, costs of 
processing are key. Water removal in the milling process requires a lot of energy; the last 10% of water 
is only removed with 95% of the total energy for the entire process to get to a solid state (Rausch and 
Belyea, 2006). 
Production and consumption 
After two of years of stable production at the end of 1990s, corn production has been growing steadily 
since 2003, when the use of corn for biofuels became of interest for the whole industry. Driven by 
growing demand, net production has been gradually moving from a stable surplus (around 5% of 
total production) to a more balanced (or slightly negative) position. As Figure 158 shows, even with 
high volatility, production has met consumption with a surplus up to 5% of total production. 
Figure 158. Corn production and consumption, 1960-2012 (kt) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from USDA. 
The United States, China, Brazil and the European Union dominate corn production, with more 
than three-quarters of global production between them. These four regions are also the top four global 
consumers of corn globally, especially where subsidies policies have been implemented to foster the 
development of biofuels markets (such as in the United States and Brazil). The United States produces 
over 40% of global production.  
 
Figure 159. Top ten producers (left) and consumers (right) (kt), 2012 
 
Source: USDA. 
Production therefore has some degree of concentration, with ten countries/regions producing 
over 85% of total production (and this mainly by the top four). 
International trade 
Despite  high  internal  consumption,  the  United  States  and  the  European  Union  are  significant  net 
exporters, while China and Brazil are net importers. However, the magnitude of Chinese imports, 
which emerges from a simple difference between production and consumption levels, is not reflected 
in the level of imports (around 2.5 million tonnes), perhaps due to unreported production or imports 
or to high domestic corn inventories. Japan would be the world’s biggest importer, with almost 16 
million tonnes (Figure 160). 
Figure 160. Top ten importers (left) and exporters, 2012 (right) (kt) 
 
Source: USDA. 
While exports are fairly concentrated in four countries, imports are spread across more countries. 
Nevertheless,  the  vast  majority  of  corn  is  produced  for  domestic  use,  mainly  for  feed  and 
biofuels production. As a consequence, the total value of international trade is at one of its lowest 194 | AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES 
 
levels since 1970, just above 10% of value of total production (Figure 161). International trade for corn 
is around $26 billion. 
The  limited  development  of  international  trade  is  strictly  linked  to  the  high  production 
mandates for biofuels imposed by the biggest corn producers, such as the United States and Brazil, 
which increases incentives for internal uses. In addition, it may be inconvenient to produce ethanol 
from imported corn. The need to ship abroad significant amounts of a bulk commodity and to install 
the ethanol plant in an area where food or animal industries are already developed and can benefit 
from the high-moisture co-products very much limits the development of an international market for 
corn. International trade is therefore limited to the use of corn in industrial food application or some 
feed product for livestock. 
Figure 161. Value of production and international trade, 1960-2012 ($k) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from USDA and World Bank. 
Genetically engineered corn: opportunity or threat? 
Due to its widespread use as a key component for biofuels production and the need for economies of 
scale  to  benefit  from  these  markets  and  from  subsidies  programmes  (to  meet  mandates),  corn  is 
increasingly produced through genetically modified solutions that ensure high production rates and 
lower costs. The portion of cultivated areas for genetically modified corn has been steadily increasing 
across the globe, reaching 29% globally but with much higher rates in the United States, Canada, and 
Argentina (roughly 85%). 
Several biotech companies have invested billion of dollars over the years to develop intellectual 
property rights that can only produce results after several years, replacing state research with private 
investments. Today, genetically engineered seeds are essential  to  high-yield productions  with less 
pesticides (Wilson and Dahl, 2010), while no evidence today points at these products being harmful 
for people’s health. For instance, some biotech companies have developed a type of corn that, when 
mixed with an enzyme (alpha amylase), can break down corn starch into sugar and make ethanol 
production  less  expensive.  This  would  reduce  the  use  of  water,  energy  and  chemicals  in  the 
production  process.  However,  close  attention  should  always  be  paid  to  the  impact  of  new 
biotechnologies for direct or indirect (animal feed) human consumption.  
 
Table 61. GMO corn cultivation in key countries 
 
Year 
Cultivation Area in Million Hectares 
 
Total Maize  GM Maize  GMO Ratio 
Global 
1998  140  2  1.4% 
2008  161  37.3  23% 
2009  158  42  26% 
USA 
1997  29,6  2.8  9.5% 
2008  35.3  28.2  80% 
2009  35.2  29.9  85% 
Canada 
1997  1.06  0.03  2.8% 
2007  1.4  1.17  84% 
Argentina 
1998  3.18  0.017  0.5% 
2007  3.9  2.8  84% 
2008  3.4  2.8  83% 
2009  2.5  2.1  85% 
Brazil 
2008  14.7  1.3  9% 
2009  14  5  36% 
Source: GMO Compass. 
The market for genetically modified organisms, and corn is no exception, has been developed 
mainly in the United States through the strict enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPRs). The 
United States therefore has the highest yield in corn production, followed by the European Union ( 
Figure 162). 
Figure 162. Corn production yields (tonne/hectare) 
 
Source: USDA. 
The difference with wheat yields is particularly striking, where the United States has one of the 
lowest yields per hectare. The industrial use of corn and its profitability (coming from co-products) 
has  encouraged  several  biotech  companies  to  develop  IPRs  mainly  for  corn,  also  to  meet  biofuel 
production mandates. Today, this industry is one of the faster growing sectors in agricultural markets. 
Two types of IPRs have been fostering growth in the sector (Wilson and Dahl, 2010): plant patents 
(less detailed information is required, but IPRs can be used for free by those that have been already 196 | AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES 
 
using them for experimentation or production); and plant varietal protection rights (which require 
more detailed information but receive greater protection from unauthorised uses). This rapid growth 
has  also  attracted  significant  investments  from  big  biotech  companies  (such  as  Monsanto  and 
Syngenta),  which  have  acquired  several  smaller  companies  in  the  process  of  licensing  new  traits. 
Competition, however, has been constantly growing and several firms are now ready to launch new 
traits that promise to increase yields and lower production costs not only for corn, but also for other 
coarse grains such as soybeans. 
Storage 
Corn kernels are typically subject to a drying process with  heating (an aeration system) until the 
moisture content reaches the desired level, depending on the final use of the commodity (corn feed 
generally has a lower moisture level). As a result, the storability of harvested corn is related to the 
moisture level of corn kernels and the temperature level (as well as its humidity). Corn can be stored 
for long periods if stored in cooled bins in the absence of oxygen (usually in sealed bags). However, 
this may not stop insects degrading the quality of the commodity, especially if not sufficiently dried 
(below 15% moisture). As a result, storability costs may require upfront costs and the commodity may 
bring some additional storage risks.  
For example, a moisture level higher  than 18%, a cool temperature (below 5° Celsius), and 
control over the presence of fines (from broken kernels) would ensure storage for up to two years.132 
However, moisture is generally kept at around 15%, which prolongs the storability of the commodity. 
In the  ethanol production  process,  slightly higher moisture of corn and  co-products  (corn-based 
products with high moisture) are key for the profitability of the entire process. Ethanol plants need to 
dispose of high-moisture co-products in a short time frame. Corn producers may also not have full 
control  over  supply  and  thus  storage  due  to  several  exogenous  factors  that  may  impact  the 
productivity of the soil. As a consequence, in agricultural markets, production or stockpiles reports by 
government authorities often have the ability to surprise markets  because of the unpredictability of 
supply factors, which are often exposed to exogenous variables (e.g. weather events) . Stocks are 
therefore only a short-term driver of price formation, as the y are an endogenous reflection of  short-
term supply and demand factors that can impact the upcoming harvesting season.  
As  Figure  163  shows,  ending stocks strictly follow surplus and deficit of production   (net 
demand), which seems to be more or less stable after the great volatility of the 1980s. 
Figure 163. Corn yearly net production and global ending stocks, 1960-2012 (kt) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from USDA. 
                                                            
132 Please, see http://www.whetstoneag.com/MANAGING%20STORED%20GRAIN.pdf.   
 
Stocks levels have been diminishing in recent years, both in absolute and relative terms (taking 
into account corn use) (Figure 164). This drop reflects an increasing negative imbalance in the net 
demand due to the growing demand in the last decade. 
Figure 164. Corn stock-to-use ratio, 1960-2012 (%) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from USDA. 
A slightly downward trend in stock levels since the 1990s is also reflected in growing real prices 
in the last five years, close to the historical peak in the 1970s (Figure 165). 
Figure 165. Ending stock levels and real prices ($2005/tonne) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from World Bank and CME Group. 
Finally, freight and transportation costs of available corn are similar to other grains and beans, 
and therefore to other bulk commodities. Storability in the medium-to-long term for medium moisture 
content corn allows shipping of the commodity to main global ports and thus the development of 
international trade in the commodity.   198 | AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES 
 
4.2.1.1  Supply characteristics: the role of production convertibility 
The production of corn is not as capital intensive as for metal or crude oil production. However, over 
the years, land requires investments in production and processing of the commodity, usually right 
after harvesting. These investments can become an important part of the capital investments needed 
to run an agricultural company. For ethanol production, for instance, an additional refining process 
with  high  energy  and  water  consumption  is  required.  This  refining  process  requires  upfront 
investments  and  has  high  variable  costs,  but  it  may  be  outweighed  by  lower  dependence  on  oil-
refined products and so lower emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG). Corn production can be easily 
converted to other crops or alternative productions, which helps risk diversification for initial and on-
going investments. Due to the high convertibility of production, elasticity of supply to demand is 
fairly high. Supply capacity can rapidly change, which makes it easier to steer markets with direct 
interventions (such as government subsidies). For production of co-products such as ethanol (a fuel 
from renewable sources that has been developing rapidly in some oil-intensive economies), elasticity 
may be lower due to initial investments required to set up a plant for the refining process of corn and 
the transformation into ethanol. 
Production  costs  have  a  significant  impact  on  corn  production,  with  almost  balanced 
contributions of operating and non-operating costs to the total cost of production (Figure 166). Costs 
have been increasing in recent years, and in particular in 2011. 
Figure 166. Operating versus non-operating production costs ($ per planted acre) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from USDA. Note: US 2011 data. 
Main production costs were on the rise in 2011 due to higher fertilisers costs (as the crude oil 
price picked up) and also due to higher land opportunity costs (land rental rate) as the value of the 
land increases, ultimately affecting productivity and discouraging investments.   
 
Figure 167. Operating and non-operating production costs (% total) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from USDA. Note: US 2011 data. 
Operating costs for corn are essentially seed and fertilisers (and energy costs), between them 
making  up  79.49%  of  total  operating  costs,  while  non-operating  costs  are  heavily  affected  by  the 
opportunity  cost  of  the  land  and  the  capital  investment  required  for  machinery  and  equipment 
(together, 79.62% of total non-operating costs). These costs vary across regions, but it is a reasonable to 
take seed, fertilisers, machinery and opportunity costs as equivalent to total production costs in most 
of the countries. 
Increasing capital investments over the years (14.5% of total production costs in 2011) has led to 
an increase in the average size of farms and to gradual vertical integration. Greater market power and 
size also increases the benefits from subsidies programmes, which have become a key price driver in 
this market. As a consequence, a strong consolidation process has been led by the big grain processing 
companies, such as Cargill and ADM, also partly to meet biofuel mandates. Downstream has therefore 
become more concentrated, while upstream is still fairly fragmented, even though concentration is 
growing  as  farms  need  to  build  economies  of  scale  to  fully  benefit  from  subsidies  programmes 
(Elbehri et al., 2013). Due to the high amounts of corn used in biofuel production, consolidation is 
increasing in the farming sector to achieve higher economies of scale, which puts corn processing 
companies in an ideal position to integrate their business vertically as well. 
4.2.1.2  Demand characteristics: the biofuel driver 
On the demand side, elasticity of demand to prices is fairly high both for food uses (due to alternative 
products and its limited market size) and for ethanol use. For food and feed uses, demand is sustained 
by  both  advanced  and  emerging  economies,  both  for  the  intrinsic  value  of  co-products  and  for 
technological developments to increase yields and thus use of the land. Growing populations and 
urbanisation (as discussed in Section 4.1.2) will also have an important impact on future demand 
trends for corn. Consumption will continue to grow, though perhaps at a lower pace due to the caps 
introduced, or likely to be introduced, on corn production for biofuel targets (see Figure 168). 200 | AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES 
 
Figure 168. Future coarse grain* uses (kt) 
 
Note: Coarse grains generally refer to cereal grains other than wheat and rice — in the OECD countries, those 
used primarily for animal feed or brewing (OECD Glossary). 
Source: Author’s elaboration from OECD-FAO Stats. 
For ethanol use, much will depend  on costs of alternative fuels. Emerging markets  play an 
important role in driving demand as they mostly depend on fossil fuels. However, the development of 
alternative fuels is limited by their limited interest, in the current developing phase, in new models of 
growth  and  in  environmental  issues  with  their  long-term  implications  for  the  population.  Due  to 
potential consumption (growing population, biofuels) and production (vast uncultivated areas) levels, 
however, emerging markets may play an important role in supporting biofuel markets in the coming 
years.  Overall,  future  demand  and  production  will  still  be  driven  by  the  big  economies  and,  in 
particular, by the role that governments will give to the use of biofuels to reduce oil-dependence and 
gas emissions. In 2011, adjustments to government programmes and lower oil prices caused a slight 
decrease in the use of renewable sources for biofuels, which has been offset by 2012 production, and it 
is forecasted to increase significantly by 2021 (Figure 169). 
Figure 169. Renewable fuels sources (k/tonnes) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from OECD-FAO Stats.  
 
Corn will still play a crucial role in the renewable fuels sector in the coming years, even though 
the gradual end of subsidy programmes or programmes to develop alternative biofuels may stabilise 
or reduce corn production for renewable fuels over the next decade. Conflicts around the growth of 
corn-ethanol and the need to use land for food production have been long-standing and may reduce 
the weight of corn in non-food or feed uses in the coming years. However, biofuels production will 
continue  to  grow  and  prices  may  adjust  accordingly,  gradually  making  the  market  self-sustained 
(Figure 170). 
Figure 170. Ethanol and biodiesel production share (mn/litres) and prices 
(US$/100 litres on rhs) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from OECD-FAO Stats. 
In recent years, global corn production  has been  dependent on biofuel policies of  the main 
producing countries, with a resultant impact on corn prices. Lower stock levels and a following period 
of higher prices, coupled with recent droughts, have called into question direct interventions in these 
markets to promote biofuel production. Much of the future demand will arguably come from how 
governments  will  finally  reorient  their  policies  towards  developing  biofuels  markets  that  do  not 
(directly or indirectly) rely on agricultural commodities. 
Box 9. Current and future challenges for biofuels 
Biofuels  are  engine  or  heating  fuels  produced  from  renewable  sources.  Biofuel  production  has  been 
increasing since the beginning of the 21st century, when oil-dependent economies have started to look at 
energy diversification, reduction of CO2 emissions, and fostering development in rural areas through 
capital  investments  and  job  creation.  On  top  of  increasing  energy  independence,  studies  have  also 
proved that biofuels may yield more energy than fossil fuels (without taking into account indirect effects 
on  the  land  use;  Farrell  et  al.,  2006;  Lapan  and  Moschin,  2009).  Biofuels  can  be  split  into  two  main 
categories: ethanol and biodiesel. Both bioethanol and biodiesel can be used for low or high blending in 
gasoline or diesel (e.g. E85 or ED95), or as pure fuel such as 100% biodiesel fuels (B100). 
Ethanol is mainly produced from corn and sugar, and currently uses, for example, around 37% of 
coarse grain133 production in the United States (FAO, 2012, p. 103). Ethanol is usually mixed with motor 
fuels  to  reduce  the  polluting  impact  on  the  environment  and  increase  the  octane  rating  (and  so 
performance). In a slightly modified version, ethanol is used to produce alcoholic beverages. The ethanol 
                                                            
133 ‘Coarse grains’ generally refers to cereal grains other than wheat and rice — in the OECD countries, those used 
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production process entails different phases: 
  Cooking and liquefaction (first stage of saccharification). 
  Fermentation (second stage of saccharification of starches). 
  Distillation and dehydration (to remove water, CO2 and residuals used for animal food). 
This process needs energy and water, but it is produced along with other co-products that cover 
most of the production costs (as explained above).  
Figure 171. Ethanol production by regions, 2001-2012 (mn/litres) 
 
Note: 2012 data is an estimate. 
Source: Author’s elaboration from OECD-FAO Stats. 
Bioethanol  production  is  mainly  produced  in  countries  that  have  established  programmes  to 
subsidise production, directly or indirectly, for the indirect benefits, which are usually seen as public 
goods  (promoting  more  environmentally  friendly  energy  production  or  increasing  energy 
independence). While Brazil has been subsidising ethanol production since the second oil crisis at the 
end of the 1970s, mainly for main transport fuel, the US has only developed a bold subsidy programme 
since 2003, but by 2012 had become the top producer of ethanol in the world (Figure 171). 
By 2006, 75% of new cars manufactured in Brazil were flexible fuel vehicles (FFVs), using pure 
ethanol fuel, which causes conflicts with export uses for ethanol (Gee and McMeekin, 2010). 
Biodiesel is mainly produced from vegetable oils (such as those made from rapeseed and soybean) 
or fat-based oils (from animals). It is used as a pure motor fuel, in particular for some old diesel engines, 
or for heating systems. It has very low sulphur content, so it causes very limited abrasion or damage to 
engines  over  time.  Biofuel  oils  have  been  in  use  for  decades,  but  oil-based  diesel  has  been  always 
preferred to vegetable oils due to its low cost, in particular before governments started to pay attention to 
the environmental costs of emissions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 172. Biodiesel production by regions, 2001-2012 (mn/litres) 
 
Note: 2012 data is an estimate. 
Source: Author’s elaboration from OECD-FAO Stats. 
Over 90% of oil that comes from crushed seeds can be used as a fuel for diesel engines without 
further refining. Oil yields of seeds is about half that of oil to biodiesel. Biodiesel is extracted from oil 
through a catalyst (a strong alkaline), forming the mono-alkyl ester with the fatty acid. This process is 
called  ‘transesterification’.  There  are  three  main  products  from  the  process:  glycerine,  biodiesel,  and 
methanol  (recovered  from  the  removal  of  excess  alcohol).  Glycerine  is  used  in  the  pharmaceutical 
industry, while methanol is re-used within the same production process. 
New, alternative biofuels are emerging, thanks to new technologies, as countries strive to reduce 
dependence on agricultural products (with its indirect effects). As a result, there are several initiatives to 
develop  advanced  biofuels,  both  in  Europe  and  the  United  States.  Cellulosic  biomass,  which  can  be 
obtained from several plants (from mill residues, etc.), from wood/agri waste, and most recently from 
algae, may become a strategic feedstock for ethanol production. The United States, for instance, gives 
higher subsidies for biofuels produced from cellulosic biomass, which is likely become the main source 
of  biofuel  production.  It  is  also  a  greener  source  of  energy.  While  corn  ethanol  can  reduce  GHG 
emissions by 19%, cellulose can make this reduction up to 86% (USDA). However, a conflict may arise 
with forest-bioenergy and its impact on nature conservation; using forest residues complements farm 
landing and reduces fire risks, and so reduces the costs of fire prevention (Södeberg and Eckeberg, 2012).  
The transportation fuel mandate 
The  widespread  diffusion  of  biofuels  has  been  driven  by  mandates  to  reduce  oil  dependence  in 
transportation  fuels,  where  mainly  oil  gasoline  and  oil  diesel  products  are  used.  Ethanol’s  share  of 
gasoline transport fuel, for instance, will become significant both in Europe and the United States, but 
still  rather  low  in  comparison  to  the  high  share  reached  in  Brazil  over  the  years  (which  will  be 
unsustainable for them). 
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Figure 173. Ethanol share of gasoline transport fuel, 2009-11 and 2021 (%) 
 
Source: OECD-FAO Stats. 
Biodiesel will also partially replace oil diesel fuels, but its share will not go above 10% of total 
diesel fuels. 
Figure 174. Biodiesel share of diesel transport fuel, 2009-11 and 2021 (%) 
 
Source: OECD-FAO Stats. 
  
 
Partial replacement of oil-based transport fuels is a controversial objective, but is ‘achievable’ for 
governments. Overall, biofuels production will continue to increase, but will still remain low in relation 
to the corresponding amounts of oil consumed for energy purposes by the main countries. The scale of 
biofuels production is still insufficient to move prices of all underlying commodities and to transmit to 
their prices the instability of energy policies. However, only limited evidence has been found so far of a 
minimal impact of crude oil prices on corn prices (as a spillover effect of volatility from energy markets), 
even though this relationship could increase to cautionary levels in the coming years (see Section 4.2.3). 
Furthermore,  new  evidence  suggests  that  shocks  in  corn  prices  may  have  an  immediate  impact  on 
ethanol prices and so on energy diversification (Gardebroek and Hernandez, 2012).  
Ethanol  and  biodiesel  production,  in  tonnes  of  oil  equivalent  (7.15  barrels  of  oil  equals 
approximately 1 metric tonne), have grown exponentially in the last ten years, is still very low compared 
to oil production (Figure 175). For instance, ethanol and biodiesel production in North America is only 
2.3% of equivalent oil consumption. 
Figure 175. Ethanol and biodiesel production by regions (mn oil/tonnes equivalent) 
 
Source: BP. 
However, biofuels (mainly for transport fuels) play an important role in the growth of the sector 
since they have significantly increased the use of land for corn production despite increasing yields (in 
particular, in the United States where the percentage of corn for food and feed uses have been stable in 
recent years; Figure 176). This situation has raised questions about corn production sustainability, in 
particular in periods when droughts result in substantial cuts to food supply and lead to higher prices.134 
 
 
                                                            
134 In the aftermath of a long drought in 2012, which pushed food prices to higher levels, the United Nations 
called for the immediate suspension of biofuel production mandates in the United States (Horby, 2012). 206 | AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES 
 
Figure 176. Corn harvested areas (k/ha) 
 
Source: USDA. 
Increasing the harvested areas for corn also reduces access to land and raises conflicts with 
nature conservation and risk of deforestation. In some countries, the availability of land has become 
a  significant  issue.  As  a  result,  for  instance,  China  has  purchased  1.2  million  hectares  in  the 
Philippines, and South Korea has purchased 1.3 million hectares in Madagascar. 
 
4.2.1.3  Key product and market characteristics 
The product and market characteristics for corn can be summarised as follows: 
  Corn is a renewable commodity that has a potentially high number of substitutes. 
  It has high production convertibility, a high number of co-products with different uses, and 
limited capital use have gradually increased average farm size and shaped a vertically and 
horizontally integrated (with substitute products) supply structure. 
  For  products  requiring  low  moisture,  such  as  feedstock,  corn  can  be  easily  stored  for  long 
periods and so can be shipped worldwide in the international market as a bulky commodity. 
  International trade, however, has not developed at same speed of other markets, due to high 
internal demand for processed corn-based products and limited storability for high-moisture 
grains that are used for ethanol production and often processed after the harvesting. 
  As a result of these factors, both demand and supply elasticity tend to be very high for corn, 
causing their patterns to be less predictable and less stable than for other commodities. 
  Supply is fairly concentrated at the downstream level, while consolidation at the upstream level 
is still at an initial stage. 
  Emerging markets may be source of both  high demand and potentially  higher corn supply 
capacity, in particular through increasing yields, but currently have limited interest in biofuels 
and limited use for feed. 
  Overall, demand and production capacity may remain stable in the coming years, as corn-based 
biofuels and co-products suffer from structurally higher prices and policy decisions to manage 
lands in a more sustainable way.   
 
Table 62. Key product and market characteristics 
 
Recycling/ 
Production 
convertibility 
Substitutes/ 
Horizontal 
integration 
Alternative 
uses/ 
Vertical 
integration 
Capital 
intensive 
production 
Storability 
Freight 
costs 
incidence 
Elasticity 
to price/ 
demand 
Concen-
tration 
BRICs 
weight 
Future 
Consumption/ 
Production 
Demand 
side 
None  High  High 
Low/ 
Medium 
(ethanol) 
Medium  Medium 
High 
Medium 
High  Medium 
Supply 
side 
High  High  High  High 
Mediu
m 
Medium 
Source: Author. 
4.2.2  Exogenous factors: what role for government policies? 
Exogenous  factors  play  a  fundamental  role  in  corn  markets.  On  top  of  weather  events  such  as 
droughts or floods, which periodically affect products of the earth and have some effects on prices 
(see Section 4.2.3), there are two main external factors that drive corn prices: government interventions 
and crude oil prices. First, government subsidies to maize producers have been growing lately, both in 
China and the United States (Figure 177), while the European Union has stopped its direct subsidies 
programme for corn. 
Figure 177. US and Chinese support to maize producers, 1995-2011 ($mn) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from OECD-FAO Stats and OANDA (yearly average exchange rate). 
The  size  of  recent  Chinese  subsidies  for  maize  producers  may  suggest  a  change  of  policy 
towards a sustained programme of subsidies for Chinese corn production, which could signal, on the 
one hand, an effort to increase yields and land productivity in China and, on the other hand, the 
beginning of a massive plan of investments into biofuel markets. 
Government interventions in recent years have reached a more significant size and had a more 
significant effect on the biofuel market, through which they have been driving solid growth in corn 
production (Sorda et al., 2010; FAO, 2011). Intervention in the biofuel market is typically pursued 
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  Tax exemptions for biofuel products. 
  Quotas mandates (usually combined with tax exemptions or other subsidies). 
  Import tariffs. 
  Other forms of direct subsidies (e.g. loan programmes and grants). 
These  measures  have  been  the  catalyst  for  significant  changes  in  biofuel  production,  in 
particular as a blend for transport fuel. Brazil has perhaps the oldest subsidies programme, which 
began after the second oil crisis at the end of the 1970s. As a result, more than 75% of vehicles in the 
country can now run on bioethanol mainly produced from sugar canes (Moreira, 2006). However, 
since 2005 Europe and, most importantly (in terms of commitments), the United States have pushed 
through legislative process subsidies programmes that have radically changed the  landscape, and 
have made the latter the biggest ethanol producer in the world. 
The US Energy Policy Act in 2005 set for the first time the Renewable Fuels Standards (RFS), 
aimed  at  increasing  biofuels  production  between  2006  and  2012  to  7.5  billion  gallons  annually. 
However, in 2007 (with the Energy Independence and Security Act) this mandate was expanded (RFS 
2) to at least 10.5 billion gallons annually in 2009 and to 36 billion by 2022, with minimum GHG 
emissions reduction thresholds (a reduction of at least 20% of life-cycle GHG for corn-based biofuels, 
for instance). Taking stock from the debate over food versus fuel, a cap was introduced on corn-based 
ethanol  to  15  billion  gallons.  Additional  ethanol  production  would  need  to  come  from  cellulosic 
biomass (at least 16 billion gallons per year by 2022) and advanced biofuels (at least 4 billion gallons 
per year by 2022), in addition to biomass-based diesel (at least 1 billion gallons per year from 2012). 
The plan was implemented with an effective tax credit of 45 cents per gallon, and also discouraged 
ethanol imports with a tariff of 54 cents per gallon. 
In  Europe,  on  top  of  general  CAP  investments  in  agriculture,  there  are  national  subsidies 
coordinated  at  the  European  level  through  three  key  directives  (CrossBorder  Bioenergy  Working 
Group, 2012): 
1.  Renewable Energy Directive (2009/28), which sets a new target of 10% of renewable energy135 
in the transport sector by 2020 with rules on the calculation of GHG emissions and limited 
incentives for advanced biofuels, and lower thresholds in some countries. 
2.  Fuel Quality Directive (2009/30), a quality-based intervention to promote the blending of fuels 
and the reduction of GHG emissions by 6% per year, with 2010 as reference. 
3.  Energy  Taxation  Directive  (2003/96,  under  review),  with  criteria  for  tax  reduction  in  each 
country that does not reflect CO2 emissions (though this might change with the review) and that 
included a different approach for biofuels only in some countries. 
Overall, the application of mandates and tax reduction is very fragmented at the European 
level, which reduces the effectiveness of the programme. For instance, in Germany there is no direct 
support to get to a 6.25% target for biofuels in the transportation sector but there are tax breaks (to end 
in 2013 for biodiesel and 2015 for ethanol-blended fuels), while in Italy, the target for 2020 is 10%, up 
from 4.5% in 2012 (below the target set by the EU Directive) with no subsidies or tax breaks, only 
sanctions if producers don’t comply (CrossBorder Bioenergy Working Group, 2012).  
An  additional  exogenous  factor  is  the  growing  link  between  prices  and  crude  oil  prices, 
strengthened by the production mandates and tax breaks, in particular (Irwin and Good, 2009, Hertel 
and Beckman, 2011). As Figure 178 suggests, the correlation between crude oil and corn prices, usually 
positive or negative for short periods of time, seems to be have been consistently above 70% since 2007 
when the United States launched its subsidies programme.  
                                                            
135 The mandate of 5.75% by 2010 set by the 2003 version of the Directive was not met.  
 
Figure 178. Three-year rolling correlation with crude oil prices 
 
Source: Author’s calculation from World Bank. Note: crude oil is an average spot price. 
However,  despite  the  significant  impact  that  biofuel  policies  have  on  corn  production,  the 
empirical analysis (see Section 4.2.3) cannot establish a strong causal link between the two variables, 
even though they seem to move in the same direction. They could both be driven by the combined 
effect of exchange rates and the economic cycle. Marginal effects, however, can come from the impact 
of crude oil on fertilisers and transport fuels. 
Table 63. Key exogenous factors 
Government intervention  Main other external factors 
High  Weather, exchange rates, oil prices, fertilisers, lands value 
Source: Author. 
Finally, the value of land is another important exogenous factor. In fact, higher land values may 
lead to underinvestment in supply capacity and so to a sudden halt in, or inadequate, production 
levels (supply constraint) to adapt to changing demand. 
4.2.3  Empirical analysis: growing link with energy commodities? 
As  for  other  grains,  such  as  wheat,  the  empirical  analysis  is  complicated  by  a  combination  of 
endogenous  and  exogenous  factors  that  exert  similar  pressure  on  prices.  The  analysis  used  the 
following variables: 
  Log of monthly front-month CBOT corn price from 1990 to 2011 (US PPI). 
  Log of OECD indicator for US economy. 
  Log of Broad Dollar Index published by the Fed. 210 | AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES 
 
  Log of Palmer weather index.136 
The Dickey-Fuller test confirms that the corn price series is a unit root. First difference, though, 
does not show unit root. The test for arch effect in the series  excludes a GARCH model. Analysis of 
correlation and autocorrelation graphs confirms a seasonal path of six months. As was done for wheat, 
a seasonal autoregressive integrated moving average (SARIMA) appears to be  the best option. The 
seasonal of autocorrelation (ACF) seems to be decaying, while the partial autocorrelation (PACF) 
seems to cut off after two lags, leading  to the choice of a seasonal ARMA (2,0). The non -seasonal 
component of the ACF and PACF do es not show significant lags, which makes the ARIMA (0,1,0) 
good for this analysis. The combination of seasonal and non -seasonal components leads us to a 
SARIMA (2,1,0,6). 
Table 64. SARIMA outputs 
Independent variable  Coefficient (t) 
OECD demand 
6.37*** 
(2.71) 
Palmer Index 
.132* 
(1.88) 
Broad Dollar Index 
-.75* 
(-1.79) 
Note: *10% **5% and ***1% significance. See Output #42, Output #43, Output #44, and Output #46. 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
As  Table  64  illustrates,  corn  prices  are  strongly  linked  to  the  economic  cycle  and  so  to  the 
demand, with a solid positive relationship. The relationship with the dollar exchange-rate trend is also 
significant, but at 10% significance level, and inversely related to the corn price trend. The weather 
index has also an impact on prices, albeit small, while no meaningful relationship with crude oil was 
found at any level. Even though the variables have become more correlated recently, the long-term 
effects of this have not materialised yet and so are not sufficiently captured by log dataset.  
However, a volatility analysis137 (see Output #45) shows how the volatility of crude oil prices 
affects the volatility of corn prices. The  dataset is  shorter, from January 2002 to March 2012.  Even 
though coefficients are very low (.23), they are statistically significant and might confirm the argument 
that a relationship with crude oil prices is building up, but gets diluted on a broader sample, as new 
technologies and biofuel policies have only begun to influence these markets in recent years. 
An additional analysis was run to test links with inventories using the following dataset: 
  Log of monthly front-month CBOT corn real price from 2003 to 2011 (US PPI). 
  Log of CBOT inventories seasonally adjusted.138 
The SARIMA model seems to fit well, but with some adjustme nts. The seasonal component of 
ACF seems to be decaying while the PACF seems to cut off after the first leg, which leads to choosing 
the  seasonal  ARMA  (1,0).  The  non -seasonal  component  of  the  ACF  and  PACF  does  not  show 
significant lags, and so an ARIMA (0,1,0). 139 As a consequence, the SARIMA (1,1 ,0,6) finds a very 
small (.07) positive relationship between inventories and corn prices (see  Output #46), which gives 
support  to  the  conclusion  tha t  corn  inventories  are  simply  a  function  of  supply  and  demand 
interaction and cannot be controlled. So data on inventories may surprise markets in the short  term 
but they cannot be considered a crucial  long-term driver of price formation. However, inventor ies 
                                                            
136 It is an indicator widely used in the US markets that shows how monthly moisture weather conditions change, 
whether causing drought or highly wet periods. A constant is added to account for negative values in logarithmic 
transformation. 
137 Volatility has been calculated as the logarithm of the ratio between current price and the price of the previous 
observation. It is essentially a logarithm of the daily difference between prices. 
138 With X12 ARIMA software. 
139 (0,1,0)*(1,1,0)6 = SARIMA (1,1,0,6)  
 
show some reaction to the shape of the futures curve. Seasonally adjusted inventories have dropped to 
their lowest level in decades, as the futures curve has turned backwardated (with a high convenience 
yield) due to constant high demand and the inability of supply capacity to keep up (Figure 179). 
Figure 179. Fourth-month basis and seasonally adjusted inventories, 2003-2012 
(cent/bu, kbushels) 
 
Note: Monthly data. ‘Fourth month basis’ is the differential between front-month and fourth month futures contract. 
Source: Author’s elaboration from CME Group.  
Nevertheless, the relationship between corn prices and S&P 500 is assessed to verify a links 
with financial indexes. As Output #46 shows, the SARIMA (2,1,0,6) suggests that the corn price (as a 
dependent variable) is positively linked with the S&P 500 (with a coefficient of .50). However, by 
modelling the inverse with GARCH model (1,1),140 S&P 500 (as dependent variable) is also positively 
related to the corn price (with a coefficient of .12). To confirm the relationship, an additional analysis 
may be needed. As illustrated  earlier in this report, the joint impact of exchange rates and interest 
rates (mainly driven by monetary policies) , on top of the effects linked to the economic cycle,  may 
have caused these markets to become more heavily interlinked (a pooling effect). This analysis is again 
confirmed by splitting the dataset into two periods (1990-2001 and 2002-2011). Linear regressions of 
differentiated levels show no relationship before 2002 and a statistically significant link with a positive 
sign after 2002 (see Output #50). 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
140 S&P 500 is a non-stationary variable, but becomes stationary if it is differentiated. The test for ARCH effect in 
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Table 65. Linear regressions outputs 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 
D.lnspot  D.lnspot  D.lnspot  D.lnspot  D.lnspot 
D.lnindex  0.326***  0.0144  0.0257  -0.0145  -0.00616 
 
(0.0945)  (0.105)  (0.102)  (0.0993)  (0.0999) 
D.lncommercial 
 
0.514***  0.463***  0.469***  0.471*** 
   
(0.0902)  (0.0879)  (0.0854)  (0.0861) 
D.lnsp500 
   
0.472***  0.275***  0.278** 
     
(0.0995)  (0.105)  (0.108) 
D.lncrudeoil 
     
0.263***  0.260*** 
       
(0.0536)  (0.0575) 
D.lnDollar 
       
-0.0534 
         
(0.244) 
Constant  0.00281  0.00270  0.00275  0.00234  0.00229 
 
(0.00291)  (0.00277)  (0.00268)  (0.00262)  (0.00265) 
            Observations  312  312  312  307  303 
R-squared  0.037  0.128  0.188  0.247  0.245 
Note: standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Tests for the linear regression 5 are available in 
the Annex (Output #51).  
Source: Author’s calculation. 
Finally, a dataset of monthly data for commodities  index and commercial positions in corn 
futures contracts was extracted from CFTC data for the period January 2006 to March 2012. Both the 
commercial (short) and index (long) positions appears to be significantly and positively linked to corn 
prices, but the impact is small (respectively with coefficients of .52 and .31; see Output #48 and Output 
#49). However, Granger causality does not confirm the relationship. This may partially rule out, at 
least for corn markets, the idea that futures markets drive prices in underlying physical markets. If 
they produce an impact, as it should be the case, this impact does not alter the structure of underlying 
physical markets because of its negligible intensity.  
 
 
 
Table 65 confirms this earlier analysis. Index positions for corn are only statistically significant if 
taken separately from other relevant variables. 
By adding more variables, such as commercial positions, S&P 500 and crude oil prices, index 
positions constantly lose significance. Commercial positions, instead, show a constant significance, 
which points at the importance of commercial positions as key drivers of price formation for front-
month futures contracts. The analysis thus confirms previous results in this report about the limited 
role of index positions in futures markets price formation mechanisms. 
4.2.4  Market organisation: what future for international markets? 
Pricing of physical transactions is typically not complex and relies on bilateral contracts between one 
or more farmers and a bigger commodity firm processing the commodity and distributing it to the 
market. These contracts may rely on the price of a global benchmark contract, which may often be a 
second  or  third  available  month  futures  contract  (especially  when  the  commodity  is  sold  with  a 
discount before harvesting). These types of contracts are not disclosed but are the result of legitimate 
OTC commercial bilateral transactions. The futures market, on the other hand, is highly liquid and 
traded on a fully transparent electronic platform in Chicago and delivered in the United States (in six  
 
warehouse locations). Another exchange-traded futures contract is available in Europe (LIFFE) for 
European corn with similar characteristics to the CBOT corn futures contract, which is then delivered 
to sponsored warehouses located in the region. The European futures contract, however, is a newer 
and much less liquid contract, partly due to its commitment not to accept GMO corn for delivery.  
New futures contracts have also been developed in China (at the Dalian Commodity Exchange) and in 
Brazil  (on  BM&FBOVESPA),  but  these  do  not  exhibit  the  same  liquidity  patterns  as  other  globally 
recognised  benchmarks.  However,  as  the  respective  countries  overcome  hurdles  to  ensure  legal 
certainty and financial stability, and with a more stable currency, these futures markets are most likely 
to become fierce competitors of European and US peers. As advanced countries remain the biggest 
consumption  areas,  however,  the  development  of  local  contracts  in  these  countries  is  a  natural 
outcome that will continue to be central in the future. 
As for other coarse grains, an international market has developed thanks to big trading houses 
using scale to promote cross-border flows by reducing handling and transportation costs. Some of the 
international  trade  is  done  through  international  auctions  in  sealed  envelopes  delivered  to  main 
government  bodies  in  charge  of  delivering  or  purchasing  the  commodity  in  global  markets  (as 
explained in Section 4.1.4). As a consequence, while local markets have some degree of competition 
due to the limited concentration of the upstream part of the market, the international market – due to 
the scale needed to have a commercially viable business – is much more concentrated and sees few 
global players involved. The situation, aggravated by government subsidies to fulfil significant biofuel 
mandates,  certainly  puts  pressure  on  the  upstream  to  consolidate  as  well  as  to  become  more 
productive. This process may also cause a potential reduction in diversification of product varieties 
and  a  drop  in  general  investments  in  rural  areas  across  regions,  as  investments  will  be  more 
concentrated in high-yielding arable lands mainly run by big farming companies. 
Table 66. Market organisation factors 
Physical market 
setting 
Pricing 
complexity 
Liquidity futures 
market 
Delivery 
points 
Competitive (local) 
Oligopolistic (global) 
Low  High 
Limited 
(US, EU [France], China) 
Source: Author. 
Finally, this market organisation suggests a market that strives to soften the complex effects of a 
web of exogenous factors with liquid futures markets and growing consolidation. Due to the lack of 
control over supply, and  so limited control over inventories, futures markets are essential for the 
upstream market, which provides some of the stability that participants in this market are always 
looking for.  
4.3  Soybean oil 
Soybean oil is extracted from soybean seeds and it is one of the most widely used edible vegetable oil 
with a 28% share (Figure 180), just behind the high-yield palm oil. In 2012, over 43 million tonnes were 
produced with a value of more than $53 billion.141 It represents 16.3% in equivalent  soybean crop 
production, out of  the 18% of crude soybean oil that can be  theoretically extracted from a soybean, 
which results in over 90% of soybeans being processed to extract oil.  
                                                            
141 Data on production from USDA and on 2012 average nominal annual price from World Bank Commodities 
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Figure 180. Vegetable oils,* 1997-2012 (kt) 
 
Note: *Vegetable oil is defined as rapeseed oil (canola), soybean oil, sunflower seed oil and palm oil, except in 
Japan where it excludes sunflower seed oil. 
Source: Author’s elaboration from FAO Stats and OECD-FAO Stats. 
Soybean oil is used in multiple applications, including cooking oil, industrial food applications, 
oil paints, pharmaceutical products, printing inks (for its dehydrating properties), and biofuels. Non-
food uses, which include biodiesel production, make up roughly one-third of total soybean oil uses 
(Figure 181). 
Figure 181. Soybean oil uses 
 
Note: 2009 data. 
Source: Author’s elaboration from FAO Stats. 
In  developing  economies  where  a  combination  of  growing  urbanisation  and  oil-intensive 
economies  emerges,  such  as  China,  this  commodity  may  become  of  primary  importance  for  the 
development of industrial food and transport fuels, i.e. for energy and food security. More developed 
countries, instead, may aim at more sustainable transport fuels by promoting the use of alternative 
sources (biodiesel). Price patterns have in part reflected these fundamental developments. After the 
second oil crisis, real prices dropped drastically and reached a trough in the second half of the 1980s, 
as the situation stabilised. Prices then stayed within a low range until the beginning of 2000s, when 
they gradually rose due to soaring demand from China (first) and Brazil (afterwards), both for food 
and biofuel uses (Figure 182).  
 
Figure 182. Soybean oil real prices (annual, $2005/tonne) 
 
Source: World Bank. 
The development of sophisticated production processes that allow the extraction of several co-
products from crude soybean oil refining is increasing the appetite for the commodity, even though 
substitutes (such as palm  oil) are gradually increasing their  market share due to higher  yields of 
production. 
4.3.1  Product and market characteristics: the key role of by-products 
Soybean oil is derived from soybeans. Soybean seeds, however, are not oil crops. The oil content is 
estimated at around 18%. An average of 5 kg of crude soybean oil can be extracted from one bushel 
(27.7 kg) of soybeans (Hammond et al., 2005), but most of it would be soybean meal with high protein 
content ( 
Table 67). The quality of the oil and the quantity of proteins can vary depending on the location of the 
cultivation area, the weather, and so on, which is reflected in a premium discounted or charged over a 
reference price.  
Table 67. Soybean seed key components 
1 Bushel of Soybeans (27.7kg)  Weight (kg)  Relative weight (%) 
Soybean oil  5  18.1 
Soybean meal  20.1  72.6 
Soybean hulls  1.5  5.4 
Source: Adapted from Hammond et al. (2005). 
Seed productivity is key for the future development of the market. Assuming that each soybean 
contains 18% of crude oil and that no oil is wasted in the refining process, roughly 90% of soybean 
produced in 2012 was treated in a process involving the production of oil. Therefore, even though is 
not an oil crop, the oil component of soybean is key for the commercial profitability of its production. 
As show in Figure 183, Soybean oil production requires two key processes: soybean processing, 
and soybean oil refining. Oil can be extracted from soybeans in at least in three ways (Hammond et 
al.,  2005).  Two  of  the  three  methods  involve  a  screw-press  (expeller)  and  are  ideal  for  small 
productions, since they require low capital investments and can flexibly adapt to production levels. 
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Figure 183. Soybean oil production steps 
 
Source: Author. 
The most widely used way of processing soybeans is through the use of solvents (Hammond et 
al., 2005; Li et al., 2006), which also allows the production of several co-products, making soybean oil 
production more profitable. This process is ideal for large quantities as it provides very high yields 
and minimal product waste. Some capital investment is required, though, in terms of energy costs, 
machinery,  and  labour  force.  The  extraction  process  with  solvents  (typically  hexane  or  another 
petroleum solvent) requires some pre-processing, such as mechanical cleaning of foreign matters (e.g. 
stones)  and  dehulling  (by  removing  hulls,  to  reduce  fibres  content  and  minimise  external 
contamination). Beans are then heated and cut into flakes, to be immerged in hexane, which is then 
removed  through  evaporation.  The  soy  oil,  free  of  hexane,  is  then  further  purified  of  soluble 
impurities through filtration or other methods (e.g. bleaching with activated earth).  Hydrogenation 
may take place for oil with more saturated fats for food uses. The results of this processing are crude 
oil and oil cakes, which are then transformed into defatted soybean meal, ideal specifically for high-
protein feed. 
After extraction, crude soybean oil is then refined to remove components affecting its quality, 
such as free fatty acids and unsaponifiable  matter.  The results  of this process are refined oil and 
lecithin  (by  degumming  heated  oil  with  water  and  centrifugation),  which  is  used  both  in  the 
pharmaceutical and food industries (Hammond et al., 2005). Neutralisation with sodium hydroxide, 
bleaching with acid earth, and the use of hydrogen gas and a catalyst produce a semi-solid plastic fat 
for food (e.g. for shortenings  or confectionary fats) and cooking  oil.  Finally, after these  steps, the 
injection of steam (from special water) into soybean oil produces a polished salad and cooking oil. 
This process requires a fair amount of energy and has an environmental impact due to the use of 
solvents and acid exhalations. 
Both in oil extraction and refining processes, there is a list of co-products that are produced in 
addition to oil: 
1.  High-protein feed (for the animal industry). 
2.  Semi-solid meal (for adhesive, etc.). 
3.  Shortenings and other vegetable fats (for the food industry, e.g. in margarine). 
4.  Lubricants and oleochemicals (for resins, bioplastics, cosmetics, pharmaceuticals, paint, etc.). 
5.  Methylesters and glycerine (for biofuel production and pharmaceuticals, respectively). 
Items  3  and  4  are  direct  co-products  of  oil  refining  operations,  which  makes  soybean  oil  a 
commercially  viable  business,  while  item  5  is  a  derived  product  of  further  soybean  oil  refining.  
Another profitable use of soybean oil is  in the production of biofuels, and in particular biodiesel. 
Typically, soybean oil can be transformed, through the ‘transesterification’ process (which involves 
methanol and a catalyst, often sodium hydroxide), into methylesters (or esters) (86%), alcohol (4%), 
fertilisers (1%), and glycerine (9%), which is distilled and bleached for pharmaceutical applications (Li 
et al., 2006). Biodiesel production has been a key driver of growth for soybean oil in recent years. 
Historically a cheap way to produce biofuels and other industrial food and feed products, soybean oil 
today faces harsh competition from multiple oil substitutes, such as canola, palm and sunflower. For 
industrial food and feed, strong competition comes from corn co-products, such as dried distillers 
grains  with  solubles  (DDGS).  Soybean  biodiesel  is  both  renewable  and  economically  sustainable, 
considering the energy inputs (Pradhan et al., 2008), but lack of investment in new technologies (such 
as  fertilisers,  GMO  seeds),  which  have  been  massive  in  corn  markets,  may  gradually  reduce  its 
commercial viability.   
 
Production and consumption 
Global  soybean  oil  production  is  one  of  the  largest  of  any  oilseed,  with  over  40  million  tonnes 
produced per year (soybeans make up over 37% of total primary production of oil crops). Its growth 
has been impressive, in particular in the last decade and with the new developments in renewable fuel 
applications. Subject to strong supply/demand instability during the 1970s and 1980s, soybean oil 
production has steadily grown in the last two decades, with minimal swings in net production (rarely 
above 3% of total production; Figure 184). 
Figure 184. Historical production, consumption and net production (kt, %) 
 
Source: Author’s calculation from USDA.  
The  world’s  biggest  producers  are  China,  the  United  States,  Argentina,  and  Brazil,  which 
between them produce over 79% of all soybean oil (Figure 185). While production is concentrated in a 
few regional areas, especially where co-products can be usefully allocated to other uses, consumption 
is fairly spread out across the world, with China  not surprisingly  at the  head (with  more  or less 
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Figure 185. Top ten producer (left) and consumer (right) countries, 2012 (kt) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from USDA. 
Technological developments are key factors for a market that faces important challenges and 
competition from substitute markets, such as corn. For at least a decade, a big part of the soybean 
production  has  come  from  genetically  modified  seeds  largely  used  to  increase  yields.  As  a 
consequence,  despite  countries  in  the  European  Union  banning  GMO  production,  77%  of  world 
soybean cultivation was based on GMO seeds in 2009, with 91% in the United States and almost 100% 
in Argentina.   
Table 68. Soybeans GMO ratios 
 
Year  Cultivation Area in Million Hectares 
    Total Soybean  GM Soybean  GM Ratio 
Worldwide 
1997  67  5.1  7.6% 
2008  91  65.8  72% 
2009  90  69  77% 
USA 
1997  25.7  3.6  4% 
2008  30.1  27.7  92% 
2009  31  28.6  91% 
Argentina 
1997  6.2  1.4  22.6% 
2008  16.4  16.2  99% 
2009  17.5  17.4  99% 
Brazil 
1999  13  1.4*  10% 
2007  22.5  14.5  64% 
2009  23  16.2  71% 
Note: * 1999-2002 illegal cultivation of GM soybeans, estimated data. 
Source: GMO-Compass.org. 
 
    
 
Since genetic engineering reduces costs and increases yields at the same time, there have been 
important positive developments over the years. However, in the last decade, the increase in yields 
has  stagnated  (perhaps  due  to  lack  of  investments  and  soaring  land  value),  leaving  space  for 
substitute markets to develop (such as palm fruit for oil production) and for new cultivation areas in 
Africa and Asia that are currently highly underdeveloped in terms of yields (Figure 186). 
Figure 186. Soybean yields, 1961-2011 (by regions) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from FAO Stats. 
The  lack  of  technological  developments  and  the  increase  in  land  value  in  recent  years,  in 
particular for soybean markets, are also reflected in a slight growth in harvested areas (which may 
also reflect the inability of yields to keep growing) and a steady yield level. In the United States, the 
ethanol mandate and subsidies have caused a drop in soybean production and a switch to higher-
yielding corn (Goldsmith, 2008; Figure 187). 
As  a  consequence,  the  market  may  undergo  some  years  of  new  challenges  for  production 
capacity and further development of physical market infrastructures. 
Figure 187. US soybean harvested areas (acres) and yields (Bu/acre) 
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Source: Author’s elaboration from USDA. 
International trade 
As a reflection of the production structure, exports are also concentrated, with Argentina and Brazil 
responsible for roughly 64% of global exports. Imports, instead, are spread across several countries, 
with China and India the leading importers. 
Figure 188. Top ten Importers (left) and exporters (right), 2012 (kt) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from USDA. 
Due  to  high  domestic  consumption  for  the  many  applications  in  which  soybean  crops  are 
involved, international trade (exports) is roughly 20.9% of global yearly production, or roughly $9.2 
billion. In recent years, international trade has reached peaks as high as 45% of yearly production, but 
after the development of significant biofuel subsidies and additional growth of domestic demand for 
alternative uses (e.g. in high-protein feed), volumes dropped to the level of the late 1990s (Figure 189). 
As production in the United States and China is allocated mainly for internal consumption, the 
global market for soybean oil is led by Argentina and Brazil, since their economies can also absorb less 
of  the  commodity  for  alternative  applications  to  food  use,  such  as  pharmaceuticals  or  advanced 
industrial food use. 
Figure 189. Value and share of international trade 
 
Source: Author’s calculation from USDA and World Bank.   
 
Storage 
Soybean oil can be stored in a dark, dry place and for no longer than one year (if not refrigerated). 
Transport, usually through trains or ships, is a relevant but not a major component of total cost in 
international  trade.  Certainly,  the  particular  characteristics  of  oil  storage,  which  requires  constant 
control of the (low) temperature and oxygen levels, can become a disincentive for international trade if 
not done in high volumes. 
Storage has been increasing over the long term, due to the accumulation of surpluses (especially 
at the beginning of 2000s), but with the development of new biofuel policies and growth of global 
demand driven by China, stock levels have halved since their historical peak in 2006 (Figure 190). 
Figure 190. Net production and global ending stocks, 1964-2012 (kt) 
 
Source: Author’s calculation from USDA. 
These recent developments are also reflected in a falling stock-to-use ratio, a joint effect of a 
reduction  in  production  capacity  (driven  by  yields)  and  growing  demand  led  by  both  emerging 
markets and government policies (Figure 191). 
Figure 191.Soybean oil stock-to-use ratio, 1964-2012 (%) 
 
Note: Global ending stocks over domestic consumption. 222 | AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES 
 
Source: Author’s calculation from USDA. 
As stock levels represent the reaction function of supply and demand patterns, real prices seem 
to broadly follow the path laid down over the years. As recent stock levels have been consistently 
dropping to a historical low in terms of stock-to-use ratios, prices are gradually picking up and, since 
2006, have moved far from the stable range in which they have been moving for two decades. As a 
reaction function of supply and demand, soybean oil inventories will continue to adjust to underlying 
factors shaping the market. 
4.3.1.1  Supply characteristics: the weight of non-operating costs 
Supply  structure  is  affected  by  the  ability  to  make  best  use  of  co-products  generated  by  soybean 
processing  and  of  soybean  oil  products  afterwards.  However,  soybean  oil  has  a  different  supply 
structure  from  raw  soybean  production.  The  production  of  soybean  oil  (with  its  specific  refining 
process) cannot be easily  converted to alternative products, and plants are usually designed  with 
limited  convertibility  to  alternatives  but  with  high  flexibility  to  volumes  of  inputs.  As  for  other 
agricultural commodities, industry structure includes local producers that are typically mono-product 
and  big  commodity  firms  that  are  often  horizontally  and  vertically  integrated.  Nonetheless,  local 
farms are increasingly consolidating and investing in new technologies to benefit from the economies 
of scale needed to profit from domestic and international trade.  
Elasticity of supply to demand changes depends on the level of fixed costs, which are very low. 
The dependence on variable costs due to the adaptable supply of soybeans or crude oil and low fixed 
costs makes supply highly responsive to new demand patterns. This structure allows flexibility to 
sudden changes in the production of the coarse grain. 
Figure 192. Operating versus non-operating production costs in the United States ($ per planted acre) 
 
Note: 2011 US production data. 
Source: Author’s elaboration from USDA. 
As soybean oil supply is closely intertwined with supply in the upstream market for soybean, 
costs of soybean production and processing may be important drivers of spillover effects on soybean 
oil  markets.  The  main  production  costs  may  vary  from  country  to  country;  in  the  United  States, 
soybean production costs are chiefly affected by non-operating factors, which make up over 65% of 
total production costs (Figure 192). This greatly exposes the commodity to exogenous factors, such as 
the economic cycle and monetary policies. Total costs therefore increased when energy prices and the 
economic cycle largely picked up during 2011 and 2012. 
The breakdown of total costs shows the dominant impact of opportunity costs for the foregone 
rental rate of the land (which has been substantially growing for over a decade), seed and fertilisers, 
and capital invested in machinery and equipment (Figure 193). Opportunity cost is the cost factor that  
 
moves most quickly and that distinguishes production across countries. These are very high in the 
United  States,  where  land  can  be  quickly  reallocated  to  other  productive  use  (Goldsmith,  2008). 
Opportunity cost is much lower in Brazil, in contrast, as options for alternative production with the 
same or higher profitability are very limited. This may put Brazil and Argentina at a competitive 
advantage versus more developed economies. Higher land values may ultimately affect productivity 
by discouraging investments.  
Figure 193. Operating and non-operating production costs in the United States (% of total) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from USDA. Note: US 2011 data. 
The role of capital investments, which account for over 20% of total US production costs in 2011, 
is an important sign that the industry may continue to consolidate and to seek greater economies of 
scale and vertical integration. 
4.3.1.2  Demand characteristics: biofuel policies and emerging markets 
Soybean oil demand is very diversified, depending on the use to be made of the commodity. The 
growing importance of soybean oil in the biodiesel industry has partially lowered elasticity of demand 
to price for this type of use. However, elasticity is still high as several other vegetable oils can be used 
for biodiesel production and the inputs for industrial food use comes into competition with several 
other commodities. 
Among the biggest producers, emerging markets are significant consumers of soybean oil for 
food uses. Soy oil consumption for biofuels uses (biodiesel) is less important, at this stage of these 
countries’  development.  Since  the  beginning  of  the  2000s,  China  in  particular  (and  more  recently 
Brazil) has been a driving factor for global demand, and its consumption today is well above that of 
the United States due to growing food consumption and the relative size of their populations. Despite 
biofuels mandates, consumption in Europe has continued to drop, also partly due to bans against 
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Figure 194. Soybean oil consumption levels (kt) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from USDA. 
As suggested by  FAO statistics (Figure 195), consumption will continue to experience solid 
growth in the coming years, and may be driven by emerging markets that still have modest pro capita 
consumption of food derived from soybean oil, as well as of high-protein feed for the animal industry. 
Figure 195. Future vegetable oils* consumption (kt) 
 
Note: *Vegetable oil is defined as rapeseed oil (canola), soybean oil, sunflower seed oil and palm oil, except in 
Japan where it excludes sunflower seed oil. 
Source: Author’s elaboration from OECD-FAO Stats. 
The many industrial food applications to meet  the  growing demand for protein to feed the 
animal industry in emerging markets and the vegetarian market in advanced countries will inevitably 
put pressure on demand in the coming years. However, much will depend on the conflicts arising 
with substitute commodities and the continuation of biofuel mandates and subsidies policies. The 
final use of soy oil for biodiesel has constantly increased over the years and will perhaps continue to 
do  so  (Figure  196).  The  fuel  can  be  used  alone  (B100)  or  mixed  with  petro-diesel.  As  for  ethanol 
production, biodiesel ensures lower costs of production and less gas emissions. However, it deviates 
production away from food uses, as well requiring the use of vast cultivable areas. The attractiveness 
of using soybean oil for biodiesel production is in the high yield (98%) of soybean oil that is usually 
transformed in biodiesel.  
 
Figure 196. Future vegetable oils biodiesel and food uses (kt) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from OECD-FAO Stats. 
Soy oil has many substitute oils, such as canola, palm, corn, olive, sunflower, and rapeseed, 
which  may  limit  its  future  developments.  However,  soybean  oil  has  historically  been  a  cheap 
alternative  for  food  and  other  uses  (biofuels),  even  though  in  recent  years  prices  have  gradually 
adjusted to soaring demand.  Higher production yields are needed to meet future demand with the 
same or even less cultivation area. As a result, the market may show a fair amount of instability and, if 
the price of soybeans continues to grow, it may become difficult to ensure profitability since oil is only 
one in a long list of co-products derived from soybeans.  
4.3.1.3  Key product and market characteristics 
Product and market characteristics shape soybean oil markets in a way that exposes the commodity to 
several external factors, as with other agricultural commodities. Despite the importance of external 
variables, endogenous factors are key drivers in this market.  In particular, soybean oil exhibits a list of 
important product and market characteristics: 
  Soybean oil is a renewable commodity and several alternative uses can be made of it. 
  Convertibility  of  production  to  alternative  products  is  limited  to  perhaps  some  alternative 
oilseeds. 
  Capital investments are required, but fixed operating costs are low. 
  The value of underlying land is an important factor that contributes, with production costs of 
substitutes such as corn, to increasing the contribution needed to meet total costs.  
  International  trade  has  experienced  a  drop  in  absolute  values  in  recent  years,  but  its 
development mainly depends on dealing with the on-going variable costs for storage, freight 
costs,  and  risk  management  (mainly  currency  and  price  risk),  which  may  impede  further 
growth. 
  Supply appears very integrated horizontally, but only partially integrated at the vertical level 
with strict links among farmers and trading houses. 
  Low concentration at the farm level is counterbalanced by the growing average size of farms, 
and higher concentration at the processing and refining level to reap the benefits of economies 
of scale and scope in international markets. 
  Due to the large number of co-products and their ability to substitute soybean oil in feed and 
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  The  supply  side  also  shows  high  elasticity  to  demand  patterns,  mainly  due  to  low  fixed 
production costs. 
  High demand from emerging markets will continue, both for food and feed uses, but also for 
biodiesel production especially if government subsidies programmes continue; 
  Emerging markets may be a source of high demand and potentially higher soybean oil supply 
capacity, in particular if increases in their yields keep up with those of other global regions. 
  Future demand and production capacity may grow at a stable rate in the coming years, as 
competitive pressure from substitutes grows and policy decisions for more sustainable land 
management develop further.  
Table 69. Product and market characteristics 
 
Recycling/ 
Production 
convertibility 
Substitutes/ 
Horizontal 
integration 
Alternative 
uses/ 
Vertical 
integration 
Capital 
intensive 
production 
Stora-
bility 
Freight 
costs 
incidence 
Elasticity 
to price/ 
demand 
Concen-
tration 
BRICs 
weight 
Future 
Consumption/ 
Production 
Demand 
side 
None  High  High 
Medium  Medium  Medium 
High 
Medium 
High  High 
Supply 
side 
Low  High  High  High  High  High 
Source: Author. 
4.3.2  Exogenous factors: grasping the complex interaction 
As with other agricultural commodities, even though a derived product, soybean oil is affected by 
several exogenous factors. Among these, government intervention is again a key factor. In particular, 
interventions in recent years have been directed towards subsidies and direct investments for the 
production  of  biodiesel  from  this  vegetable  oil.  Even  with  these,  the  question  has  been  raised  of 
whether agricultural commodities should in the end be diverted from food uses. The use for biofuels 
will increase even further to meet fuel mandates in diesel blending (as discussed in Box 9). The risk 
that external factors (such as oil prices) may cause additional supply constraints, and consequently 
impact on food prices, is becoming non-negligible (see Section 4.3.3). 
Other external factors impacting on soybean oil prices are: the costs of fertilisers (which depend 
highly on crude oil prices and so may transfer this dependence to the price of soybean oil; EU COM, 
2012); weather conditions (less predictable, more variable); and the value of the land, which may lead 
to structural underinvestment. Links with crude oil prices are gradually increasing. Whether this is 
through  the  common  impact  of  the  economic  cycle  or  through  biofuel  policies  needs  further 
investigation, but certainly the link with crude oil prices has been strengthening in recent years (see 
Section 4.3.3). 
As suggested in Figure 198, soybean oil prices are becoming increasingly positively correlated 
with crude oil prices at a pace and strength that the market has rarely experienced before, certainly 
not for such a prolonged period.  
On top of biofuels mandates and subsidies, which are tying market up with crude oil prices, 
China  and  the  United  States  in  particular  have  solid  programmes  of  subsidies  for  soybean  oil 
producers based on past production (US) or for direct market price support (China). Intervention has 
been more consistent in the last four years (Figure 197).  
 
Figure 197. Chinese and US support to soybean producers (US$/mn) 
 
Note: Producer single commodity transfers. 
Source: Author’s elaboration from OECD-FAO Stats.  
The European Union, instead, has removed subsidies based on the nature of the commodity 
produced, whether based on reference production or to sustain market prices. Transfers are directly 
done to the producer of any commodity under the remit of the CAP. Furthermore, there are additional 
exogenous factors, such as costs of fertilisers, value of the land (as described in previous sections) and 
weather, which can impact prices with significant effects. 
Table 70. Key exogenous factors 
Government intervention  Main other external factors 
High  Weather, exchange rates, oil prices, fertilisers, lands value 
Source: Author. 
4.3.3  Empirical analysis: what impact for biofuel policies? 
The empirical analysis for soybean oil, as for other coarse grains such as corn, is a difficult exercise 
due to a complicated web of endogenous and exogenous factors that exert simultaneous pressures on 
prices. The analyses below rely on the following dataset of monthly data: 
  Log  of  monthly  third-month  CBOT  soybean  oil  futures  real  prices  from  31/01/1990  to 
30/03/2012 (deflated with US PPI) as dependent variable. 
  Log of OECD indicator for the US and Chinese economy. 
  Log of Broad Dollar Index published by the Fed. 
  Log of Palmer weather index (to which a constant is added to account for negative values in 
logarithmic transformation). 
The basic ARCH (autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity) model used in this estimation 
helps to handle the fact that the error term is normally distributed and heteroskedastic. ARCH effects 
also confirm the use of an ARCH (1) model to understand the impact of key variables on soybean oil 
prices.142  
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Table 71. ARCH analysis outputs 
Independent variable  Coefficient (t) 
China OECD 
2.62** 
(2.43) 
Palmer index (lag1) 
-.012*** 
(-3.19) 
Broad Dollar Index 
-1.09*** 
(-2.74) 
Crude oil 
.078* 
(1.88) 
Note: *10% **5% and ***1% significance. Note: see Output #52 and Output #53. 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
The  dollar  exchange  rate  and  Chinese  demand  are  two  key  drivers  of  price  formation  for 
soybean oil, with solid coefficients above 1, which confirms the joint impact of monetary policies (and 
the  financial  crisis)  and  emerging  markets  demand  for  soybean  oil  markets.  In  addition,  the 
commodity reacts (though the link is very small) to weather conditions and crude oil prices, which 
shows that the combination of biofuel policies and tools based on petroleum products are gradually 
creating a direct link between the commodity price formation and crude oil prices. In fact, this is also 
confirmed  by  Output  #54,  which  shows  how  crude  oil  prices  Granger-cause  soybean  oil  price 
volatility at 10% significance. 
The relation of soybean oil prices with financial indexes confirms the analysis on the impact of 
the  financial  system  on  commodities  markets.  On  the  one  hand,  the  three-year  rolling  correlation 
shows a clear path towards a structurally higher positive correlation (up to 90%!; Figure 198). 
Figure 198. Three-year rolling correlation with S&P 500, January 1980 – April 2012 
 
Note: monthly data. 
Source: Author’s calculation from CME Group (CBOT) and Yahoo Finance. 
On the other hand,  Output #55 shows  how soybean oil  prices and  the  S&P 500 are tightly 
interlinked. This confirms that the two variables have been placed in a close relationship thanks to an 
underlying  common  factor  putting  the  two  variables  on  the  same  path.  The  empirical  analysis  
 
confirms these claims, in line with the analyses of the previous chapters. Through linear regressions of 
differentiated levels, Output #56 confirms that no relationship with the S&P 500 was present before 
2002, while after 2002 a relationship with a positive sign is statistically significant with a coefficient 
equal to 0.14. 
Finally, a set of linear regressions shows the lack of a statistically significant link with index 
positions throughout the different applications. The analysis matches earlier tests for wheat and corn, 
which pointed at the limited role of index positions in driving price formation for commodities front-
month futures contracts. This suggests that the claim that index positions inflate commodities prices 
appears unfounded. 
Table 72. Linear regressions outputs 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 
D.lnspotprice  D.lnspotprice  D.lnspotprice  D.lnspotprice  D.lnspotprice 
D.lnindex  -0.00447  -0.0451  -0.0725  -0.0792  -0.0753 
 
(0.0563)  (0.0582)  (0.0540)  (0.0486)  (0.0486) 
D.lncommercial 
 
0.113**  0.142***  0.142***  0.139*** 
   
(0.0459)  (0.0427)  (0.0389)  (0.0387) 
D.lnsp500 
   
0.558***  0.298***  0.284*** 
     
(0.0768)  (0.0750)  (0.0765) 
D.lncrudeoil 
     
0.337***  0.302*** 
       
(0.0382)  (0.0404) 
D.lnDollar 
       
-0.487*** 
         
(0.172) 
Constant  0.00258  0.00249  0.00251  0.00175  0.00162 
 
(0.00226)  (0.00224)  (0.00208)  (0.00187)  (0.00187) 
Observations  312  312  312  307  303 
R-squared  0.000  0.019  0.163  0.332  0.344 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Tests for linear regression 5 are available in the 
Annex (Output #57). 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
Commercial  positions,  however,  are  strongly  linked  to  spot  prices  throughout  the  different 
analyses, which also matches earlier tests suggesting a key role for these futures positions in the price 
formation mechanism of futures markets. 
4.3.4  Market organisation 
In relation to pricing in the physical market, participants rely on bilateral long-term or spot contracts, 
which  may  be  linked  to  an  active  global  benchmark  price  (as  the  front-month  soybean  oil  future 
contract price on CBOT). Pricing is not very complex and relies on a fairly liquid futures market. 
However, only two active futures markets, one very liquid market based in the United States with one 
delivery point also in the United States, and one less liquid market based in China (DCE), point to the 
difficulty of introducing globally recognised benchmarks in production and consumption areas, as 
well as infrastructures that are not fully developed. This could increase the risk of bottlenecks in the 
delivery of the commodity, and at the same time it requires significant investments in infrastructure in 
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Table 73. Market organisation factors 
Physical market setting  Pricing complexity  Liquidity futures market  Delivery points 
Competitive (local) 
Oligopolistic (global) 
Low  High 
Limited 
(US and China) 
Source: Author. 
The market structure is similar to that for other agricultural commodities. Local markets are 
different from international ones, with a more fragmented and competitive upstream market that is 
paired  with  a  more  consolidated  downstream  market,  especially  when  capital  investments  are 
required (as for soybean oil refining). Consolidation is even higher in international markets, where a 
few trading houses with sufficient scale handle global flows of commodities.  
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5.  SOFT COMMODITIES 
5.1  Sugar market  
Sugar is a carbohydrate, i.e. a combination of carbon, hydrogen and oxygen, which is produced from a 
plant (cane) or a root (beet) in several countries. It is mainly used in food (beverages, plus industrial 
and home-made food) as a sweetener or preservative (e.g. candied fruit), as well as a bulking agent in 
baking and other processed foods. Sugar cane and sugar beet can be also used to produce a biofuel 
usually blended with gasoline (ethanol). This can either be derived directly from the plant through 
distillation or from the main by-product, molasses. Sugarcane fibre is used to fuel boilers at sugar 
mills and also to generate surplus electricity. Other by-products include paper and particle board. The 
annual value of raw sugar production was around $82 billion in 2012, while refined sugar production 
was estimated at around $52 billion in 2009.143 The product is typically extracted from a crop, then 
processed (into raw sugar) and refined into granular (mostly white) sugar and ethanol.  As Figure 199 
shows, more than 80% of sugar is used as  an ingredient for food, while roughly 20% is used also to 
extract ethanol. 
Figure 199. Sugar uses, 2012 
 
Note: Raw sugar equivalent. 
Source: Author’s elaboration from OECD-FAO Stats. 
Sugar  has  been  extracted  from  cane  for  several  centuries,  and  particularly  after  a  way  was 
found to transform sugarcane juice into crystals for longer storage. However, it was not very widely 
produced until the 18th century when slavery supported an increase in supply capacity, and it became 
even more widely produced in the 19th century, when European countries started to extract sugar 
from beets as an alternative to sugar cane, mainly due to the blockade of France by the British navy 
during the Napoleonic wars. Cane is predominantly produced in tropical and sub-tropical countries. 
Sugarcane  and  beet  are  harvested  and  processed  during  a  period  of  between  three  and    months 
depending on whether it is being grown in the Northern or Southern hemisphere. As a result, prices 
are affected by enhanced seasonal factors. As Figure 200 shows, after the two significant spikes of the 
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two economic crises following the oil crises during the 1970s, nominal prices have remained in a low 
range until recent years. Since 2006, prices have become more volatile with sharp spikes and peaks 
only previously seen during the oil crises. 
Figure 200. Raw sugar nominal price ($cents/kg) and annualised three-year rolling volatility (rhs) 
 
Note: International Sugar Agreement (ISA) daily price, raw, f.o.b. and stowed at greater Caribbean ports. Monthly 
data.144  
Source: World Bank Database from International Sugar Organisation and Thomson Reuters. 
Prices and volatility have continued to grow in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis and 
have stabilised at a higher level for different reasons. The promotion of biofuel policies has increased 
demand for ethanol. The proportion of the sugar harvest used for ethanol production was 11% in 
2004, but reached almost a fifth of total production in 2012. In addition, the market has reacted to the 
significant reduction in EU sugar exports since 2006 as a result of the WTO ruling against the EU 
sugar regime, which put an end to a long period of artificially low prices in some regions. In addition 
to automatic market price reactions, in a low price environment, the supply side has found itself with 
underinvestment in new infrastructures, especially where sugar is produced at the lowest cost (e.g. 
Brazil). This reflects in lower stock-to-use ratios and a less responsive supply capacity, which adds 
uncertainty to pricing and therefore creates a more volatile price pattern. 
5.1.1  Product and market characteristics: the rise of sugar cane 
The carbohydrate combination, which can be found in simple (monosaccharide, such as dextrose) or 
more complex (disaccharides, such as sucrose in raw sugar) forms, is extracted from sugar cane (a 
plant cultivated in tropical and sub-tropical regions, such as Brazil) or beets (a root crop cultivated in 
cooler climate, such as Europe). However, due to low production costs, higher crop and ethanol yields 
(even though lower sugar content), and compatibility with different kinds of soil around the tropical 
longitudinal belt, sugar cane has come to account for roughly 87% of total beet and cane production in 
2012 (FAO Stats). Sugar is also preferable to corn for ethanol production, as it requires far less energy 
to transform molasses into alcohol. 
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        , where j is any individual observation.  
 
Table 74. Key components of sugar beet and cane (per tonne) 
1 Tonne of:  Sucrose  Water  Wet pulp  Moist bagasse (dry) 
Sugar cane  135kg  605kg  -  260kg (130kg) 
Sugar beet  160kg 
302kg 
(at least) 
500kg  38kg 
Source: Author’s elaboration from various websites and FAO (2009). 
As shown in Table 74, despite a higher sugar yield from sugar beet, sugar cane produces a 
much  more  semi-liquid  substance  (bagasse)  that  is  used  for  ethanol  production,  increasing  the 
commercial viability of cane over beet. In addition, cane is more flexible in terms of the crossover 
between sugar and ethanol as most sugar can be produced in a first process and sucrose can be later 
recovered from the bagasse to produce ethanol at a lower cost. 
Sugar is typically produced for two uses: as a sweetener in food or beverages (mainly in the 
form  of  a  white  crystallised  sucrose),  and  ethanol  production.  Several  natural  (e.g.  dextrose)  and 
artificial substitutes (e.g. aspartame) exist today. Most notably, the natural sweetener produced from 
corn wheat and tapioca (high-fructose syrup, HFS) is a relatively cheap alternative that is increasingly 
used in corn-producing countries like the United States. This is often a result of high protection given 
to sugar production over cereal inputs. Other biomasses and cellulosic substances can also substitute 
for sugar in ethanol production. However, sugar cane has one of the highest ethanol yields of roughly 
660 gallons per acres versus, for instance, 400 gallons for US corn (Coyle, 2007).  
Sugar (in brown or white crystallized  granules) and ethanol production from cane requires 
processing within 24 hours of harvest to retain the sucrose content. To increase profitability in the 
medium term, several refineries have been built as annexes to sugar mills to merge the processing and 
refining of sugar crops into one place. This potentially increases yields and the quality of molasses. 
However,  most  global  trade  is  still  in  raw  sugar,  which  then  becomes  an  input  in  the  refining 
processing carried out at strategic locations close to consumption areas. For sugar beet, even though 
processing is not required immediately after the root is pulled out from the soil (as for sugar cane), the 
last refining must usually be completed within 90 days. This requires fast processing and refining 
operations, with highly productive refining plants that face high sunk and fixed costs as they only 
work for three to four months a year. However, many sugar beet plants now go straight to a thick 
juice that requires a balanced pH to avoid fermentation and is then crystallised during the year, thus 
improving returns on fixed assets. Beet sugar is distinct from cane in the fact that the process does not 
have a raw sugar intermediary stage, i.e. all sugar is white crystal. 
Production of refined sugar and by-products is less complex than other commodities. After 
initial processing, which involves cleaning and slicing, raw sugar is produced from a juice extracted 
both from cane (by pressing) and beet (by diffusion at high temperatures of around 70° Celsius). The 
pulp is then pressed to extract additional juice. The solid part left can be specifically used for animal 
feed, as it is rich in fibres. The bagasse produced by canes can be used as fuel for boilers if the juice 
boiled with lime and carbon dioxide (oxidizing agent), which makes raw sugar production from sugar 
cane less polluting and cheaper. After the juice is boiled in a process called ‘clarification’, evaporators 
remove part of the water and increase the sugar concentration to roughly 70%, so transforming the 
juice into syrup. By adding very fine seed crystal to the syrup boiled in a vacuum pan, sugar starts to 
crystallise  and,  through  centrifugal  forces,  is  separated  from  the  molasses  using  hot  water.  The 
molasses  can  be  mainly  used  for  ethanol  production  or  animal  feed  additives.  Once  crystals  are 
separated from the molasses, they are dried until separated and can be transported, in the case of 
cane, as raw sugar to refining areas across the world. 
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The refining process follows a similar process to that used to produce raw sugar.145 Raw sugar 
(with around 95% sucrose content) is usually mixed with saturated syrup, centrifuged and screened to 
remove impurities and fibres before being dissolved in sweet water in a process known as ‘affination’. 
In the following ‘carbonatation’ process, inorganic ash is removed by adding milk of lime (calcium 
hydroxide) and bubbling gas (carbon dioxide) through the mixture. Phosphoric acid may also be used 
to  precipitate  calcium  phosphate  with  careful  control  of  acidity  levels,  ‘phosphotation’  (PH), 
entrapping  impurities  that  will  float  on  top  of  the  tank  ready  to  be  skimmed  off  (filtering).  The 
resulting  coloured  liquor  is  decolourised  with  bone  charcoal  (activated  carbon)  and  heated  in  a 
vacuum to remove organic impurities. Finally, crystallised sugar (through the introduction of very 
fine sucrose crystals) is separated from the molasses through centrifugal forces. The syrup is used for 
other sugar products (such as sweet syrups), while the final product is the white refined sugar (over 
99% sucrose) that is commonly used as a food ingredient. 
Figure 201. Sugar processing and refining 
  
Source: Author. 
Storage and yields 
Sugar  cane  ideally  needs  to  be  refined  within  12  months  of  transformation  to  raw  sugar. 
Transformation into raw sugar means that the product can be stored for a longer period, but canes 
and  beets  should  be  processed  within  few  weeks  (often  days)  of  harvesting  the  crop.  With  some 
minimal requirements (storage in a dry and cool place), refined sugar can be stored for long periods 
(years) with limited deterioration. Raw sugar, due to its organic impurities, has a shorter storage life 
                                                            
145  For  a  more  detailed  description,  see  The  New  Zealand  Institute  of  Chemistry  website  at 
http://nzic.org.nz/ChemProcesses/food/6E.pdf.   
 
than  refined  products,  but  this  shorter  storability  has  not  impeded  the  development  of  an  active 
international market for raw sugar, which is then refined close to consumption areas. 
The commodity is then easy to trade globally through standardised contracts. As production 
areas  are  not  necessarily  close  to  consumption,  freight  costs  are  an  important  part  of  total  costs, 
together  with  costs  of  keeping  sugar  in  adequate  warehouses.  In  addition,  cane-derived  sugar  is 
subject to two processes, one immediately after harvesting the raw sugar, and a second one to produce 
a refined product, which increase the impact of transportation costs because  the product needs to 
travel  to  two  locations.  Refineries  are  generally  spread  across  the  world,  so  shipping  costs  could 
potentially affect those businesses that are far from crop production and refined sugar consumption 
areas. 
During recent years, stock levels have increased as a response function to growing positive net 
production, but in relative terms stocks have fallen dramatically due to two factors – the significant 
demand boosted by biofuel policies, and the reduced supply capacity prompted by the reduction of 
subsidies programmes, particularly in the European Union. 
Figure 202. Ending stocks (kt) and stock-to-use ratios, 1960-2013* (%) 
 
Note: *2013 data is an estimate. 
Source: Author’s elaboration from USDA. 
These  factors  add  uncertainty  to  the  future  production  and  consumption  balance,  causing 
volatile price patterns. In addition, supply capacity  uncertainty is also reflected in anaemic yields, 
which  have  been  compensated  so  far  by  increasing  harvested  areas  for  sugar  cane  (especially  in 
Brazil). Growing  harvested areas in some regions have then raised  issues of  sustainability due to 
concerns  over  deforestation.  Higher  sugar  cane  production  has  also  compensated  for  decreasing 
harvested areas for beet production after the replacement of the EU sugar regime in 2006 (Figure 203). 236 | SOFT COMMODITIES 
 
Figure 203. Harvested areas and yields for sugar beet and cane, 1996-2021 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from OECD-FAO Stats. 
 
Sugar producers face a lack of investment to develop and improve varieties that could improve 
yields, which have been stable for more than a decade, such as biologically engineered crops for sugar 
cane. While yields are currently around 72 tonnes per hectare, the theoretical yield is as high as 280 
tonnes per hectare (Duke, 1983). The development of GMO for sugar beet has helped to increase yields 
lately in some countries, even though harvested areas have gone down (Figure 203). However, lack of 
investments and the complexity of fostering new technological developments in genetically modified 
sugar cane is raising questions over sustainability for Brazil, one of the biggest producers in the world, 
as  labour  costs  increase  and  the  currency  continues  to  appreciate.  The  increase  in  yields  due  to 
development in the genetics of sugar cane crops could potentially stabilise the market and improve 
sustainability of biofuel policies. 
Production and consumption 
After a drop in production during the current crisis, volumes of centrifugal sugar production146 have 
recovered  and reached a new historical peak.   While supply seems under stress, consumption  is 
growing steadily, reflected in an  unstable net balance that has quickly gone from +10% to  -5% of 
global production (Figure 204).  
                                                            
146 ‘Centrifugal sugar’ is a type of raw sugar containing 96-98% per cent sucrose, which has been isolated from 
sugar beet or cane by standard extraction processes (USDA). It is the unrefined sugar that is widely adopted for 
international trade.  
 
Figure 204. Sugar production, consumption and net production, 1962-2013* 
 
Note: * 2013 data are estimates. 
Source: Author’s elaboration from USDA. 
As production seems likely to be slow down in 2013, markets may still suffer instability in the 
coming months. To cope with growing demand and a stabilisation of sugar beet production, sugar 
cane has been massively growing in recent years, and now represents more than 80% of global sugar 
crop production (Figure 205). 
Figure 205. Sugar cane and beet production, 1960-2013* (kt) 
 
Note: * 2013 data is an estimate. 
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Brazil and India are the two biggest sugar cane producers, while the European Union leads 
sugar  beet  production  (Figure  207).  Cane  and  beet  production  are  fairly  diversified  in  terms  of 
production  areas,  even  though  most  production  is  mainly  used  for  domestic  consumption  or  for 
domestic refining industries. 
Figure 206. 2012 Sugar beet and cane producers (%) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from USDA. 
Production is fairly concentrated, with the top ten producers producing 77% of the total yearly 
production of sugar. The top three produce roughly half, and the top producer (Brazil) has reached a 
share of almost 22% (and growing) of total production. Consumption is slightly more dispersed, with 
the  top  ten  consuming  roughly  65%  of  total  production.  The  top  three,  including  India  and  the 
European Union, consume over 35% of total production. Concentration in consumption suggests two 
conclusions about the refined sugar industry – it has historically been located only in strategic points 
across the world, and there is potential for this market to grow even further as the populations in 
developing economies grow and increases their income levels and consumption of new food. 
Figure 207. Top ten producers (left) and consumers (right), 2012 (kt) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from USDA. 
  
 
International trade 
After  a  sustained  fall  in  international  trade  in  sugar  until  the  1990s,  exports  of  raw  sugar  have 
gradually returned to roughly 20% of the total value of yearly production (Figure 208). International 
trade  in  raw  sugar  is  valued  around  $16  billion,  with  big  commodity  trading  houses  managing 
operations that have significant cross-border implications. 
Figure 208. Value of raw sugar international trade, 1960-2012 ($mn) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from USDA and World Bank. 
 
Over 55% of international trade in raw sugar is led by Brazilian exports, which account for 
almost 20 million out of a total of 35 million tonnes of raw sugar exports, according to USDA. If we 
include the broader definition of centrifugal sugar, the total for Brazilian exports soars to 25 million 
tonnes but becomes lower in relative terms, at roughly 45% of global exports. International trade is 
therefore  driven  by  Brazilian  production  (and  partially  by  Thailand),  while  most  other  countries 
produce raw sugar for domestic use or refining purposes. This is reflected in the widely dispersed 
share of global imports among the top ten global importers (Figure 209). 
The European Union, following the reform of sugar policies aiming at slashing market price 
support and quota limits below consumption needs, has become a net importer of raw sugar for its 
several refining industries. The additional demand for consumption coming from Europe may become 
a catalyst for change in other regions into which investments in sugar production are starting to flow, 
such as Mexico and Australia. 
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Figure 209. Top ten centrifugal sugar exporters (left) and importers (right), 2012 
 
Source: USDA. 
5.1.1.1  Supply characteristics: the emergence of new suppliers 
Sugar  is  non-recyclable,  renewable  commodity,  the  production  of  which  is  limited  only  by  the 
availability of land and water. Production convertibility is high, as for other cultivated products, since 
the land can be always assigned to alternative uses. However, machines and refining tools cannot be 
easily adjusted to alternative productions, even though they can be sold to reduce the impact of sunk 
costs. 
Crop producers first process sugar crops in plants close to harvesting areas. The raw sugar then 
is shipped to areas where it is refined or consumed in the food industry. Due to its bulky nature and 
the double processing required to obtain the refined product, freight and processing are the main cost 
items for sugar production. Even though production costs involve a limited capital investment (sunk 
costs) compared to other commodities markets, operating costs – such as the workforce, machinery for 
refining, and the cost opportunity of land – can be substantial and determine the commercial viability 
of sugar production. For instance, when the European Union has cut back on quotas supporting sugar 
producers, they have reduced their sugar beet production since the costs for sugar processing can be 
too high in the region. 
Operating variable and fixed production costs certainly vary across regions and also depend on 
the  possibilities  for  using  the  land  for  alternative  commercial  activities  (opportunity  costs). 
Opportunity costs in big producing countries such as Brazil and Thailand (combined with their low 
labour  costs,  as  developing  economies)  have  historically  been  very  low,  even  though  their  recent 
growth  and  currency  appreciation  is  compelling  these  countries  to  improve  productivity  through 
infrastructure and research investments because of the rising labour costs and land opportunity costs. 
The costs of machinery, seeds/fertilisers and fuel (especially for sugar beets factories that have to burn 
fossil fuels to produce energy) are other key production costs that can impact on the commercial 
viability of the economic activity, but they suffer fewer regional influences. Both the use of oil-based 
products  (e.g.  fertilisers  and  fuels)  and  the  increasing  use  of  sugar  for  ethanol  production  have 
increased the link of sugar with crude oil prices and, so with the economic cycle.  
Aside  from  the  big  commodity  firms,  refined  sugar  producers  are  typically  mono-product, 
while sugar crop (raw sugar) producers can be vertically streamlined with big commodity houses 
trading  other  commodities,  or  can  operate  as  a  single  producer  or  as  part  of a  cooperative.  As  a 
consequence, market concentration is very low on the (sugar crop) supply side, but consolidation is 
increasing  on  the  refining  side  since  refining  activities  require  capital  commitments  and  supply 
security that are difficult to ensure in the current volatile markets without strong contractual power. 
Therefore,  refining  activities  are  concentrating  in  strategic  points  across  the  globe  close  to  big  
 
consumption  areas.  The  market  is  becoming  even  more  global  and  relies  heavily  on  low-cost 
productions, which makes the consolidation process  irreversible. As Figure 210 shows, exports of 
refined  sugar  have  been  slowing  down,  while  raw  sugar  has  become  even  more  dominant  in 
international markets. The collapse of EU white sugar exports post 2006 is the main cause of this drop, 
and of an increase in many importing countries of autonomous refineries. 
Figure 210. Raw and refined sugar exports, 2001-2021 (kt) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from OECD-FAO Stats. 
However, consolidation and more vertical integration of raw sugar producers with refining 
activities may reduce the gap in the coming years, as raw sugar producers may look to maximise 
profitability by encouraging refined sugar production to be done close to harvesting areas rather than 
close to consumption areas. 
For  all  these  reasons,  supply  elasticity  to  demand  is  theoretically  very  high,  as  for  other 
commodities that require limited sunk investments, because land and the workforce can be redirected 
to  more  profitable  alternative  productions.  However,  lack  of  investments  in  infrastructure  and 
research (and so reduced productivity), and recent developments in government policies may impose 
new constraints on supply capacity and flexibility, despite the increase in harvested areas.  
5.1.1.2  Demand characteristics: the key commodity for biofuels 
Demand elasticity to prices of sugar for food use is very high, but much depends on market and 
product developments in artificial and natural alternative sweeteners. For ethanol uses, elasticity is 
also high as ethanol can  be produced from alternative commodities, and it can be substituted by 
alternative  sources  of  fuels  (e.g.  biomass  or  advanced  cellulosic  matter).  In  recent  years,  despite 
growing ending stocks, demand has been sustained by several factors that have reduced stock levels 
in relative terms (as discussed earlier). 
In addition to biofuel policies, emerging countries play an important role in driving current and 
future demand patterns in terms of both production and consumption. Future demand and supply 
will mainly be driven by soaring populations in emerging markets and by the use of high-yield sugar 
cane  as  a  source  of  ethanol  and  butanol  fuels.  Demand  should  increase  by  over  25%  by  2021, 
according to OECD-FAO statistics (Figure 211). 242 | SOFT COMMODITIES 
 
Figure 211. Current and future raw sugar demand (kt) 
 
Source: OECD-FAO Stats. 
Looking at demand in regional areas, India, the European Union and China have been leading 
demand growth in recent years, though with a volatile pattern. Stable and structural growth is also 
visible in Brazil, while very moderate growth has occurred in the United States (Figure 212). Biofuel 
policies remain an important driver of demand. 
Figure 212. Raw sugar consumption (key regional areas, kt) 
 
Source: USDA.  
 
Almost  75%  of  biofuel  production  will  come  from  sugar  by  2021  (Figure  213).  Most  of  the 
remaining  production  will  come  from  coarse  grains,  such  as  corn  and  sorghum  for  ethanol  and 
soybean for biodiesel. Today, the contribution of sugar to biofuel production is already above 65%, as 
the massive biofuel production in Brazil relies almost exclusively on sugar cane processing for ethanol 
extraction. 
Figure 213. Sources of biofuel production (kt) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from OECD-FAO Stats. 
While less than 25% of raw sugar is used for biofuel production today, in 2021 this may be as 
high as 31%, reigniting the food versus biofuel debate. 
Figure 214. Food and biofuel use (kt) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from OECD-FAO Stats. 244 | SOFT COMMODITIES 
 
However, the debate is still open, with those claiming that – on top of potential increments in 
the productivity of the land – there is underutilised sugar capacity in the world due to distortions in 
trade  caused  by  government  policies,  which  have  kept  prices  at  artificial  levels,  unable  to  shape 
incentives to invest around the world (Hira, 2011). As trade distortions are gradually removed due to 
the WTO commitments, markets will reveal more about the economic sustainability of higher biofuel 
use supported by increasing sugar production. 
5.1.1.3  Key product and market characteristics  
The product and market characteristics of raw and refined sugar are shaped by a delicate equilibrium 
of endogenous and exogenous variables. Endogenous factors are important drivers of price formation. 
More precisely, the following endogenous characteristics can be ascertained: 
  Sugar is a renewable commodity with great yield potential, but limited alternative uses can be 
made of it (mainly in food and biofuels). 
  The convertibility of crop production to alternative products is unlimited, but there is much less 
flexibility for refining plants, which cannot be easily converted to alternative productions. 
  Capital investments are required, but fixed operating costs are limited. 
  The  opportunity  cost  for  the  land  may  become  an  important  factor  as  emerging  economies 
become wealthier, with production costs of substitutes such as corn (which can produce both a 
sweetening syrup and biofuel) becoming an important driver of change. 
  International trade has been steadily growing in recent years and more vertical coordination 
between the processing and refining of raw sugar may stimulate their further concentration, 
thus encouraging international markets rather than production and consumption in the same 
region (even if subsidised by taxpayers’ money) 
  Supply relies on low-cost production and appears dispersed in its industrial structure but very 
concentrated in geographical terms. Industry consolidation is growing, however, partly due to 
stricter links among farmers and trading houses, as well as to more coordination among farms 
through cooperative instruments. 
  Demand elasticity to price changes is high due to the number of substitutes that can reduce the 
appetite for the commodity. 
  The  supply  side  also  shows  some  elasticity  to  demand  patterns,  mainly  due  to  low  fixed 
production costs, but growing supply constraints (such as lack of investments) may affect this 
elasticity in the medium term. 
  High demand from emerging markets will continue, both for food and biofuel uses, but the 
elimination  of  government  subsidies  programmes  and  other  distortions  may  produce 
unpredictable results in the short term. 
  Emerging  markets  may  be  a  source  of  both  high  demand  and  potentially  higher  supply 
capacity, in particular if they improve yields. 
  Future demand and production capacity may grow in the coming years, but it will very much 
depend on how the supply side adapts to a new, challenging environment. 
Table 75. Key product and market characteristics 
 
Recycling/ 
Production 
convertibility 
Substitutes/ 
Horizontal 
integration 
Alternative 
uses/ 
Vertical 
integration 
Capital 
intensive 
production 
Stora-
bility 
Freight 
costs 
incidence 
Elasticity 
to price/ 
demand 
Concen-
tration 
BRICs 
weight 
Future 
Consumption/ 
Production 
Demand 
side  None  High  High 
Low 
Mediu
m 
Medium 
High 
Low/ 
medium 
High  High 
Supply 
side  High  High  High  Medium  Medium  High 
Source: Author.  
 
5.1.2  Exogenous factors: the effects of EU reforms 
As illustrated for other crop commodities, several exogenous factors can impact the determinants of 
raw sugar production. Government subsidies programmes and the oil price are the main exogenous 
factors driving the latest market trends. For instance, the sugar reform in the European Union, aimed 
at keeping prices very low by subsidising local production to have a constant oversupply, has reduced 
quota production (indirect market price support) and replaced direct transfers based on sugar outputs 
with  monetary  transfers  to  producers  within  the  general  direct  transfers  foreseen  in  the  CAP 
agreements. By the end of 2009, no direct market support was being given to sugar producers based 
on output, while quotas have been revised below consumption levels. The elimination of this market 
distortion has resulted in a drop in sugar beet production in the region, with the European Union 
ultimately becoming a net importer of raw sugar (mainly from Brazil). While raw sugar imports have 
slightly increased since 2006 (when the effects of the reform began to), refined sugar exports, the 
biggest item in European sugar trade, have dropped by 84% in three years, and have so far struggled 
to pick up again (Figure 215).  
Figure 215. EU-27 (EU-15 until 2004 and EU-25 until 2006) raw imports and refined exports (kt) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from USDA. 
 
This  situation  may result  in a shift of production towards countries  with lower labour and 
energy costs, as well as to raw sugar producers deciding to internalise the refining process and export 
refined and raw products together. 246 | SOFT COMMODITIES 
 
Figure 216. Refined sugar exports of the top six European countries (tonnes) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from FAO Stats. Note: Belarus is not part of the European Union. 
 
As Figure 216 suggests, refining activities fell in key EU producing countries between 2005 and 
2010, with only a slight increase in the non-EU country (Belarus). Production is therefore partially 
shifting away from the region, and is partially being reallocated internally towards the areas where 
refined sugar production is more profitable.   
The sugar reform is part of a broader project of reforming the entire scheme of supports to the 
agricultural sector in the European Union. However, the European Union has also undertaken this 
fundamental change of policy to meet important WTO commitments and so speed up the current 
Doha  WTO  Round  (Busse  and  Jerosch,  2006),  which  could  also  potentially  become  a  catalyst  for 
change in government policies in other significant markets, such as the United States. 
So far, however, policy changes in this direction in other important regions have only emerged 
timidly. The US, for instance, continue to impose trade barriers that have been very effective so far in 
protecting the local ethanol industry (Elobeid and Tokgoz, 2008), and direct market support subsidies 
for the sugar industry. China has started a strong programme for its domestic raw sugar production, 
which today provides the biggest worldwide financial support to the industry, with more than $3.5 
billion in 2009 and around $1.5 billion in 2010 (Figure 217).  
 
Figure 217. Chinese and US direct support to the sugar industry ($mn) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from OECD-FAO statistics. 
Both interventions have been targeting direct market support for sugar prices, often coupled 
with tariffs to discourage imports (for instance, US import tariffs for ethanol fuel). 
Table 76. Key exogenous factors 
Government intervention  Main other external factors 
High  Weather, exchange rates, oil prices, lands value 
Source: Author. 
Other exogenous factors can influence sugar markets. In particular, exchange rates have been 
the subject of strong discussion among developing and advanced countries, as the appreciation of 
local currencies against the dollar can cause important shifts in labour costs, final product price and 
opportunity costs of land. In fact, land value is another key factor influencing the dominant low-cost 
productions. Any policy that increases the value of the underlying land can have an indirect effect on 
the commercial viability of the business. Oil prices can also have important implications for sugar, 
both  for  the  use  of  petroleum-based  products,  such  as  fertilisers  and  fuel  for  machinery,  and  the 
development of biofuel policies as a valid option to increase diversification and independence from 
the price of oil.  
Markets have to deal with legal certainty as well, especially when it needs to ensure that trading 
activities are run smoothly. For instance, futures trading on sugar contracts on the Indian Exchange 
was halted and banned for over 17 months after claims that the local supply was undergoing large 
cuts due to a bad season. This was, in reality, an action by primary consumer in the world to keep 
control over sugar prices and make restrictions effective. Prices  in local spot markets continued to 
grow because the flow of information into prices obviously could not be stopped by shutting down 
the futures markets, and the spike in price was very high and sudden. A ban on futures trading was 
implemented in India in 2007 for some staple food product. 
Finally,  weather  conditions,  since  cultivation  is  in  the  open  air,  may  have  some  impact  on 
production (at least in the short term). Even though markets have become more equipped to give 
valid probabilities to weather events, this variable is still the least predictable among the exogenous 
factors described above. 248 | SOFT COMMODITIES 
 
5.1.3  Market organisation: a fast developing international market 
As  for  other  commodities,  physical  market  organisation  relies  on  a  web  of  bilateral  and  forward 
contracts among cooperatives of farmers and big industrial players (trading houses). Production is 
fairly  dispersed,  but  international  markets  have  a  more  concentrated  structure.  Bilateral  spot  and 
forward contracts may rely on active futures markets where benchmark contracts are continuously 
priced. Two liquid futures markets, in Europe for refined white sugar (on LIFFE) and in the United 
States for raw cane sugar (on ICE) have become reference markets for spot and future transactions. 
Despite being under different platforms and in different locations, ICE owns them both, which brings 
global reference prices for soft commodities under a single ownership. Delivery ports, however, are 
also available in South America, Asia (including China and India for the white sugar contract), and 
Oceania. 
Table 77. Market organisation factors 
Physical market setting  Pricing complexity  Liquidity futures market  Delivery points 
Competitive (local) 
Oligopolistic (global) 
Low  High 
Limited 
(US and EU) 
Source: Author. 
Other futures markets are also active, such as the Indian exchange, but they do not have enough 
liquidity or are pure financial contracts trading the same contract on ICE or LIFFE, with no possibility 
of physical delivery. 
The presence of trade barriers and  other distortions to free  markets  has always limited the 
potential of sugar futures markets. However, the growth of international trade and the reduction of 
market  distortions  in  the  WTO  Rounds,  and  so  the  limitation  over  artificial  market  prices,  may 
increase the importance of liquid futures markets as they become a valid alternative to manage price 
risk in sugar trades rather than using quotas. They may increasingly become a point of reference for 
the pricing of international trades. 
    
 
5.2  Cocoa market 
Cocoa beans are a product of cocoa trees and are widely used for food and beverages production, but 
more recently also for pharmaceutical products (cocoa butter). Production is typically concentrated 
around  the  Equator  and  it  was  already  being  cultivated  for  human  consumption  (mainly  as  an 
ingredient for beverages) in Central and South America at the time of the Roman Empire. Cocoa beans 
were only brought to Europe in the mid-17th century. Their commercial use for chocolate production 
only arrived in the 19th century with the discovery of a production process that allowed the extraction 
of both cocoa powder and butter at a low cost. The yearly production of cocoa beans is valued at 
around $13 billion, and the cost of the beans is generally only a small part of total production costs of 
the final product, chocolate (Gilbert, 2008). Nonetheless, almost 90% of cocoa beans are used for food 
and beverages production (Figure 218). 
Cocoa beans were also used in ancient times as money for the exchange of goods. Beans can be 
stored for several months in bags and traded multiple times. They hold their value well and their 
scarcity (due to the particular cultivation required for their production) makes them a suitable store of 
value during crises. As a consequence, prices patterns have followed the economic cycle, and also the 
growing  demand  of  consumption  coming  from  both  emerging  and  developing  markets.  This  has 
resulted in astonishing growth in prices, which almost tripled from 2000 to 2010, before dropping 
slightly recently.  
Figure 218. Cocoa beans uses 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from FAO Stats. 
In real terms, prices are still a fair way from the peak at the end of the second oil crisis, which 
was followed by a drop and a gradual stabilisation of prices during most of the 1980s and 1990s at 
between $1-2 per kilogram. 250 | SOFT COMMODITIES 
 
Figure 219. Cocoa beans real and nominal prices 
 
Note: International Cocoa Organization daily price, average of the first three positions on the terminal markets of 
New York and London, nearest three future trading months. 
Source: World Bank. 
5.2.1  Product and market characteristics: new prospects for alternative uses 
Cocoa beans are the seeds of a fruit (pod) produced by a tree, 10-20 metres tall, that needs specific 
temperatures and amounts of rainfall every year. The plant is typically grown in forests, with some 
shade and wind protection. Maturation of the fruits takes five to six months, and the first fruit only 
appears around five years after plantation. Even though the trees can even live for up to 200 hundred 
years,  they  are  commercially  profitable  for  only  25  years.  A  large  harvest  occurs  from 
September/October to February, and a smaller one before July. Cocoa seeds are usually subject to an 
initial processing, which entails open pods ‘sweating’ their pulp for a few days over the seeds. This 
helps  the  fermentation  process,  which  is  followed  by  the  process  of  drying  the  beans  to  reduce 
moisture levels (to help storage), before sending them to the market for commercialisation. The next 
processing stage involves roasting the beans for a couple of hours, which helps to build the chocolate 
aroma. This second part of the processing can also be done at the country of destination. 
Cocoa seeds (or beans/nibs) are fairly homogeneous, with one variety (forastero) representing 
the  vast  majority  of  the  global  production.  Other  (higher  quality)  varieties  are  available  but 
commercial production is very limited. They cannot be recycled but it is a renewable crop which is not 
a primary good, but can be substituted with alternative sweet food. No alternatives are available for 
its taste and aroma, though. Most notably, cocoa has a high vitamin E content, which makes it an 
important  component  of  the  human  diet.  Product  substitutability  is  limited  due  to  the  unique 
properties of the cocoa beans, which can be at the same time a diuretic, stimulant, anti-depressant and 
nutritive. These qualities meant that the fruit was widely used by ancient populations around the 
Equator. Dark chocolate has also been proved to provide important cardiovascular health benefits 
(Schroeter et al. 2006; Taubert et al., 2007).  
 
Figure 220. Historical cocoa beans uses (tonnes, %) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from FAO Stats. 
Cocoa beans are mainly used for chocolate production. After local early processing (involving 
seeds ‘sweating’ and ‘drying’), beans are exported and roasted close to consumption areas. Roasting 
allows reducing moisture content and adjusting the chocolate aroma to give a special flavour. Seeds 
are then cracked to remove shells and the internal part (the ‘nib’) is crushed with a mechanical process 
in  order  to  produce  storable  liquor,  in  a  process  called  ‘grinding’.  Further  processing  to  allow 
solidification or to reduce moisture content through a mechanical press produces cocoa butter and 
powder, respectively, which are main ingredients of chocolate production. Cocoa butter and powder 
are extracted in the same proportion from the processing of the beans. However, cocoa butter has 
more value due to its many uses in the food, beverage and non-food industries. In the industrial 
production of chocolate, cocoa powder or butter is only a base ingredient to which other ingredients 
are  added  (such  as  milk  and  sugar).  The  combination  of  these  ingredients,  moulded  together  at 
specific  temperatures,  is  the  discretionary  aspect  in  the  production  process  that  gives  value  to 
chocolate products.  
A  growing  share  of  cocoa  bean  production  is  also  dedicated  to  pharmaceutical  products 
because cocoa  butter (typically converted into oil) has the important property of melting at body 
temperature. In particular, it can be used to encapsulate drugs and skin applications thanks to the 
Vitamin E content. As show below, non-food uses make up roughly 8% of global production and are 
growing with on the medium-term horizon. 
Other uses also include cosmetics and soaps, as the properties of cocoa remain stable for years. 
There  is  potential  for  the  development  of  by-products,  which  could  increase  the  commercial 
attractiveness of the product. Over 60% of the pulp is typically wasted. Pulp and pods (which have a 
high gum component) may be products for alternative uses, such as soap or even animal feed. The 
processing of cocoa beans also produces oil and shells.  
Production 
The production of cocoa beans can be renewed but there are two important supply constraints. First, 
production of cocoa bean from the plant becomes commercial only five years after plantation. The tree 
produces beans for only 25 years in tropical and humid areas, under the shade of taller vegetation, 
even though the plant can live up to 200 years. Second, on top of particular needs such as shade, wind 252 | SOFT COMMODITIES 
 
protection and roughly 10 cm of rainfall per month, cocoa is commercially produced in the open at 
around 15° above and below the equator line (for temperature reasons).  
As shown by Figure 221, cocoa bean production has been constantly growing in the last three 
decades, with a significant jump after 2003 as demand from emerging markets became more sustained 
and when the market opened up to global competition (the liberalisation process). 
Figure 221. Cocoa beans world production, 1961-2011 (tonnes) 
 
Source: FAO Stats. 
In recent years, production has slowed down and it is now stable at around 4 million tonnes, 
while the balance is consistently in surplus (as high as nearly 20%; Figure 222). This surplus was 
reflected in prices reaching a historical low around the beginning of the 2000s, and then gradually 
recovering to around $2 per kg.  
Figure 222. Production, consumption and net production (tonnes, %) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from CRB Commodity Yearbook (2011).  
 
Production  is  concentrated  in  West  Africa  (66%),  with  a  further  third  produced  in  South 
America and South East Asia (Figure 223). No commercial production is available in Europe. Africa’s 
market share has grown significantly after the end of the price controls and the opening up of markets 
to global competition at the end of the 1980s. 
Figure 223. Cocoa beans production by region, 1961-2011 (tonnes) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from FAO Stats. 
Among producing countries, Ivory Coast, Indonesia and Ghana account for more than two-
thirds of global production, which exposes the market to exogenous factors such as political instability 
in a region that has already undergone long periods of severe instability in the past decades.  
Figure 224. Key global producers, 2011 (% of total) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from FAO Stats. 254 | SOFT COMMODITIES 
 
Concentration in production (the top ten producers represent 97% of cocoa bean production) is 
also counterbalanced by high concentration in  the consumption of cocoa beans, which are mainly 
refined in the European Union (37%), the United States (10%), and countries where the cocoa beans 
are produced before being exported as a more final product.  
Figure 225. Top ten producers (left) and consumers (right), 2011 
 
Note: tonnes. 
Source: Author’s elaboration from FAO Stats. 
Storage 
The storage life of cocoa (in bean form, but more so as a as powder or liquor) is long. Once fermented 
and dried, there is one year of storage life for cocoa beans before they begin to deteriorate (which goes 
very slowly). Another 5-6 months of storage life is gained after processing (roasting) the bean and de-
shelling into nibs, while the most refined product (cocoa liquor or paste) can be stored for many years 
before it begins to lose its properties. Together with its limited supply, these storage characteristics 
allow the commodity to be more easily sold in the market, as well as imposing some anti-cyclical 
patterns. Due to its easy storability, freight costs have a limited impact in the long term. Cocoa beans 
can be directly stored after collection from the plants, which does not add more transportation steps 
before the final production of the refined product. However, consumption areas are typically far from 
production countries, so volatility in shipping costs can produce some short-term impacts on costs. 
On the market side, the constant production surplus – enhanced by the recent economic crisis – 
has recently boosted stock variations positively, growing to 10% of total production in 2009. 
Figure 226. Global stocks variations (tonnes) 
  
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from FAO Stats. 
This may reflect a conflict between price-elastic consumption and a rather slow adjustment of 
supply  to  changes  in  consumption  levels.  As  a  consequence,  prices  would  react  (with  a  lag)  to  a 
negative/positive supply shock reflected in variations of inventory levels rather than to a short-term 
variation of consumption levels (Gilbert, 2012), as argued by the storage theory. Long-term shocks to 
demand, however, can affect price levels with similar intensity, as they will gradually be reflected in 
supply levels and stock variations. 
Harvested areas and yields 
No important advancements have been made so far in developing genetically engineered cocoa bean 
production  to  increase  yields  while  containing  harvested  areas  and  so  the  collateral  effects  of 
potentially excessive land use (e.g. deforestation and water waste). While global yields were more or 
less  stable  since  the  1980s  and  have  been  declining  in  recent  years,  harvested  areas  have  almost 
doubled since the beginning of 1990s, with a sharp increase at the beginning of this century being one 
the most significant effects of the opening up of markets in developing economies (with similar effects 
to those seen for other commodities covered in this report; Figure 227). 
Figure 227. Global harvested areas (ha) and yield (hg/ha) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from FAO Stats. 
There is therefore a potential high margin for yields to exploit new technological developments 
in  fertilisers,  machinery  and  bio-engineering  (if  needed)  to  produce  more  without  necessarily 
expanding harvested areas. Africa is no exception. Once the market was liberalised at the end of the 
1980s, yields went immediately up as many inefficient producers were put out of the market and new 
production came in with higher and more stable yields, after a natural lag of 4-5 years (Figure 228). 
Since  the  1990s,  though,  besides  a  higher  contribution  in  terms  of  harvested  areas,  not  much  has 
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Figure 228. African harvested areas (ha) and yield (hg/ha) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from FAO Stats. 
Since the beginning of the 21st century, harvested areas have been growing at a speed has begun 
to raise questions over sustainability if it were to grow even further in the coming years. 
International trade 
Reflecting  of  the  distribution  of  producers,  international  trade  is  organised  around  the  same 
production and consumption areas, since cocoa beans are typically used in the production of chocolate 
around consumption areas. The top ten exporters of cocoa beans have 90% of the export market, led 
mainly by developing economies, while Belgium and the Netherlands are partially exporters because 
they are the main ports of delivery and trade in Europe. Ivory Coast accounts for almost 30% of the 
exports, while the European Union (in particular, big chocolate producers such as the Netherlands, 
Belgium and Germany) attracts almost 60% of total imports (Figure 229). 
Figure 229. Top ten exporters (left) and importers (right), 2011 
 
Note: metric tonnes. 
Source: Author’s elaboration from FAO Stats.  
 
 
The total value of international trade grew quickly in the last decade to reach almost $10 billion 
in 2010 (70% of the total yearly production value). The market is small compared to other crops, but 
international  trade  relative  to  total  production  is  among  the  highest  in  international  commodities 
markets (Figure 230).  
The  processing  of  cocoa  beans,  beyond  the  immediate  cleaning  and  drying  required  after 
harvesting, is mainly carried out close to consumption areas by totally different market participants, 
which are usually much bigger and more international in market reach. Since only a few players are 
involved both in production/conversion and (chocolate) manufacturing, international trade is led by 
the big trades of those few that have the capacity to be converters and manufacturers, in addition to 
the market activities of single manufacturers/converters. International trade is mainly in cocoa beans 
as butter or liquor can be too costly to export because they require special treatment (e.g. an artificial 
temperature).   
 
Figure 230. Value of international trade ($bn) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from FAO Stats and World Bank. 
5.2.1.1  Supply characteristics: the dominance of the refining industry 
While the production process is very simple, the value chain of cocoa production has different layers 
and  requires  the  involvement  of  several  actors.  In  the  upstream  market,  small-scale  producers 
dominate  production  levels.  Increasing  coordination  in  cooperatives  has  given  more  contractual 
power to smallholders, which have to deal with big international traders. The refining industry is 
fairly  concentrated,  but  with  different  degrees  along  the  long  processing  chain,  which  is  mainly 
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Figure 231. Cocoa beans processing 
 
Source: Author. 
Small-scale plantations, often united through cooperatives to increase their contractual power, 
are the standard type of producer in tropical regions. These producers deal with local traders before 
the  product  reaches  exporting  companies,  which  are  typically  international  firms.  The  exporting 
company is not necessarily a grinder and converter, so the product may be simply sold to an import 
company  that  will  sell  it  or  process  it  further  once  it  has  been  imported  and  is  close  to  the 
consumption area. While production is a competitive market, the massive economies of scale needed 
to  run  the  grinding  and  converting  process  may  result  in  high  concentration,  producing  an 
oligopolistic  setting  (Gilbert,  2008).  Therefore,  to  increase  economies  of  scale  and  scope,  the 
downstream  part  of  the  supply  chain  (converters  and  chocolate  manufacturers)  is  increasingly 
becoming more vertically and horizontally integrated. Due to the local nature of production versus the 
international nature of cocoa processing, exporters, foreign grinders or chocolate manufacturers enjoy 
some  oligopsonistic  market  power  (UNCTAD,  2008;  Kireyev,  2010).  Cocoa  bean  processing  for 
chocolate production also interacts with sugar and milk value chains. As a consequence, the cost of 
cocoa beans is only a very small part (3.5%) of total chocolate costs (Gilbert, 2008). Processing and 
other retail costs are the two most important production cost items. 
Due to the known supply constraints, elasticity of supply to demand is fairly low. Increasing 
production  is  difficult  because  the  plant  requires  time  before  it  becomes  commercially  usable. 
Therefore, supply arrives to the market years later and may not be easy to remove, as producers are 
price-takers  and  they  would  not  be  interested  in  cutting  their  own  supply  once  on  the  market. 
Converting land to alternative uses has both the constraint of an external environment that may not 
easily allow alternative cultivation, as well as the sunk costs of having spent several years bringing the 
area up to full production. However, the cocoa bean does not require immediate refining so it can be 
easily  stored  and  shipped  right  after  collection,  which  makes  it  easier  to  manage  reductions  in 
production. 
5.2.1.2  Demand characteristics: the link with income growth 
Since the production of cocoa is local but it is an export crop, market concentration on the demand 
side is high at the regional level due to the concentration among exporters. Demand concentration is 
much  lower  at  global  level,  however,  especially  with  the  final  product.  Historical  market 
fragmentation and a lack of cooperation among regional farmers have also increased the contractual  
 
power  of  the  demand  side.  This  situation,  however,  is  gradually  changing  as  farmers  coalesce  to 
increase their contractual strength and have access to global markets and the global supply chain. 
Emerging markets have a fundamental role in the production process, but a rather limited role 
in consumption that is dominated by European countries and the United States. However, growing 
populations and gradual redistribution of wealth will increase the use of cocoa and its main refined 
product in the dietary habits of newly developing countries. Cocoa is often seen as an expensive good 
that does not satisfy a primary dietary need. As a result, elasticity of demand to price is low for 
specific  food  use  (e.g.  chocolate)  in  higher-income  countries,  while  elasticity  is  greater  for  the 
alternative uses of cocoa beans (e.g. pharmaceutical products). No immediately substitutable product 
is generally available, but products that use a very low amount of cocoa are increasingly available and 
that can be seen (especially by low-income consumers) as an alternative product to those costly ones 
with high-cocoa content. The increasing sophistication of cocoa-based products requires an increasing 
level  of  vertical  integration,  which  would  mainly  leave  only  production,  harvesting  and  primary 
processing to third parties. 
5.2.1.3  Key product and market characteristics  
The product and market characteristics of cocoa are those of a particular export crop that relies on a 
complex interaction between different value chains and income levels. These characteristics can be 
summarised as follows: 
  Cocoa beans are a renewable commodity with strong homogeneity and limited substitutes, but 
mainly used for one purpose (food). 
  New market developments are still to be seen, due to limited alternative uses of the commodity, 
commercial  use  of  co-products,  and  very  low  yields  due  to  the  lack  of  technological 
developments in biological engineering. 
  Supply  suffers  important  constraints  due  to  the  nature  of  the  commodity,  with  a  lack  of 
production convertibility and low elasticity to short- and medium-term demand shocks. 
  Capital needed to produce cocoa is typically very low, and this aspect results in a production 
environment  fragmented  across  several  small-scale  plantations,  on  the  one  hand,  and  in  a 
strong  processing  industry  enjoying  an  oligopsonistic  power  on  the  other.  Concentration  is 
therefore very low in the upstream market but is growing as the commodity requires more 
economies of scale to make processing and product refining profitable. 
  Cocoa beans are an export crop that relies on high storability and acceptable freight costs if 
exported in its raw form (beans). 
  Demand elasticity to price is high for higher-income consumers that have consolidated the use 
of  chocolate  in  their  dietary  habits,  but  lower  for  low-income  consumers  that  still  perceive 
chocolate as a luxury good. 
  Emerging markets are essentially the only production area and also the consumption areas with 
greatest potential, as their average incomes increase due to economic development. 
  As future consumption depends on several aspects, including income and dietary habits, future 
production may need to rise to deal with recent increase in demand from emerging markets, 
which is driving prices out of a price range that has been consistently below $2 per kg for over 
20 years. 
Table 78. Product and market characteristics 
 
Recycling/ 
Production 
convertibility 
Substitutes/ 
Horizontal 
integration 
Alternative 
uses/Vertical 
integration 
Capital 
intensive 
production 
Stora-
bility 
Freight 
costs 
incidence 
Elasticity 
to price/ 
demand 
Concen-
tration 
BRICs 
weight 
Future 
Consumption/ 
Production 
Demand 
side 
None  Medium  Low 
Low  High  Medium 
Medium 
Medium 
Low  Medium 
Supply 
side 
Low  Medium  Medium  Low  High  High 
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5.2.2  Exogenous factors: long-term effects of liberalisation 
In addition to the endogenous factors described above, there are several exogenous factors that have 
an impact on this market. Most importantly, weather conditions in recent years and military conflicts 
(i.e. political instability) in past years have become drivers of changes in this market. Neither of these, 
however, has produced changes in this market to the same degree as the liberalisation process that 
shook Africa at the end of the 1980s, with the abolition of trade agreements and the pricing power of 
marketing boards. The process not only had heatedly debated redistribution effects, but also boosted 
production and productivity to unprecedented levels, driving long-term changes in the market (see 
Box 10). Overall, the process has reduced the pervasive government intervention that was anyway 
unable to increase living standards of local populations, due to great inefficiencies and consolidated 
corrupt  systems.  However,  the  process  was  implemented  differently  across  countries  and 
organisations controlled by governments still play an important role today in controlling resources 
and  the  share  of  export  revenues  that  the  domestic  industry  is  able  to  extract  from  international 
traders. 
 
Box 10. Causes and effects of market liberalisation: the case of cocoa 
The post-independence (of former British and French colonies) liberalisation of marketing boards and 
other public (state-owned) or semi-public infrastructures, which had the power to fix prices, quality, and 
quantity of the commodity (Gilbert, 2009), aimed at:  
  Stabilising prices. 
  Ensuring high-quality products and more efficient production through greater competition. 
  Increasing transparency of marketing boards. 
  Reducing market power of local processing firms and exporters. 
  Increasing producers’ welfare and share of total value. 
Since most of the liberalisation processes were completed in key producing countries in the 1990s, 
the effects on market operators have been significant. Liberalisation increased competition in production 
and intermediation/export of cocoa beans, bringing down global prices (Gilbert, 2009). It also delivered 
price stability and increases in production levels and productivity (as shown by Figure 227). New regions 
(such as Indonesia) have gradually increased their market share as lower-cost producers. The process 
gave opportunities to those areas showing flexibility and openness to competition, which implemented 
these reforms in the best possible way. For instance, Ghana and, to some extent, Ivory Coast have seen a 
long and incomplete implementation of the process, opening up domestic crop production but keeping 
control  over  the  export  industry  (UNCTAD,  2008).  Other  countries  have  interpreted  this  process 
differently, or even coupled it with the liberalisation of foreign exchange regimes, leading to different 
results.  As  a  result,  there  is  still  debate  today  over  whether  the  transmission  of  world  prices  and 
disintermediation reached the farm gate in several countries, where taxation has often been used as an 
alternative way to control prices. In addition, a lower cocoa bean price was insufficient to influence the 
prices of retail products, which have increased due to the impact of other factors such as labour costs and 
other ingredients. It is therefore hard to quantify the beneficial effects of the process. 
The  liberalisation  process  has  also  generated  side  effects.  Besides  the  long  and  troubled  post-
liberalisation political process of defining a new equilibrium among domestic actors, the implementation 
has  created  too  much  pressure  too  quickly  on  production  costs  in  some  countries,  due  to  global 
competition and the legacy of local marketing boards’ pricing power. Some local producers, who were 
already  poor,  were  unprepared  (and  lacked  government  support)  to  internalise  these  changes  and 
quickly needed to coalesce into cooperatives to deal with the strong market power of global players. 
Some high-cost producers (especially in Central America) have greatly  suffered the new competitive 
environment  and  had  to  modify  their  business  to  cope  with  a  lower-cost  and  higher-production 
environment.  
 
 
  
 
Figure 232. Key African producers' prices as a share of world prices (%) 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2008), p. 35. 
Whether producers’ share of the global cocoa bean price (calculated by ICCO) indeed declined 
after the liberalisation in Africa, this does not capture how the industry has changed (UNCTAD, 2008), in 
particular the change in ownership of local plantations from being mostly state-controlled. This could 
provide the final say on how producers’ share of the global price has actually changed the welfare and 
economic  conditions  of  local  populations.  Questions  have  also  been  raised  about  the  environmental 
sustainability  of  these  strong  competitive  pressures,  which  initially  had  an  impact  on  the  quality  of 
production (Oxfam, 2009; Gilbert, 2009). 
On  the  one  hand,  opportunities  emerged  to  expand  production  and  business  beyond  local 
intermediaries,  but  on  the  other  hand,  it  required  consolidation  that  was  much  easier  to  achieve  in 
intermediation (export) than production, with local production still fragmented in many countries today. 
The process also caused a general and structural reduction of production costs, and so global benchmark 
prices dropped to historically low levels. Quality also went down, but new market niches emerged for 
high-quality cocoa products. Some producers in Central America and Africa were unable to cope with 
this  process,  which  worsened  their  standard  of  living  and  increased  poverty.  As  a  reaction  to  this 
process, a movement advocating ‘fairer’ trade emerged. This movement, represented by confederations 
or groups such as Oxfam, sees the liberalisation process mainly as a vertical redistribution of resources in 
favour of international traders that have gradually taken greater control of the cocoa (and coffee) export 
and processing chain. This ‘fair trade’ movement that emerged during the 1990s and early 2000s has, 
over time, forced even big  companies to purchase cocoa and coffee at an additional premium to be 
redistributed for activities that would support local producers. 
 
Another  important  exogenous  factor  is  economic  development.  In  particular,  economic 
development supports income growth and, therefore, changes in dietary habits that typically favour 
higher consumption of cocoa on a regular basis. The economic cycle therefore has only a marginal 
impact  on  cocoa  consumption,  while  more  long-term  economic  development  is  able  to  produce 
important  changes  in  the  market.  In  the  short  term,  cocoa  even  shows  some  anti -cyclical 
characteristics as the commodity can be stored for a long time without losing its properties and can be 
easily traded and shipped in international markets, and supply does not easily adjust to short-term 
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Table 79. Key exogenous factors 
Government intervention  Main other external factors 
Medium 
Weather, political instability and military conflicts, 
economic development 
Source: Author. 
Finally,  as  suggested  above,  the  location  of  the  top  producers  also  raises  the  problem  of 
potential  political  instability,  which  has  often  resulted  in  the  past  in  long  military  conflicts.  This 
exogenous variable is difficult to predict and thus produces a great deal of uncertainty that markets 
are unable to price. This factor may put cocoa prices under sudden volatile conditions that may be 
difficult to recover from in the short-term. 
5.2.3  Empirical analysis: the role of inventories 
It is hard to model directly front-month settlement prices on futures (LIFFE) for cocoa. However, as 
explained by Gilbert (2012), cocoa prices react to supply shocks through changes in inventory levels in 
the short term (as the supply does  not adjust rapidly; very  much in line with the  storage theory 
illustrated in Chapter 1). Therefore, most of the empirical analysis is done on inventory levels of LIFFE 
(monthly data). The analysis is complicated by additional interaction of endogenous variable with 
exogenous factors. The following dataset of monthly data was used for this analysis: 
  Monthly data from March 2002 to December 2012. 
  Log of end of month front-month LIFFE futures contract on cocoa. 
  Log147 of monthly data on LIFFE stocks. 
  Log of OECD leading composite indicator demand indicator for OECD countries. 
  Log of OECD leading composite indicator demand indicator for China. 
  Log of price-adjusted Broad Dollar Index published by the Fed. 
  Log of Southern Oscillation Index (to which a constant is added to account for negative values 
in logarithmic transformation).148 
  Log of S&P 500 (closing). 
  The volatility indicator is the 22-day annualised rolling standard deviation of front-month price. 
  Log of convenience yield at 100 days (as the difference between expected price [front-month 
price times 100 days annualised risk-free interest rate] and second month futures price, minus 
actual cost of storage). 
  Dividend  yield  (as  the  difference  between  convenience  yield  and  basis  between  front  and 
second month, over the front months). 
A  broad  regression  (see  Output  #58)  shows  white  noise  in  its  residuals  but  may  not  be 
sufficiently specified. However, a strong link emerges between cocoa inventories and OECD demand, 
convenience yield (real cost of storage), and dollar exchange. To verify these relationships and confirm 
their link with the theoretical background, a Granger causality test is done between cocoa stocks and 
dollar exchange rate index, OECD demand, convenience yield, and dividend yield (see Output #59, 
Output #60, Output #61, and Output #62). 
 
 
 
                                                            
147 For ‘Log’ we intend a natural logarithm (ln). 
148 The Southern Oscillation Index (SOI) gives an indication of the development and intensity of El Niño or La 
Niña events in the Pacific Ocean. The SOI is calculated using the pressure differences between Tahiti and Darwin.  
 
Table 80. Granger causality outputs 
Independent variables  Granger causality with cocoa stocks  Inverse relationship 
Broad Dollar Index  Yes***  No 
OECD demand  Yes***  No 
Dividend yield  Yes***  No 
Convenience yield  Yes***  Yes** 
Note: *10%, **5%, ***1% significance. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
As Table 80 illustrates, the dollar exchange rate and broader demand (the general economic 
situation)  Granger-cause  cocoa  stock  levels.  The  analysis  also  confirms,  through  convenience  and 
dividend yield, the importance of costs of storage and opportunity costs (represented by  risk-free 
interest rates) in driving levels of stocks. In addition, a Granger causal relationship was established 
between spot prices and weather index, represented by SOI. 
Furthermore,  the  empirical  analysis  confirms  the  theoretical  background  of  the  impact  of 
monetary policies and credit easing in building a link between financial and non-financial assets. As 
described  by  Output  #64,  when  extending  the  database  from  to  March  1990,  a  linear  regression 
between  log  front-month  prices  and  S&P  500  closing  finds  that  before  (end)  2001  there  was  no 
relationship between cocoa prices and financial indexes. From 2002, when the decline of the dollar 
exchange rate started as a result of expansionary monetary policies (reflected in the expansion of the 
monetary base and lower interest rates), the relationship between cocoa prices and financial indexes 
became significant at 10% (with a negative sign). This shows once again that a common variable has 
affected both financial and non-financial assets and driven them in the same direction, mainly through 
the role of exchange rates. The small coefficient (.3), however, defines this relationship as marginal in 
relation to other important links established above, for instance with OECD demand. Demand and 
supply fundamentals are still key drivers of price formation for cocoa markets. 
Finally, no Granger was able to show a clear prevalence of one of the markets in the interaction 
between types of market player and prices (commercial versus index positions). Output #66 suggest 
that, at 10%, there is a small but significant link between front-month commercial positions in the 
futures market (0.15) and the position of commercial players, while no significant relationship was 
found  between  prices  and  index  positions.  No  definite  conclusions,  however,  can  be  drawn  on 
whether trading on physical or futures are driving price formation in cocoa markets. 
5.2.4  Market organisation: an immature market infrastructure 
Market organisation of physical markets for cocoa is similar to that for other commodities. It mainly 
relies  on  bilateral  spot  and  forward  contracts  with  price  formula  frequently  linked  to  the  main 
benchmark front-month futures contracts. However, it also depends at which stage of the long value 
chain we are looking at. Local intermediaries rely more on spot traders with local producers, even 
though  small  producers,  due  to  technological  developments,  are  also  increasingly  taking  global 
benchmark futures contracts prices (front-month) as a reference price (with a discount or premium) 
for local trades. 
Futures markets for cocoa mainly rely on two liquid contracts traded on two exchanges, one in 
Europe (LIFFE) and one in the United States (ICE). Delivery areas offered by the exchanges are only 
located in the United States and Europe. Both futures contracts accept delivery for all types of cocoa 
bean with a set discount. The underlying commodity is cocoa beans sealed in bags and the minimum 
contract size is 10 tonnes. 
Table 81. Cocoa market organisation 
Physical market setting  Pricing complexity  Liquidity futures market  Delivery points 
Competitive (local) 
Oligopolistic (global) 
Low  High 
Limited 
(US and EU) 
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Due to its limited supply and high demand, cocoa is typically purchased in large quantities. Its 
storage life (either as a bean or in its more refined form) is long compared to other crops, and this 
allows the commodity to be more easily sold in the market and so purchased in bigger quantities. Its 
limited supply and its historically low price in recent years have made cornering attempts by big 
investors easier and, due to the market size, also easier to spot. For instance, in July 2010, Anthony 
Ward’s Armajaro hedge fund took delivery of over 241,000 tonnes of cocoa beans worth roughly $1 
billion (roughly 5% of yearly global production), causing a sharp price increase leading to a historical 
peak on LIFFE. This trade, which corresponds to the total annual production of cocoa beans in Brazil, 
caused  a  significant  shortage  in  the  market  and  a  widening  spread  between  EU  and  US  futures 
contracts. It is unclear whether the trade was simply aimed at speculating on future price trends, 
perhaps not so profitably when cocoa was offloaded later in 2010 at a lower price (over a three-month 
period),  taking  into  account  warehousing  costs,  or  at  cornering  other  market  participants.  As  a 
consequence, such a trade, which is not very frequent in the market, may in the short  term have 
prevented other market participants from finding enough positions available at specific dates due to a 
lack of supply. In any case, the market was deep enough to absorb the delivery in a month. The 
market  player  (as  ‘non-commercial’)  was  then  forced  by  price  trends  to  sell  the  physical  holding 
through a sale that lasted three months. The trade revealed itself to be very risky for the investment 
fund  and  markets  have  been  able  to  hold  it,  though  with  some  frictions.  Management  and 
transparency of positions for operators and regulators may help to supervise the accumulation of a 
position that may corner the market. In 2012, as a response to this type of event that may create 
disruption and loss of reputation for the exchange, LIFFE introduced a new system of delivery limits 
that applies to different commodities contracts on the exchange, with an important exemption for 
those contracts with a clear commitment to deliver the commodity to an end-user (a firm involved in 
production, processing, or handling/packaging of a physical commodity)149. It therefore applies to all 
positions, and exemptions must be requested by the member of the exchange. 
Transparent  and  efficient  futures  markets  are  an  opportunity  to  allocate  resources  across 
regions to those that va lue them more,  in addition to  being a hedging tool for big commercial 
counterparties.  Futures  markets  also  become  an  opportunity  to  bypass  traditional  intermediary 
channels, which can create artificial bottlenecks, so cutting transaction costs. In effect, they can limit 
the monopsonistic power of the processing industry. However, accessibility  is an essential factor for 
futures markets to effectively reach the supply side. Unfortunately, cocoa futures markets do not 
necessarily take delivery outside Europe  or the United States, which  makes the expected costs for 
producers in Africa or other regions to sell their product prohibitively high (also due to their local 
fragmentation). 
   
                                                            
149 For more details, please see https://globalderivatives.nyx.com/sites/ 
globalderivatives.nyx.com/files/lon3635_revised_250912.pdf.   
 
5.3  Coffee market 
Coffee  is  a  widely  consumed  drink  extracted  from  coffee  seeds  that  has  an  important  stimulant 
component (caffeine). Consumption is mainly concentrated in western economies, and the value of 
global production, which is mainly in developing economies, has reached over $28 billion in 2012.150 
Coffee  seeds  are  extracted  fr om  a  plant  cultivated  in  tropic al  regions  and  brewed  for  human 
consumption since medieval times. The commodity was first produced in Ethiopia, where a special 
Arabica variety is also produced (mocha), and only reached western countries around the 16th century. 
Its commercial utilisation only began only in the mid-19th century, when the drink quickly spread due 
to its use in coffeehouses where other activities (such as live music or dance) were also offered to 
coffee  drinkers.  The  particular  characteristics  of  caffeine  became  an  important  element  of  dietary 
habits of many people, which increased the long-term diffusion of the commodity. Over 97% of coffee 
beans are used today for brewed coffee production or for caffeine use in other types of drinks (Figure 
233). 
Figure 233. Green coffee uses 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from FAO Stats. 
Non-food use is limited to some pharmaceutical products that require a caffeine component. 
Due to its production as a warm drink, coffee may be subject to seasonal demand, though this very 
much depends on how coffee is typically consumed. 
Prices show a steady long-term downward trend as the market expanded on  a global scale 
during 1980s and 1990s, with more efficient and productive production process. Limited alternative 
use of land in producing countries has supported this long-term trend. The effects of liberalisation, 
with the end of the international coffee agreements at the beginning of the 1990s, also helped to bring 
prices down to an historical low as expansion of supply has a lagged effect of 4-5 years on production 
levels. Since the early 2000s, however, prices have been gradually increasing again, with the spread 
between Arabica and Robusta varieties reaching a very high level in recent years. 
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Figure 234. Arabica and Robusta real coffee prices, 1960-2012 
 
Source: World Bank. 
The sharp increase, from the historical low at the beginning of the 2000s, is also confirmed when 
looking at the weighted average (by production levels) of Arabica and Robusta coffee (Figure 235). 
The compound annual growth rate from 2001 (the historical low) to 2012 was roughly 10%. 
Figure 235. Coffee nominal weighted average price (Robusta and Arabica) 
 
Note: Weighted average (by production levels) of Arabica and Robusta prices. 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
In 2012, prices fell due to several factors, but overall prices appear to be in a new phase after 
having reached the bottom.   
 
5.3.1  Product and market characteristics: the rise of Robusta coffee 
Coffee beans are the seeds of the fruit produced by coffee plants. There are two main types of coffee 
seeds: Arabica and Robusta. Arabica can be found in several varieties with unique flavours due to 
different oil contents, so it is generally considered the high-quality coffee, both for beans and coffee 
blends. Robusta, on the other hand, has high caffeine content and a more standardised flavour, though 
it can be also found in slightly different varieties. It can be used both for low-quality coffee blends and 
higher-quality  products.  Coffee  is  a  renewable  crop  with  very  low  substitutability  due  to  the 
particular substance (caffeine) and flavour that makes it a unique product. The differences among 
varieties have caused some authors to argue that coffee is more like wine rather than a standardised 
commodity (Fitter and Kaplinsky, 2001), while Ghoshray (2010) confirms that, on closer examination, 
the law of one price (between Arabica and Robusta) exists if we allow for non-linear adjustments from 
equilibrium. 
Production  of  coffee  beans  can  be  renewed  but,  as  for  cocoa,  there  are  significant  supply 
constraints that slow down the reaction time to structural changes in demand. Harvesting coffee fruits 
from plants is commercially viable only 4-5 years after plantation. The tree can be harvested for up to 
three months, once a year for roughly 20 years in a belt of countries around the Equator. 
Coffee requires some processing in order to extract the seed from the berry that is harvested 
from the coffee plant, often through labour-intensive hand picking, as not all fruits ripen at the same 
time.  This  bean  (called  green  coffee)  goes  through  dry  and  wet  processing  before  roasting.  Dry 
processing (the old method) involves, after removing foreign matters, placing the fruit in the sun for 2-
3 weeks. Afterwards, the dried pulp is removed from the seeds, which are ready to be sold in the 
market. It is a natural and cheap method, but it is slow and may damage the seed. Wet processing is 
more widely adopted because it does not damage the seed and requires less time to wash the fruit and 
for  the  following  fermentation.  After  processing,  the  green  coffee  bean  is  ready  to  be  sold  by 
producers to roasters and manufacturers, who will roast and grind (if sold as powder) the beans close 
to consumption areas. Roasted coffee will be used to prepare coffee blends sold to end-users. The 
roasting time shapes the flavour of coffee, and longer roasting reduces the amount of caffeine. 
Roasted coffee beans or blends are typically used for coffee drink production, but coffee beans 
can also be processed to extract caffeine, which is a chemical compound (a stimulant) used in low 
quantities in other beverages (especially soft drinks) and in high concentration for pharmaceutical 
products, cosmetics, and even pesticides. 
Robusta and Arabica varieties 
Arabica and Robusta coffee are the two major categories of coffee, each with several varieties. Arabica 
is  of  higher  quality,  with  different  flavours,  while  Robusta  is  produced  at  low  altitude  with  less 
flavour but more strength (and so higher caffeine content). Arabica coffee is heterogeneous, and so a 
premium based on quality is discounted in the final price. This premium is typically in a more or less 
stable range over time. However, from time to time (more recently, in 2011 and to some extent in 
2012), the market experiences a sharp widening of the spread, which remain fairly unstable today 
(Figure 236).  
Arabica has had fairly unstable production growth, as Robusta has come to account for almost 
half of the total coffee production (Figure 238). In particular, increasing global competition with the 
development  of  low-cost  production  of  coffee  by  Brazil  and  Vietnam,  supported  by  liberalisation 
processes  in  several  countries,  currency  depreciation  (e.g.  of  the  Brazilian  real)  and  technological 
developments to reduce the bitterness of low-quality Robusta coffee, has been gradually crowding out 
production of Arabica with the consequent slowing down of its production until 2005. This reduced 
the stocks of coffee 4-5 years down the line and resulted in a price spike in 2010 and part of 2011. In 
2010-11, the situation was aggravated by bad weather conditions in Columbia and Central America 
before the main harvest, which enhanced this long-term structural change.  
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Figure 236. Arabica and Robusta second-month futures prices (monthly) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from ICE and LIFFE. 
Even though low-cost production increased at faster rate (Figure 237), demand continued to 
grow strongly even after 2005 and gradually production has picked up again (again, 4-5 years later) 
causing the price drop of 2011-12, thanks also to supportive weather conditions. Arabica production, 
however, is still very volatile. As a result, coffee markets are undergoing important long-term changes 
that increase instability due to the inability to predict supply capacity as it is subject to very slow 
adjustment  processes,  which  may  push  some  producers  out  of  the  market  in  the  meantime  (in 
particular, if they do not have access to long-term credit). 
 
Figure 237. Arabica and Robusta production (k/60 kg 
bags) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration form USDA. 
Figure 238. Robusta and Arabica share of total 
production (%) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from USDA. 
  
 
Cheaper Robusta coffee may continue to play a structural role, which  will result in further 
growth in the future. It is a very good commodity for mass production and for the stable and high 
margins that can be generated in international markets. Cheaper production costs and technological 
advancements  put  Robusta  ahead  for  base  coffee  production.  Product  diversification  and  brand 
loyalty may continue to gain traction (Peluplessy, 2007) for Arabica varieties, however, as they become 
less widely produced and subject to more labour-intensive processing (e.g. shade grown coffee) to 
meet the demand of a growing part of the population that is developing more sophisticated taste for 
high-quality coffee. 
This process of diversification is also gradually reflected in the changing correlation between 
Robusta and Arabica prices. The prices have historically experienced a strong positive correlation, but 
more recently this positive correlation is becoming weaker and periods of negative correlation are 
becoming more frequent and intense (Figure 239). 
Figure 239. Three-year rolling correlation between Robusta and Arabica prices 
 
Source: Author’s calculation from World Bank. 
It may still take several years until this process becomes more visible, but in the meantime 
instability may still continue to shake the market. 
 
Production and consumption 
Production of green beans coffee has been growing since 1961, with some medium-term periods of 
stability during the 1970s and between mid-1980s and the end of 1990s, which saw the beginning of 
more diffused international trade after the liberalisation process in many countries and new WTO 
agreements  (as  discussed  earlier).  Production  trends,  however,  appear  to  be  very  volatile  as 
investment in agricultural technologies that can limit damage from the weather and plant diseases has 
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Figure 240. Green coffee production, 1961-2013 (k/60kg bags) 
 
Note: 2013 data is provisional. 
Source: USDA. 
Markets have only found a more stable positive balance between production and consumption 
in the last 2-3 years (Figure 241). This constant surplus pushed prices of Robusta and Arabica down in 
2011 and 2012. Overall, since 2003, consumption has grown at a compound annual rate of 2.25%. 
Figure 241. Green coffee production and consumption (k/60 kg bags) 
 
Note: 2013 is provisional. 
Source: Author’s elaboration from USDA. 
Even though Arabica trees need a more temperate climate, both Arabica and Robusta coffee 
plants are cultivated in tropical areas. The biggest producers are therefore in South American (Brazil 
and  Columbia,  in  particular),  Central  and  Eastern  African,  and  Central  Asia.  Emerging  markets, 
therefore  are  key  producers  of  coffee  beans  and  are  gradually  becoming  important  users  of  the  
 
commodity,  though  consumption  is  still  mainly  concentrated  in  western  economies.  Interestingly, 
among producing countries, those in Africa and the Americas have lost ground over the years to 
Asian countries (such as Vietnam and Indonesia), in particular after the liberalisation process started 
at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s.  
Figure 242. Production by regions (% of total) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from FAO Stats. 
However, single countries (more than regions) play a crucial role in coffee global production. 
Today, Brazil produces almost 50 million bags, which is roughly 37% of total production. Central and 
South America’s share of nearly 60% of global production is concentrated in a few countries (Figure 
243). Therefore, any major weather events affecting production in the south of Central America (e.g. in 
Guatemala, Honduras) and the centre-north of South America (e.g. in Brazil or Columbia) can have 
important repercussions on global prices, as occurred in 2010 and 2011. Overall, the top ten producers 
handle over 85% of total production, which (except for Ethiopia) is mainly concentrated in Central 
Asia and in Mexico and Brazil in the Americas. 
Figure 243. Top ten green coffee producers (left) and consumers (right), 2012 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from USDA. 272 | SOFT COMMODITIES 
 
Consumption, on the other hand, is concentrated mainly in the European Union (32%) and the 
United States (17%). Brazil is also a big consumer of green coffee, as the main competitor of roasters 
located close to the key consumption areas. Below the top three (plus Japan), consumption is more or 
less equally split across several countries (Figure 243). 
Storage and land productivity 
Storability of coffee depends on the refined state of the product. The green coffee bean, the state in 
which coffee beans are sold at the wholesale level (in airtight bags of 60 kg), can last for more than one 
year. However, after around one year, the product begins to lose its original properties and is sold at a 
discount. Moisture in green coffee beans is an essential element. A high moisture level (above 12.5%) 
ensures  a  more  intense  flavour,  but  a  shorter  storage  life.  Moisture  below  8%,  instead,  gives  less 
flavour to the bean, but a longer storage life. Roasted coffee, at the end-user level, has more or less the 
same storage life, but it will already have started to lose its original properties after a few weeks of 
being packaged in airtight bags (the storage life for coffee powder is even shorter). Storage should be 
in a dark and dry place. Storage in bags is ideal for exchange in international markets of green coffee, 
which is usually roasted close to consumption areas to preserve its original flavour. 
In line with the upward trend of nominal prices from the beginning of the 21st century, stocks-
to-use ratios have gradually decreased to around 20%, which  has partly been  led by a constantly 
growing consumption rate across developing economies. 
Figure 244. Stock-to-use ratio, 2003-2013 
 
Note: 2013 data is provisional 
Source: Author’s elaboration from USDA. 
Stocks of green coffee, as for cocoa, are the response function of supply and demand changes 
that are then ultimately reflected into nominal prices, while structural changes to the supply side will 
only appear in stock levels a few years later. As suggested below, prices appear to follow a non-linear 
relationship with nominal prices trends that are, on average, growing.  
 
Figure 245. Ending stocks and average nominal prices 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from USDA and World Bank. 
The  growing  inability  of  production  to  keep  up  with  higher  demand  growth  rates  is  also 
enhanced by current productivity and harvested areas. Global harvested areas have been more or less 
stable in the last 20 years, while yields have stabilised around a peak reached only recently in 2008, 
after 20 years of growth (Figure 246). 
Figure 246. Harvested areas (by regions) and global yield 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from FAO Stats. 
The long-term increase in yield was essentially triggered by new investments in agricultural 
technologies after the liberalisation, in particular new sun-grown cultivations, which ensured greater 
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(frequently used for mass sun-grown production). Genetic engineering for coffee plants has not been 
developed successfully so far. However, the picture is different when we look at different areas. Africa 
and the Americas have both seen a decline in harvested areas. But while Africa appears to suffer more 
from land productivity and a decline in harvested areas after the liberalisation, yields in the Americas 
have very much compensated the slight decline in harvested areas in the last decade at least (Figure 
247 and Figure 248). 
Figure 247. African harvested areas and yield 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from FAO Stats. 
Figure 248. Harvested areas and yields in the 
Americas 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from FAO Stats. 
Asia is gradually overtaking Africa in terms of  harvested areas, after the boost in production 
and  supply  capacity  at  the  beginning  of  the  21 st  century.  Asian  countries  have  been  the  main 
beneficiaries of the liberalisation process. Growth in harvested areas has since stabilised at around 2.5 
million hectares, while yields have continued to grow in recent years.  
Figure 249. Asian harvested areas and yield 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from FAO Stats.  
 
As Robusta continues to grow as the global coffee variety for mass production and emerging 
economies increase their consumption of coffee, Asian cultivations will become more important for 
global coffee production. 
International trade 
Due to its commercial storage life, freight costs may become more predictable and so may have a 
limited impact in the medium term. However, coffee fruits require a two-step refining process, which 
implies  significant  transportation  costs  before  the  commodity  can  be  transformed  into  a  refined 
product for end-users. Countries such as Brazil have high transportation costs since long-term low 
price production has often resulted in a lack of investments in infrastructure. As a consequence, they 
face  more  structural  issues  as  their  domestic  infrastructure  gradually  becomes  inadequate  (ABN 
AMRO, 2012). In addition, consumption areas are far from production countries, so shipping cost 
volatility can produce some significant impacts on costs. However, coffee can be easily shipped by 
different means of transport, which noticeably reduces freight costs. Beans (green) are the form in 
which the commodity will continue to be traded for two reasons: grinding increases the surface area 
of coffee (and so costs); and roasting will become more efficient if done close to consumption areas, 
due  to  storage  and  quality  reasons  and  potential  synergies  with  grinding  operations  that  would 
reduce transportation costs and build economies of scale at the port of delivery (Leibtag et al., 2007). 
As a result, international trade today is around 80% of total production, with a value of more 
than $22 billion (the biggest soft commodities market). 
Figure 250. Value of international trade ($mn) 
 
Source: Author’s calculation from USDA and World Bank. 
The leading actors in the international market for green coffee are the two low cost producers 
that entered the international markets on the wave of the liberalisation reforms. Vietnam and Brazil 
account for almost 50% of the total international trade, which points to the Robusta variety becoming 
the key international coffee commodity. The top ten countries have over 83% of the market share of 
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Figure 251. Top ten green coffee exporters (left) and importers (right), 2012 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from USDA. 
More than 40% of total exports are directed to the European Union, while the United States 
receives another 20% of global exports. All other countries have more or less similar shares, on the 
basis of their historical coffee consumption. 
5.3.1.1  Supply characteristics: a simple value chain 
Due to its particular characteristics, the supply of coffee has significant constraints that delay reactions 
to  market  changes.  Converting  land  to  alternative  uses  has  both  the  constraint  of  an  external 
environment that may not easily allow alternative cultivation, as well as the sunk costs of having 
spent several years bringing the area to full production. Supply, therefore, mostly faces high sunk 
costs but very low opportunity costs. Market developments then, such as the liberalisation process 
and the general reduction of production costs, may greatly impact higher-cost producers in the short 
term, while their ability to react is postponed to several years down the line. After the liberalisation 
and  the  entrance  of  new  low-cost  players  (and  also  thanks  to  currency  devaluations),  African 
producers and processors/roasters, in particular, have been squeezed by low-cost coffee (from Asia; 
Oxfam 2003) and widespread practices of blending high-quality coffee for industrial production with 
today’s ability to reduce bitterness of cheap coffee. 
On the manufacturing side, high fixed costs in manufacturing slow down the reaction of retail 
prices to changes in the underlying commodity price (Leibtag et al., 2007). Coffee beans are only a 
small part of the costs of the final product. In a cup of coffee, similarly to chocolate and cocoa beans, it 
is estimated that the coffee beans make up 5-7% of total costs, labour is 19-20%, rent 16-18%, diary 6-
8%, and packaging and sugar 13-15% (Coffee Association of Canada, 2002). 
Figure 252. Coffee’s simplified value chain 
 
Source: Author.  
 
The coffee supply chain is very simple, even though it is spread across many geographical 
levels (Figure 252). While local producers are coordinating much more through cooperatives following 
the growth of international trade, they are still small and fragmented in comparison to international 
processors  and  roasters  that  manufacture  coffee  or  simply  export  beans  for  resale  close  to 
consumption areas. The reach of their business interest, which spans across different continents, also 
requires a significant size and scale. Roasters and grinders are established close to delivery ports to 
minimise the transportation costs.  
This discrepancy of market power has often prompted claims for unfair trade conditions to be 
addressed by policy interventions (Talbot, 2004; Lindsey, 2004). More competition for international 
processors  and  roasters  from  production  areas  that  become  better  equipped  to  sell  a  semi-final 
product may shorten the value chain and allow more value-added to be transferred to producing 
areas. However, this income will not necessarily reach those that are suffering the most from lower 
production  costs,  essentially  the  workers  in  coffee  plantations  (see  Box  11).  The  market  power  of 
international  coffee  manufacturers  may  expose  the  weaker  part  of  the  value  chain  to  aggressive 
competition  and  rent  extraction.  Monitoring  of  market  practices  and  the  use  of  market  power  by 
national or supranational authorities is an important element. However, changes in recent years have 
also gone beyond rent extraction, with new regions of the world able to produce at much lower cost, 
so replacing other regions where costs have not adjusted. Conditions for workers are often dependent 
on government policies that avoid allocating or seeking more resources to pursue social objectives. 
Most coffee (70%) is sold through supermarkets (Pelupessy, 2007) and many important chains have 
started  backward  vertical  integration  to  access  the  margins  of  roasters.  Coffee’s  limited  two-step 
refining process (with low production costs) and its almost direct usability in the beverage industry 
frequently  leads  to  vertical  integration  with  the  green  coffee  bean  refining  industry  and  to  some 
horizontal  integration  with  the  production  of  other  beverages  and  soft  drinks  (as  with  big  food 
companies, like Nestle). Access to international finance (Cardenas, 1994) has also boosted productivity 
and provided additional market power to vertically integrated exporters. 
 
Box 11. The past, present and future of the ‘fair trade’ movement 
The coffee crisis between 2001 and 2005, when prices fell below production costs in several countries and 
small producers faced high losses, set off a chain of furious reactions towards the big coffee players in 
particular, due to the small contribution of coffee beans to the total cost of coffee, which kept margins on 
coffee sales more or less the same. The action of the movement today is also directed at persuading 
governments and other international organisations (such as FAO) to intervene to support producers and 
production  in  compliance  with  a  minimum  set  of  standards.  In  this  changing  environment,  a  broad 
movement aiming to bring fairness to international markets quickly developed. The movement had some 
important success, with Starbucks choosing to buy only ‘fair trade’ within a broader rebranding of the 
company. ‘Fair trade’ associations have since then pushed for more transparency and empowerment of 
producers in several producing countries, and not only for coffee. In particular, cutting part of the value 
chain  and  linking  cooperatives  directly  with  retailers  or  consumers  (Figure  253)  would  supposedly 
reduce total costs of production and increase margins for producers. 
Often  the  organisations  that  set  up  these  shortened  value  chains  require  buyers  to  pay  an 
additional premium, which means that ‘fair trade’ prices are typically higher than front-month prices on 
international futures markets. Importers may also provide credit directly to producers in exchange of the 
commodity. The organisations issue a certificate to producers that requires them to be compliant with 
important principles on conditions of employment (e.g. with regards to child labour) and environment 
(e.g. no GMOs) in exchange for a small premium. The organisations also provide credit and invest in 
improvements to the external working environment, with schools, roads, and so on. The certification, 
however, does not ensure that once the money flies in, producers will indirectly redistribute it through 
better  labour  conditions  for  workers  within  the  plantation.  Enforcement  is  very  difficult  when 
production  is  highly  fragmented,  especially  for  small  organisations  working  in  countries  with  very 
limited rule of law. 
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Figure 253. ‘Fair trade’ value chain 
 
Source: Locke et al. 2010, p. 9. 
As a consequence, despite the undeniable success in attracting the attention of policy-makers and 
international organisations towards the conditions of small producers of commodities in many parts of 
the world, ‘fair trade’ is still commercially limited to only 1-2% of total exports (Pelupessy, 2007). The 
overreliance on the ideological nature of the initiative cannot create sufficient demand for a convenient 
and  high-quality  product,  limiting  the  potential  growth  of  the  market.  In  the  future,  the  ‘fair  trade’ 
certification could ensure that a list of quality requirements for the product is met to commercially justify 
the imposition of a premium. Pushing ‘fair trade’ in the niche high quality coffee market may become the 
way  forward  for  promoting  more  socially  and  environmentally  sustainable  production  in  a  very 
competitive international market, and not only for coffee. 
 
5.3.1.2  Demand characteristics: a solid long-term growth 
Demand for coffee is subject to natural constraints, as consumption by an individual cannot go over a 
quantity that would affect his or her health. Demand also has some cyclical patterns, since as a warm 
drink coffee it is consumed more during the winter. In the short term, demand elasticity to price is low 
as the consumption of coffee may create an addiction, making it difficult to switch to substitutes. 
Instead,  demand  for  coffee  may  rise  through  increasing  numbers  of  drinkers.  In  recent  years, 
emerging markets have driven new demand, as average incomes have begun to grow for millions of 
people that now have new dietary requirements and a new social status. A significant market has thus 
been growing in the last decade and, as a result, demand forecasts are quite bullish and may continue 
to be so for some years ahead (Figure 254). 
Elasticity of demand to prices is limited since there are almost no natural products with same 
characteristics  and  chemical  components.  However,  among  coffee  varieties,  Arabica  and  Robusta 
compete with each other. Over the years, demand has become more sophisticated and more receptive 
to different coffee flavours, leading to diversification. There might be some additional reasons to be 
optimistic.  
  
 
Figure 254. Coffee consumption (mn bags) 
 
Source: ICO World Coffee Market Outlook (2013). 
5.3.1.3  Key product and market characteristics 
The product and market characteristics of coffee are those of a commodity that relies on a complex 
interaction between different value chains and elasticity of demand and supply. These characteristics 
can be summarised as follows: 
  Coffee is a renewable (but not recyclable) commodity with limited short-term substitution and 
alternative uses (e.g. pharmaceutical products). 
  Production convertibility is low, even though it requires limited capital. 
  Supply has significant constraints that limit elasticity to demand trends. 
  Supply is also fragmented and lacks horizontal and vertical integration. 
  The processing and roasting industry is more international and so requires economies of scale 
that increase market power over small producers. 
  Green coffee has acceptable storability for international trade, with transportation costs that can 
be borne by those companies that benefit from sufficient economies of scale. 
  Supply elasticity is low, while demand elasticity to price is low in the short term. 
  Concentration is very low at the production level, though producers are increasingly coalescing 
in  broader  cooperatives,  but  concentration  is  growing  as  the  value  chain  becomes  more 
international (for coffee manufacturing activities). 
  Emerging economies manage the global production of coffee but their domestic demand is very 
low. 
  Increasing  income  due  to  greater  development  of  emerging  economies  may  change  dietary 
habits  and  this  (together  with  a  growing  population)  may  increase  consumption  of  coffee, 
which would put bullish pressure on future consumption levels. 
Table 82. Key product and market characteristics 
 
Recycling/ 
Production 
convertibility 
Substitutes/
Horizontal 
integration 
Alternative 
uses/Vertical 
integration 
Capital 
intensive 
production 
Stora-
bility 
Freight 
costs 
incidence 
Elasticity 
to price/ 
demand 
Concen-
tration 
BRICs 
weight 
Future 
Consumption/ 
Production 
Demand 
side 
None  Low  Low 
Low  Medium  Medium 
Medium 
Medium 
Low  High 
Supply 
side 
Low  Medium  Low  Low  High  Medium 
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5.3.2  Exogenous factors: the role of opportunity costs 
Several exogenous factors can affect coffee market trends. Government intervention was historically 
very high before the liberalisation process and the end of the ICA agreements, which controlled prices 
mainly through quotas and marketing boards. With the end of such agreements and with the process 
of liberalisation, government interventions have become less invasive or have changed their scope. In 
some countries, intervention is still significant through the state ownership of main processing and 
roasting  companies.  Overall,  though,  government  intervention  has  been  decreasing  since  the 
beginning of the liberalisation period, but significant risks of political instability and (in some areas) 
military conflicts still exist for the production of coffee. 
The weather is certainly an important exogenous factor that contributed to the spike and fall of 
Arabica prices in 2010-11. Coffee trees require heavy rain before production and low rains during 
harvesting. However, a major difference with cocoa production is that coffee is produced in many 
more countries, so the impact of weather is mitigated by some geographical diversification.  
Table 83. Key exogenous factors 
Government intervention  Main other external factors 
Medium 
Weather, political instability and military conflicts, economic 
development, opportunity costs, economic cycle 
Source: Author. 
Revenues  from  the  alternative  use  of  the  land  are  important  opportunity  cost.  In  some 
countries, a lack of infrastructures (such as domestic transportability or general logistics with different 
international markets) prompts the development of low-cost/margins production, which often relies 
on unfair working conditions, etc. Improvements to infrastructure quality and scope would certainly 
provide  a  strong  foundation  to  increase  opportunity  costs  and  allow  these  economies  to  produce 
whatever maximises the interest of their own populations. However, corruption and other frictions in 
the governance of these countries often make this process of ‘self-sustainability’ very difficult, if not 
impossible.  
Finally, the economic cycle, and in particular its reflection in demand trends or exchange rates 
through changes in prices or direct monetary policy interventions, certainly has an impact on coffee 
prices. The devaluation of the Brazilian real has greatly helped its coffee industry to compete more 
fiercely with other regions in the world. Evidence of this significant impact will be discussed in the 
empirical analysis of the next section.  
5.3.3  Empirical analysis: the effects of lower production costs 
The empirical analysis looks at the implications of global competition and how its effects on supply 
and demand factors affect prices. The analysis uses the following dataset: 
  Monthly data from January 1992 to March 2012. 
  Log151 of Arabica front-month nominal price (on ICE) from the World Bank. 
  Log of OECD Leading Composite Indicator for OECD countries (average of de-trended and 
smoothed and normalised component series). 
  Log of OECD Leading Composite Indicator for China (average of de-trended and smoothed and 
normalised component series). 
  Log of nominal Brazilian real – US dollar exchange rate. 
  Log of S&P 500. 
Simple linear regressions of differentiated values of the Arabica price (as dependent variable) 
and  OECD  demand,  Chinese  demand  and  Brazilian  real  exchange  rate  with  the  US  dollar  show 
interesting results, with a statistically significant coefficient and tests on residuals that point to no 
spurious relations or significant misspecification (see Output #67, Output #68, and Output #69). 
                                                            
151 Natural logarithm.  
 
Table 84. Regression output 
Independent variable  Coefficient (t-test) 
OECD demand 
4.15* 
(1.71) 
China demand 
2.54** 
(2.05) 
BRL/USD 
.32*** 
(2.87) 
Note: *10%, **5%, ***1% significance. 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
Both demand from OECD countries and China has had a significant effect over coffee prices in 
the last 20 years. Less impact was generated by changes in the value of the Brazilian real over this 
period. However, the relationship is statistically significant with a low coefficient spread over a 20-
year  period  that  does  not  necessarily  exclude  the  potential  high  impact  of  temporary  currency 
devaluation on the global coffee market.  
Empirical tests on coffee markets also confirm that the commodity was uncorrelated with the 
S&P 500 before 2002. Via simple linear regression of differentiated values, the model finds that the 
price of Arabica became linked (with a positive sign) to the financial index from the beginning of the 
downward trend in the dollar exchange rate (as a reflection of expansionary monetary policies). This 
link became gradually stronger as the effects of such policies intensified and reached its peak with the 
recent financial crisis. The model proves to be robust in relation to normality, heteroskedasticity, and 
white noise of residuals.  
Finally,  the  ARCH  model  does  not  support  early  evidence  showing  the  different  impact  of 
commercial and index positions and their interaction with physical markets (through the front-month 
price). Both positions in this model appear statistically significant and their levels do affect front-
month contracts. No clear evidence was found that one type of position prevails over the other in its 
potential impact on physical markets.  
5.3.4  Market organisation: dealing with issues of market infrastructure  
The organisation of coffee markets underwent important structural changes after the liberalisation 
process (and the replacement of marketing boards with traders/exporters) that have improved the 
mechanisms of transmission of global prices into local/regional prices, so linking global markets to 
producers’  prices  (Krivonos,  2004).  Between  producers  and  international  coffee  manufacturers, 
roasters and processors have gained market power due to their local control over supply or  local 
intermediaries. 
Market microstructure is very simple. Physical market organisation relies on bilateral contracts 
based on global active benchmarks to which a discount or a premium is applied. The majority of 
coffee  (especially  specialty  coffee)  is  bought  and  sold  in  an  opaque  but  legitimate  bilateral 
environment that may take into account global prices as a reference or simply use global markets for 
hedging that position. On top of the general variety difference, there are regional and product features 
that can modify the reference price upwards or downwards.  
Futures markets are located in Europe (for Robusta futures contracts) and the United States (for 
Arabica futures contracts), which only deliver in their regional areas. Another futures contract (also 
available in e-mini version152) is traded in Brazil with local delivery,  mainly in São Paulo. Limited 
delivery availability, even with the multiple trading venues where these products are traded,  may 
create divergence between spot and future prices and increase the costs of those producers that cannot 
reach the market directly in this environment .  Futures markets have the possibility to reduce  the 
market power of big traders by providing access to a pool of global interests. Even though the biggest 
global  manufacturers  are  American -  or  European-headquartered  companies,  the  growth  of 
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consumption and current production in emerging markets will, over time, require a change of policy 
in the delivery points for this commodity.  
Recent issues with the slow loading out of coffee from licensed warehouses have increased the 
need for an effective monitoring system and rules/supervision of commodity distribution systems 
across important consumption areas. After complaints by market participants and to meet growing 
demand,  last  year  LIFFE  increased  the  minimum  loading-out  rate  (or  movement  out  rate)  for  its 
warehouses to 250 tonnes per day for warehouses with 30,000 tonnes, and 500 tonnes per day for 
those above. As with the proposals for LME warehouses storing aluminium discussed earlier in this 
report, in addition to rules for regular assessment and, if needed, revisions of loading-out rates, an 
open cap (above 30,000 tonnes), rather than a loading-out rate based on absolute size of the warehouse 
or even on the average time to get the commodity out of the warehouse, would create incentives for 
warehouses to increase their size well beyond the threshold (if possible) and retain more of the global 
supply.  Otherwise,  if  the  loading-out  rate  above  the  open  threshold  is  too  high,  it  may  push 
warehouses to limit their size to 30,000 tonnes, thus holding too little of the global supply (at least in 
the short term) to cope with market demand. The minimum loading-out rate may also be seen as a 
reference  point  for  warehouses,  even  if  it  were  possible  to  deliver  more  without  affecting  their 
viability.  It  provides  the  incentive  for  warehouses  to  do  their  job  and  extract  an  acceptable  rent 
without colluding to constrain supply even further and increase storage time and revenues. More 
evidence  is  needed  on  whether  the  threshold  is  adequate  for  coffee  futures  warehousing  systems 
before drawing any conclusions. Further analyses should look at the possibility of creating hybrid 
delivery systems that can allow for flexibility by involving agreements with transport and logistics 
companies to increase the flexibility of the warehouse system, which relies (perhaps too much) on 
fixed costs of labour, machineries, and so on to run its activities. A proper delivery system ensures 
convergence  and  therefore  a  proper  price  formation  process  and  interaction  between  futures  and 
physical markets. 
Table 85. Coffee market organisation 
Physical market setting  Pricing complexity  Liquidity futures market  Delivery points 
Competitive (regional) 
Oligopolistic (global) 
Low  High 
Limited 
(Brazil, US and EU) 
Source: Author. 
Finally,  the  physical  market  setting  relies  on  a  competitive  regional  market,  with  small 
producers and local merchants that liaise with international coffee manufacturers and exporters. At 
the international level, an oligopolistic setting exists with big coffee manufacturers interacting with 
local  farms  or  regional  points  of  delivery.  International  investments  in  the  upstream  markets  by 
medium-sized coffee roasters, with the direct ownership of coffee farms, have been growing, but are 
still limited compared to the total size of the market.  
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6.  DRIVERS OF COMMODITIES PRICE FORMATION IN 
PHYSICAL AND FUTURES MARKETS: CONCLUDING 
REMARKS 
his chapter summarises some of the key findings that have emerged in the previous chapters. It 
assigns  a  weight  to  each  main  driver  of  price  formation.  The  first  section  discusses  market 
fundamentals in driving price formation. The second section illustrates the conclusions of this 
study on market organisation of commodities, highlighting the key developments in recent years led 
by international trade and new technologies. Finally, matrixes of weights for each key driver of price 
formation  are  presented.  Illustrative  tables  summarise  the  complexity  of  each  commodity  market, 
pointing at the importance of bearing in mind differences when designing any policy response. 
6.1  Market fundamentals 
Price formation in commodities markets interacts with a complex set of endogenous and exogenous 
variables.  Product,  supply,  and  demand  characteristics  shape  market  structure  in  different  ways. 
Market  dynamics,  both  in  physical  and  futures  markets,  can  therefore  vary  considerably  across 
commodities. 
Product characteristics: shaping market structure 
Product characteristics have an important impact on commodities price formation and the structure of 
underlying markets, but most of the effects are indirect. Key product characteristics are:  
  Quality. 
  Storability. 
  Renewability. 
  Recyclability. 
  Substitutability. 
  (Final) usability. 
Differences among varieties are typically priced through a premium over a benchmark price, 
but qualities can also lead to the growth of markets in new geographical areas if technologies and 
margins are sufficiently high to increase substitutability in some of the uses and to attract international 
investments.  The  growth  of  Robusta  coffee  production,  which  is  gradually  becoming  the  most 
produced quality of coffee, epitomises the potential effects of qualities of commodities that can be 
produced at lower cost with limited differences from the most diffused variety. In general, qualities of 
a commodity are not radically different, which may lead to easy substitution among them. 
Storability of a commodity can have different stages, which is reflected in the cost of storage 
and shipping. But costs of storage should be looked at under a broader definition of cost. Inventories 
are the response function of supply and demand patterns. Commodities that can be easily stored are 
more  predictable  and  better  reflect  demand  and  supply  fundamentals.  When  storage  is  difficult 
because of unpredictable supply or due to the nature of the product, changes in inventories can have a 
more significant impact in the short term, as inventories cannot predictably smooth out the effects of 
unpredictable supply on price formation, as is the case for agricultural and soft commodities. Where 
supply  is  more  predictable,  information  about  inventory  levels  is  not  a  direct  driver  of  price 
formation. Storable commodities, particularly those that are export-driven, can also expose the price 
formation mechanism to external factors such as freight costs (as in 2010 for iron ore). As the empirical 
analyses of previous sections suggest by confirming the theory of storage, inventories are a response 
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function of demand and supply by reacting to the basis (difference between futures and spot price), 
i.e.  to  the  expectations  about  future  spot  prices,  taking  into  account  current  demand  and  supply 
factors and the futures curve. Inventories therefore link physical to futures markets and internalise all 
factors that can impact on the basis, i.e. risk-free interest rates, cost of physical storage, and spot price 
expectations (fears of supply shortages, etc.). Therefore, policies that affect risk-free interest rates (such 
as monetary policies), whether designed for commodities markets or not, influence storability and, 
potentially, the fundamentals of commodities markets.  
Renewable commodities are typically products of the earth (such as agricultural commodities). 
Renewability exposes supply to seasonality, which enhances the weight of exogenous factors such as 
the weather. Inventories become more important, as supply cannot be easily predicted. However, if 
the  product  is  used  for  alternative  productions,  such  as  energy,  the  assessment  becomes  more 
complex.  External  factors,  such  as  biofuel  policies,  are  gradually  linking  market  structure  to 
developments  in  other  markets  (for  instance,  crude  oil  markets).  The  use  of  corn  for  energy 
production, for example, suggests a strong interest in developing greater energy independence thanks 
to the renewability of the commodity. 
Substitutability of a product shapes market structure and moves the attention of international 
markets to a commodity that can generate higher returns and diversification, limiting exposure to one 
single use. Supply would gradually concentrate efforts on the commodity that can be produced with 
the highest margin (and so the lowest cost of production). However, the degree of substitutability may 
also  depend  on  external  factors,  such  as  the  impact  of  negative  externalities  on  the  environment, 
environmental regulation, and infrastructures. Savings generated through environmental costs favour 
the use of clean sources of energy over polluting ones, such as carbon. 
The final usability is another crucial factor. A commodity usually needs to be processed before 
being used as a final or intermediate product. Processing becomes a key driver of market structure 
developments, and so price formation, if other products (co-products) can be produced during the 
same refining process. Supply will concentrate on products that can generate the highest number of 
co-products (also for alternative uses) while keeping costs of production more or less at the same 
level. The role of co-products is key in commodities markets with less capital-intensive production 
and high substitutability. Agricultural commodities, such as corn and soybean oil, have grown quickly 
in the last decade partly thanks to demand for alternative uses (such as energy, pharmaceuticals and 
industrial food applications). Technological developments in recent years have also widened the set of 
commodities whose use has been extended to new applications, in particular in the pharmaceutical 
and industrial food industries. 
Finally, the product characteristics of a commodity also shape the business model of commodity 
firms.  For  instance,  despite  the  increasing  average  size  of  farms,  production  of  agricultural 
commodities is rarely vertically integrated in the business model of large agricultural trading houses. 
The  trading  house  coordinates  and  supports  activities  of  a  fragmented  supply,  but  ensures  that 
refining and production of co-products is done through their facilities. These firms have therefore 
integrated much more horizontally by exploiting their size in international markets, and less vertically 
with local producers to which they also provide risk management services. By contrast, gas extraction 
and refining operations usually require a high level of vertical integration due to a capital-intensive 
production model and to benefit from economies of scale. 
Supply factors: dealing with multiple constraints 
Multiple factors affect the supply of commodities, and they reflect the significant differences among 
markets. Some of these factors, which impact the elasticity of supply to demand, are: 
  Production convertibility and capital intensity. 
  Horizontal and vertical integration. 
  Storability and transportability. 
  Industry concentration. 
  Geographical concentration (emerging markets). 
  Technological developments. 
  Supply peaks and future trends.  
 
Convertibility of production facilities increases the elasticity of supply to demand and limits 
monopsonistic powers. Convertibility is typically associated with productions that have low capital 
intensity, i.e. low sunk costs and limited capital commitment. Agricultural commodities supply has 
high production convertibility, while primary aluminium factories cannot be converted to alternative 
productions. 
Horizontal and vertical integration are important factors that can affect the elasticity of supply. 
Horizontal  integration  exploits  economies  of  scope  across  different  commodities  markets,  and 
commodities firms in agricultural markets frequently adopt it. Vertical integration is typical of high 
capital-intensive production, which exploits synergies along the value chain to maximise economies of 
scale and scope. However, even in capital-intensive productions, vertical integration with the final 
product may be only partial, as with iron ore companies and steel production. The additional refining 
process required for some industrial metals may discourage upstream companies from investing in 
vertical  integration  with  downstream  markets.  Crude  oil  suppliers,  in  contrast,  are  very  often 
involved in every step of the value chain until the final production of the refined product. 
Storability and transportability properties are important factors that can influence the level of 
capital commitment that supplier will invest in the market. Limited storability and transportability 
can  increase  the  rigidity  of  supply  by  requiring  more  capital  investments  to  ensure  that  the 
commodity  reaches  the  reference  market.  These  properties  may  even  cause  suppliers  to  invest 
resources in freight markets. For instance, some crude oil companies have invested in the ownership 
of shipping companies running tankers to transport liquefied gas to key entry points in the main 
consuming regions. If capital is not available, however, this situation may weaken the contractual 
power of supply. Easy storability and transportability, on the other hand, can ease capital pressures on 
suppliers and so increase elasticity. These characteristics help to develop competitive freight markets, 
such as for bulk commodities like grains. 
Concentration  of  the  industry  can  change  market  structure  through  market  power,  which 
imposes a mark-up (monopoly or oligopoly) or ties supply to marginal costs (monopsonistic powers). 
Oligopolistic pressures usually emerge in commodities markets with high capital investments, such as 
industrial metals. Rigidity and predictability of production levels lead to a natural equilibrium that is 
not necessarily the outcome of collusive actions, but rather the ability (due to market characteristics) to 
predict competitors’ production levels and to act accordingly. Monopsonistic powers emerge where 
there is a lack of vertical integration and the supply side is rather small and fragmented. This is the 
case  of  some  soft  commodities  markets,  such  as  cocoa.  Smaller  growers  were  exposed  to 
monopsonistic  powers  when  markets  were  liberalised.  Supply  was  not  sufficiently  increased  or 
consolidated (by reducing barriers to entry) to face growing competition  from  other geographical 
areas and the rising monopsonistic power of big international exporters. Consolidation of the industry 
at  the  international  level  is  one  of  the  key  developments  of  the  opening-up  to  international 
competition. 
Geographical  concentration  can  expose  the  supply  (and  so  price  formation  mechanisms)  to 
external factors, such as political instability or weather conditions. For instance, the production of 
cocoa,  mainly  in  Western  Africa,  was  constrained  by  great  political  instability  during  the  1980s. 
Finally, proximity of supply to big consumption areas may increase elasticity and expose it less to 
exogenous (unforeseeable) factors. 
Technological developments have been an important driver of price formation through their 
effects on supply. For example, new production processes for industrial metals to minimise energy 
consumption and increase productivity, or new hydraulic fracking technologies to extract shale gas, 
have been important drivers of change for the supply side and the market as a whole. In agricultural 
markets,  new  fertilisers,  pesticides  and  genetically  modified  seeds,  with  massive  investments  in 
biotechnologies,  have  increased  yields  and  average  farm  size  while  total  harvested  areas  have 
remained stable or even fallen. Today, almost 100% of US corn is made out of a GMO, while the 
European Union has encountered some strong opposition in countries, like France, to the adoption of 
these technological advances based on claims of potential harm for human health. 
Finally, natural constraints on the supply side, such as supply peaks in crude oil extraction in 
some regions (such as Northern Europe), are drivers of change in price formation for some recognised 
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confirms the difficulty for the supply side to keep up with sustained demand growth in recent years. 
However, not only actual production but also expectations of lower (or higher) production levels can 
shape current mechanisms of price formation. Expectations of shale gas (and perhaps oil) production 
have driven natural gas prices in the United States to historical lows. It may still to be too early to 
understand how the long-term geopolitical implications of the ‘unconventional revolution’ in oil and 
gas will again change drivers of price formation for key global consumption areas. 
Demand factors: the rise of developing economies 
Demand  factors  are  crucial  for  commodities  price  formation.  Empirical  analyses  across  several 
markets  confirm  a  strong  and  statistically  significant  impact  of  demand  patterns  (driven  by  the 
economic cycle) on commodities prices. A thorough understanding of these demand factors, however, 
is subject to several assumptions about the standard behaviour of typical commodities consumers. 
Different types of users with different objectives and budgets have different price elasticity, which can 
be assessed on average through some common factors. These factors are: 
  Income growth and urbanisation. 
  Technological developments and alternative uses. 
  Long-term habits and demographics. 
  Economic cycle. 
Income level is a crucial aspect for commodities demand. Income growth changes the habits of 
the  population  and  leads  them  to  spend  more  on  commodities  that  are  not  usually  considered 
essential  goods.  The  growth  of  emerging  markets  in  the  last  decade  has  expanded  the  basket  of 
commodities that their populations use in their daily life. The classic example is crude oil, which 
reflects  the  growth  of  oil-intensive  emerging  economies  like  China,  but  income  growth  has  also 
increased emerging markets’ consumption of cocoa and coffee-based food or drinks (e.g. chocolate), 
which have typically been seen as products for high-income people. Both qualitative and quantitative 
analyses confirm that emerging markets have been a key driver of demand across all commodities 
markets assessed in this study. The link is strong; the growth of emerging markets is perhaps the 
variable  with  the  strongest  impact  across  diverse  markets.  Empirical  analyses  for  crude  oil, 
aluminium, copper, soybean oil and coffee show a strong link with Chinese demand growth, at least 
in the last 10-15 years. As a heavy industrial economy, China has imported more industrial metals and 
crude oil than anyone else. Demand still appears sustained, even though growth in these countries is 
slowing down and may continue to do so in the coming years. 
Technological developments in recent years have resulted in new important applications for 
commodities  historically  used  for  only  one  purpose.  Alternative  uses,  often  supported  by 
accommodating government interventions, have renewed production in several commodities markets. 
For instance, technological developments permit the production of several co-products from corn that 
can  be  used  for  animal  feed  and  human  food  (with  industrial  applications).  Technological 
developments, together with government policies,  have fostered demand for renewable and clean 
energy  production,  which  has  pushed  production  for  some  agricultural  commodities  to  historical 
peaks. Over 40% of the corn produced each year in the United States is used for energy production to 
meet the mandate set by law. Other developments  have gradually increased volumes of cocoa or 
coffee used for pharmaceutical applications. 
Demand factors that drive price formation can also come from changes in the long-term habits 
of a population. Income growth can change people’s habits, even in the short term. However, other 
long-term factors, such as migration, scientific research on human health, environmental factors (e.g. 
damage from ozone depletion) or globalised information channels, may cause significant changes in 
human habits that affect the consumption of commodities. 
Last but not least, the economic cycle and its reflection in endogenous demand aspects (such as 
average  personal  income)  and  cross-border  flows  (international  trade)  have  a  crucial  impact  on 
demand and so on commodity price formation; empirical analyses show that the business cycle is a 
fundamental driver of price formation. Commodities are at the heart of the economic cycle and their 
price  formation  mechanisms  immediately  reflect  changes  to  macroeconomic  conditions  fuelling 
demand. The relationship between the economic cycle and commodities prices is strongly positive 
across markets, in contrast to past claims about the strong anti-cyclical nature of commodities markets.  
 
Except for precious metals (which are not covered in this study), it appears that commodities markets 
do not follow the cycle during a long period of growth or depression, but are very responsive to short-
term drops (and rebounds) in demand. 
Exogenous factors: grasping long-term implications 
Factors that are exogenously imposed by commodities markets dynamics play a crucial role on the 
price formation mechanisms. These dynamics are: 
  ‘Financialisation process’ and monetary policies. 
  Subsidies programmes. 
  General government interventions (e.g. export bans). 
  The economic cycle and other macroeconomic events. 
  Technological developments. 
  Unpredictable events (e.g. weather). 
The ‘financialisation’ process can be defined as the process of alignment of commodities returns with 
pure  financial  assets  (‘pooling  effect’),  increasing  co-movements  among  asset  classes  that  have 
historically been seen as following opposite patterns. This process is developing in an environment 
with much higher non-commercial investments than a decade ago, due to the joint effects of monetary 
policies and deregulation of the financial sector. As illustrated through qualitative and quantitative 
analyses  in  the  first  chapter,  accommodating  monetary  policies,  technological  advances,  and  the 
growth of international markets have set this process in motion. As shown in the earlier empirical 
analysis, the rise of important commercial and hybrid commodities players, led by the impressive 
growth of global demand from emerging markets and the development of international trade, has 
been initially a key driver of growth for futures markets, which have attracted passive investments 
mainly brought by global financial institutions (see Section 1.4).  
Table 86. Link between commodities prices and financial indexes before and after 2002 
 
Before 2002  After 2002  Whole sample  Model 
Crude oil  No  Yes  No  ARCH 
Natural Gas  No  No  No  ARIMA, Granger 
Iron ore  -  -  -  - 
Aluminium*  No  Yes  Yes*  ARCH, OLS 
Copper  No  Yes  No  ARCH, OLS 
Wheat  No  Yes  No  ARIMA, OLS 
Corn  No  Yes  No  OLS 
Soybean oil  No  Yes  Yes  ARCH, OLS 
Sugar  -  -  -  - 
Cocoa  Yes**  Yes**  Yes**  OLS 
Coffee  No  Yes**  No  OLS 
Note: *both ways, **Rejection at 10% level. Data up to 2011/2012. 
Source: Author.  
This process has increased commodities co-movements with financial assets, but no evidence so 
far  has  suggested  that  volatile  patterns  can  be  attributed  to  non-commercial  investments.  The 
empirical analysis shows, instead, that commercial positions have led the growth of non-commercial 
positions  in  an  environment  deeply  influenced  by  easy  access  to  credit  and  high  profitability  of 
international trade. Non-commercial positions have eventually bridged the link with financial indexes 
and in recent years have become by far the largest component of futures trading flows (by summing 
long and short open interest positions). ‘Financialisation’ is therefore an unintended development of 
an  environment  profoundly  affected  by  the  long-term  effects  of  important  policy  decisions 
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sector).  Non-commercial  positions  and  international  finance  have  been  instrumental  to  the 
development of international commodities trade, led by the growth of emerging economies that are 
able to gain market share in several markets by producing at the lowest costs. The availability of cheap 
credit, with interests rates close to zero for a prolonged period of time and a much cheaper dollar, 
have thus fuelled massive investments in direct purchases of physical commodities, attracted by high 
profitability and the wrong assumption of a counter-cyclical nature (see Section 1.3). Liquidity has 
been flowing into stocks of commodities firms, which have in recent years multiplied their market 
capitalisation. Moreover, technological advances in the last two decades have made access to financial 
markets  easier  and  cheaper  from  any  location  in  the  world.  Real-time  accessibility  to  global 
benchmark prices has strengthened the importance of key reference prices and so the functioning of 
their price formation mechanisms becomes of global relevance. Finally, with zero risk-free interest 
rates and a falling dollar exchange rate,153 the futures curve has rapidly moved in to contango for 
storable and cyclical commodities, such as industrial metals. A legitimate carry trade  has emerged, 
with financial institutions ready to finance stocks held in warehouses,  even causing queues of up to 
one year to pull the commodity out, due to badly designed rules for warehouses. Since the early 2000s, 
the combined effect of all these events, with the crucial role of monetary policies (access to credit) and 
international trade, have created a  prolonged window for  carry trades across commodities markets 
that have increased pro-cyclicality and eventually wrapped several financial and non -financial assets 
up in the same basket. 
Subsidies policies by governments have also been a major source of pri ce distortion. The 
political objective to support national markets has prevailed for a long time. However, in recent years 
discussions within the WTO agreements over eliminating barriers to international trade have reversed 
this long-term trend. Both Europe and the United States have been leading a process of substantive 
reductions  of  subsidies  to  commodities  markets.  Aside  from  its  still  protective  policy  in  some 
agricultural markets, the European Union has cut the most in relative terms, while the United  States 
has slowed down its cuts since the inception of the financial crisis. Both Europe and the United States 
have  virtually  cancelled  forms  of  direct  intervention  on  prices,  while  favouring  more  indirect 
interventions with fixed payments (not necessarily linked to production levels or quotas). However, 
China  has  now  become  the  biggest  subsidiser  of  direct  intervention  to  manipulate  prices  in 
commodities markets. In 2012, China spent more than anyone else on subsidies programmes, roughly 
$180 billion. As a   result of the removal of past direct government interventions in the pricing of 
commodities markets due to lower fiscal strength and commitments to international trade, price 
formation mechanisms for some commodities markets are still struggling to find a n eligible reference 
price for their regional areas. The long journey to develop a futures contract for feed wheat in Europe 
is a case in point. In addition, subsidised prices, coupled with higher land values, have reduced 
farmers’ incentives to invest in their own land, so yields in many agricultural commodities have been 
steady  since  the  1980s,  while  harvested  areas  are  now  going  down  due  to  the  cuts  to  subsidies 
programmes. Competition over production costs compels advanced economies to invest in research 
and infrastructure to boost productivity. Subsidies programmes perhaps had detrimental effects on 
productivity,  leaving  advanced  economies  exposed  to  the  low-cost  productions  of  developing 
countries that have gradually become key global actors in international commodities markets. Finally, 
the need to secure commodities provision may still drive government interventions in coming years, 
as  countries  continue  to  behave  strategically,  even  though  international  cooperation  (after  the 
Uruguay Round) and free trade agreements have become more frequent outcomes. 
Several other types of government intervention have impacted commodities markets to secure 
commodities provision. Some political decisions, such as the Russian export ban or the Indian decision 
to shut down the Indian Sugar Exchange, are examples of arbitrary decisions that can distort legal 
certainty in cross-border trades. Well-defined non-arbitrary interventions, such as biofuel policies, can 
also impact commodities markets. For instance, biofuel policies in the United States have boosted corn 
production and growth in yields and harvested areas, which may become unsustainable once the 
subsidy programme ends. The liberalisation process in African countries at the end of the 1980s has 
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certainly simplified the value chain at the international level, reduced costs, and promoted the growth 
of commodities markets such as cocoa and coffee, but with no programme to strengthen the role of a 
dispersed  supply  side  operating  with  no  infrastructures  or  direct  access  to  international  markets. 
There is a long list of other potential government interventions, such as quota production or buffer 
stocks, which may have a long-term impact on commodities price formation.  
General macro events can also affect price formation in commodities markets, whether linked to 
the business cycle or not. For instance, a growing and ageing population, higher per capita income 
and urbanisation can affect long-term price formation mechanisms. Technological developments can 
change the market structure and allow more efficient production processes to take place or even new 
products  to  become  commoditised  (e.g.  the  discovery  and  commercialisation  of  shale  gas). 
Opportunity costs linked to the use of land for alternative productions are a crucial external factor, 
especially in developing countries. Low-cost production in these countries relies heavily on the lack of 
physical  and  immaterial  infrastructures  supporting  land-owners  and  little  promotion  of  other 
productions by governments, which keeps land values, and thus opportunity costs, at a very low 
level.  As  a  consequence,  opportunity  costs  play  an  important  role  particularly  for  renewable 
commodities with high production convertibility. Finally, un predictable tail events, such as weather 
conditions, earthquakes or political instability, can alter the supply and demand curves, especially for 
those commodities that are more exposed to external factors (such as agricultural commodities). 
 
Box 12. Key market failures in commodities markets and types of state intervention 
General public (government) interventions are, in some cases, essential for the functioning of markets, 
including commodities. Market failures in commodities markets are essentially caused by informational 
gaps (information asymmetries) and market power, which may result in the inability to price positive or 
negative externalities (e.g. network effects), individual wrongdoing when the counterparty is unable to 
monitor the behaviour of other market participants, or anticompetitive equilibria due to market power. 
First,  markets  may  be  unable  to  price  (negative)  externalities  generated  by  commodities 
production  and  consumption.  For  example,  governments  have  introduced  a  high  number  of 
environmental laws to protect the environment from the negative externalities of excessive polluting 
activities. Markets are unable to price these externalities because their negative impact may materialise 
years down the line and may not affect counterparties directly. It becomes the provision of a public 
good.154  The  inability  of  the  market  to  price  environmental  costs,  has  over  the  years,  crowded  out 
alternative (cleaner) commodities and so only state intervention has been able to preserve them. Second, 
material informational gaps may lead a counterparty to deviate from the good conduct due to his/her 
superior information, or due to the inability of the counterparty to monitor the other because of high 
costs. For example, market manipulation through cornering attempts or the diffusion of false information 
exploit the inability of one counterparty to monitor the quality of the information or the behaviour of the 
other. Third, market power may lead a firm to charge an unfair mark-up to consumers or producers by 
increasing barriers to entering or exiting the market. Oligopolistic or monopsonistic settings (through 
distribution bottlenecks) are very frequent in commodities markets, due to the scarcity of supply or to the 
product characteristics of the commodity. Market power can, in effect, create artificial supply or demand 
constraints that impede newcomers from entering the market and competing at a lower margin. 
To deal with these three categories of market failures, state intervention should: 
a.  Provide the public good or create the conditions for the good to be delivered. 
b.  Reduce monitoring costs by filling the informational gap. 
c.  Ensure low market barriers to entry and exit. 
To  provide  the  public  good,  state  intervention  typically  sets  specific  rules  to  preserve  the 
provision of the good or to provide the good itself. For instance, environmental law is an important tool 
to preserve the environment, since it cannot be provided directly by the state. To reduce monitoring 
costs, in addition to rules that increase the transparency of transactions both in physical and futures 
markets  (preserving  the  commercial  interest  of  the  firm  in  not  disclosing  its  market  strategy),  state 
intervention can increase the effectiveness of  direct surveillance of market transactions. For instance, 
                                                            
154 A public good is a non-excludible and non-rival product, which provision can only be provided by public 
entities (e.g. national defence) 290 | CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
transaction reporting made on a confidential basis to regulators and aggregate disclosure of positions in 
futures  markets  ensure  that  the  supervisor  can  intervene  in  most  cases  when  a  systematic  action  to 
manipulate markets (cornering) has been put in place. This kind of intervention reduces monitoring costs 
by increasing the informational flow. Additional safeguards, such as business conduct rules or conflicts 
of interest policies, would strengthen the flow of information ex ante, rather than on occasional request 
from regulators. Finally, competition policies through strong enforcement measures (whether coupled 
with  heavy  administrative  sanctions  and/or  criminal  charges)  are  essential  measures  to  ensure 
continuous  supervision  of  both  physical  and  futures  markets  and  protection  from  market  power. 
Minimising monopolisation attempts or monopsonistic behaviours would benefit the market as a whole, 
and so the entire value chain, creating more value added for the economy. 
6.2  Evolving market organisation: a forward-looking perspective 
Price  formation  mechanisms  rely  on  the  efficient  functioning  of  physical  and  futures  market 
organisation.  New  micro  and  macro  developments  over  the  years,  partly  due  to  technological 
advances,  have  entirely  reshaped  the  physical  market  organisation  and  boosted  the  growth  of 
commodities futures markets, which have become an indispensable tool to deal with complexity in 
international  trade.  This  section  sums  up  findings  of  the  study  in  the  following  key  areas  for 
commodities markets:  
  Microstructural developments. 
  Key price formation mechanisms. 
  Growth of commercial market participants and international trade. 
  Expansion of commodities futures markets and ‘non-commercial’ investors. 
  Futures markets infrastructure. 
Microstructural developments in commodities markets have changed the market organisation 
of physical commodities over the years. New international agreements to ensure legal certainty of 
contracts and general diffusion of the ‘rule of law’, together with technological developments and a 
wave of liberalisation processes that reduced state intervention in the economy, have prompted the 
reorganisation of commodities markets and the internationalisation of local productions. For the first 
time, local producers are able to compete globally and to access people eager to buy their products. 
The contractual power of the supply side has increased, while the buy side has faced a greater choice 
and  benefitted  from  cheaper  products.  Accessibility  to  consumption  areas  has  increased,  partly 
through the development of competitive freight markets following massive cross-border investments 
by commercial and non-commercial players. 
Market  organisation,  however,  varies  across  commodities  markets.  The  complexity  of 
commodities  markets  mainly  resides  in  the  different  types  of  price  formation  mechanisms. 
Benchmark-based pricing mechanisms, which apply a discount or premium to a liquid reference price, 
rely  on  the  liquidity  of  a  reference  contract,  which  is  typically  a  front-month  futures  contract. 
Liquidity is an essential feature that sometimes relies on a complex set of financial layers in order to 
align the risk profile with the underlying characteristics of the contract. For instance, in crude oil 
markets, reference prices are based on complex financial layers and information put together by price 
reporting agencies with a specific methodology that may also use editorial judgment to assess prices. 
Full transparency of methodologies, governance, and access to underlying data become crucial aspects 
for  regulators  to  ensure  the  smooth  functioning  of  the  market.  A  regulatory  framework  for  the 
provision of price assessment services and for the reliability of the information that firms voluntarily 
disclose  (e.g.  market  manipulation  rules  in  case  of  false  or  deceiving  information)  might  ensure 
effective supervision by reducing monitoring costs and creating ‘public accountability’ for the well 
functioning of price formation mechanisms. However, the underlying liquidity of the contract is a 
prevailing aspect, which may even cause the market to reshape its pricing mechanism towards new 
benchmarks  over  time.  Moreover,  price  formation  can  also  rely  on  long-term  contracts  (LTCs), 
although they are a small part of the market today. For instance, reliance on LTCs occurs in particular 
circumstances, when the commodity cannot be easily shipped and it is difficult to build a globally 
recognised benchmark that would deal with specific regional issues. This price formation mechanism 
often does not rely on a benchmark price but on private negotiations, due to factors not linked to the 
actual production of the commodity. For instance, in the recent years freight costs have been a key  
 
determinant for the conclusion of cross-border transactions in iron ore. Finally, sunk costs or high 
energy consumption productions may require different types of negotiations, which some firms may 
prefer to make through longer-term contracts. In any case, spot or forward transactions that apply a 
discount or a premium over a reference benchmark price have spread quickly in recent years as a key 
tool of price formation. 
Markets have seen the astonishing growth of commercial commodities firms across all sectors, 
as  explained  in  Chapter  1.  There  are  two  main  reasons  behind  this  growth:  the  development  of 
international  trade,  and  access  to  international  finance  and  to  cheap  credit.  The  development  of 
international  trade,  in  particular  after  the  Uruguay  Round  and  the  implementation  of  the  WTO 
commitments (with the beginning of the liberalisation process in several countries), culminating with 
the official entry of China in the WTO between 2001 and 2004, has created the opportunity for massive 
cross-border investments to flow towards more competitive commodities productions. International 
commercial  firms  were  well  positioned  to  exploit  their  international  position  and  increase  their 
physical  holdings.  However,  this  growth  has  been  only  possible  thanks  to  access  to  international 
finance, boosted by a prolonged period of accessible and cheap credit. Access to international finance, 
through global financial institutions or commodities trading houses with strong financial arms, has 
been a key factor that has boosted productivity and size, and has provided additional market power 
to  vertically  integrated  international  exporters.  Some  of  these  trading  houses  (such  as  Glencore), 
which were originally set up to offer risk management support to pure commodities firms from their 
significant financial arms, have been increasing investments in physical holdings, which may lead to 
concerns that they are now becoming ‘too-physical-to-fail’. Due to the growth of physical demand 
across several markets, underlying physical cross-border trades have grown, both in physical size and 
mostly in total value (Figure 255). The value of international trade in these commodities has soared 
from  2001  to  2011  by  a  double-digit  compounded  annual  growth  rate,  which  has  also  attracted 
financial participants and promoted the use of financial leverage in the physical commodities market. 
Figure 255. Growth of exports value ($bn) and size, 2001-11 
  Value ($bn)  Size 
  2001  2011  CAGR  2001  2011  Units 
Crude oil  340.1  1,475  16%  38,262.1  38,854  kbbl/day 
Natural Gas  82.4  368.5  16%  553.46  1073.32  bcum 
Iron ore  14.8  180  28%  493.1  1,072.9  mn/tonnes 
Wheat  19.1  47.6  10%  105.92  150.4  mn/tonnes 
Aluminium*  16  38.1  9%  11.1  15.87  mn/tonnes 
Corn  6.7  34.1  18%  74.67  117.03  mn/tonnes 
Coffee  5.4  28.6  18%  5.45  6.81  mn/tonnes 
Sugar  4  17.8  16%  21.11  31.12  mn/tonnes 
Soybean oil  2.9  11.1  14%  8.25  8.52  mn/tonnes 
Cocoa  2.6  8.8  13%  2.47  2.96  mn/tonnes 
Copper  na  Na  na  Na  na  na 
*Exports are estimates.  
Source:  Author’s  calculation  from  World  Bank,  USDA,  ABREE,  BP,  OPEC,  FAO.  See  footnote  49  for  the 
description of prices used for calculation. 
As  a  result  of  this  impressive  growth,  which  began  well  before  the  financialisation  era, 
commodities  futures  markets  have  been  put  under  strong  pressure  to  cope  with  the 
internationalisation of physical commodities markets. All major futures markets in the world have 
undergone  a  process  of  demutualisation,  which  has  transformed  them  into  for-profit  companies, 
which  have  then  begun  to  expand  their  volumes  and  range  of  products  (see  Chapter  1).  A 
consolidation  process  among  exchanges  at  the  global  level  has  increased  economies  of  scale  and 
competition in international markets for risk management tools, which have also become global. This 292 | CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
process is still on going, as suggested by the recent merger between NYSE Euronext and ICE that will 
create the biggest soft commodities exchange worldwide, and one of the biggest in the world for other 
commodities. Around the mid-2000s, at the end of the demutualisation process, liquidity pressures 
and the availability of passive (long) investors ready to diversify their investments prompted even 
further  growth  of  commodities  futures  markets  by  providing  offsetting  liquidity  for  massive 
commercial  investments,  whether  through  direct  short  positions  or  positions  taken  by  financial 
institutions hedging OTC contracts with commercial firms. Commercial investments boosted by the 
growth  of international trade have driven  non-commercial futures positions  attracted by the high 
profitability of the sector, as suggested by empirical findings in this study across several markets. 
The  growth  of  international  trade  and  commodities  futures  markets  to  support  this 
development has ensured a long period of very low prices, reaching near-historical lows in real terms 
across  several  commodities  due  to  global  competition.  However,  this  situation  began  to  reverse 
gradually when the world entered its worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. The collapse of 
the financial system under the effects of imbalances caused by overly large current account deficits in 
western economies has revealed the advanced degree of financialisation and the link with financial 
assets  that  commodities  markets  have  now  achieved.  The  availability  of  liquidity  has  ensured, 
however,  a  constant  flow  of  resources  to  accommodate  the  underlying  growth  of  international 
commodities  markets.  Reversing  this  trend  may  plunge  commodities  markets  into  costly  national 
ring-fencing, which would not necessarily avert the long-term effects of an underlying sustainability 
problem emerging from currently solid global demand across several commodities markets linked to 
more macro events such as an increasing population and natural constraints on global resources. 
Futures market infrastructure is instrumental in the long-term process of the development of 
international markets and in an efficient mechanism of commodities price formation that is able to 
price all available information. The introduction of new technologies has also contributed to futures 
markets  growth  and  brought  competition  among  market  infrastructures,  beginning  with  the 
demutualisation and continuing today with a global consolidation process among big exchanges. For 
the smooth functioning of the market infrastructure, and so of broader price formation mechanisms, it 
is  important  to  meet  a  set  of  minimum  standards:  a  liquid  cash  market;  a  reliable  infrastructure; 
trusted procedures to assess product quality; and effective supervision. Rules addressing these issues 
are typically set by the exchange itself (e.g. minimum loading-out rates). However, market findings 
point to two important aspects that often remain unclear. First, in cross-border transactions involving 
a market infrastructure located in another jurisdiction from the country of incorporation, it is often 
hard to understand which regulator is ultimately responsible for supervising the functioning and the 
rules of the exchange, and often there is no coordination among institutions on a common approach to 
supervise  the  different  types  of  commodities  markets.  Closer  coordination  of  the  approaches  of 
regulators  (whether  competition,  commerce,  or  financial  authorities)  to  commodities  markets  may 
increase  legal  certainty  around  cross-border  supervision  and  so  contribute  to  a  well-functioning 
market.  Second,  findings  show  that  any  attempt  by  market  infrastructures  to  improve  delivery 
systems (and their governance) and increase delivery points across regions (also through agreements 
with existing warehouse groups) could be beneficial for price formation, as delivery points ensure a 
more solid and efficient interaction (convergence) between futures and physical markets. However, 
rules should be set to identify, disclose and manage conflicts of interest between ownership of market 
infrastructures and market participants. Furthermore, a minimum level of interaction among global 
market infrastructures when the infrastructure becomes an essential facility for the growth in volume 
and range of products, together with protection of intellectual property rights for new products, are 
important aspects for the financial market infrastructure to thrive. Accessibility to futures markets for 
the widest possible set of market participants should be an important factor to be borne in mind when 
designing  policy  actions.  Finally,  the  growth  of  high-frequency  and  algorithmic  trading  calls  for 
improved surveillance mechanisms and supervision over the policies of trading venues, which may 
permit  trading  practices  that  could  ultimately  become  difficult  to  supervise  in  extreme  market 
conditions, or give an unfair advantage (e.g. with the timing of disclosure). If properly supervised, 
high-frequency  trading  can  provide  liquidity,  connectivity,  and  a  stable  and  reliable  flow  of 
information through different forms of arbitrage among different markets or within the same market 
along the futures curve.  
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6.3  Matrix of weights for key drivers of price formation 
1) Matrix of product, supply and demand factors  
 
Product  Supply  Demand 
Storability  Substitutability 
Final 
usability 
Freight 
costs 
Alternative 
uses 
Production 
convertibility 
Capital 
intensity 
Value chain 
complexity 
Industry 
concentration 
Sunk 
costs  
Geographical 
concentration 
Stock-to-use 
ratio 
Income growth 
urbanisation 
Price 
elasticity 
Demand 
Forecast 
                                 
Energy 
commodi-
ties 
Crude oil                               
Natural gas                               
                                 
Industrial 
metals/raw 
material 
Alumi-
nium 
       
 
           
 
     
Copper                               
Iron Ore                               
                                 
Agri-soft 
commodi-
ties 
Wheat, 
Corn, 
Soybean oil 
       
 
           
 
     
Cocoa, 
Coffee, 
White sugar 
       
 
           
 
     
                                 
High    Medium   
Low or 
none 
 
 
                   
 
-  While  product  factors  are  important  for  every  category  of  commodity,  supply  factors  appear  to  be  key  drivers  of  price  formation  for  energy 
commodities and industrial metals. 
-  Agricultural and soft commodities, however, are strongly influenced by demand factors.    
 
2) Matrix of exogenous factors and market organisation  
 
Exogenous factors  Market organisation 
Government 
intervention 
Political 
instability 
Weather 
Economic 
cycle 
Crude oil price  Financial 
layers 
Financialisation  Liquid futures 
Physical price 
transparency 
Delivery points - 
accessibility 
Downstream 
concentration 
                         
Energy 
commodities 
Crude oil           -             
Natural gas                       
                         
Industrial 
metals/raw 
material 
Aluminium                       
Copper                       
Iron Ore                       
                         
Agri-soft 
commodities 
Wheat-Corn-
Soybean oil 
     
   
       
 
 
Cocoa-Coffee-
White sugar 
     
   
       
 
 
                         
High    Medium    Low                 
 
-  Exogenous factors have a significant impact on agricultural and soft commodities. 
-  Energy commodities and industrial metals rely on a more complex market organisation with a higher level of financialisation. 
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ACRONYMS 
ACER  Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators 
ACF  Autocorrelation Function 
API  American Petroleum Institute 
ARCH  Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity 
ARIMA  Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average 
ASCI  Argus Sour Crude Index, 
bbl  barrels 
bcm  billion cubic metres 
BDI   Baltic Dry Index 
BFOE  Brent, Forties, Oseberg, Ekofisk 
BWAVE  Brent futures Weighted Average 
CAGR  Compound Annual Growth Rate 
CAP   Common Agricultural Policy 
CAPEX  Capital Expenditure 
CBOT  Chicago Board of Trade 
CCP  Central Counterparty 
CFDs  Contracts for Difference 
CFTC  Commodity Futures Trade Commission 
CIF  Cost, Insurance and Freight   
CNG  Compressed natural gas 
COT  Commitment of Traders 
DDGS  Dried Distillers Grains with Solubles 
DFL  Dated to Front Line 
DWT  Dead Weight Tonne 
EEP  Export Enhancement Programme 
EIA  Energy Information Administration 
EFP  Exchange For Physical 
ERGEG  European Regulators’ Group for Electricity and Gas 
EROI  Energy Return On Investment 
ETD  Exchange-Traded Derivative 
ETP  Exchange-Traded Product 
FAO  Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
FOB  Free-On-Board 
GARCH  Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
GHG  Greenhouse Gases 
GMO  Genetically Modified Organism 
GSCI  Goldman Sachs Commodity Index 
IPRs  Intellectual Property Rights 296 | ACRONYMS 
 
kb/d or kbbl/d  Kilos (1,000s) of barrels per day 
kt  Kilos (1,000s) tonnes 
LIFFE  London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange 
LM  Lagrange Multiplier  
LME  London Metal Exchange 
LNG  Liquefied natural gas 
LTC  Long-Term Contract 
mb/d or mmb/d  millions of barrels per day 
MBIO  Metal Bulletin Iron Ore 
mcm    million cubic metres 
MCY  Marginal Convenience Yield  
Mmbtu or MBtu  Million British Thermal Units 
mmt  million metric tonnes 
NBP  National Balancing Point 
NGL  Natural gas liquid 
NYMEX  New York Mercantile Exchange 
NYSE  New York Stock Exchange 
OI  Open Interest 
OPEC  Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
OTC  Over-The-Counter 
PACF  Partial Autocorrelation Function 
PPI  Producer Price Index 
ppm  parts per million 
PRA  Price Reporting Agency 
REMIT  Regulation on Energy Market Integrity and Transparency 
SARIMA  Seasonal Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average 
SGX  Singapore Exchange 
SX-EW  Solvent Extraction and Electrowinning 
TSE  Total Support Estimate 
TSI  The Steel Index 
ULCC  Ultra Large Crude Carriers 
USDA  U.S. Department of Agriculture 
VAR  Vector Autoregressive Model 
VEC  Vector Error Correction Model 
VIX  Volatility Index 
VLCC  Very Large Crude Carriers 
WFE  World Federation of Exchanges  
WTI   West Texas Intermediate  
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ANNEX  
Tables and Figures 
Top commodities firms  
Selection of top Industrial metals companies (copper, aluminium, iron ore) 
   
Ownership  Country  Total assets  Total revenues 
1  ArcelorMittal  Public  Luxembourg  121.88  93.97 
2  Bhp Billiton  Public  Australia-UK  102.89  71.74 
3  Rio Tinto  Public  Australia-UK  119.55  60.54 
4  Vale  Private  Brazil  128.70  60.40 
5  Anglo American  Public  UK  87.28  51.12 
6  Alcoa  Public  USA  40.12  25.00 
7  Aluminumcorp of China  Public  China  21.87  18.72 
8  Codelco  State-owned  Chile  20.83  17.52 
9  Mitsui Chemicals  Public  Japan  16.27  17.48 
10  Votorantim  Private  Brazil  38.37  16.88 
11  Evraz  Public  Russia  16.98  16.48 
12  Norsk Hydro ASA  Public  Norway  23.66  16.33 
13  Freeport  Public  USA  20.30  16.10 
14  China power investment  State-owned  China  63.39  16.08 
15  Hindalco  Public  India  18.07  15.44 
16  Norilsk  Public  Russia  18.91  13.31 
17  United Rusal  Public  Russia  25.35  13.20 
18  Teck  Public  Canada  34.22  11.51 
19  Vedanta  Public  India  28.90  11.43 
20 
Newmont Mining 
Corporation  Public  USA  24.47  10.36 
21 
Steel Authority of India 
Limited  State-owned  India  8.67  10.08 
22  MetalloInvest  Private  Russia  10.47  10.00 
23  CSN  Private  Brazil  24.99  8.81 
24  Southern Copper Corp. 
Subsidiary 
Grupo Mexico 
USA  8.07  6.82 
25  KGHM Polska  Public  Poland  9.92  6.82 
26  Cliffs Natural Resources  Private  USA  14.54  6.55 
27  Antofagasta  Public  Chile  11.71  6.08 
28  Kazakhymys  Public  Kazakhstan  11.73  5.49 
29  LKAB  State-owned  Sweden  8.29  4.80 
30  Fortescue  Public  Australia  10.98  3.36 
31  Grupo Mexico  Public  Mexico  1.23  2.70 
32  First Quantum  Public  Canada  5.30  2.69 
33 
National Mineral 
Development Corporation  State-owned  India  4.14  2.43 
34  Noranda  Private  USA  1.38  1.56 
35  Nalco  State-owned  India  2.51  1.53 306 | ANNEX 
 
36  Vimetco  Public  Switzerland  5.13  1.52 
37  Petropavlovsk plc  Public  Russia  3.27  1.26 
38  Argentine aluar  Private  Argentine  Na  1.10 
39  Dubai Aluminium  Public  UAE  Na  0.95 
40 
China Minmetals 
Corporation  State-owned  China  2.19  0.68 
41  National Iranian Copper  State-owned  Iran  Na  Na 
42  Aluminium Bahrain  Public  Bahrain  Na  Na 
Source: Author. 
Selection of top energy companies (crude oil and gas) by total revenues (end 2011; $bn) 
   
Ownership  Country  Total assets  Total revenues 
1  Royal Dutch Shell  Public  Netherlands  345.26  470.17 
2  Exxon Mobile  Public  USA  331.05  467.03 
3  Sinopec  Public  China  177.08  387.68 
4  BP  Public  UK  293.07  375.52 
5  Petrochina  Public  China  296.69  310.04 
6  Total  Public  France  228.36  257.09 
7  Conoco Phillips  Public  USA  153.23  251.23 
8  Chevron  Public  USA  209.47  244.37 
9  Gazprom  Public  Russia  431.21  217.73 
10  Saudi Aramco*  State-owned  Saudi Arabia  na  210.00 
11  Eni  Public  Italy  198.98  152.55 
12  PetroBras  Semi-public  Brazil  359.90  145.92 
13  Lukoil  Public  Russia  91.19  133.65 
14  PDVSA Venezuela  State-owned  Venezuela  182.15  127.80 
15  Valero Energy Corporation  Public  USA  42.78  125.99 
16  JX Holding  Public  Japan  75.29  115.87 
17  Koch Industries  Private  USA  na  110.00 
18  Iranian Oil Company  State-owned  Iran  200.00  100.00 
19  Statoil  Public  Norway  137.22  94.03 
20  Rosneft  State-owned  Russia  105.97  91.98 
21  Repsol  Public  Spain  98.77  88.71 
22 
Kuwait Petroleum 
Corporation  State-owned  Kuwait  na  87.82 
23  Indian Oil Corporation 
Public-State 
owned 
India  43.15  86.01 
24  Reliance Industries  Public  India  64.23  76.12 
25 
Abu Dhabi National Oil 
Company  State-owned  Abu Dhabi  na  75.00 
26 
Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation*  Public  Nigeria  na  59.00 
27  Sonatrach  State-owned  Algeria  47.70  56.10 
28 
Qatar General Petroleum 
Corporation  State-owned  Qatar  84.83  51.63 
29  Iraq national oil companies  State-owned  Iraq  na  51.40 
30  Petronas  State-owned  Malaysia  67.92  37.32 
31  China National Offshore Oil  State-owned  China  59.45  37.28  
 
Corporation 
32  Pemex  State-owned  Mexico  109.80  30.04 
33 
Occidental Petroleum 
Corporation  Public  USA  60.04  24.12 
34  Marathon Oil  Public  USA  31.30  14.60 
35  Libyan national oil company  State-owned  Libya  na  Na 
Source: Author. 
Top global exchanges 
 
Futures 
exchange 
Contract 
size  Delivery dates  Price quote 
Open Interest 
(at 19-Oct-2012 
close) 
Value of OI in 
USD 
Cocoa  
ICE Futures 
US 
10 metric 
tons 
H, K, N, U, Z  USD per metric tons  205,758  $5,092,510,500 
NYSE-LIFFE 
10 metric 
tons 
H, K, N, U, Z  GBP per metric tons  197,654*  $3,954,939,565 
Coffee 
ICE Futures 
US 
37,500 
pounds 
H, K, N, U, Z  USD per pounds  152,473  $9,205,557,375 
NYSE-LIFFE 
10 metric 
tons 
F, H, K, N, U, X  USD per metric tons  86,238*  $2,177,509,500 
Bolsa de 
Mercadorias 
& Futuros 
100 bags, 
weighing 60 
net 
kilograms 
each. 
F, H, K, N, U, X 
Brazilian Real (BRL) 
per 60 net kilograms 
(one bag) of coffee. 
8,753  $181,143,335 
Tokyo Grain 
Exchange 
50 bags 
(3,450 
kilograms) 
F, H, K, N, U, X 
JPY per bag (69 
kilograms) 
239  $2,863,899 
Sugar 
NYSE-LIFFE  50 tonnes  H, K, Q, V, Z 
USD and cents per 
tonne 
62,927*  $2,024,990,860 
ICE Futures 
US 
112,000 
pounds 
H, K, N, V 
USD Cents and 
hundredths of a 
cent per pound 
707,460 
$15,054,748,80
0 
Tokyo Grain 
Exchange 
10,000 
kilograms 
(10 metric 
tons) 
F, H, K, N, U, X 
JPY per 1,000 
kilograms 
2,616  $7,600,289 
Bolsa de 
Mercadorias 
& Futuros 
270 bags of 
50 net 
kilograms 
G, J, N, U, X 
USD per 50-net 
kilogram bag 
na  na 
Soybean 
oil 
CBOT 
60,000 
pounds 
(~ 27 metric 
tons) 
F, H, K, N, Q, U, V, Z 
USD Cents per 
pound 
330,035 
$10,099,071,00
0 
ICE Futures 
US 
60,000 
pounds 
(~ 27 metric 
tons) 
F, H, K, N, Q, U, V, Z 
USD cents per 
pound 
150  $4,590,000 
Wheat 
NYSE-LIFFE  100 tonnes  F, H, K, N, X 
GBP and pence per 
tonne 
14,530*  $500,657,326 
CBOT 
5,000 
bushels 
(~ 136 Metric 
Tons) 
H, K, N, U, Z 
USD cents per 
bushel 
468,562 
$20,288,734,60
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Corn 
CBOT 
5,000 
bushels 
(~ 127 Metric 
Tons) 
H, K, N, U, Z 
USD cents per 
bushel 
1,273,959 
$48,091,952,25
0 
Bolsa de 
Mercadorias 
& Futuros 
450 bags of 
60-net 
kilograms 
each 
F, H, K, N, Q, U, X 
BRL per 60-net 
kilogram bag 
na  Na 
ICE Futures 
US 
5,000 
bushels 
H, K, N, U, Z 
USD cents per 
bushel, 
2,001  $1,900,950 
Tokyo Grain 
Exchange 
50,000 
kilograms 
(50 metric 
tons) 
F, H, K, N, U, X 
JPY per 1,000 
kilograms 
28,515  $492,447,143 
Alumin
ium 
London 
Metal 
Exchange 
25 tonnes 
Weekly prompts on 
every Wednesday 
from 3 months to 6 
months. Monthly 
prompts on every 3rd 
Wednesday from 7 
months to 123 
months 
USD per tonne  720,846 
$35,366,506,87
5 
Tokyo 
Commodity 
Exchange 
5,000 kg (5 
tonnes) per 
contract 
All even months 
within a year 
JPY 0.1 per kg  na  Na 
Shanghai 
Futures 
Exchange 
5 Metric 
Tonnes 
12 months of the year  Yuan (RMB) / ton  na  Na 
Copper 
London 
Metal 
Exchange 
25 tonnes 
Weekly prompts on 
every Wednesday 
from 3 months to 6 
months. Monthly 
prompts on every 3rd 
Wednesday from 7 
months to 123 
months 
USD per tonne  249,780 
$49,893,555,00
0 
Shanghai 
Futures 
Exchange 
5 tonnes  12 months of the year  RMB / ton  na  Na 
NYMEX 
25,000 
pounds 
Trading is conducted 
for delivery during 
the current calendar 
month, the next 23 
calendar months, and 
any March, May, 
July, September, and 
December falling 
within a 60-month 
period beginning 
with the current 
month. 
USD cents per 
pound 
155,204 
$13,900,458,25
0 
Iron ore 
Singapore 
Mercantile 
Exchange 
Index data 
normalised 
to 62% Fe 
Iron Ore, 
CFR 
Qingdao 
n/a 
USD to two decimal 
places 
n/a  n/a 
Crude 
oil 
ICE Futures 
US 
1,000 barrels  n/a 
USD and cents per 
barrel 
Brent Crude 
1,211,530 
$130,421,204,5
00  
 
Crude WTI 
510,236 
$44,410,941,44
0 
NYMEX  1,000 barrels  n/a 
USD and cents per 
barrel 
Crude WTI 
1,578,044 
$138,431,549,4
40 
Brent Crude 
42,192 
$4,541,968,800 
Natural  
gas 
ICE Futures 
Europe 
1,000 therms 
of natural 
gas per day 
(1 therm = 
29.3071 
kilowatt 
hours) 
n/a 
GBP and pence per 
therm 
310,765 
(UK GAS) 
$33,019,191,79
6 
NYMEX 
10,000 
million 
British 
thermal 
units 
(mmBtu) 
n/a 
USD and cents per 
mmBtu 
1,213,377 
(Henry Hub) 
$42,213,385,83
0 
*30  March  2012.  January  (F),  February  (G),  March  (H),  April  (J),  May  (K),  June  (M),  July  (N),  August  (Q), 
September (U), October (V),  November (X), & December  (Z). Note: Data on open interest from Chinese and 
Indian exchanges area not available. 
Source: Author’s elaboration from exchanges’ websites.   
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Backwardation/contango (days per year) 
   
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012* 
Soybean Oil 
Contango  138  143  195  169  66  98  192  166  155  164  221  169  161  82  74  159  218  185  198  188  197  200  95 
Backwardation  97  77  44  63  166  142  46  57  82  70  18  42  77  160  164  43  20  14  43  49  36  41  22 
                                                 
   
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012** 
Corn 
Contango  164  219  225  252  212  220  105  136  251  251  232  229  249  189  239  252  252  251  252  244  252  201  41 
Backwardation  89  34  28  0  41  32  150  117  0  0  20  23  3  63  13  0  0  1  0  8  0  51  98 
                                                 
 
 
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012* 
Wheat 
Contango  160  218  102  119  187  141  79  203  251  251  252  243  203  199  251  252  251  247  188  252  253  244  134 
Backwardation  93  35  151  134  66  112  174  50  2  2  1  10  50  54  2  1  2  6  8  1  0  9  5 
                                                 
 
 
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012* 
Cocoa 
Contango  247  251  248  243  227  214  246  248  248  217  247  159  183  253  208  246  210  243  166  161  149  198  75 
Backwardation  4  2  5  10  26  39  7  5  5  36  6  94  70  0  45  7  43  10  87  92  104  55  0 
                                                 
 
 
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012* 
Aluminium 
Contango  193  252  254  253  252  243  249  230  252  254  231  200  249  141  204  129  224  198  254  254  248  246  64 
Backwardation  59  2  1  1  2  11  5  24  2  0  23  54  5  113  50  125  30  56  0  0  6  8  0 
                                                 
 
 
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012* 
Copper 
Contango  6  67  253  218  188  14  10  89  250  254  254  249  254  201  0  2  53  85  66  230  209  210  44 
Backwardation  248  187  1  36  66  240  244  165  4  0  0  5  0  53  254  252  201  169  188  24  45  44  20 
                                                 
 
 
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012* 
Sugar 
Contango  41  37  127  119  32  7  23  105  174  132  132  40  6  97  178  115  79  105  189  148  20  12  5 
Backwardation  211  215  125  133  220  245  229  147  78  120  120  212  246  155  74  137  173  147  63  104  232  240  70  
| 311 
Liquidity curves (open interest by expiry month) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation from CME GROUP and LIFFE. 
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GMO Ratio for cultivation area (%) 
   Year  Cultivation Area in Million Hectares    
Total Maize  GM Maize  GMO Ratio 
Global 
1998  140  2  1.4% 
2008  161  37.3  23% 
2009  158  42  26% 
USA 
1997  29,6  2.8  9,.5% 
2008  35.3  28.2  80% 
2009  35.2  29.9  85% 
Canada 
1997  1.06  0.03  2.8% 
2007  1.4  1.17  84% 
Argentina 
1998  3.18  0.017  0.5% 
2007  3.9  2.8  84% 
2008  3.4  2.8  83% 
2009  2.5  2.1  85% 
South Africa 
1998  2.96  0.003  0.1% 
2007  2.8  1.6  57% 
2009  3.0  1.9  63% 
Spain 
 1998  0.46  0.018  3.9% 
2009  0.34  0.076  20% 
France 
1999  3.1  0.0001  0.003% 
2007     0.021    
Germany* 
1998  0.34  0.0004  0.1% 
2008  2.08  0.003  0.15% 
Portugal 
1999  0.12  0.001  0.8% 
2009     0.005    
Czech Republic 
2005  0.29  0.00015  0.05% 
2009  0.27  0.006  2,4% 
Honduras 
2002  0.37  0.0005  0.1% 
2007  0.35  0.007  2.0% 
Philippines 
2003  2.38  0.23  1.0% 
2008  2,74  0.35  12.8% 
2009  2,7  0.5  19% 
Egypt 
2008  0.72  0.0007  0,1% 
2009  0,7  0.001  0.1% 
Brazil 
2008  14.7  1.3  9% 
2009  14  5  36% 
Source: GMO Compass. 
    
 
Composition of index investing across commodities futures markets 
US Futures Market1 
Notional Value 
(Billions US$) 
Futures Equivalent Contracts 
(Thousands) 
(Notional Value > 0.5 billion US$)2  Long  Short  Net L (S)  Long  Short  Net L (S) 
Cocoa  1.2  (0.3)  0.9  47   (13)  35  
Coffee  4.3  (1.6)  2.7  66   (25)  41  
Copper  10.4  (2.9)  7.5  111   (31)  80  
Corn  20.4  (6.5)  13.9  544   (172)  372  
Cotton  3.8  (1.4)  2.5  108   (39)  69  
Feeder Cattle  0.7  (0.2)  0.5  9   (3)  7  
Gold  25.9  (5.2)  20.7  146   (29)  117  
Heating Oil  10.6  (2.5)  8.1  81   (19)  62  
Lean Hogs  4.3  (1.4)  2.9  140   (46)  94  
Live Cattle  8.6  (2.6)  5.9  170   (53)  118  
Natural Gas  18.4  (4.9)  13.5  526   (145)  381  
Platinum  1.4  (0.3)  1.1  17   (4)  13  
RBOB Unleaded Gas  11.2  (2.7)  8.6  93   (22)  72  
Silver  7.3  (1.4)  5.8  42   (8)  34  
Soybean Meal  0.9  (0.1)  0.9  20   (1)  18  
Soybean Oil  4.9  (1.4)  3.5  153   (44)  109  
Soybeans  20.6  (5.6)  15.0  259   (70)  190  
Sugar  8.5  (2.5)  6.0  371   (110)  262  
Wheat (CBOT)  15.5  (6.8)  8.7  345   (151)  194  
Wheat (KCBT)  2.6  (0.7)  1.9  57   (15)  42  
WTI Crude Oil  49.0  (14.0)  35.0  529   (151)  378  
Subtotal (>0.5 billion US$)  230.5  (64.9)  165.5    
Subtotal (<0.5 billion US$)  0.8  (0.2)  0.7    
Total Notional US Mkts  231.3  (65.1)  166.2 
 
Total Not'l Non-US Mkts  63.4  (15.1)  48.4 
Total All Markets  294.7  (80.2)  214.6 
Source: CFTC Index Investment data (28 September 2012). 
Other graphs 
Conversion factors for energy 
 
Source: IEA Golden Rules, 2012. 
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Primary vs secondary oil 
 
Source: IEA et al. (2005, p. 70). 
  
 
Unconventional gas production in the IEA’s New Policies scenario, 2035 
 
Source: IEA WEO, 2012. 
 
Current and planned EU-27 LNG re-gasification capacity (as of September 2011) 
 
Source: JRC, 2012 based on “Gas Infrastructure Europe”, GIE LNG Investment Database, 2011.   316 | ANNEX 
 
Producers, net exporters and net importers of natural gas 
 
Source: IEA. 
    
 
LNG system dynamics, 2011 
 
Source: Rogers, 2012a. 
LME Aluminium and copper stocks, 1992-2011 
Year  Global 
Production 
Global 
Consumption 
Stock 
(tonnes) 
% Global 
production 
Global 
Production 
Global 
Consumption 
Stock 
(tonnes) 
% Global 
production 
 
Aluminium  Copper 
1992  19,457  18,513  1,527  7.85%  11,170  10,761  342  3.07% 
1993  19,715  18,166  2,486  12.61%  11,306  10,972  600  5.30% 
1994  19,112  19,762  1,675  8.76%  11,166  11,639  302  2.70% 
1995  19,658  20,548  584  2.97%  11,829  12,167  296  2.51% 
1996  20,846  20,650  951  4.56%  12,756  12,414  125  0.98% 
1997  21,798  21,797  622  2.85%  13,599  13,080  338  2.48% 
1998  22,654  21,825  636  2.81%  14,142  13,339  592  4.19% 
1999  23,710  23,358  775  3.27%  14,463  14,024  790  5.46% 
2000  24,464  24,871  322  1.32%  14,814  15,104  357  2.41% 
2001  24,436  23,722  821  3.36%  15,675  14,686  799  5.10% 
2002  26,076  25,372  1,241  4.76%  15,336  15,037  856  5.58% 
2003  28,002  27,608  1,423  5.08%  15,221  15,315  431  2.83% 
2004  29,940  29,957  693  2.31%  15,832  16,671  49  0.31% 
2005  31,889  31,689  644  2.02%  16,651  16,680  92  0.55% 
2006  33,975  33,935  698  2.06%  17,353  17,007  191  1.10% 
2007  38,186  37,411  929  2.43%  18,044  18,143  199  1.10% 
2008  39,669  36,900  2,338  5.89%  18,501  18,138  341  1.84% 
2009  37,198  34,765  4,624  12.43%  18,613  18,178  502  2.70% 
2010  41,112  39,662  4,275  10.40%  19,190  19,365  378  1.97% 
2011  43,652  42,027  4,979  11.41%  19,578  19,508  372  1.90% 
Note: see the Annex for full data from 1992. 
Source: LME & WMBS. Thousands of metric tonnes (MT).  
 
Econometric analysis: Stata outputs 
Below, the outputs of the econometric analyses run across nine commodities markets.  
First chapter 
Output #1   
 
 
 
Output #2   
The Granger Theorem states that if Y and X are cointegrated, the relationship can be written as below and 
at least one between γ1 γ2 must be ≠ 0. 
ΔYt=a1 ΔYt-1+b0 ΔXt+ b1 ΔXt-1+γ1(Yt-1- Xt-1)                 (eq.1) 
ΔXt=a1 ΔXt-1+b0 ΔYt+ b1 ΔYt-1+γ2(Yt-1- Xt-1)                 (eq.2) 
γ1 and γ2 are the coefficient of the cointegrating equation. At least one of them must be statistically 
different from zero and with negative coefficient, as it shows how a variable, when the distance between 
the  two  variables  grows,  is  brought  back  to  the  equilibrium  and  the  model  is  then  stable.  Those 
coefficients should then be between 0 and -1. It is the speed of adjustment of the dependent variable to the 
equilibrium. For instance, if it is equal to 0.5 it means a 50% movement back to equilibrium following a 
shock to the model one period later. If it is equal to 1 then there is full adjustment to the equilibrium the 
period after. A coefficient higher than 1 would not make much sense. 
   
                                                                              
       _cons    -.4486328   .3264045    -1.37   0.170    -1.090881    .1936157
        lnm2      1.62709   .0385993    42.15   0.000      1.55114     1.70304
                                                                              
     commTOT        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    141.077867   311  .453626581           Root MSE      =     .26
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.8510
    Residual    20.9564659   310  .067601503           R-squared     =  0.8515
       Model    120.121401     1  120.121401           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  1,   310) = 1776.90
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     312
. reg  commTOT lnm2
Durbin-Watson d-statistic(  2,   312) =  .1009832
. dwstat
                                                                              
       _cons     .0024848    .004561     0.54   0.586      -.00649    .0114596
         LD.    -.1069497    .055503    -1.93   0.055    -.2161641    .0022646
         L1.    -.0707039   .0180856    -3.91   0.000    -.1062914   -.0351165
       coin1  
                                                                              
     D.coin1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0020
                                                                              
 Z(t)             -3.909            -3.455            -2.878            -2.570
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root         Number of obs   =       310
. dfuller coin1, reg lag(1)DRAFT LIST OF MEMBERS AND OBSERVERS - Confidential 
 
 
  
 
Output #3   
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     .0205437    .006461     3.18   0.002     .0078301    .0332574
         L1.    -.0812382   .0178908    -4.54   0.000    -.1164428   -.0460336
       coin1  
         D1.    -2.367319   1.075996    -2.20   0.029    -4.484607   -.2500303
        lnm2  
         LD.     -.104876   .0548934    -1.91   0.057    -.2128924    .0031404
     commTOT  
                                                                              
   D.commTOT        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    2.06783957   309  .006692037           Root MSE      =   .0786
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0767
    Residual    1.89063841   306  .006178557           R-squared     =  0.0857
       Model    .177201164     3  .059067055           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3,   306) =    9.56
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     310
. reg d.commTOT dl.commTOT d.lnm2 l.coin1
                                                                              
       _cons     .0039853   .0003435    11.60   0.000     .0033093    .0046612
         L1.    -.0026633   .0009751    -2.73   0.007     -.004582   -.0007446
       coin1  
         D1.     -.006499   .0029625    -2.19   0.029    -.0123284   -.0006696
     commTOT  
         LD.     .0947919   .0571094     1.66   0.098     -.017585    .2071687
        lnm2  
                                                                              
      D.lnm2        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .005468579   309  .000017698           Root MSE      =  .00413
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0378
    Residual    .005211015   306  .000017029           R-squared     =  0.0471
       Model    .000257564     3  .000085855           Prob > F      =  0.0020
                                                       F(  3,   306) =    5.04
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     310
. reg d.lnm2 dl.lnm2 dl(0).commTOT l.coin1
                                                                              
       _cons    -9.729133   .4339758   -22.42   0.000    -10.58304   -8.875222
        lnm2     2.500503   .0513203    48.72   0.000     2.399523    2.601483
                                                                              
  NONcommTOT        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    320.740798   311  1.03132089           Root MSE      =  .34569
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.8841
    Residual    37.0456178   310  .119501993           R-squared     =  0.8845
       Model     283.69518     1   283.69518           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  1,   310) = 2373.98
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     312
. reg NONcommTOT lnm2
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0014365   .0118329    -0.12   0.903    -.0247215    .0218485
        L3D.    -.0945171   .0563819    -1.68   0.095    -.2054667    .0164325
        L2D.    -.1436072   .0591232    -2.43   0.016    -.2599513   -.0272632
         LD.    -.2046474   .0607481    -3.37   0.001    -.3241889   -.0851058
         L1.    -.1437611   .0387549    -3.71   0.000     -.220024   -.0674983
       coin2  
                                                                              
     D.coin2        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0040
                                                                              
 Z(t)             -3.709            -3.455            -2.878            -2.570
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root         Number of obs   =       308
. dfuller coin2, reg lag(3) 
 
 
 
Output #4   
  
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     .0255268   .0171685     1.49   0.138    -.0082566    .0593101
         L1.    -.1832619   .0365718    -5.01   0.000     -.255226   -.1112978
       coin2  
         D1.       -2.868   2.843853    -1.01   0.314    -8.463982    2.727982
        lnm2  
         LD.    -.1301126   .0564883    -2.30   0.022    -.2412674   -.0189579
  NONcommTOT  
                                                                              
D.NONcommTOT        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total     15.394331   309  .049819841           Root MSE      =  .20996
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1152
    Residual    13.4892931   306  .044082657           R-squared     =  0.1237
       Model    1.90503788     3  .635012625           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3,   306) =   14.41
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     310
. reg d.NONcommTOT dl.NONcommTOT dl(0).lnm2 l.coin2
                                                                              
       _cons     .0037679   .0003417    11.03   0.000     .0030955    .0044402
         L1.     .0000999   .0007302     0.14   0.891    -.0013371    .0015368
       coin2  
         D1.    -.0011387   .0011296    -1.01   0.314    -.0033616    .0010841
  NONcommTOT  
         LD.     .1317168   .0567432     2.32   0.021     .0200606     .243373
        lnm2  
                                                                              
      D.lnm2        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .005468579   309  .000017698           Root MSE      =  .00418
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0107
    Residual    .005357756   306  .000017509           R-squared     =  0.0203
       Model    .000110823     3  .000036941           Prob > F      =  0.0990
                                                       F(  3,   306) =    2.11
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     310
. reg d.lnm2 dl.lnm2 dl(0).NONcommTOT l.coin2
                                                                              
       _cons    -7.737542    .613394   -12.61   0.000    -8.944485     -6.5306
   commSHORT     1.460438    .048561    30.07   0.000     1.364887    1.555989
                                                                              
 NONcommLONG        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total     434.85012   311   1.3982319           Root MSE      =  .59838
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.7439
    Residual     110.99847   310  .358059581           R-squared     =  0.7447
       Model    323.851649     1  323.851649           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  1,   310) =  904.46
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     312
. reg  NONcommLONG commSHORT
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0039797    .018784    -0.21   0.832    -.0409422    .0329828
        L2D.    -.1623107   .0557445    -2.91   0.004    -.2720032   -.0526182
         LD.    -.1722922    .057707    -2.99   0.003    -.2858464    -.058738
         L1.     -.137106   .0341737    -4.01   0.000    -.2043521   -.0698599
       coin5  
                                                                              
     D.coin5        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0013
                                                                              
 Z(t)             -4.012            -3.455            -2.878            -2.570
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root         Number of obs   =       309
. dfuller coin5, reg lag(2)DRAFT LIST OF MEMBERS AND OBSERVERS - Confidential 
 
Output #5   
  
 
Output #6   
  
 
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0038412   .0190743    -0.20   0.841    -.0413745    .0336921
         L1.    -.1598455   .0332285    -4.81   0.000    -.2252308   -.0944602
       coin5  
         D1.     1.753686   .1919461     9.14   0.000     1.375985    2.131387
   commSHORT  
         LD.    -.1039714   .0501897    -2.07   0.039     -.202732   -.0052108
 NONcommLONG  
                                                                              
 NONcommLONG        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
D.            
                                                                              
       Total    47.5573066   309  .153907141           Root MSE      =  .33408
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.2748
    Residual     34.153502   306  .111612752           R-squared     =  0.2818
       Model    13.4038046     3  4.46793487           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3,   306) =   40.03
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     310
. reg d.NONcommLONG dl.NONcommLONG d.commSHORT l.coin5
                                                                              
       _cons     .0092288   .0049606     1.86   0.064    -.0005325    .0189901
         L1.      .018442   .0089171     2.07   0.039     .0008952    .0359888
       coin5  
         LD.     .0294207   .0146473     2.01   0.045     .0005981    .0582432
         D1.      .120293   .0131884     9.12   0.000     .0943413    .1462448
 NONcommLONG  
         LD.    -.1805889   .0559078    -3.23   0.001    -.2906028   -.0705751
   commSHORT  
                                                                              
 D.commSHORT        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    3.03075463   309  .009808267           Root MSE      =  .08687
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.2307
    Residual    2.30139603   305  .007545561           R-squared     =  0.2407
       Model    .729358602     4  .182339651           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  4,   305) =   24.17
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     310
. reg d.commSHORT dl.commSHORT dl(0/1).NONcommLONG l.coin5
            Prob > F =    0.0013
       F(  2,   349) =    6.80
 ( 2)  L2D.LnSp500 = 0
 ( 1)  LD.LnSp500 = 0
. test dl1.LnSp500 dl2.LnSp500
                                                                              
       _cons     .0010496   .0009388     1.12   0.264    -.0007967     .002896
        L2D.     .0584193   .0362431     1.61   0.108    -.0128632    .1297017
         LD.     .1234158    .035819     3.45   0.001     .0529676    .1938639
     LnSp500  
        L2D.     .1405412   .0517441     2.72   0.007     .0387716    .2423107
         LD.     .0747558   .0530476     1.41   0.160    -.0295773     .179089
lnindexpos~n  
                                                                              
lnindexpos~n        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
D.            
                                                                              
       Total    .116236705   353  .000329282           Root MSE      =  .01754
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0659
    Residual    .107345758   349  .000307581           R-squared     =  0.0765
       Model    .008890947     4  .002222737           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  4,   349) =    7.23
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     354
. reg d.lnindexposition dl(1/2).lnindexposition dl(1/2).LnSp500
                                                                      
            D_LnSp500                ALL    1.6166     2    0.446     
            D_LnSp500  D.lnindexposition    1.6166     2    0.446     
                                                                      
    D_lnindexposition                ALL    13.275     2    0.001     
    D_lnindexposition          D.LnSp500    13.275     2    0.001     
                                                                      
             Equation           Excluded     chi2     df Prob > chi2  
                                                                      
   Granger causality Wald tests
. vargranger 
 
Output #7   
(a) 1992-2011 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     .0003075   .0033448     0.09   0.927    -.0062483    .0068632
        L5D.    -.0600304   .0313864    -1.91   0.056    -.1215465    .0014858
        L4D.    -.0426604   .0323289    -1.32   0.187    -.1060238    .0207031
        L3D.     .0044932   .0323758     0.14   0.890    -.0589622    .0679487
        L2D.    -.0514314    .032336    -1.59   0.112    -.1148087    .0119459
         LD.    -.2391162   .0315153    -7.59   0.000    -.3008851   -.1773472
       LnVix  
        L5D.     .1749648   .0903048     1.94   0.053    -.0020294     .351959
        L4D.     .1658828   .0876892     1.89   0.059    -.0059848    .3377505
        L3D.     .1414392   .0873137     1.62   0.105    -.0296925    .3125709
        L2D.    -.0719579   .0875055    -0.82   0.411    -.2434656    .0995498
         LD.    -.1922562   .0899523    -2.14   0.033    -.3685595   -.0159528
      lncomm  
D_LnVix       
                                                                              
       _cons     .0013016   .0011713     1.11   0.266    -.0009941    .0035972
        L5D.     -.011337   .0109907    -1.03   0.302    -.0328784    .0102044
        L4D.    -.0055847   .0113208    -0.49   0.622     -.027773    .0166036
        L3D.     .0045817   .0113372     0.40   0.686    -.0176388    .0268022
        L2D.    -.0075996   .0113232    -0.67   0.502    -.0297928    .0145936
         LD.    -.0023716   .0110359    -0.21   0.830    -.0240016    .0192583
       LnVix  
        L5D.     .0889301   .0316225     2.81   0.005     .0269512     .150909
        L4D.     .2622039   .0307066     8.54   0.000     .2020202    .3223876
        L3D.    -.1617723   .0305751    -5.29   0.000    -.2216983   -.1018462
        L2D.    -.1438222   .0306422    -4.69   0.000    -.2038799   -.0837645
         LD.    -.1129993   .0314991    -3.59   0.000    -.1747364   -.0512623
      lncomm  
D_lncomm      
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                
D_LnVix              11     .105769   0.0701   75.20163   0.0000
D_lncomm             11     .037038   0.1535   180.7411   0.0000
                                                                
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2
Det(Sigma_ml)  =   .000015                         SBIC            = -5.278983
FPE            =  .0000157                         HQIC            = -5.346071
Log likelihood =  2707.525                         AIC             = -5.387212
Sample:  7 - 1003                                  No. of obs      =       997
Vector autoregression
. var d.lncomm d.LnVix, lags(1/5)
                                                                      
              D_LnVix                ALL    15.761     5    0.008     
              D_LnVix           D.lncomm    15.761     5    0.008     
                                                                      
             D_lncomm                ALL    2.0707     5    0.839     
             D_lncomm            D.LnVix    2.0707     5    0.839     
                                                                      
             Equation           Excluded     chi2     df Prob > chi2  
                                                                      
   Granger causality Wald tests
. vargrangerDRAFT LIST OF MEMBERS AND OBSERVERS - Confidential 
 
(b) 1992-2001 
                                                                        
              D_LnVix                ALL    5.8246     4    0.213     
              D_LnVix           D.lncomm    5.8246     4    0.213     
                                                                      
             D_lncomm                ALL    3.3238     4    0.505     
             D_lncomm            D.LnVix    3.3238     4    0.505     
                                                                      
             Equation           Excluded     chi2     df Prob > chi2  
                                                                      
   Granger causality Wald tests
. vargranger
                                                                              
       _cons     .0008684   .0044837     0.19   0.846    -.0079195    .0096562
        L4D.    -.0829582   .0454008    -1.83   0.068     -.171942    .0060257
        L3D.     -.025036   .0466124    -0.54   0.591    -.1163947    .0663226
        L2D.    -.1299364   .0466998    -2.78   0.005    -.2214663   -.0384064
         LD.    -.2223783   .0455929    -4.88   0.000    -.3117388   -.1330179
       LnVix  
        L4D.     .1415733   .1123532     1.26   0.208     -.078635    .3617816
        L3D.    -.0278712   .1110345    -0.25   0.802    -.2454948    .1897524
        L2D.    -.1058286   .1107003    -0.96   0.339    -.3227973      .11114
         LD.    -.1517995   .1119697    -1.36   0.175     -.371256     .067657
      lncomm  
D_LnVix       
                                                                              
       _cons     .0010832    .001762     0.61   0.539    -.0023702    .0045366
        L4D.     .0082307   .0178413     0.46   0.645    -.0267377     .043199
        L3D.     .0314366   .0183175     1.72   0.086    -.0044649    .0673382
        L2D.     .0179731   .0183518     0.98   0.327    -.0179958     .053942
         LD.     .0087694   .0179168     0.49   0.625    -.0263469    .0438857
       LnVix  
        L4D.     .2821224   .0441519     6.39   0.000     .1955863    .3686585
        L3D.    -.1747994   .0436336    -4.01   0.000    -.2603197    -.089279
        L2D.    -.1952695   .0435023    -4.49   0.000    -.2805325   -.1100065
         LD.    -.0884991   .0440011    -2.01   0.044    -.1747397   -.0022585
      lncomm  
D_lncomm      
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                
D_LnVix               9     .098655   0.0699    35.8424   0.0000
D_lncomm              9     .038769   0.1857   108.7909   0.0000
                                                                
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2
Det(Sigma_ml)  =   .000014                         SBIC            = -5.264647
FPE            =  .0000151                         HQIC            = -5.360078
Log likelihood =  1311.126                         AIC             = -5.421912
Sample:  6 - 482                                   No. of obs      =       477
Vector autoregression
. var d.lncomm d.LnVix  if tin(1,482), lags(1/4) 
 
(c) 2002-2011 
                                                                        
              D_LnVix                ALL    6.8405     3    0.077     
              D_LnVix           D.lncomm    6.8405     3    0.077     
                                                                      
             D_lncomm                ALL    3.8775     3    0.275     
             D_lncomm            D.LnVix    3.8775     3    0.275     
                                                                      
             Equation           Excluded     chi2     df Prob > chi2  
                                                                      
   Granger causality Wald tests
. vargranger
                                                                              
       _cons     .0000794   .0049087     0.02   0.987    -.0095415    .0097004
        L3D.     .0284243   .0436365     0.65   0.515    -.0571018    .1139503
        L2D.     .0056658   .0449432     0.13   0.900    -.0824213    .0937529
         LD.    -.2403403    .043649    -5.51   0.000    -.3258908   -.1547897
       LnVix  
        L3D.     .2586992   .1316464     1.97   0.049      .000677    .5167214
        L2D.    -.0946373     .13189    -0.72   0.473    -.3531368    .1638623
         LD.    -.1692057   .1317911    -1.28   0.199    -.4275115    .0891002
      lncomm  
D_LnVix       
                                                                              
       _cons     .0022621   .0015938     1.42   0.156    -.0008618    .0053859
        L3D.    -.0182942   .0141684    -1.29   0.197    -.0460638    .0094754
        L2D.     -.024066   .0145927    -1.65   0.099    -.0526671    .0045351
         LD.     .0025844   .0141725     0.18   0.855    -.0251931    .0303619
       LnVix  
        L3D.     -.203528   .0427445    -4.76   0.000    -.2873056   -.1197504
        L2D.    -.1432191   .0428236    -3.34   0.001    -.2271517   -.0592865
         LD.     -.140799   .0427915    -3.29   0.001    -.2246688   -.0569293
      lncomm  
D_lncomm      
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                
D_LnVix               7     .112477   0.0711   39.88595   0.0000
D_lncomm              7      .03652   0.0719   40.34853   0.0000
                                                                
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  .0000164                         SBIC            = -5.174484
FPE            =  .0000173                         HQIC            = -5.244047
Log likelihood =  1391.743                         AIC             = -5.288842
Sample:  483 - 1003                                No. of obs      =       521
Vector autoregression
. var d.lncomm d.LnVix  if tin(483,1003), lags(1/3)DRAFT LIST OF MEMBERS AND OBSERVERS - Confidential 
 
Output #8   
(a) 1992-2011 
                                                                        
              D_LnVix                ALL    7.4186     5    0.191     
              D_LnVix        D.lnnoncomm    7.4186     5    0.191     
                                                                      
          D_lnnoncomm                ALL    5.5129     5    0.357     
          D_lnnoncomm            D.LnVix    5.5129     5    0.357     
                                                                      
             Equation           Excluded     chi2     df Prob > chi2  
                                                                      
   Granger causality Wald tests
. vargranger
                                                                              
       _cons     .0005115   .0033514     0.15   0.879    -.0060573    .0070802
        L5D.    -.0548423   .0315954    -1.74   0.083    -.1167681    .0070836
        L4D.    -.0445685   .0324387    -1.37   0.169    -.1081471    .0190101
        L3D.    -.0021954   .0324706    -0.07   0.946    -.0658365    .0614458
        L2D.    -.0532332   .0323696    -1.64   0.100    -.1166766    .0102101
         LD.    -.2308078   .0315803    -7.31   0.000    -.2927041   -.1689115
       LnVix  
        L5D.    -.0354506   .0286149    -1.24   0.215    -.0915348    .0206336
        L4D.     .0610489   .0286226     2.13   0.033     .0049496    .1171482
        L3D.     .0137114   .0286003     0.48   0.632    -.0423441    .0697669
        L2D.    -.0212578   .0286929    -0.74   0.459    -.0774948    .0349792
         LD.     .0012344    .028681     0.04   0.966    -.0549793    .0574481
   lnnoncomm  
D_LnVix       
                                                                              
       _cons     .0036861   .0036782     1.00   0.316    -.0035232    .0108953
        L5D.     .0075483   .0346763     0.22   0.828     -.060416    .0755126
        L4D.    -.0364477   .0356018    -1.02   0.306    -.1062259    .0333304
        L3D.      .034152   .0356368     0.96   0.338    -.0356948    .1039988
        L2D.    -.0477174    .035526    -1.34   0.179    -.1173471    .0219123
         LD.    -.0215933   .0346597    -0.62   0.533     -.089525    .0463385
       LnVix  
        L5D.    -.1139606   .0314052    -3.63   0.000    -.1755135   -.0524076
        L4D.    -.0013663   .0314136    -0.04   0.965    -.0629359    .0602033
        L3D.    -.1264154   .0313891    -4.03   0.000    -.1879369   -.0648938
        L2D.    -.1047228   .0314907    -3.33   0.001    -.1664435   -.0430021
         LD.    -.0652446   .0314777    -2.07   0.038    -.1269398   -.0035495
   lnnoncomm  
D_lnnoncomm   
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                
D_LnVix              11     .106207   0.0624    66.3698   0.0000
D_lnnoncomm          11     .116564   0.0421   43.80507   0.0000
                                                                
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  .0001497                         SBIC            = -2.978732
FPE            =  .0001565                         HQIC            = -3.045821
Log likelihood =   1560.85                         AIC             = -3.086961
Sample:  7 - 1003                                  No. of obs      =       997
Vector autoregression
. var d.lnnoncomm d.LnVix, lags(1/5) 
 
(b) 1992-2001 
 
. 
                                                                      
              D_LnVix                ALL    5.0184     5    0.414     
              D_LnVix        D.lnnoncomm    5.0184     5    0.414     
                                                                      
          D_lnnoncomm                ALL    8.9319     5    0.112     
          D_lnnoncomm            D.LnVix    8.9319     5    0.112     
                                                                      
             Equation           Excluded     chi2     df Prob > chi2  
                                                                      
   Granger causality Wald tests
. vargranger
                                                                              
       _cons     .0013162   .0044686     0.29   0.768     -.007442    .0100745
        L5D.    -.0503137   .0458701    -1.10   0.273    -.1402175    .0395901
        L4D.     -.107666   .0468536    -2.30   0.022    -.1994973   -.0158347
        L3D.    -.0495856   .0472605    -1.05   0.294    -.1422145    .0430433
        L2D.    -.1430859   .0466797    -3.07   0.002    -.2345763   -.0515954
         LD.    -.2172982   .0457047    -4.75   0.000    -.3068778   -.1277187
       LnVix  
        L5D.    -.0375761   .0298422    -1.26   0.208    -.0960658    .0209136
        L4D.      .039312   .0300666     1.31   0.191    -.0196174    .0982414
        L3D.    -.0240012   .0300454    -0.80   0.424    -.0828891    .0348867
        L2D.    -.0193504   .0301539    -0.64   0.521    -.0784511    .0397502
         LD.    -.0143855   .0300896    -0.48   0.633      -.07336     .044589
   lnnoncomm  
D_LnVix       
                                                                              
       _cons     .0032843   .0067492     0.49   0.627    -.0099439    .0165126
        L5D.    -.0124708   .0692811    -0.18   0.857    -.1482592    .1233176
        L4D.    -.0871633   .0707665    -1.23   0.218     -.225863    .0515364
        L3D.     .0700921   .0713811     0.98   0.326    -.0698123    .2099965
        L2D.    -.1249353   .0705038    -1.77   0.076    -.2631202    .0132496
         LD.    -.1057108   .0690312    -1.53   0.126    -.2410095     .029588
       LnVix  
        L5D.    -.1531535    .045073    -3.40   0.001    -.2414949   -.0648121
        L4D.    -.0293285   .0454118    -0.65   0.518     -.118334     .059677
        L3D.      -.14651   .0453798    -3.23   0.001    -.2354528   -.0575672
        L2D.    -.1241801   .0455438    -2.73   0.006    -.2134442    -.034916
         LD.    -.1031346   .0454465    -2.27   0.023    -.1922082    -.014061
   lnnoncomm  
D_lnnoncomm   
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                
D_LnVix              11     .098528   0.0715   36.66724   0.0001
D_lnnoncomm          11     .148815   0.0708   36.26618   0.0001
                                                                
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  .0002035                         SBIC            = -2.539016
FPE            =  .0002232                         HQIC            = -2.655834
Log likelihood =  672.1054                         AIC             = -2.731535
Sample:  7 - 482                                   No. of obs      =       476
Vector autoregression
. var d.lnnoncomm d.LnVix  if tin(1,482), lags(1/5)DRAFT LIST OF MEMBERS AND OBSERVERS - Confidential 
 
(c) 2002-2011 
                                                                        
              D_LnVix                ALL    6.0271     3    0.110     
              D_LnVix        D.lnnoncomm    6.0271     3    0.110     
                                                                      
          D_lnnoncomm                ALL    2.1708     3    0.538     
          D_lnnoncomm            D.LnVix    2.1708     3    0.538     
                                                                      
             Equation           Excluded     chi2     df Prob > chi2  
                                                                      
   Granger causality Wald tests
. vargranger
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0002015   .0049101    -0.04   0.967    -.0098251    .0094221
        L3D.     .0339411   .0437054     0.78   0.437    -.0517198    .1196021
        L2D.    -.0029362    .044963    -0.07   0.948     -.091062    .0851896
         LD.    -.2379383   .0436259    -5.45   0.000    -.3234436    -.152433
       LnVix  
        L3D.     .1359666   .0659793     2.06   0.039     .0066495    .2652838
        L2D.    -.0901239   .0659167    -1.37   0.172    -.2193183    .0390705
         LD.      .041004   .0659733     0.62   0.534    -.0883013    .1703093
   lnnoncomm  
D_LnVix       
                                                                              
       _cons     .0034873   .0032461     1.07   0.283     -.002875    .0098495
        L3D.     .0000848   .0288939     0.00   0.998    -.0565463    .0567158
        L2D.    -.0152794   .0297253    -0.51   0.607    -.0735399    .0429812
         LD.     .0347707   .0288414     1.21   0.228    -.0217574    .0912988
       LnVix  
        L3D.    -.0846017   .0436194    -1.94   0.052    -.1700941    .0008908
        L2D.    -.0724849    .043578    -1.66   0.096    -.1578961    .0129264
         LD.     .0409936   .0436154     0.94   0.347     -.044491    .1264782
   lnnoncomm  
D_lnnoncomm   
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                
D_LnVix               7     .112564   0.0697    39.0216   0.0000
D_lnnoncomm           7     .074417   0.0194   10.30241   0.1125
                                                                
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  .0000682                         SBIC            = -3.748641
FPE            =   .000072                         HQIC            = -3.818205
Log likelihood =  1020.311                         AIC             = -3.862999
Sample:  483 - 1003                                No. of obs      =       521
Vector autoregression
. var d.lnnoncomm d.LnVix  if tin(483,1003), lags(1/3) 
 
Output #9   
(a) 1992-2011 
 
 
                                                                      
              D_LnVix                ALL    9.5235     5    0.090     
              D_LnVix      D.lnnocomlong    9.5235     5    0.090     
                                                                      
        D_lnnocomlong                ALL    7.6402     5    0.177     
        D_lnnocomlong            D.LnVix    7.6402     5    0.177     
                                                                      
             Equation           Excluded     chi2     df Prob > chi2  
                                                                      
   Granger causality Wald tests
. vargranger
                                                                              
       _cons     .0004232   .0033451     0.13   0.899    -.0061332    .0069795
        L5D.    -.0554288   .0315983    -1.75   0.079    -.1173603    .0065027
        L4D.    -.0440966   .0324382    -1.36   0.174    -.1076742    .0194811
        L3D.    -.0019844   .0324943    -0.06   0.951     -.065672    .0617032
        L2D.    -.0546619    .032335    -1.69   0.091    -.1180373    .0087135
         LD.     -.230547   .0316048    -7.29   0.000    -.2924912   -.1686028
       LnVix  
        L5D.    -.0045648   .0177741    -0.26   0.797    -.0394015    .0302718
        L4D.     .0517498   .0178108     2.91   0.004     .0168414    .0866583
        L3D.    -.0010107   .0177692    -0.06   0.955    -.0358377    .0338164
        L2D.    -.0140857   .0184874    -0.76   0.446    -.0503202    .0221489
         LD.     .0184123   .0184551     1.00   0.318     -.017759    .0545836
 lnnocomlong  
D_LnVix       
                                                                              
       _cons     .0037165   .0056929     0.65   0.514    -.0074414    .0148744
        L5D.      .021636   .0537757     0.40   0.687    -.0837625    .1270344
        L4D.    -.0575989    .055205    -1.04   0.297    -.1657988     .050601
        L3D.     .0172261   .0553005     0.31   0.755    -.0911609     .125613
        L2D.    -.1252399   .0550294    -2.28   0.023    -.2330955   -.0173842
         LD.    -.0308078   .0537867    -0.57   0.567    -.1362279    .0746123
       LnVix  
        L5D.    -.0232346    .030249    -0.77   0.442    -.0825215    .0360523
        L4D.    -.0120244   .0303113    -0.40   0.692    -.0714336    .0473847
        L3D.    -.1167583   .0302406    -3.86   0.000    -.1760289   -.0574878
        L2D.    -.0078661   .0314628    -0.25   0.803     -.069532    .0537999
         LD.     .0639396   .0314079     2.04   0.042     .0023813    .1254979
 lnnocomlong  
D_lnnocoml~g  
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                
D_LnVix              11     .106096   0.0644   68.59819   0.0000
D_lnnocomlong        11      .18056   0.0286   29.33622   0.0011
                                                                
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  .0003583                         SBIC            =  -2.10616
FPE            =  .0003744                         HQIC            = -2.173248
Log likelihood =  1125.873                         AIC             = -2.214389
Sample:  7 - 1003                                  No. of obs      =       997
Vector autoregression
. var d.lnnocomlong d.LnVix, lags(1/5)DRAFT LIST OF MEMBERS AND OBSERVERS - Confidential 
 
(b) 1992-2001 
                                                                        
              D_LnVix                ALL    8.5082     5    0.130     
              D_LnVix      D.lnnocomlong    8.5082     5    0.130     
                                                                      
        D_lnnocomlong                ALL    8.3867     5    0.136     
        D_lnnocomlong            D.LnVix    8.3867     5    0.136     
                                                                      
             Equation           Excluded     chi2     df Prob > chi2  
                                                                      
   Granger causality Wald tests
. vargranger
                                                                              
       _cons     .0011988   .0044394     0.27   0.787    -.0075022    .0098998
        L5D.    -.0495701   .0454865    -1.09   0.276    -.1387221    .0395819
        L4D.    -.1089294   .0463863    -2.35   0.019    -.1998449   -.0180139
        L3D.    -.0459442   .0468118    -0.98   0.326    -.1376936    .0458053
        L2D.    -.1361711   .0462092    -2.95   0.003    -.2267393   -.0456028
         LD.    -.2117214   .0455857    -4.64   0.000    -.3010678    -.122375
       LnVix  
        L5D.    -.0028873   .0180473    -0.16   0.873    -.0382594    .0324847
        L4D.     .0455337   .0180153     2.53   0.011     .0102243    .0808431
        L3D.    -.0215225   .0179693    -1.20   0.231    -.0567417    .0136967
        L2D.    -.0117164   .0188911    -0.62   0.535    -.0487424    .0253095
         LD.     .0146031   .0189095     0.77   0.440    -.0224589     .051665
 lnnocomlong  
D_LnVix       
                                                                              
       _cons     .0007539   .0106453     0.07   0.944    -.0201105    .0216184
        L5D.     .0256494   .1090738     0.24   0.814    -.1881313    .2394302
        L4D.    -.0969172   .1112314    -0.87   0.384    -.3149267    .1210922
        L3D.     .1040774   .1122517     0.93   0.354     -.115932    .3240867
        L2D.    -.2388437   .1108066    -2.16   0.031    -.4560206   -.0216667
         LD.    -.1117488   .1093117    -1.02   0.307    -.3259957    .1024982
       LnVix  
        L5D.    -.0403679   .0432763    -0.93   0.351    -.1251878     .044452
        L4D.    -.0300629   .0431996    -0.70   0.486    -.1147326    .0546069
        L3D.    -.1290661   .0430892    -3.00   0.003    -.2135194   -.0446128
        L2D.     -.017854   .0452997    -0.39   0.693    -.1066398    .0709318
         LD.     .0240137   .0453438     0.53   0.596    -.0648585    .1128858
 lnnocomlong  
D_lnnocoml~g  
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                
D_LnVix              11     .098069   0.0782   40.48869   0.0000
D_lnnocomlong        11     .235164   0.0397   19.69592   0.0323
                                                                
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2
Det(Sigma_ml)  =   .000506                         SBIC            = -1.628684
FPE            =  .0005549                         HQIC            = -1.745322
Log likelihood =  456.2837                         AIC             = -1.820896
Sample:  7 - 483                                   No. of obs      =       477
Vector autoregression
. var d.lnnocomlong d.LnVix  if tin(1,483), lags(1/5) 
 
(c) 2002-2011 
 
 
   
                                                                      
              D_LnVix                ALL    7.8948     3    0.048     
              D_LnVix      D.lnnocomlong    7.8948     3    0.048     
                                                                      
        D_lnnocomlong                ALL    4.1631     3    0.244     
        D_lnnocomlong            D.LnVix    4.1631     3    0.244     
                                                                      
             Equation           Excluded     chi2     df Prob > chi2  
                                                                      
   Granger causality Wald tests
. vargranger
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0004674   .0049074    -0.10   0.924    -.0100857    .0091508
        L3D.     .0405226   .0436966     0.93   0.354    -.0451211    .1261662
        L2D.    -.0076323   .0448613    -0.17   0.865    -.0955588    .0802941
         LD.    -.2366194   .0435762    -5.43   0.000    -.3220272   -.1512116
       LnVix  
        L3D.     .1216999   .0459984     2.65   0.008     .0315446    .2118551
        L2D.    -.0678971   .0473205    -1.43   0.151    -.1606436    .0248494
         LD.     .0335107   .0460577     0.73   0.467    -.0567608    .1237821
 lnnocomlong  
D_LnVix       
                                                                              
       _cons     .0052598   .0046603     1.13   0.259    -.0038744    .0143939
        L3D.     -.037147   .0414971    -0.90   0.371    -.1184799    .0441859
        L2D.    -.0601805   .0426032    -1.41   0.158    -.1436813    .0233202
         LD.      .041696   .0413828     1.01   0.314    -.0394129    .1228049
       LnVix  
        L3D.    -.0746152   .0436831    -1.71   0.088    -.1602326    .0110022
        L2D.    -.0183554   .0449387    -0.41   0.683    -.1064336    .0697228
         LD.     .2348404   .0437394     5.37   0.000     .1491127    .3205681
 lnnocomlong  
D_lnnocoml~g  
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                
D_LnVix               7     .112365   0.0730   41.00625   0.0000
D_lnnocomlong         7     .106709   0.0650   36.19711   0.0000
                                                                
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  .0001396                         SBIC            = -3.032894
FPE            =  .0001473                         HQIC            = -3.102458
Log likelihood =  833.8593                         AIC             = -3.147252
Sample:  483 - 1003                                No. of obs      =       521
Vector autoregression
. var d.lnnocomlong d.LnVix  if tin(483,1003), lags(1/3)DRAFT LIST OF MEMBERS AND OBSERVERS - Confidential 
 
Crude oil 
Output #10   
 
 
   
 
     
 
   
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0172424   .0078839    -2.19   0.030    -.0327837   -.0017011
         D1.     12.89676   2.919459     4.42   0.000     7.141715     18.6518
      lnoecd  
         D1.    -1.461619   .5042191    -2.90   0.004    -2.455571   -.4676664
    lndollar  
         D1.    -.5329891   .2019181    -2.64   0.009    -.9310243   -.1349539
lninventor~s  
                                                                              
 lnspotprice        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
D.            
                                                                              
       Total    1.95089442   214  .009116329           Root MSE      =  .08728
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1644
    Residual    1.60740152   211  .007618017           R-squared     =  0.1761
       Model    .343492899     3  .114497633           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3,   211) =   15.03
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     215
. reg d.lnspotprice d.lninventories d.lndollar d.lnoecd
                                                                              
       _cons     -.036506   .0181405    -2.01   0.045    -.0722657   -.0007462
         D1.     3.975196   1.612342     2.47   0.014     .7968336    7.153558
     lnchina  
         D1.    -1.565516   .5324604    -2.94   0.004     -2.61514   -.5158927
    lndollar  
         D1.    -.5850167   .2075468    -2.82   0.005    -.9941475   -.1758858
lninventor~s  
                                                                              
 lnspotprice        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
D.            
                                                                              
       Total    1.95089442   214  .009116329           Root MSE      =  .08994
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1126
    Residual    1.70689007   211  .008089526           R-squared     =  0.1251
       Model    .244004352     3  .081334784           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3,   211) =   10.05
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     215
. reg d.lnspotprice d.lninventories d.lndollar d.lnchina
 Prob > chi2(40)           =     0.2174
 Portmanteau (Q) statistic =    46.6656
                                       
Portmanteau test for white noise
(note: time series has 3 gaps)
. wntestq res2
                                                          
Residuals       1.7917      0.4083      1.7582      0.4152
                                                          
(n = 212)          D-H     P-value        asy.     P-value
                                                          
. omninorm res2
                  Prob > F =      0.0148
                 F(3, 208) =      3.58
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of D.lnspotprice
. estat ovtest
                                                   
               Total        12.77     13    0.4657
                                                   
            Kurtosis         0.70      1    0.4034
            Skewness         3.49      3    0.3222
  Heteroskedasticity         8.58      9    0.4765
                                                   
              Source         chi2     df      p
                                                   
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test
         Prob > chi2  =    0.4765
         chi2(9)      =      8.58
         against Ha: unrestricted heteroskedasticity
White's test for Ho: homoskedasticity
. estat imtest,white
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LnSpotPrice 
 
Output #11   
(a) 
   
 
(b) 
   
 
(c) 
   
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     .0081485   .0020093     4.06   0.000     .0042104    .0120866
         L1.    -.2842201   .2002123    -1.42   0.156    -.6766291    .1081888
       garch  
         L1.      .239776   .0787471     3.04   0.002     .0854345    .3941174
        arch  
ARCH          
                                                                              
       _cons     .0151405   .0061677     2.45   0.014      .003052     .027229
         LD.    -.4550465   .2145602    -2.12   0.034    -.8755767   -.0345162
lnbrentsto~s  
lnbrentprice  
                                                                              
lnbrentprice        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
D.            
                               OPG
                                                                              
Log likelihood =  220.4784                         Prob > chi2     =    0.0339
Distribution: Gaussian                             Wald chi2(1)    =      4.50
Sample: 3 - 216                                    Number of obs   =       214
ARCH family regression
Iteration 7:   log likelihood =  220.47844  
Iteration 6:   log likelihood =  220.47843  
Iteration 5:   log likelihood =  220.47778  
(switching optimization to BFGS)
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  220.47393  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  220.43219  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  220.19397  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  219.30363  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =   215.0574  
(setting optimization to BHHH)
. arch d.lnbrentprice dl.lnbrentstocks, arch(1) garch(1)
-
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-
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LnBrentPrice
 Prob > chi2(40)           =     0.2911
 Portmanteau (Q) statistic =    44.4129
                                       
Portmanteau test for white noise
. wntestq se2
                                                                              
       _cons     .0084157   .0025403     3.31   0.001     .0034367    .0133946
         L1.     -.326461    .309971    -1.05   0.292    -.9339931    .2810711
       garch  
         L1.     .1906678   .0695089     2.74   0.006     .0544328    .3269027
        arch  
ARCH          
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0314662    .015389    -2.04   0.041     -.061628   -.0013044
         D1.     4.125955   1.332705     3.10   0.002     1.513902    6.738008
     lnchina  
         LD.    -.5007922   .2078281    -2.41   0.016    -.9081279   -.0934565
lnbrentsto~s  
lnbrentprice  
                                                                              
lnbrentprice        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
D.            
                               OPG
                                                                              
Log likelihood =  224.4417                         Prob > chi2     =    0.0006
Distribution: Gaussian                             Wald chi2(2)    =     14.77
Sample: 3 - 216                                    Number of obs   =       214
ARCH family regression
Iteration 13:  log likelihood =   224.4417  
Iteration 12:  log likelihood =   224.4417  
Iteration 11:  log likelihood =  224.44166  
Iteration 10:  log likelihood =  224.44147  
Iteration 9:   log likelihood =  224.44113  
Iteration 8:   log likelihood =  224.44024  
Iteration 7:   log likelihood =  224.43629  
Iteration 6:   log likelihood =  224.38077  
Iteration 5:   log likelihood =  223.22802  
(switching optimization to BFGS)
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  222.21433  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  221.03819  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  219.77642  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  219.12845  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  216.65147  
(setting optimization to BHHH)
. arch d.lnbrentprice dl.lnbrentstocks d.lnchina, arch(1) garch(1)
-
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LnBrentPrice
 Prob > chi2(40)           =     0.1370
 Portmanteau (Q) statistic =    49.8375
                                       
Portmanteau test for white noise
. wntestq se2
                                                                              
       _cons     .0116125   .0017237     6.74   0.000     .0082341    .0149909
         L1.    -.8019366   .1293339    -6.20   0.000    -1.055426   -.5484469
       garch  
         L1.     .1359556   .0396168     3.43   0.001      .058308    .2136032
        arch  
ARCH          
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0118424   .0075442    -1.57   0.116    -.0266288     .002944
         D1.    -1.363367   .4803912    -2.84   0.005    -2.304917   -.4218177
    lndollar  
         D1.     11.86563   2.458424     4.83   0.000      7.04721    16.68405
      lnoecd  
lnbrentprice  
                                                                              
lnbrentprice        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
D.            
                               OPG
                                                                              
Log likelihood =   232.783                         Prob > chi2     =    0.0000
Distribution: Gaussian                             Wald chi2(2)    =     43.36
Sample: 2 - 216                                    Number of obs   =       215
ARCH family regression
Iteration 9:   log likelihood =  232.78298  
Iteration 8:   log likelihood =  232.78298  
Iteration 7:   log likelihood =  232.78291  
Iteration 6:   log likelihood =  232.78266  
Iteration 5:   log likelihood =  232.77787  
(switching optimization to BFGS)
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  232.77116  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  232.74138  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =   232.2745  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  228.68973  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  224.93451  
(setting optimization to BHHH)
. arch d.lnbrentprice d.lnoecd d.lndollar, arch(1) garch(1)
-
2
-
1
0
1
2
s
e
2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5
LnBrentPrice
 Prob > chi2(40)           =     0.1693
 Portmanteau (Q) statistic =    48.4333
                                       
Portmanteau test for white noise
(note: time series has 9 gaps)
. wntestq se2DRAFT LIST OF MEMBERS AND OBSERVERS - Confidential 
 
Output #12   
                                                                        
           D_basis12m                ALL    .93237     3    0.818     
           D_basis12m    D.lninventories    .93237     3    0.818     
                                                                      
      D_lninventories                ALL    14.909     3    0.002     
      D_lninventories         D.basis12m    14.909     3    0.002     
                                                                      
             Equation           Excluded     chi2     df Prob > chi2  
                                                                      
   Granger causality Wald tests
. vargranger
                                                                              
       _cons     .0049258   .1220454     0.04   0.968    -.2342787    .2441304
        L3D.    -.0039858   .0707034    -0.06   0.955     -.142562    .1345903
        L2D.    -.1375307   .0704133    -1.95   0.051    -.2755382    .0004768
         LD.    -.1030609   .0688306    -1.50   0.134    -.2379665    .0318446
    basis12m  
        L3D.    -2.482749   4.128226    -0.60   0.548    -10.57392    5.608424
        L2D.     1.392457   4.216714     0.33   0.741    -6.872151    9.657066
         LD.     -3.14403    4.23177    -0.74   0.458    -11.43815    5.150087
lninventor~s  
D_basis12m    
                                                                              
       _cons     .0000921   .0019599     0.05   0.963    -.0037492    .0039335
        L3D.     .0017912   .0011354     1.58   0.115    -.0004342    .0040166
        L2D.     .0017338   .0011308     1.53   0.125    -.0004824    .0039501
         LD.     .0039159   .0011053     3.54   0.000     .0017494    .0060823
    basis12m  
        L3D.    -.0898659   .0662949    -1.36   0.175    -.2198014    .0400697
        L2D.    -.0657577   .0677159    -0.97   0.332    -.1984784     .066963
         LD.     .0380064   .0679577     0.56   0.576    -.0951882     .171201
lninventor~s  
D_lninvent~s  
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                
D_basis12m            7      1.8069   0.0335   7.339138   0.2906
D_lninventories       7     .029017   0.0822   18.99269   0.0042
                                                                
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  .0025704                         SBIC            =  .0658039
FPE            =  .0029335                         HQIC            = -.0662671
Log likelihood =  30.52089                         AIC             = -.1558575
Sample:  5 - 216                                   No. of obs      =       212
Vector autoregression
. var d.lninventories d.basis12m, lags(1/3) 
 
                                                                        
            D_basis4m                ALL    2.5565     3    0.465     
            D_basis4m    D.lninventories    2.5565     3    0.465     
                                                                      
      D_lninventories                ALL    9.5449     3    0.023     
      D_lninventories          D.basis4m    9.5449     3    0.023     
                                                                      
             Equation           Excluded     chi2     df Prob > chi2  
                                                                      
   Granger causality Wald tests
. vargranger
                                                                              
       _cons     .0062048   .0639012     0.10   0.923    -.1190392    .1314487
        L3D.     -.135602   .0687216    -1.97   0.048    -.2702939   -.0009101
        L2D.    -.1655228     .06805    -2.43   0.015    -.2988983   -.0321472
         LD.     -.080839   .0679924    -1.19   0.234    -.2141017    .0524237
     basis4m  
        L3D.    -1.736649   2.168673    -0.80   0.423    -5.987171    2.513872
        L2D.     2.220118    2.18667     1.02   0.310    -2.065676    6.505911
         LD.    -2.381445   2.188641    -1.09   0.277    -6.671103    1.908214
lninventor~s  
D_basis4m     
                                                                              
       _cons     .0000103   .0019833     0.01   0.996    -.0038769    .0038975
        L3D.     .0035267   .0021329     1.65   0.098    -.0006537    .0077072
        L2D.     .0030646   .0021121     1.45   0.147    -.0010749    .0072042
         LD.     .0053587   .0021103     2.54   0.011     .0012226    .0094948
     basis4m  
        L3D.    -.0898827   .0673092    -1.34   0.182    -.2218062    .0420409
        L2D.     -.059588   .0678677    -0.88   0.380    -.1926063    .0734302
         LD.      .042102   .0679289     0.62   0.535    -.0910362    .1752403
lninventor~s  
D_lninvent~s  
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                
D_basis4m             7     .946161   0.0586   13.18983   0.0401
D_lninventories       7     .029366   0.0600   13.53198   0.0353
                                                                
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  .0007218                         SBIC            = -1.204202
FPE            =  .0008238                         HQIC            = -1.336273
Log likelihood =  165.1416                         AIC             = -1.425864
Sample:  5 - 216                                   No. of obs      =       212
Vector autoregression
. var d.lninventories d.basis4m, lags(1/3)DRAFT LIST OF MEMBERS AND OBSERVERS - Confidential 
 
Output #13   
 
   
                                                                      
            D_lnsp500                ALL    4.5542     3    0.208     
            D_lnsp500      D.lnspotprice    4.5542     3    0.208     
                                                                      
        D_lnspotprice                ALL    10.074     3    0.018     
        D_lnspotprice          D.lnsp500    10.074     3    0.018     
                                                                      
             Equation           Excluded     chi2     df Prob > chi2  
                                                                      
   Granger causality Wald tests
. vargranger
                                                                              
       _cons     .0037779   .0031234     1.21   0.226    -.0023438    .0098997
        L3D.     .1007538    .070199     1.44   0.151    -.0368338    .2383414
        L2D.    -.0705911   .0691541    -1.02   0.307    -.2061307    .0649484
         LD.      .103706   .0697372     1.49   0.137    -.0329764    .2403885
     lnsp500  
        L3D.     .0336981   .0335076     1.01   0.315    -.0319755    .0993718
        L2D.      .058589   .0333396     1.76   0.079    -.0067553    .1239334
         LD.    -.0084503   .0335113    -0.25   0.801    -.0741312    .0572305
 lnspotprice  
D_lnsp500     
                                                                              
       _cons     .0019377   .0063883     0.30   0.762    -.0105832    .0144586
        L3D.     .3463921   .1435792     2.41   0.016      .064982    .6278022
        L2D.     .2249053    .141442     1.59   0.112    -.0523159    .5021265
         LD.     .1473154   .1426346     1.03   0.302    -.1322433    .4268741
     lnsp500  
        L3D.     .0948998   .0685336     1.38   0.166    -.0394236    .2292232
        L2D.    -.0528306   .0681899    -0.77   0.438    -.1864804    .0808192
         LD.     .0782124   .0685411     1.14   0.254    -.0561257    .2125505
 lnspotprice  
D_lnspotpr~e  
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                
D_lnsp500             7     .045589   0.0464   10.31342   0.1121
D_lnspotprice         7     .093245   0.0767   17.62315   0.0072
                                                                
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  .0000163                         SBIC            =  -4.99752
FPE            =  .0000186                         HQIC            = -5.129591
Log likelihood =  567.2332                         AIC             = -5.219182
Sample:  5 - 216                                   No. of obs      =       212
Vector autoregression
. var  d.lnspotprice d.lnsp500, lags(1/3) 
 
Output #14   
  
   
 
   
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     .0042667   .0064087     0.67   0.506    -.0083659    .0168994
         D1.     .4417079   .1392999     3.17   0.002      .167125    .7162909
     lnsp500  
                                                                              
 lnspotprice        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
D.            
                                                                              
       Total    1.95089442   214  .009116329           Root MSE      =  .09352
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0406
    Residual    1.86295347   213   .00874626           R-squared     =  0.0451
       Model    .087940951     1  .087940951           Prob > F      =  0.0017
                                                       F(  1,   213) =   10.05
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     215
. reg d.lnspotprice d.lnsp500
                                                          
Residuals       5.3003      0.0706      6.6314      0.0363
                                                          
(n = 214)          D-H     P-value        asy.     P-value
                                                          
. omninorm res
 Prob > chi2(40)           =     0.1244
 Portmanteau (Q) statistic =    50.4536
                                       
Portmanteau test for white noise
(note: time series has 2 gaps)
. wntestq res
-
.
3
-
.
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-
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LnSpotPrice
                                                                              
       _cons     .0016539   .0001728     9.57   0.000     .0013151    .0019926
         L1.     .1731276   .0861101     2.01   0.044      .004355    .3419002
        arch  
ARCH          
                                                                              
       _cons     .0051019   .0033219     1.54   0.125     -.001409    .0116127
         D1.     .0725535    .031534     2.30   0.021     .0107479     .134359
 lnspotprice  
lnsp500       
                                                                              
   D.lnsp500        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                               OPG
                                                                              
Log likelihood =  365.8776                         Prob > chi2     =    0.0214
Distribution: Gaussian                             Wald chi2(1)    =      5.29
Sample: 2 - 216                                    Number of obs   =       215
ARCH family regression
Iteration 7:   log likelihood =   365.8776  
Iteration 6:   log likelihood =  365.87758  
Iteration 5:   log likelihood =  365.87725  
(switching optimization to BFGS)
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  365.87654  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  365.87427  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  365.86675  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  365.83597  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  365.48875  
(setting optimization to BHHH)
. arch  d.lnsp500 d.lnspotprice, arch(1)
 Prob > chi2(40)           =     0.0716
 Portmanteau (Q) statistic =    53.7666
                                       
Portmanteau test for white noise
(note: time series has 8 gaps)
. wntestq se2DRAFT LIST OF MEMBERS AND OBSERVERS - Confidential 
 
Output #15   
(a) 1983-2002 
   
  
(b) 2002-2011 
   
 
Output #16   
(a) 1994-2011 
   
 
 
       _cons     .0003804   .0002303     1.65   0.099     -.000071    .0008319
         L1.     .6186613   .0518285    11.94   0.000     .5170792    .7202434
       garch  
         L1.     .4375194   .0817145     5.35   0.000     .2773618    .5976769
        arch  
ARCH          
                                                                              
       _cons     .0000212   .0037056     0.01   0.995    -.0072416     .007284
         D1.    -.1061058   .0893056    -1.19   0.235    -.2811414    .0689299
     lnsp500  
lnspotprice   
                                                                              
 lnspotprice        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
D.            
                               OPG
                                                                              
Log likelihood =  238.9838                         Prob > chi2     =    0.2348
Distribution: Gaussian                             Wald chi2(1)    =      1.41
Sample: 2 - 226, but with gaps                     Number of obs   =       219
ARCH family regression
Iteration 7:   log likelihood =  238.98376  
Iteration 6:   log likelihood =  238.98376  
Iteration 5:   log likelihood =  238.98362  
(switching optimization to BFGS)
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  238.97622  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  238.74273  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  236.80057  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  220.12727  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =   199.7378  
(setting optimization to BHHH)
(note: conditioning reset at each gap)
Number of gaps in sample:  3
. arch d.lnspotprice  d.lnsp500, arch(1) garch(1)
-
4
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LnSpotPrice
 Prob > chi2(40)           =     0.9346
 Portmanteau (Q) statistic =    27.4271
                                       
Portmanteau test for white noise
(note: time series has 3 gaps)
. wntestq se2
                                                                              
       _cons      .000961   .0007915     1.21   0.225    -.0005904    .0025124
         L1.     .6344791   .1515962     4.19   0.000     .3373561    .9316021
       garch  
         L1.     .2639878   .1461696     1.81   0.071    -.0224994     .550475
        arch  
ARCH          
                                                                              
       _cons     .0101848   .0075652     1.35   0.178    -.0046427    .0250124
         D1.     .8139862   .1625204     5.01   0.000     .4954521     1.13252
     lnsp500  
lnspotprice   
                                                                              
 lnspotprice        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
D.            
                               OPG
                                                                              
Log likelihood =  120.2889                         Prob > chi2     =    0.0000
Distribution: Gaussian                             Wald chi2(1)    =     25.09
Sample: 97 - 216                                   Number of obs   =       120
ARCH family regression
Iteration 9:   log likelihood =  120.28887  
Iteration 8:   log likelihood =  120.28886  
Iteration 7:   log likelihood =  120.28803  
Iteration 6:   log likelihood =  120.28684  
Iteration 5:   log likelihood =  120.24612  
(switching optimization to BFGS)
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  120.16366  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  119.68185  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  119.03208  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  118.97293  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  118.43568  
(setting optimization to BHHH)
. arch d.lnspotprice d.lnsp500 if tin(97,216), arch(1) garch(1)
-
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LnSpotPrice
 Prob > chi2(40)           =     0.1711
 Portmanteau (Q) statistic =    48.3593
                                       
Portmanteau test for white noise
. wntestq se2
                                                                              
       _cons     .0061864    .000771     8.02   0.000     .0046754    .0076975
         L1.     .2007634   .0870412     2.31   0.021     .0301659     .371361
        arch  
ARCH          
                                                                              
       _cons     .0102217   .0064399     1.59   0.112    -.0024002    .0228436
         LD.     .2274503   .1096355     2.07   0.038     .0125687     .442332
     lnsp500  
lnbrentprice  
                                                                              
lnbrentprice        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
D.            
                               OPG
                                                                              
Log likelihood =  219.7684                         Prob > chi2     =    0.0380
Distribution: Gaussian                             Wald chi2(1)    =      4.30
Sample: 3 - 216                                    Number of obs   =       214
ARCH family regression
Iteration 8:   log likelihood =  219.76844  
Iteration 7:   log likelihood =  219.76844  
Iteration 6:   log likelihood =  219.76841  
Iteration 5:   log likelihood =  219.76696  
(switching optimization to BFGS)
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  219.76458  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  219.75406  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  219.68534  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  218.75963  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  216.44421  
(setting optimization to BHHH)
. arch d.lnbrentprice dl(1).lnsp500, arch(1)
-
2
-
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LnBrentPrice
 Prob > chi2(40)           =     0.0569
 Portmanteau (Q) statistic =    55.0560
                                       
Portmanteau test for white noise
(note: time series has 7 gaps)
. wntestq se2 
 
(b) 1994-2002 
     
 
(c) 2002-2011 
 
 
 
Natural gas 
Output #17   
   
 
                                                                              
       _cons     .0059298   .0010507     5.64   0.000     .0038704    .0079891
         L1.     .3288481   .1234064     2.66   0.008     .0869759    .5707202
        arch  
ARCH          
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0029828   .0080204    -0.37   0.710    -.0187025    .0127368
         D1.    -.2912692   .2043234    -1.43   0.154    -.6917357    .1091973
     lnsp500  
lnbrent       
                                                                              
   D.lnbrent        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                               OPG
                                                                              
Log likelihood =  137.1215                         Prob > chi2     =    0.1540
Distribution: Gaussian                             Wald chi2(1)    =      2.03
Sample: 2 - 144, but with gaps                     Number of obs   =       137
ARCH family regression
Iteration 7:   log likelihood =  137.12149  
Iteration 6:   log likelihood =  137.12148  
Iteration 5:   log likelihood =  137.12102  
(switching optimization to BFGS)
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  137.12014  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =    137.117  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  137.10692  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  137.02013  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  136.51169  
(setting optimization to BHHH)
(note: conditioning reset at each gap)
Number of gaps in sample:  3
. arch  d.lnbrent d.lnsp500, arch(1)
-
2
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LnBrent
 Prob > chi2(40)           =     0.3304
 Portmanteau (Q) statistic =    43.3522
                                       
Portmanteau test for white noise
(note: time series has 7 gaps)
. wntestq se2
                                                                              
       _cons     .0107565   .0082453     1.30   0.195    -.0055714    .0270844
         LD.     .6984865   .2455714     2.84   0.005     .2121883    1.184785
     lnsp500  
                                                                              
lnbrentprice        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
D.            
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  .08988
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1173
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0052
                                                       F(  1,   118) =    8.09
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     120
. reg d.lnbrentprice dl.lnsp500 if tin(97,216),r
                  Prob > F =      0.0701
                 F(3, 115) =      2.42
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of D.lnbrentprice
. estat ovtest
                                                          
Residuals       7.1661      0.0278      7.5903      0.0225
                                                          
(n = 214)          D-H     P-value        asy.     P-value
                                                          
. omninorm res
                                                                              
      /sigma     .1393897   .0067203    20.74   0.000     .1262182    .1525613
                                                                              
         L3.    -.1767412   .0856627    -2.06   0.039     -.344637   -.0088454
         L2.    -.2569548   .0665154    -3.86   0.000    -.3873226    -.126587
         L1.    -.1940036   .0659567    -2.94   0.003    -.3232764   -.0647308
          ar  
ARMA          
                                                                              
       _cons      .002831   .0063339     0.45   0.655    -.0095832    .0152453
         D1.     7.249326   2.726552     2.66   0.008     1.905383    12.59327
      lnoecd  
         D1.    -5.103331   .6197163    -8.23   0.000    -6.317953    -3.88871
lninventor~s  
lnspotprice   
                                                                              
 lnspotprice        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
D.            
                               OPG
                                                                              
Log likelihood =   118.472                      Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(5)       =     96.49
Sample:  2 - 216                                Number of obs      =       215
ARIMA regression
Iteration 7:   log likelihood =  118.47198  
Iteration 6:   log likelihood =  118.47198  
Iteration 5:   log likelihood =  118.47195  
(switching optimization to BFGS)
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  118.47195  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  118.47194  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =   118.4719  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  118.47142  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  118.46263  
(setting optimization to BHHH)
. arima lnspotprice lninventories lnoecd, arima(3,1,0)
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LnSpotPriceDRAFT LIST OF MEMBERS AND OBSERVERS - Confidential 
 
Output #18   
 
Output #19   
 
                                                                      
            D_basis4m                ALL    4.2089     3    0.240     
            D_basis4m      D.lnspotprice    4.2089     3    0.240     
                                                                      
        D_lnspotprice                ALL     7.112     3    0.068     
        D_lnspotprice          D.basis4m     7.112     3    0.068     
                                                                      
             Equation           Excluded     chi2     df Prob > chi2  
                                                                      
   Granger causality Wald tests
. vargranger
                                                                              
       _cons     .0030068   .0404733     0.07   0.941    -.0763195    .0823331
        L3D.    -.2938412   .0843742    -3.48   0.000    -.4592116   -.1284707
        L2D.    -.1805484   .0833756    -2.17   0.030    -.3439615   -.0171353
         LD.     .0166111   .0842536     0.20   0.844    -.1485229    .1817451
     basis4m  
        L3D.    -.5210432   .3157284    -1.65   0.099     -1.13986    .0977731
        L2D.     .1123891    .310437     0.36   0.717    -.4960562    .7208344
         LD.     .2572623   .3175174     0.81   0.418    -.3650604     .879585
 lnspotprice  
D_basis4m     
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0004944   .0109101    -0.05   0.964    -.0218778     .020889
        L3D.     .0562177   .0227441     2.47   0.013       .01164    .1007954
        L2D.     .0083126   .0224749     0.37   0.711    -.0357375    .0523626
         LD.     .0263465   .0227116     1.16   0.246    -.0181675    .0708604
     basis4m  
        L3D.     .1454974   .0851086     1.71   0.087    -.0213124    .3123072
        L2D.    -.2261905   .0836822    -2.70   0.007    -.3902047   -.0621763
         LD.      .029749   .0855909     0.35   0.728     -.138006     .197504
 lnspotprice  
D_lnspotpr~e  
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                
D_basis4m             7     .592322   0.0999   22.98696   0.0008
D_lnspotprice         7     .159668   0.0881   20.00674   0.0028
                                                                
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  .0055065                         SBIC            =  .8345951
FPE            =  .0063044                         HQIC            =  .7003442
Log likelihood = -49.05157                         AIC             =  .6091939
Sample:  5 - 216, but with a gap                   No. of obs      =       207
Vector autoregression
. var d.lnspotprice d.basis4m, lags(1/3)
                                                                      
               D_lnm2                ALL     .4983     3    0.919     
               D_lnm2      D.lnspotprice     .4983     3    0.919     
                                                                      
        D_lnspotprice                ALL    1.2171     3    0.749     
        D_lnspotprice             D.lnm2    1.2171     3    0.749     
                                                                      
             Equation           Excluded     chi2     df Prob > chi2  
                                                                      
   Granger causality Wald tests
. vargranger
                                                                              
       _cons     .0030674   .0005769     5.32   0.000     .0019367    .0041981
        L3D.      .185915   .0675671     2.75   0.006     .0534858    .3183441
        L2D.     .1847375    .066534     2.78   0.005     .0543332    .3151417
         LD.    -.0082199   .0679279    -0.12   0.904    -.1413561    .1249163
        lnm2  
        L3D.    -.0001549   .0017746    -0.09   0.930    -.0036331    .0033232
        L2D.    -.0001811   .0017303    -0.10   0.917    -.0035725    .0032103
         LD.    -.0012386   .0017764    -0.70   0.486    -.0047202    .0022431
 lnspotprice  
D_lnm2        
                                                                              
       _cons     .0172713   .0224961     0.77   0.443    -.0268203    .0613628
        L3D.    -2.197661    2.63486    -0.83   0.404    -7.361892     2.96657
        L2D.    -1.756802   2.594572    -0.68   0.498     -6.84207    3.328466
         LD.     .1661343   2.648928     0.06   0.950    -5.025668    5.357937
        lnm2  
        L3D.    -.0002957   .0692022    -0.00   0.997    -.1359295    .1353381
        L2D.    -.2380453   .0674763    -3.53   0.000    -.3702964   -.1057943
         LD.    -.0348895   .0692717    -0.50   0.614    -.1706595    .1008805
 lnspotprice  
D_lnspotpr~e  
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                
D_lnm2                7     .004147   0.0751   17.22161   0.0085
D_lnspotprice         7      .16172   0.0601   13.55553   0.0350
                                                                
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  4.15e-07                         SBIC            = -8.666124
FPE            =  4.73e-07                         HQIC            = -8.798195
Log likelihood =  956.1053                         AIC             = -8.887786
Sample:  5 - 216                                   No. of obs      =       212
Vector autoregression
. var d.lnspotprice d.lnm2, lags(1/3) 
 
     
 
Aluminium 
Output #20   
 
 
 
                                                                      
            D_lnsp500                ALL    4.4149     3    0.220     
            D_lnsp500      D.lnspotprice    4.4149     3    0.220     
                                                                      
        D_lnspotprice                ALL    3.6556     3    0.301     
        D_lnspotprice          D.lnsp500    3.6556     3    0.301     
                                                                      
             Equation           Excluded     chi2     df Prob > chi2  
                                                                      
   Granger causality Wald tests
. vargranger
                                                                              
       _cons     .0040618   .0031214     1.30   0.193     -.002056    .0101797
        L3D.     .1268967   .0684983     1.85   0.064    -.0073575    .2611509
        L2D.    -.0472398   .0680514    -0.69   0.488    -.1806181    .0861385
         LD.     .1029113   .0684076     1.50   0.132    -.0311652    .2369878
     lnsp500  
        L3D.    -.0112035   .0195984    -0.57   0.568    -.0496157    .0272086
        L2D.     .0342516   .0189727     1.81   0.071    -.0029343    .0714374
         LD.     .0144204   .0195444     0.74   0.461    -.0238859    .0527266
 lnspotprice  
D_lnsp500     
                                                                              
       _cons     -.002296   .0110063    -0.21   0.835     -.023868     .019276
        L3D.     .3301751   .2415301     1.37   0.172    -.1432151    .8035653
        L2D.      .232766   .2399543     0.97   0.332    -.2375357    .7030678
         LD.    -.1787894   .2412104    -0.74   0.459     -.651553    .2939743
     lnsp500  
        L3D.     .0048024   .0691053     0.07   0.945    -.1306416    .1402464
        L2D.     -.227274   .0668993    -3.40   0.001    -.3583941   -.0961539
         LD.    -.0327296   .0689149    -0.47   0.635    -.1678003    .1023412
 lnspotprice  
D_lnspotpr~e  
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                
D_lnsp500             7     .045604   0.0458   10.17037   0.1177
D_lnspotprice         7     .160803   0.0707   16.13515   0.0130
                                                                
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  .0000499                         SBIC            = -3.875314
FPE            =   .000057                         HQIC            = -4.007385
Log likelihood =  448.2794                         AIC             = -4.096975
Sample:  5 - 216                                   No. of obs      =       212
Vector autoregression
. var d.lnspotprice d.lnsp500, lags(1/3)
                                                                      
          D_lnfedfund                ALL    1.9016     3    0.593     
          D_lnfedfund      D.lnspotprice    1.9016     3    0.593     
                                                                      
        D_lnspotprice                ALL    2.1412     3    0.544     
        D_lnspotprice        D.lnfedfund    2.1412     3    0.544     
                                                                      
             Equation           Excluded     chi2     df Prob > chi2  
                                                                      
   Granger causality Wald tests
. vargranger
                                                                              
       _cons     -.013087   .0114313    -1.14   0.252     -.035492     .009318
        L3D.     .1061567   .0683125     1.55   0.120    -.0277333    .2400467
        L2D.      .186262   .0671007     2.78   0.006     .0547471    .3177769
         LD.    -.0219578   .0680614    -0.32   0.747    -.1553558    .1114401
   lnfedfund  
        L3D.      .087327   .0708513     1.23   0.218    -.0515391     .226193
        L2D.     .0448782   .0692348     0.65   0.517    -.0908195    .1805759
         LD.        .0125   .0711134     0.18   0.860    -.1268796    .1518797
 lnspotprice  
D_lnfedfund   
                                                                              
       _cons     .0016045    .011058     0.15   0.885    -.0200687    .0232777
        L3D.      .044729   .0660813     0.68   0.498    -.0847879    .1742459
        L2D.     .0150713    .064909     0.23   0.816    -.1121481    .1422906
         LD.     .0739981   .0658384     1.12   0.261    -.0550428     .203039
   lnfedfund  
        L3D.      .003952   .0685372     0.06   0.954    -.1303784    .1382824
        L2D.    -.2375658   .0669734    -3.55   0.000    -.3688313   -.1063003
         LD.    -.0357746   .0687906    -0.52   0.603    -.1706018    .0990526
 lnspotprice  
D_lnspotpr~e  
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                
D_lnfedfund           7     .166819   0.0556   12.49092   0.0519
D_lnspotprice         7     .161371   0.0642   14.53314   0.0242
                                                                
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  .0006775                         SBIC            = -1.267563
FPE            =  .0007732                         HQIC            = -1.399634
Log likelihood =  171.8578                         AIC             = -1.489224
Sample:  5 - 216                                   No. of obs      =       212
Vector autoregression
. var d.lnspotprice d.lnfedfund, lags(1/3)
                                                                              
       _cons     .0018192   .0007276     2.50   0.012     .0003931    .0032453
         L1.     .0057591   .2818176     0.02   0.984    -.5465932    .5581115
       garch  
         L1.      .281755   .1224095     2.30   0.021     .0418368    .5216732
        arch  
ARCH          
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0017147     .00322    -0.53   0.594    -.0080257    .0045963
         D1.     6.630483   1.482521     4.47   0.000     3.724796     9.53617
      lnoecd  
         D1.    -.7306652   .3299346    -2.21   0.027    -1.377325   -.0840053
    lndollar  
         D1.    -.1325496   .0432453    -3.07   0.002    -.2173088   -.0477904
lninventor~s  
lnspotprice   
                                                                              
 lnspotprice        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
D.            
                               OPG
                                                                              
Log likelihood =  343.5528                         Prob > chi2     =    0.0000
Distribution: Gaussian                             Wald chi2(3)    =     38.53
Sample: 2 - 216                                    Number of obs   =       215
ARCH family regression
Iteration 6:   log likelihood =  343.55281  
Iteration 5:   log likelihood =  343.55277  
(switching optimization to BFGS)
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  343.55271  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  343.55245  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =   343.5508  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  343.53438  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  343.14907  
(setting optimization to BHHH)
. arch d.lnspotprice d.lninventories d.lndollar d.lnoecd,arch(1) garch(1)
-
4
-
2
0
2
4
s
e
6.6 6.8 7 7.2 7.4
LnSpotPrice
 Prob > chi2(40)           =     0.9588
 Portmanteau (Q) statistic =    25.8896
                                       
Portmanteau test for white noise
. wntestq se2
(1 missing value generated)
. gen se2=se^2DRAFT LIST OF MEMBERS AND OBSERVERS - Confidential 
 
Output #21   
   
Output #22   
 
                                                                      
           D_basis15m                ALL    3.3525     3    0.340     
           D_basis15m    D.lninventories    3.3525     3    0.340     
                                                                      
      D_lninventories                ALL     26.52     3    0.000     
      D_lninventories         D.basis15m     26.52     3    0.000     
                                                                      
             Equation           Excluded     chi2     df Prob > chi2  
                                                                      
   Granger causality Wald tests
. vargranger
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0409949   2.943182    -0.01   0.989    -5.809526    5.727536
        L3D.     .0211891   .0703704     0.30   0.763    -.1167344    .1591126
        L2D.    -.1319634    .070698    -1.87   0.062     -.270529    .0066022
         LD.    -.1301761   .0686082    -1.90   0.058    -.2646458    .0042936
    basis15m  
        L3D.    -16.54318   50.02061    -0.33   0.741    -114.5818    81.49542
        L2D.    -23.54052   56.78941    -0.41   0.678    -134.8457    87.76469
         LD.     87.25458   50.03453     1.74   0.081     -10.8113    185.3205
lninventor~s  
D_basis15m    
                                                                              
       _cons     .0010648   .0039294     0.27   0.786    -.0066366    .0087662
        L3D.     .0003197   .0000939     3.40   0.001     .0001356    .0005038
        L2D.     .0000489   .0000944     0.52   0.604    -.0001361    .0002339
         LD.    -.0003063   .0000916    -3.34   0.001    -.0004859   -.0001268
    basis15m  
        L3D.     .0608446   .0667811     0.91   0.362    -.0700439    .1917331
        L2D.     .1370704   .0758179     1.81   0.071      -.01153    .2856708
         LD.     .5236845   .0667997     7.84   0.000     .3927596    .6546095
lninventor~s  
D_lninvent~s  
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                
D_basis15m            7     43.5396   0.0536   12.01655   0.0616
D_lninventories       7     .058128   0.4590   179.8929   0.0000
                                                                
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  5.989265                         SBIC            =   7.81946
FPE            =  6.835244                         HQIC            =  7.687389
Log likelihood = -791.3666                         AIC             =  7.597798
Sample:  5 - 216                                   No. of obs      =       212
Vector autoregression
. var d.lninventories d.basis15m, lags(1/3)
                                                                      
            D_basis27                ALL    2.8401     3    0.417     
            D_basis27    D.lninventories    2.8401     3    0.417     
                                                                      
      D_lninventories                ALL    23.794     3    0.000     
      D_lninventories          D.basis27    23.794     3    0.000     
                                                                      
             Equation           Excluded     chi2     df Prob > chi2  
                                                                      
   Granger causality Wald tests
. vargranger
                                                                              
       _cons     .0738777   4.264199     0.02   0.986    -8.283799    8.431554
        L3D.     .1150182   .0695445     1.65   0.098    -.0212865    .2513228
        L2D.    -.0432121   .0703637    -0.61   0.539    -.1811225    .0946982
         LD.    -.1645968    .068206    -2.41   0.016    -.2982781   -.0309155
     basis27  
        L3D.    -51.77289   71.64125    -0.72   0.470    -192.1872    88.64138
        L2D.     14.30868   81.28694     0.18   0.860    -145.0108    173.6281
         LD.     98.91678   71.56767     1.38   0.167    -41.35328    239.1868
lninventor~s  
D_basis27     
                                                                              
       _cons     .0010848    .003952     0.27   0.784    -.0066609    .0088306
        L3D.     .0002439   .0000645     3.78   0.000     .0001175    .0003702
        L2D.     .0000516   .0000652     0.79   0.429    -.0000762    .0001794
         LD.    -.0001748   .0000632    -2.77   0.006    -.0002987   -.0000509
     basis27  
        L3D.     .0734937   .0663961     1.11   0.268    -.0566403    .2036276
        L2D.     .1118181   .0753356     1.48   0.138    -.0358369    .2594731
         LD.     .5273468   .0663279     7.95   0.000     .3973465    .6573471
lninventor~s  
D_lninvent~s  
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                
D_basis27             7     63.0819   0.0523   11.69915   0.0690
D_lninventories       7     .058463   0.4528   175.4152   0.0000
                                                                
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  12.71734                         SBIC            =  8.572457
FPE            =  14.51365                         HQIC            =  8.440386
Log likelihood = -871.1843                         AIC             =  8.350796
Sample:  5 - 216                                   No. of obs      =       212
Vector autoregression
. var d.lninventories d.basis27, lags(1/3)
                                                                      
               D_lnm2                ALL    4.6956     3    0.195     
               D_lnm2      D.lnspotprice    4.6956     3    0.195     
                                                                      
        D_lnspotprice                ALL    9.7852     3    0.020     
        D_lnspotprice             D.lnm2    9.7852     3    0.020     
                                                                      
             Equation           Excluded     chi2     df Prob > chi2  
                                                                      
   Granger causality Wald tests
. vargranger
. 
                                                                              
       _cons      .003374   .0006117     5.52   0.000     .0021752    .0045729
        L3D.     .1615293   .0686167     2.35   0.019     .0270431    .2960154
        L2D.     .1515833   .0682794     2.22   0.026     .0177582    .2854085
         LD.    -.0154261   .0689385    -0.22   0.823    -.1505431    .1196909
        lnm2  
        L3D.     .0011257   .0052459     0.21   0.830    -.0091562    .0114075
        L2D.    -.0106126     .00527    -2.01   0.044    -.0209416   -.0002835
         LD.    -.0038584   .0052263    -0.74   0.460    -.0141018    .0063851
 lnspotprice  
D_lnm2        
                                                                              
       _cons     .0183727   .0080665     2.28   0.023     .0025627    .0341827
        L3D.    -1.358429   .9049203    -1.50   0.133     -3.13204    .4151823
        L2D.    -.3282733   .9004724    -0.36   0.715    -2.093167     1.43662
         LD.     -2.25508   .9091651    -2.48   0.013     -4.03701   -.4731488
        lnm2  
        L3D.     .1135307   .0691837     1.64   0.101    -.0220669    .2491284
        L2D.    -.0537247   .0695011    -0.77   0.440    -.1899444     .082495
         LD.      .024679   .0689252     0.36   0.720    -.1104119      .15977
 lnspotprice  
D_lnspotpr~e  
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                
D_lnm2                7     .004107   0.0930   21.74927   0.0013
D_lnspotprice         7      .05416   0.0752   17.24236   0.0084
                                                                
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  4.49e-08                         SBIC            = -10.88988
FPE            =  5.12e-08                         HQIC            = -11.02195
Log likelihood =  1191.824                         AIC             = -11.11155
Sample:  5 - 216                                   No. of obs      =       212
Vector autoregression
. var d.lnspotprice d.lnm2, lags(1/3)
                                                                      
            D_lnsp500                ALL     4.846     4    0.303     
            D_lnsp500      D.lnspotprice     4.846     4    0.303     
                                                                      
        D_lnspotprice                ALL    11.063     4    0.026     
        D_lnspotprice          D.lnsp500    11.063     4    0.026     
                                                                      
             Equation           Excluded     chi2     df Prob > chi2  
                                                                      
   Granger causality Wald tests
. vargranger
                                                                              
       _cons     .0041282   .0031555     1.31   0.191    -.0020564    .0103128
        L4D.     .0422493   .0744793     0.57   0.571    -.1037274     .188226
        L3D.     .0985467   .0736155     1.34   0.181    -.0457369    .2428304
        L2D.    -.0941826   .0733937    -1.28   0.199    -.2380315    .0496663
         LD.     .1125477   .0730424     1.54   0.123    -.0306127    .2557081
     lnsp500  
        L4D.     .0092126   .0609995     0.15   0.880    -.1103443    .1287694
        L3D.     .0343058   .0608779     0.56   0.573    -.0850127    .1536244
        L2D.     .1229481   .0603256     2.04   0.042     .0047121    .2411841
         LD.    -.0316979   .0610825    -0.52   0.604    -.1514173    .0880215
 lnspotprice  
D_lnsp500     
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0012553   .0037372    -0.34   0.737    -.0085801    .0060695
        L4D.    -.1632163     .08821    -1.85   0.064    -.3361047     .009672
        L3D.     .2449898   .0871869     2.81   0.005     .0741065     .415873
        L2D.     .0350832   .0869242     0.40   0.687    -.1352851    .2054516
         LD.     .0347904   .0865081     0.40   0.688    -.1347625    .2043432
     lnsp500  
        L4D.     .0885583   .0722451     1.23   0.220    -.0530395    .2301562
        L3D.     .0974282   .0721012     1.35   0.177    -.0438875    .2387439
        L2D.    -.0278209    .071447    -0.39   0.697    -.1678544    .1122127
         LD.      .057285   .0723434     0.79   0.428    -.0845054    .1990754
 lnspotprice  
D_lnspotpr~e  
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                
D_lnsp500             9      .04584   0.0499   11.07766   0.1973
D_lnspotprice         9      .05429   0.0825   18.96915   0.0150
                                                                
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  5.01e-06                         SBIC            =  -6.07204
FPE            =  5.94e-06                         HQIC            = -6.242398
Log likelihood =   688.767                         AIC             = -6.357981
Sample:  6 - 216                                   No. of obs      =       211
Vector autoregression 
 
  
Output #23   
     
 
                                                                      
          D_lnfedfund                ALL    3.7306     3    0.292     
          D_lnfedfund      D.lnspotprice    3.7306     3    0.292     
                                                                      
        D_lnspotprice                ALL    11.894     3    0.008     
        D_lnspotprice        D.lnfedfund    11.894     3    0.008     
                                                                      
             Equation           Excluded     chi2     df Prob > chi2  
                                                                      
   Granger causality Wald tests
. vargranger
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0141696   .0114083    -1.24   0.214    -.0365294    .0081902
        L3D.     .0813969   .0698484     1.17   0.244    -.0555035    .2182973
        L2D.     .1613882   .0686659     2.35   0.019     .0268055     .295971
         LD.    -.0325107   .0688781    -0.47   0.637    -.1675092    .1024879
   lnfedfund  
        L3D.     .0491297   .2091338     0.23   0.814     -.360765    .4590244
        L2D.     .3767963   .2099782     1.79   0.073    -.0347534     .788346
         LD.      .139308   .2102585     0.66   0.508    -.2727911     .551407
 lnspotprice  
D_lnfedfund   
                                                                              
       _cons     .0009814   .0037021     0.27   0.791    -.0062745    .0082373
        L3D.    -.0286169   .0226662    -1.26   0.207    -.0730419    .0158081
        L2D.     .0485314   .0222825     2.18   0.029     .0048585    .0922043
         LD.     .0569659   .0223513     2.55   0.011      .013158    .1007737
   lnfedfund  
        L3D.     .1412842   .0678651     2.08   0.037     .0082709    .2742974
        L2D.    -.0325564   .0681392    -0.48   0.633    -.1661067    .1009939
         LD.     .0304955   .0682301     0.45   0.655     -.103233    .1642241
 lnspotprice  
D_lnspotpr~e  
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                
D_lnfedfund           7     .166111   0.0636   14.41054   0.0254
D_lnspotprice         7     .053904   0.0839   19.42223   0.0035
                                                                
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2
Det(Sigma_ml)  =   .000074                         SBIC            = -3.482473
FPE            =  .0000844                         HQIC            = -3.614544
Log likelihood =  406.6382                         AIC             = -3.704134
Sample:  5 - 216                                   No. of obs      =       212
Vector autoregression
. var d.lnspotprice  d.lnfedfund, lags(1/3)
                                                                      
            D_lnsp500                ALL    10.361     4    0.035     
            D_lnsp500             D.lnm2    10.361     4    0.035     
                                                                      
               D_lnm2                ALL    8.4151     4    0.078     
               D_lnm2          D.lnsp500    8.4151     4    0.078     
                                                                      
             Equation           Excluded     chi2     df Prob > chi2  
                                                                      
   Granger causality Wald tests
. vargranger
                                                                              
       _cons     .0078648   .0073945     1.06   0.288    -.0066282    .0223579
        L4D.     .0332881   .0702016     0.47   0.635    -.1043044    .1708806
        L3D.     .1094812   .0695636     1.57   0.116     -.026861    .2458234
        L2D.    -.0555168   .0688961    -0.81   0.420    -.1905507    .0795171
         LD.     .0714856    .068723     1.04   0.298    -.0632089    .2061802
     lnsp500  
        L4D.     1.542065   .7521136     2.05   0.040     .0679497    3.016181
        L3D.     .4709078   .7457328     0.63   0.528    -.9907017    1.932517
        L2D.    -.6972869   .7580817    -0.92   0.358      -2.1831    .7885259
         LD.    -2.077206    .764461    -2.72   0.007    -3.575522   -.5788903
        lnm2  
D_lnsp500     
                                                                              
       _cons     .0038897   .0006692     5.81   0.000      .002578    .0052013
        L4D.     .0010433   .0063533     0.16   0.870     -.011409    .0134955
        L3D.    -.0128294   .0062956    -2.04   0.042    -.0251685   -.0004903
        L2D.    -.0094617   .0062352    -1.52   0.129    -.0216824     .002759
         LD.    -.0079175   .0062195    -1.27   0.203    -.0201074    .0042725
     lnsp500  
        L4D.    -.0562144    .068067    -0.83   0.409    -.1896233    .0771944
        L3D.     .1521915   .0674895     2.26   0.024     .0199145    .2844685
        L2D.     .1536575   .0686071     2.24   0.025       .01919    .2881249
         LD.    -.0298616   .0691844    -0.43   0.666    -.1654606    .1057373
        lnm2  
D_lnm2        
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                
D_lnsp500             9     .045265   0.0736   16.75216   0.0328
D_lnm2                9     .004097   0.1087   25.74258   0.0012
                                                                
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  3.11e-08                         SBIC            = -11.15462
FPE            =  3.69e-08                         HQIC            = -11.32498
Log likelihood =   1224.98                         AIC             = -11.44057
Sample:  6 - 216                                   No. of obs      =       211
Vector autoregression
. var d.lnm2  d.lnsp500, lags(1/4)
   lnfedfund    -0.1356   1.0000
     lnsp500     1.0000
                                
                lnsp500 lnfedf~d
(obs=216)
. correlate  lnsp500  lnfedfund
        lnm2     0.6125   1.0000
     lnsp500     1.0000
                                
                lnsp500     lnm2
(obs=216)
. correlate  lnsp500 lnm2
        lnm2    -0.0222   1.0000
 lnspotprice     1.0000
                                
               lnspot~e     lnm2
(obs=216)
. correlate lnspotprice  lnm2DRAFT LIST OF MEMBERS AND OBSERVERS - Confidential 
 
Output #24   
 
 
 
Output #25   
 
Output #26   
(a) 31/1/1994 - 31/12/2001 
     
   
 
                                                                              
       _cons     .0025083   .0007355     3.41   0.001     .0010667    .0039498
         L1.    -.2208841   .2241198    -0.99   0.324    -.6601508    .2183825
       garch  
         L1.     .2684406   .1179057     2.28   0.023     .0373497    .4995316
        arch  
ARCH          
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0025818   .0032225    -0.80   0.423    -.0088977    .0037342
         D1.     .4067474   .0679006     5.99   0.000     .2736647    .5398301
     lnsp500  
         D1.     .0336344   .0149869     2.24   0.025     .0042606    .0630083
   lnfedfund  
lnspotprice   
                                                                              
 lnspotprice        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
D.            
                               OPG
                                                                              
Log likelihood =  339.5819                         Prob > chi2     =    0.0000
Distribution: Gaussian                             Wald chi2(2)    =     40.20
Sample: 2 - 216                                    Number of obs   =       215
ARCH family regression
Iteration 9:   log likelihood =  339.58188  
Iteration 8:   log likelihood =  339.58188  
Iteration 7:   log likelihood =  339.58183  
Iteration 6:   log likelihood =  339.58069  
Iteration 5:   log likelihood =  339.56698  
(switching optimization to BFGS)
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  339.56356  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  339.55471  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  339.53897  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  338.91933  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  337.60166  
(setting optimization to BHHH)
. arch d.lnspotprice d.lnfedfund d.lnsp500, arch(1) garch(1)
-
4
-
2
0
2
4
s
e
6.6 6.8 7 7.2 7.4
LnSpotPrice
 Prob > chi2(40)           =     0.9935
 Portmanteau (Q) statistic =    21.2355
                                       
Portmanteau test for white noise
. wntestq se2
                                                                              
       _cons     .0000547   .0000524     1.04   0.297    -.0000481    .0001575
         L1.     .8014381   .0680704    11.77   0.000     .6680226    .9348537
       garch  
         L1.     .1910367    .073663     2.59   0.010       .04666    .3354134
        arch  
ARCH          
                                                                              
       _cons     .0054325   .0026988     2.01   0.044      .000143     .010722
         D1.     .2016718   .0461917     4.37   0.000     .1111377    .2922058
 lnspotprice  
lnsp500       
                                                                              
   D.lnsp500        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                               OPG
                                                                              
Log likelihood =  382.9368                         Prob > chi2     =    0.0000
Distribution: Gaussian                             Wald chi2(1)    =     19.06
Sample: 2 - 216                                    Number of obs   =       215
ARCH family regression
Iteration 9:   log likelihood =   382.9368  
Iteration 8:   log likelihood =   382.9368  
Iteration 7:   log likelihood =  382.93674  
Iteration 6:   log likelihood =    382.936  
Iteration 5:   log likelihood =  382.92971  
(switching optimization to BFGS)
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  382.87255  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  382.80969  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  382.07073  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  380.05782  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  372.44842  
(setting optimization to BHHH)
. arch d.lnsp500  d.lnspotprice, arch(1) garch(1)
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0014904   .0052413    -0.28   0.777    -.0118984    .0089177
         D1.     .1842347   .1156207     1.59   0.114    -.0453652    .4138345
     lnsp500  
                                                                              
 lnspotprice        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
D.            
                                                                              
       Total    .239184538    94  .002544516           Root MSE      =  .05004
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0161
    Residual    .232827957    93  .002503526           R-squared     =  0.0266
       Model    .006356581     1  .006356581           Prob > F      =  0.1145
                                                       F(  1,    93) =    2.54
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      95
. reg d.lnspotprice d.lnsp500 if tin(1,96)
-
.
2
-
.
1
0
.
1
.
2
R
e
s
i
d
u
a
l
s
6.6 6.8 7 7.2 7.4
LnSpotPrice
                                                          
Residuals       2.1282      0.3450      1.8335      0.3998
                                                          
(n = 215)          D-H     P-value        asy.     P-value
                                                          
. omninorm res
                  Prob > F =      0.9575
                  F(3, 90) =      0.10
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of D.lnspotprice
         Prob > chi2  =    0.5144
         chi2(2)      =      1.33
         against Ha: unrestricted heteroskedasticity
White's test for Ho: homoskedasticity 
 
(b) 31/1/2002-31/12/2011 
   
  
 
Copper 
Output #27   
   
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0014116   .0048032    -0.29   0.769    -.0109223    .0080992
         D1.     .5730118    .103635     5.53   0.000     .3678042    .7782195
     lnsp500  
                                                                              
 lnspotprice        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
D.            
                                                                              
       Total    .417384919   120  .003478208           Root MSE      =  .05283
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1977
    Residual     .33207438   119  .002790541           R-squared     =  0.2044
       Model    .085310539     1  .085310539           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  1,   119) =   30.57
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     121
. reg d.lnspotprice d.lnsp500 if tin(96,216)
-
4
-
2
0
2
4
s
e
6.6 6.8 7 7.2 7.4
LnSpotPrice
         Prob > chi2  =    0.8354
         chi2(2)      =      0.36
         against Ha: unrestricted heteroskedasticity
White's test for Ho: homoskedasticity
. estat imtest, white
                  Prob > F =      0.2792
                 F(3, 116) =      1.30
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of D.lnspotprice
. estat ovtest
                                                          
Residuals       2.1282      0.3450      1.8335      0.3998
                                                          
(n = 215)          D-H     P-value        asy.     P-value
                                                          
. omninorm res
                                                                              
       _cons     .0042343   .0004313     9.82   0.000     .0033891    .0050795
         L1.     .1034826   .0682329     1.52   0.129    -.0302515    .2372167
        arch  
ARCH          
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0414453   .0137553    -3.01   0.003    -.0684051   -.0144854
         D1.     9.074894    2.04233     4.44   0.000     5.072002    13.07779
      lnoecd  
         D1.    -1.023185   .3438498    -2.98   0.003    -1.697118   -.3492516
    lndollar  
         D1.     2.438727    1.25711     1.94   0.052     -.025162    4.902617
     lnchina  
         D1.    -.1215591   .0264272    -4.60   0.000    -.1733555   -.0697627
lninventor~s  
lnspotprice   
                                                                              
 lnspotprice        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
D.            
                               OPG
                                                                              
Log likelihood =  296.2492                         Prob > chi2     =    0.0000
Distribution: Gaussian                             Wald chi2(4)    =    140.51
Sample: 2 - 235                                    Number of obs   =       234
ARCH family regression
Iteration 7:   log likelihood =  296.24923  
Iteration 6:   log likelihood =  296.24921  
Iteration 5:   log likelihood =  296.24893  
(switching optimization to BFGS)
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  296.24845  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  296.24673  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  296.23989  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  296.21018  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  295.90287  
(setting optimization to BHHH)
. arch d.lnspotprice d.lninventories d.lnchina d.lndollar d.lnoecd, arch(1)
-
4
-
2
0
2
4
s
e
7 7.5 8 8.5
LnSpotPrice
 Prob > chi2(40)           =     0.2678
 Portmanteau (Q) statistic =    45.0817
                                       
Portmanteau test for white noise
. wntestq se2
(1 missing value generated)
. gen se2=se^2DRAFT LIST OF MEMBERS AND OBSERVERS - Confidential 
 
Output #28   
 
 
                                                                      
               D_lnm2                ALL    6.0561     3    0.109     
               D_lnm2      D.lnspotprice    6.0561     3    0.109     
                                                                      
        D_lnspotprice                ALL    8.0006     3    0.046     
        D_lnspotprice             D.lnm2    8.0006     3    0.046     
                                                                      
             Equation           Excluded     chi2     df Prob > chi2  
                                                                      
   Granger causality Wald tests
. vargranger
                                                                              
       _cons     .0028246   .0005202     5.43   0.000     .0018051    .0038441
        L3D.     .1816573   .0648172     2.80   0.005     .0546179    .3086968
        L2D.     .1851231   .0634441     2.92   0.004      .060775    .3094712
         LD.     .0099555   .0651955     0.15   0.879    -.1178254    .1377365
        lnm2  
        L3D.    -.0018222   .0035021    -0.52   0.603    -.0086861    .0050418
        L2D.    -.0077486   .0034833    -2.22   0.026    -.0145757   -.0009215
         LD.     -.001609   .0034753    -0.46   0.643    -.0084204    .0052025
 lnspotprice  
D_lnm2        
                                                                              
       _cons     .0145822   .0098886     1.47   0.140    -.0047992    .0339635
        L3D.    -1.163958   1.232176    -0.94   0.345    -3.578979    1.251062
        L2D.     1.259364   1.206072     1.04   0.296    -1.104494    3.623222
         LD.    -2.817126   1.239368    -2.27   0.023    -5.246242   -.3880096
        lnm2  
        L3D.    -.0333465   .0665744    -0.50   0.616    -.1638299    .0971369
        L2D.     .0811214   .0662171     1.23   0.221    -.0486618    .2109046
         LD.     .1125191   .0660651     1.70   0.089    -.0169661    .2420043
 lnspotprice  
D_lnspotpr~e  
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                
D_lnm2                7     .004057   0.1218    32.0268   0.0000
D_lnspotprice         7     .077125   0.0573   14.03168   0.0293
                                                                
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  9.06e-08                         SBIC            = -10.21121
FPE            =  1.02e-07                         HQIC            = -10.33569
Log likelihood =  1217.492                         AIC             = -10.41984
Sample:  5 - 235                                   No. of obs      =       231
Vector autoregression
. var d.lnspotprice d.lnm2,lag(1/3)
                                                                      
            D_lnsp500                ALL    7.9335     3    0.047     
            D_lnsp500      D.lnspotprice    7.9335     3    0.047     
                                                                      
        D_lnspotprice                ALL    .48379     3    0.922     
        D_lnspotprice          D.lnsp500    .48379     3    0.922     
                                                                      
             Equation           Excluded     chi2     df Prob > chi2  
                                                                      
   Granger causality Wald tests
. vargranger
                                                                              
       _cons     .0056233   .0030247     1.86   0.063    -.0003049    .0115516
        L3D.     .0945085   .0698883     1.35   0.176      -.04247     .231487
        L2D.    -.1256378   .0700337    -1.79   0.073    -.2629014    .0116258
         LD.     .0891976   .0712116     1.25   0.210    -.0503746    .2287698
     lnsp500  
        L3D.     .0526992   .0413264     1.28   0.202     -.028299    .1336974
        L2D.     .0832923   .0408169     2.04   0.041     .0032926    .1632919
         LD.     .0295868   .0403022     0.73   0.463     -.049404    .1085776
 lnspotprice  
D_lnsp500     
                                                                              
       _cons     .0018358    .005487     0.33   0.738    -.0089185    .0125901
        L3D.     .0636522   .1267829     0.50   0.616    -.1848376    .3121421
        L2D.    -.0668165   .1270467    -0.53   0.599    -.3158235    .1821905
         LD.     .0063284   .1291835     0.05   0.961    -.2468667    .2595234
     lnsp500  
        L3D.     .0212769   .0749693     0.28   0.777    -.1256603     .168214
        L2D.     .0825597   .0740451     1.11   0.265    -.0625661    .2276854
         LD.     .1529122   .0731114     2.09   0.036     .0096166    .2962078
 lnspotprice  
D_lnspotpr~e  
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                
D_lnsp500             7     .043266   0.0710   15.74916   0.0152
D_lnspotprice         7     .078488   0.0377   8.070024   0.2330
                                                                
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  9.76e-06                         SBIC            = -5.499198
FPE            =  .0000112                         HQIC            = -5.633895
Log likelihood =  603.7126                         AIC             = -5.725365
Sample:  5 - 235, but with gaps                    No. of obs      =       206
Vector autoregression
. var d.lnspotprice d.lnsp500,lag(1/3) 
 
   
Output #29   
   
 
Output #30   
(a) 1/1/1994 - 31/12/2001 
   
 
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0149996   .0102787    -1.46   0.144    -.0351454    .0051462
        L3D.     .1093823   .0646358     1.69   0.091    -.0173015    .2360661
        L2D.     .1272207   .0641943     1.98   0.048     .0014022    .2530392
         LD.    -.0620004   .0668535    -0.93   0.354    -.1930308    .0690301
   lnfedfund  
        L3D.    -.0347372   .1394291    -0.25   0.803    -.3080133    .2385389
        L2D.     .5263789   .1348696     3.90   0.000     .2620394    .7907185
         LD.     .1590607   .1335049     1.19   0.233    -.1026042    .4207255
 lnspotprice  
D_lnfedfund   
                                                                              
       _cons     .0019935    .005132     0.39   0.698    -.0080651    .0120521
        L3D.    -.0617407   .0322721    -1.91   0.056    -.1249928    .0015113
        L2D.     .0403841   .0320516     1.26   0.208     -.022436    .1032041
         LD.     .0042923   .0333793     0.13   0.898      -.06113    .0697146
   lnfedfund  
        L3D.     .0250888   .0696157     0.36   0.719    -.1113555     .161533
        L2D.     .0660308   .0673392     0.98   0.327    -.0659515    .1980132
         LD.      .127721   .0666578     1.92   0.055    -.0029259    .2583679
 lnspotprice  
D_lnspotpr~e  
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                
D_lnfedfund           7     .155332   0.1166   30.47701   0.0000
D_lnspotprice         7     .077556   0.0467    11.3184   0.0790
                                                                
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  .0001293                         SBIC            = -2.947655
FPE            =   .000146                         HQIC            = -3.072138
Log likelihood =  378.5511                         AIC             = -3.156287
Sample:  5 - 235                                   No. of obs      =       231
Vector autoregression
. var d.lnspotprice d.lnfedfund,lag(1/3)
                                                                      
          D_lnfedfund                ALL    17.819     3    0.000     
          D_lnfedfund      D.lnspotprice    17.819     3    0.000     
                                                                      
        D_lnspotprice                ALL    5.3541     3    0.148     
        D_lnspotprice        D.lnfedfund    5.3541     3    0.148     
                                                                      
             Equation           Excluded     chi2     df Prob > chi2  
                                                                      
   Granger causality Wald tests
. vargranger
                                                                      
      D_lninventories                ALL    2.5327     3    0.469     
      D_lninventories    D.LnConvenience    2.5327     3    0.469     
                                                                      
      D_LnConvenience                ALL    7.5587     3    0.056     
      D_LnConvenience    D.lninventories    7.5587     3    0.056     
                                                                      
             Equation           Excluded     chi2     df Prob > chi2  
                                                                      
   Granger causality Wald tests
. vargranger
                                                                              
       _cons     -.000579    .000607    -0.95   0.340    -.0017687    .0006106
        L3D.     .1235441   .0298807     4.13   0.000     .0649791    .1821091
        L2D.     .1535177   .0300156     5.11   0.000     .0946882    .2123472
         LD.     .1882658   .0297527     6.33   0.000     .1299515    .2465802
lninventor~s  
        L3D.     -.000399   .0012181    -0.33   0.743    -.0027864    .0019883
        L2D.     .0010989   .0013063     0.84   0.400    -.0014613    .0036591
         LD.     .0016857   .0012339     1.37   0.172    -.0007326    .0041041
LnConvenie~e  
D_lninvent~s  
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0024407    .014348    -0.17   0.865    -.0305622    .0256808
        L3D.    -1.321633    .706326    -1.87   0.061    -2.706007    .0627403
        L2D.    -1.081594   .7095159    -1.52   0.127    -2.472219    .3090321
         LD.     .2686374   .7033026     0.38   0.702     -1.10981    1.647085
lninventor~s  
        L3D.    -.1471175   .0287931    -5.11   0.000     -.203551    -.090684
        L2D.    -.2587707   .0308777    -8.38   0.000      -.31929   -.1982514
         LD.    -.4514356   .0291666   -15.48   0.000    -.5086011     -.39427
LnConvenie~e  
D_LnConven~e  
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                
D_lninventories       7     .020251   0.1097    137.313   0.0000
D_LnConvenience       7     .478688   0.1831   249.6753   0.0000
                                                                
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  .0000928                         SBIC            = -3.521274
FPE            =  .0000951                         HQIC            = -3.560476
Log likelihood =  2010.459                         AIC             = -3.584308
Sample:  87 - 1995, but with gaps                  No. of obs      =      1114
Vector autoregression
. var d.LnConvenience d.lninventories, lags(1/3)
                                                                      
      D_LnConvenience                ALL    3.9133     3    0.271     
      D_LnConvenience          D.lnvol22    3.9133     3    0.271     
                                                                      
            D_lnvol22                ALL    9.6792     3    0.021     
            D_lnvol22    D.LnConvenience    9.6792     3    0.021     
                                                                      
             Equation           Excluded     chi2     df Prob > chi2  
                                                                      
   Granger causality Wald tests
. vargranger
                                                                              
       _cons      .000429   .0143279     0.03   0.976    -.0276531    .0285111
        L3D.    -.1460596   .0289122    -5.05   0.000    -.2027264   -.0893928
        L2D.     -.257025   .0309456    -8.31   0.000    -.3176773   -.1963728
         LD.    -.4478619    .029215   -15.33   0.000    -.5051222   -.3906016
LnConvenie~e  
        L3D.    -.0424157   .2447254    -0.17   0.862    -.5220688    .4372373
        L2D.    -.4045816   .2468256    -1.64   0.101    -.8883508    .0791876
         LD.     .3109908   .2472064     1.26   0.208    -.1735248    .7955064
     lnvol22  
D_LnConven~e  
                                                                              
       _cons     .0005749   .0017386     0.33   0.741    -.0028326    .0039824
        L3D.    -.0023754   .0035082    -0.68   0.498    -.0092514    .0045006
        L2D.      .008238    .003755     2.19   0.028     .0008784    .0155976
         LD.     .0075258    .003545     2.12   0.034     .0005777    .0144738
LnConvenie~e  
        L3D.      .053776   .0296953     1.81   0.070    -.0044257    .1119777
        L2D.     .0516424   .0299501     1.72   0.085    -.0070588    .1103436
         LD.     .1319087   .0299963     4.40   0.000     .0731169    .1907004
     lnvol22  
D_lnvol22     
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                
D_LnConvenience       7     .479468   0.1804   245.2429   0.0000
D_lnvol22             7     .058179   0.0348   40.18928   0.0000
                                                                
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  .0007683                         SBIC            = -1.407446
FPE            =  .0007878                         HQIC            = -1.446649
Log likelihood =  833.0576                         AIC             =  -1.47048
Sample:  87 - 1995, but with gaps                  No. of obs      =      1114
Vector autoregression
. var d.lnvol22 d.LnConvenience,lags(1/3)
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0074278   .0072414    -1.03   0.308    -.0218164    .0069608
         D1.     .1958418   .1806625     1.08   0.281    -.1631307    .5548143
     lnsp500  
                                                                              
 lnspotprice        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
D.            
                                                                              
       Total    .384020194    90  .004266891           Root MSE      =  .06526
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0019
    Residual    .379015907    89  .004258606           R-squared     =  0.0130
       Model    .005004287     1  .005004287           Prob > F      =  0.2813
                                                       F(  1,    89) =    1.18
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      91
. reg d.lnspotprice d.lnsp500 if tin(1,96)
                                                   
               Total         4.92      4    0.2954
                                                   
            Kurtosis         2.39      1    0.1223
            Skewness         2.45      1    0.1177
  Heteroskedasticity         0.09      2    0.9573
                                                   
              Source         chi2     df      p
                                                   
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test
. estat imtest
                  Prob > F =      0.8411
                  F(3, 86) =      0.28
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of D.lnspotprice
. estat ovtest
 Prob > chi2(40)           =     0.5491
 Portmanteau (Q) statistic =    38.2533
                                       
Portmanteau test for white noise
(note: time series has 6 gaps)
. wntestq resDRAFT LIST OF MEMBERS AND OBSERVERS - Confidential 
 
 
(b) 1/1/2002 - 31/12/2011 
   
  
 
Wheat 
Output #31   
     
 
 
Output #32   
    
                                                                              
       _cons     .0037218   .0007265     5.12   0.000     .0022979    .0051456
         L1.     .4875165   .1534161     3.18   0.001     .1868265    .7882064
        arch  
ARCH          
                                                                              
       _cons     .0106839   .0077767     1.37   0.169    -.0045581     .025926
         D1.     .5572501   .1856325     3.00   0.003     .1934171    .9210832
     lnsp500  
lnspotprice   
                                                                              
 lnspotprice        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
D.            
                               OPG
                                                                              
Log likelihood =   134.927                         Prob > chi2     =    0.0027
Distribution: Gaussian                             Wald chi2(1)    =      9.01
Sample: 96 - 215, but with gaps                    Number of obs   =       116
ARCH family regression
Iteration 8:   log likelihood =  134.92696  
Iteration 7:   log likelihood =  134.92696  
Iteration 6:   log likelihood =  134.92657  
Iteration 5:   log likelihood =  134.91802  
(switching optimization to BFGS)
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  134.90354  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  134.86063  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  134.75282  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  134.16158  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  132.89554  
(setting optimization to BHHH)
(note: conditioning reset at each gap)
Number of gaps in sample:  2
. arch d.lnspotprice d.lnsp500 if tin(96,216), arch(1)
-
4
-
2
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LnSpotPrice
 Prob > chi2(40)           =     0.5379
 Portmanteau (Q) statistic =    38.4981
                                       
Portmanteau test for white noise
                                                                   
residual, one-step       5.1519      0.0761      3.1021      0.2120
                                                                   
         (n = 119)          D-H     P-value        asy.     P-value
                                                                   
. omninorm res2
. graph twoway scatter res2 lnspotprice
(1 missing value generated)
. predict res2,res
                                                                              
      /sigma      .096607   .0053142    18.18   0.000     .0861913    .1070227
                                                                              
         L1.    -.1643384   .1015529    -1.62   0.106    -.3633786    .0347017
          ar  
ARMA          
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0020008   .0085916    -0.23   0.816      -.01884    .0148385
         D1.     .1166612   .0649655     1.80   0.073    -.0106689    .2439912
lninventor~s  
         D1.    -2.012378   .7456051    -2.70   0.007    -3.473737    -.551019
    lndollar  
lnspotprice   
                                                                              
 lnspotprice        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
D.            
                               OPG
                                                                              
Log likelihood =  109.2501                      Prob > chi2        =    0.0247
                                                Wald chi2(3)       =      9.37
Sample:  2 - 120                                Number of obs      =       119
ARIMA regression
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  109.25014  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  109.25013  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  109.25011  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  109.24977  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  109.23934  
(setting optimization to BHHH)
. arima lnspotprice lndollar  lninventories, arima(1,1,0)
-
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LnSpotPrice
                                                                              
      /sigma     .1015318   .0038924    26.08   0.000     .0939027    .1091608
                                                                              
         L2.    -.3603858    .060284    -5.98   0.000    -.4785403   -.2422312
         L1.    -.7742695    .052494   -14.75   0.000    -.8771559   -.6713832
          ar  
ARMA6         
                                                                              
       _cons     .0004549    .003059     0.15   0.882    -.0055406    .0064504
        DS6.     4.249103   2.021718     2.10   0.036     .2866076    8.211598
      lnoecd  
lnspotprice   
                                                                              
 lnspotprice        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
DS6.          
                               OPG
                                                                              
Log likelihood =  223.7866                      Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(3)       =    221.45
Sample:  8 - 267                                Number of obs      =       260
ARIMA regression
Iteration 9:   log likelihood =   223.7866  
Iteration 8:   log likelihood =   223.7866  
Iteration 7:   log likelihood =  223.78656  
Iteration 6:   log likelihood =  223.78528  
Iteration 5:   log likelihood =  223.77349  
(switching optimization to BFGS)
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  223.73337  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  223.58475  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  222.57192  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  208.13209  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  157.13381  
(setting optimization to BHHH)
. arima lnspotprice  lnoecd,arima(0,1,0) sarima(2,1,0,6)
-
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Output #33   
     
 
Output #34   
   
   
                                                                   
residual, one-step       4.9402      0.0846      3.9122      0.1414
                                                                   
         (n = 252)          D-H     P-value        asy.     P-value
                                                                   
. omninorm res
                                                                              
      /sigma     .1011933   .0039165    25.84   0.000     .0935172    .1088694
                                                                              
         L2.    -.3752943   .0598594    -6.27   0.000    -.4926166   -.2579719
         L1.    -.7995302   .0516279   -15.49   0.000    -.9007191   -.6983413
          ar  
ARMA6         
                                                                              
       _cons     .0003668   .0030222     0.12   0.903    -.0055566    .0062902
        DS6.     .1186116   .0557126     2.13   0.033     .0094168    .2278063
  lncrudeoil  
lnspotprice   
                                                                              
 lnspotprice        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
DS6.          
                               OPG
                                                                              
Log likelihood =    224.52                      Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(3)       =    244.57
Sample:  8 - 267                                Number of obs      =       260
ARIMA regression
Iteration 8:   log likelihood =  224.51995  
Iteration 7:   log likelihood =  224.51995  
Iteration 6:   log likelihood =   224.5197  
Iteration 5:   log likelihood =  224.51072  
(switching optimization to BFGS)
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  224.46905  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  224.23671  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  222.77685  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  211.60519  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  156.97337  
(setting optimization to BHHH)
. arima lnspotprice   lncrudeoil,arima(0,1,0) sarima(2,1,0,6)
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residual, one-step       6.0029      0.0497      4.4819      0.1064
                                                                   
         (n = 251)          D-H     P-value        asy.     P-value
                                                                   
. omninorm res
 Prob > chi2(80)           =     0.1948
 Portmanteau (Q) statistic =    90.6607
                                       
Portmanteau test for white noise
(note: time series has 6 gaps)
. wntestq res2, lags(80)
                                                                              
      /sigma     .1010806    .003842    26.31   0.000     .0935504    .1086107
                                                                              
         L2.    -.3792998   .0603076    -6.29   0.000    -.4975004   -.2610991
         L1.    -.7860682   .0533077   -14.75   0.000    -.8905493   -.6815871
          ar  
ARMA6         
                                                                              
       _cons     .0004352   .0029963     0.15   0.885    -.0054374    .0063078
        DS6.    -1.021647   .4343155    -2.35   0.019     -1.87289   -.1704043
    lndollar  
lnspotprice   
                                                                              
 lnspotprice        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
DS6.          
                               OPG
                                                                              
Log likelihood =  224.8438                      Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(3)       =    222.30
Sample:  8 - 267                                Number of obs      =       260
ARIMA regression
Iteration 8:   log likelihood =  224.84383  
Iteration 7:   log likelihood =  224.84383  
Iteration 6:   log likelihood =  224.84374  
Iteration 5:   log likelihood =  224.84043  
(switching optimization to BFGS)
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  224.82312  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  224.71597  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  223.86161  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =   214.2988  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  157.23534  
(setting optimization to BHHH)
. arima lnspotprice    lndollar,arima(0,1,0) sarima(2,1,0,6)
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residual, one-step       3.7680      0.1520      3.2610      0.1958
                                                                   
         (n = 252)          D-H     P-value        asy.     P-value
                                                                   
. omninorm res3
 Prob > chi2(100)          =     0.1037
 Portmanteau (Q) statistic =   118.1709
                                       
Portmanteau test for white noise
(note: time series has 6 gaps)
. wntestq res3, lags(100)DRAFT LIST OF MEMBERS AND OBSERVERS - Confidential 
 
Output #35   
 
Output #36   
     
    - 
Output #37   
(a) 31/1/1990 - 31/12/2001 
   
   
 
                                                                              
      /sigma     .1012822   .0038873    26.05   0.000     .0936633    .1089011
                                                                              
         L2.    -.3490805   .0605112    -5.77   0.000    -.4676802   -.2304807
         L1.    -.7555815   .0528836   -14.29   0.000    -.8592314   -.6519316
          ar  
ARMA6         
                                                                              
       _cons     .0005722   .0031015     0.18   0.854    -.0055065     .006651
       LDS6.       .00133   .0005906     2.25   0.024     .0001723    .0024876
         soi  
lnspotprice   
                                                                              
 lnspotprice        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
DS6.          
                               OPG
                                                                              
Log likelihood =  223.6561                      Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(3)       =    214.09
Sample:  9 - 267                                Number of obs      =       259
ARIMA regression
Iteration 8:   log likelihood =  223.65606  
Iteration 7:   log likelihood =  223.65606  
Iteration 6:   log likelihood =  223.65602  
Iteration 5:   log likelihood =  223.65377  
(switching optimization to BFGS)
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =   223.6382  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  223.51243  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  222.55725  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  212.89977  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =   160.1212  
(setting optimization to BHHH)
. arima lnspotprice   l.soi,arima(0,1,0) sarima(2,1,0,6)
                                                                              
      /sigma     .0990484   .0040483    24.47   0.000      .091114    .1069829
                                                                              
         L2.    -.3083535   .0652562    -4.73   0.000    -.4362534   -.1804537
         L1.    -.7968296   .0608154   -13.10   0.000    -.9160257   -.6776336
          ar  
ARMA6         
                                                                              
       _cons     .0001455    .003354     0.04   0.965    -.0064283    .0067193
        DS6.     .4694751   .1386021     3.39   0.001       .19782    .7411301
     lnsp500  
lnspotprice   
                                                                              
 lnspotprice        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
DS6.          
                               OPG
                                                                              
Log likelihood =  205.0271                      Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(3)       =    209.72
Sample:  8 - 267, but with gaps                 Number of obs      =       236
ARIMA regression
Iteration 8:   log likelihood =  205.02713  
Iteration 7:   log likelihood =  205.02713  
Iteration 6:   log likelihood =  205.02709  
Iteration 5:   log likelihood =  205.01918  
(switching optimization to BFGS)
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =   204.9878  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  204.83394  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  203.92691  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =   194.8197  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =   144.6311  
(setting optimization to BHHH)
(note: filtering over missing observations)
Number of gaps in sample:  12
. arima lnspotprice  lnsp500,arima(0,1,0) sarima(2,1,0,6)
-
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 Prob > chi2(40)           =     0.4032
 Portmanteau (Q) statistic =    41.5452
                                       
Portmanteau test for white noise
(note: time series has 12 gaps)
. wntestq res4
                                                                   
residual, one-step       3.4180      0.1810      2.3951      0.3019
                                                                   
         (n = 235)          D-H     P-value        asy.     P-value
                                                                   
. omninorm res4
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0028849   .0064762    -0.45   0.657    -.0156928     .009923
         D1.     .1823295   .1507972     1.21   0.229     -.115901    .4805599
     lnsp500  
                                                                              
 lnspotprice        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
D.            
                                                                              
       Total    .752762921   136  .005535021           Root MSE      =  .07427
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0034
    Residual    .744698488   135  .005516285           R-squared     =  0.0107
       Model    .008064433     1  .008064433           Prob > F      =  0.2287
                                                       F(  1,   135) =    1.46
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     137
. reg d.lnspotprice d.lnsp500 if tin(1,144)
-
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LnSpotPrice
                                                          
Residuals       1.1661      0.5582      0.8249      0.6620
                                                          
(n = 253)          D-H     P-value        asy.     P-value
                                                          
. omninorm res
                  Prob > F =      0.6423
                 F(3, 132) =      0.56
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of D.lnspotprice
. estat ovtest
         Prob > chi2  =    0.2305
         chi2(2)      =      2.93
         against Ha: unrestricted heteroskedasticity
White's test for Ho: homoskedasticity
. estat imtest,white 
 
(b) 31/1/2002 - 31/2/2012 
   
 
  
Output #38   
   
 
Output #39   
(a) 
   
   
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     .0036139   .0092027     0.39   0.695    -.0146149    .0218427
         D1.     .4849231   .1999265     2.43   0.017     .0889071     .880939
     lnsp500  
                                                                              
 lnspotprice        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
D.            
                                                                              
       Total    1.19294891   116  .010284042           Root MSE      =  .09934
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0404
    Residual    1.13489103   115  .009868618           R-squared     =  0.0487
       Model    .058057884     1  .058057884           Prob > F      =  0.0168
                                                       F(  1,   115) =    5.88
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     117
. reg d.lnspotprice d.lnsp500 if tin(145,267)
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Residuals       3.8458      0.1462      2.8013      0.2464
                                                          
(n = 254)          D-H     P-value        asy.     P-value
                                                          
. omninorm res2
                  Prob > F =      0.3947
                 F(3, 112) =      1.00
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of D.lnspotprice
. estat ovtest
         Prob > chi2  =    0.9663
         chi2(2)      =      0.07
         against Ha: unrestricted heteroskedasticity
White's test for Ho: homoskedasticity
. estat imtest,white
                                                                              
       _cons     .0038214   .0004067     9.40   0.000     .0030242    .0046186
         L1.     .2282442   .0869955     2.62   0.009     .0577363    .3987522
        arch  
ARCH          
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0205877   .0105595    -1.95   0.051    -.0412839    .0001084
         D1.     1.830954   .9824804     1.86   0.062    -.0946721     3.75658
     lnchina  
lnwbprice     
                                                                              
 D.lnwbprice        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                               OPG
                                                                              
Log likelihood =  334.8536                         Prob > chi2     =    0.0624
Distribution: Gaussian                             Wald chi2(1)    =      3.47
Sample: 2 - 267                                    Number of obs   =       266
ARCH family regression
Iteration 5:   log likelihood =  334.85363  
(switching optimization to BFGS)
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  334.85362  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  334.85357  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  334.85297  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  334.84391  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  334.68875  
(setting optimization to BHHH)
. arch d.lnwbprice d.lnchina, arch(1)
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 Prob > chi2(40)           =     0.3860
 Portmanteau (Q) statistic =    41.9573
                                       
Portmanteau test for white noise
. wntestq se2
                                                          
Residuals       0.1792      0.9143      0.1687      0.9191
                                                          
(n = 294)          D-H     P-value        asy.     P-value
                                                          
. omninorm res
(19 missing values generated)
. predict res, res
                                                                              
       _cons     .0022877   .0031052     0.74   0.462    -.0038238    .0083991
         D1.     .3272388   .1101415     2.97   0.003     .1104669    .5440107
  lntotindex  
                                                                              
    D.lnspot        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total     .85219862   293  .002908528           Root MSE      =  .05322
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0260
    Residual    .827192236   292   .00283285           R-squared     =  0.0293
       Model    .025006384     1  .025006384           Prob > F      =  0.0032
                                                       F(  1,   292) =    8.83
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     294
. reg d.lnspot d.lntotindex
               Total         3.38      4    0.4960
                                                   
            Kurtosis         0.04      1    0.8498
            Skewness         1.63      1    0.2020
  Heteroskedasticity         1.72      2    0.4233
                                                   
              Source         chi2     df      p
                                                   
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test
         Prob > chi2  =    0.4233
         chi2(2)      =      1.72
         against Ha: unrestricted heteroskedasticity
White's test for Ho: homoskedasticity
. estat imtest,white
                                                          
Residuals       0.1792      0.9143      0.1687      0.9191
                                                          
(n = 294)          D-H     P-value        asy.     P-value
                                                          
. omninorm res
(19 missing values generated)
. predict res, res
                                                                              
       _cons     .0022877   .0031052     0.74   0.462    -.0038238    .0083991
         D1.     .3272388   .1101415     2.97   0.003     .1104669    .5440107
  lntotindex  
                                                                              
    D.lnspot        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total     .85219862   293  .002908528           Root MSE      =  .05322
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0260
    Residual    .827192236   292   .00283285           R-squared     =  0.0293
       Model    .025006384     1  .025006384           Prob > F      =  0.0032
                                                       F(  1,   292) =    8.83
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     294
. reg d.lnspot d.lntotindex
 Prob > chi2(40)           =     0.7595
 Portmanteau (Q) statistic =    33.4194
                                       
Portmanteau test for white noise
(note: time series has 8 gaps)
. wntestq res
                  Prob > F =      0.2836
                 F(3, 289) =      1.27
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of D.lnspot
. estat ovtestDRAFT LIST OF MEMBERS AND OBSERVERS - Confidential 
 
(b) 
   
   
Output #40   
 
Output #41   
    
        
    
                                                                              
       _cons     .0025306   .0028969     0.87   0.383    -.0031708     .008232
         D1.     .4219632   .0577369     7.31   0.000       .30833    .5355963
lncommercial  
                                                                              
    D.lnspot        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total     .85219862   293  .002908528           Root MSE      =  .04967
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1517
    Residual    .720419857   292  .002467191           R-squared     =  0.1546
       Model    .131778763     1  .131778763           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  1,   292) =   53.41
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     294
. reg d.lnspot  d.lncommercial
                                                          
Residuals       3.6559      0.1607      3.1249      0.2096
                                                          
(n = 294)          D-H     P-value        asy.     P-value
                                                          
. omninorm res2
 Prob > chi2(40)           =     0.6756
 Portmanteau (Q) statistic =    35.4380
                                       
Portmanteau test for white noise
(note: time series has 8 gaps)
. wntestq res2
                                                   
               Total         4.71      4    0.3179
                                                   
            Kurtosis         0.78      1    0.3778
            Skewness         1.87      1    0.1716
  Heteroskedasticity         2.07      2    0.3556
                                                   
              Source         chi2     df      p
                                                   
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test
         Prob > chi2  =    0.3556
         chi2(2)      =      2.07
         against Ha: unrestricted heteroskedasticity
White's test for Ho: homoskedasticity
. estat imtest,white
                  Prob > F =      0.0033
                 F(3, 289) =      4.68
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of D.lnspot
. estat ovtest
                                                                      
       D_lncommercial                ALL    .19421     3    0.979     
       D_lncommercial       D.lntotindex    .19421     3    0.979     
                                                                      
         D_lntotindex                ALL    11.816     3    0.008     
         D_lntotindex     D.lncommercial    11.816     3    0.008     
                                                                      
             Equation           Excluded     chi2     df Prob > chi2  
                                                                      
   Granger causality Wald tests
. vargranger
                                                                              
       _cons     .0000306   .0027598     0.01   0.991    -.0053786    .0054397
        L3D.     -.094761   .0637973    -1.49   0.137    -.2198014    .0302795
        L2D.     .1037548   .0653982     1.59   0.113    -.0244233     .231933
         LD.     .1612675   .0636032     2.54   0.011     .0366076    .2859275
lncommercial  
        L3D.     .0231628   .1096192     0.21   0.833    -.1916868    .2380124
        L2D.     .0444376   .1125671     0.39   0.693    -.1761899    .2650652
         LD.     .0061462   .1129792     0.05   0.957     -.215289    .2275814
  lntotindex  
D_lncommer~l  
                                                                              
       _cons     .0008098    .001544     0.52   0.600    -.0022164    .0038361
        L3D.    -.0839389   .0356928    -2.35   0.019    -.1538955   -.0139824
        L2D.     .0750244   .0365884     2.05   0.040     .0033124    .1467363
         LD.    -.0777369   .0355841    -2.18   0.029    -.1474805   -.0079932
lncommercial  
        L3D.     .0670288   .0613288     1.09   0.274    -.0531734    .1872309
        L2D.    -.0550843   .0629781    -0.87   0.382     -.178519    .0683504
         LD.     -.027602   .0632086    -0.44   0.662    -.1514886    .0962846
  lntotindex  
D_lntotindex  
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                
D_lncommercial        7     .048985   0.0476   15.45919   0.0170
D_lntotindex          7     .027406   0.0482   15.65674   0.0157
                                                                
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  1.38e-06                         SBIC            = -7.559432
FPE            =  1.51e-06                         HQIC            = -7.660954
Log likelihood =  1208.066                         AIC             =  -7.72858
Sample:  5 - 313                                   No. of obs      =       309
Vector autoregression
. var d.lntotindex d.lncommercial, lags(1/3)
                                                          
Residuals       0.6626      0.7180      0.9739      0.6145
                                                          
(n = 286)          D-H     P-value        asy.     P-value
                                                          
. omninorm res
 Prob > chi2(40)           =     0.6670
 Portmanteau (Q) statistic =    35.6352
                                       
Portmanteau test for white noise
(note: time series has 11 gaps)
. wntestq res
-
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LnSpot
                                                   
               Total        32.18     19    0.0298
                                                   
            Kurtosis         0.92      1    0.3368
            Skewness        11.62      4    0.0204
  Heteroskedasticity        19.64     14    0.1420
                                                   
              Source         chi2     df      p
                                                   
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test
         Prob > chi2  =    0.1420
         chi2(14)     =     19.64
         against Ha: unrestricted heteroskedasticity
White's test for Ho: homoskedasticity
. estat imtest, white
                  Prob > F =      0.4818
                 F(3, 281) =      0.82
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of D.lnspot
. estat ovtest 
 
Corn 
Output #42   
     
     
Output #43   
   
 
Output #44   
     
   
                                                                              
      /sigma     .0880209   .0035662    24.68   0.000     .0810312    .0950106
                                                                              
         L2.    -.3777827   .0566584    -6.67   0.000     -.488831   -.2667344
         L1.    -.7790741   .0567433   -13.73   0.000     -.890289   -.6678592
          ar  
ARMA6         
                                                                              
       _cons     .0007382   .0027837     0.27   0.791    -.0047177    .0061941
        DS6.     6.374209   2.350164     2.71   0.007     1.767972    10.98045
      lnoecd  
lnspot        
                                                                              
  DS6.lnspot        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                               OPG
                                                                              
Log likelihood =    250.45                      Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(3)       =    222.19
Sample:  9 - 267, but with gaps                 Number of obs      =       251
ARIMA regression
Iteration 7:   log likelihood =     250.45  
Iteration 6:   log likelihood =     250.45  
Iteration 5:   log likelihood =  250.44961  
(switching optimization to BFGS)
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  250.44563  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  250.38639  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  249.61697  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  237.08824  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  187.15858  
(setting optimization to BHHH)
(note: filtering over missing observations)
Number of gaps in sample:  4
. arima lnspot  lnoecd, arima(0,1,0) sarima(2,1,0,6)
-
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LnSpot
                                                                   
residual, one-step       4.3621      0.1129      4.0805      0.1300
                                                                   
         (n = 251)          D-H     P-value        asy.     P-value
                                                                   
. omninorm res
 Prob > chi2(40)           =     0.1273
 Portmanteau (Q) statistic =    50.3071
                                       
Portmanteau test for white noise
                                                                              
      /sigma     .0886282   .0036813    24.08   0.000      .081413    .0958433
                                                                              
         L2.     -.399321     .05824    -6.86   0.000    -.5134693   -.2851728
         L1.    -.7915687   .0573852   -13.79   0.000    -.9040416   -.6790958
          ar  
ARMA6         
                                                                              
       _cons     .0003165   .0027087     0.12   0.907    -.0049925    .0056255
        DS6.    -.7506252   .4196736    -1.79   0.074     -1.57317    .0719199
    lndollar  
lnspot        
                                                                              
  DS6.lnspot        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                               OPG
                                                                              
Log likelihood =  248.5481                      Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(3)       =    192.10
Sample:  9 - 267, but with gaps                 Number of obs      =       251
ARIMA regression
Iteration 7:   log likelihood =  248.54809  
Iteration 6:   log likelihood =  248.54809  
Iteration 5:   log likelihood =  248.54762  
(switching optimization to BFGS)
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  248.54223  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  248.47426  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  247.59125  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  224.68856  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  182.78476  
(setting optimization to BHHH)
(note: filtering over missing observations)
Number of gaps in sample:  4
. arima lnspot   lndollar, arima(0,1,0) sarima(2,1,0,6)
-
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LnSpot
 Prob > chi2(40)           =     0.1997
 Portmanteau (Q) statistic =    47.2783
                                       
Portmanteau test for white noise
(note: time series has 4 gaps)
. wntestq res
                                                                   
residual, one-step       4.3452      0.1139      5.0662      0.0794
                                                                   
         (n = 251)          D-H     P-value        asy.     P-value
                                                                   
. omninorm res
                                                                              
      /sigma     .0886495   .0036304    24.42   0.000      .081534     .095765
                                                                              
         L2.    -.3982095   .0568172    -7.01   0.000    -.5095691   -.2868499
         L1.    -.7748554   .0569118   -13.62   0.000    -.8864005   -.6633104
          ar  
ARMA6         
                                                                              
       _cons     .0006358   .0027517     0.23   0.817    -.0047575    .0060291
      L2DS6.     .1315128   .0698401     1.88   0.060    -.0053713    .2683968
  lnpalmer10  
lnspot        
                                                                              
  DS6.lnspot        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                               OPG
                                                                              
Log likelihood =  246.5828                      Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(3)       =    185.95
Sample:  11 - 267, but with gaps                Number of obs      =       249
ARIMA regression
Iteration 7:   log likelihood =   246.5828  
Iteration 6:   log likelihood =   246.5828  
Iteration 5:   log likelihood =  246.58269  
(switching optimization to BFGS)
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  246.58108  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  246.53446  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  245.15174  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  228.61215  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  183.95633  
(setting optimization to BHHH)
(note: filtering over missing observations)
Number of gaps in sample:  4
. arima lnspot  l(2).lnpalmer10, arima (0,1,0) sarima(2,1,0,6)
-
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LnSpot
                                                                   
residual, one-step       5.2177      0.0736      5.9470      0.0511
                                                                   
         (n = 249)          D-H     P-value        asy.     P-value
                                                                   
. omninorm res3
 Prob > chi2(40)           =     0.5629
 Portmanteau (Q) statistic =    37.9506
                                       
Portmanteau test for white noiseDRAFT LIST OF MEMBERS AND OBSERVERS - Confidential 
 
Output #45   
   
 
Output #46   
     
 
Output #47   
(a) 
     
                                                                              
       _cons     7.752596   1.236449     6.27   0.000     5.329201    10.17599
         L1.     .3537349   .1470209     2.41   0.016     .0655792    .6418906
        arch  
ARCH          
                                                                              
       _cons     .0095608   .2596795     0.04   0.971    -.4994018    .5185233
         D1.      .233293   .1011134     2.31   0.021     .0351144    .4314716
 crudeoilvol  
cornvol       
                                                                              
   D.cornvol        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                               OPG
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -317.6569                         Prob > chi2     =    0.0210
Distribution: Gaussian                             Wald chi2(1)    =      5.32
Sample: 2 - 123                                    Number of obs   =       122
ARCH family regression
Iteration 7:   log likelihood = -317.65687  
Iteration 6:   log likelihood = -317.65688  
Iteration 5:   log likelihood =  -317.6584  
(switching optimization to BFGS)
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -317.65934  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -317.66114  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -317.66599  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -317.69512  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -318.01751  
(setting optimization to BHHH)
. arch d.cornvol d.crudeoilvol, arch(1)
-
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CornVol
 Prob > chi2(40)           =     0.9578
 Portmanteau (Q) statistic =    25.9689
                                       
Portmanteau test for white noise
(note: time series has 12 gaps)
. wntestq se2
                                                                              
      /sigma     .1150734   .0095821    12.01   0.000     .0962928    .1338539
                                                                              
         L1.    -.5719139   .0979844    -5.84   0.000    -.7639598    -.379868
          ar  
ARMA6         
                                                                              
       _cons     .0004765   .0084378     0.06   0.955    -.0160613    .0170142
        DS6.     .0774253   .0307579     2.52   0.012      .017141    .1377096
       LnInv  
LnSpot        
                                                                              
  DS6.LnSpot        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                               OPG
                                                                              
Log likelihood =  61.24352                      Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(2)       =     36.28
Sample:  8 - 103, but with gaps                 Number of obs      =        84
ARIMA regression
Iteration 7:   log likelihood =  61.243523  
Iteration 6:   log likelihood =  61.243522  
Iteration 5:   log likelihood =  61.243365  
(switching optimization to BFGS)
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  61.241998  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  61.221421  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  60.995356  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =   54.37481  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  45.843543  
(setting optimization to BHHH)
(note: filtering over missing observations)
Number of gaps in sample:  6
. arima LnSpot  LnInv, arima(0,1,0) sarima(1,1,0,6)
-
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LnSpot
 Prob > chi2(40)           =     0.0104
 Portmanteau (Q) statistic =    63.5063
                                       
Portmanteau test for white noise
(note: time series has 6 gaps)
. wntestq res
                                                                   
residual, one-step       0.6033      0.7396      0.7363      0.6920
                                                                   
          (n = 84)          D-H     P-value        asy.     P-value
                                                                   
. omninorm res
                                                                              
      /sigma      .083599   .0037434    22.33   0.000      .076262    .0909359
                                                                              
         L2.    -.4127614   .0641482    -6.43   0.000    -.5384895   -.2870333
         L1.     -.762438   .0674552   -11.30   0.000    -.8946477   -.6302284
          ar  
ARMA6         
                                                                              
       _cons     .0004334   .0028787     0.15   0.880    -.0052089    .0060756
        DS6.     .4970216   .1214415     4.09   0.000     .2590006    .7350426
     lnsp500  
lnspot        
                                                                              
  DS6.lnspot        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                               OPG
                                                                              
Log likelihood =  221.9034                      Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(3)       =    149.43
Sample:  9 - 267, but with gaps                 Number of obs      =       215
ARIMA regression
Iteration 7:   log likelihood =  221.90339  
Iteration 6:   log likelihood =  221.90339  
Iteration 5:   log likelihood =  221.90321  
(switching optimization to BFGS)
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  221.90105  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  221.86154  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  221.20152  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  208.85275  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  170.74355  
(setting optimization to BHHH)
(note: filtering over missing observations)
Number of gaps in sample:  22
. arima lnspot   lnsp500, arima(0,1,0) sarima(2,1,0,6)
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(b) 
 
 
Output #48   
(a) 
 
 
 
 Prob > chi2(40)           =     0.5325
 Portmanteau (Q) statistic =    38.6169
                                       
Portmanteau test for white noise
(note: time series has 19 gaps)
. wntestq res
                                                                   
residual, one-step       0.7873      0.6746      0.5189      0.7715
                                                                   
         (n = 223)          D-H     P-value        asy.     P-value
                                                                   
. omninorm res
                                                                              
       _cons     .0000354   .0000296     1.20   0.231    -.0000226    .0000935
         L1.     .8087362   .0428564    18.87   0.000     .7247393    .8927331
       garch  
         L1.     .1676498   .0483045     3.47   0.001     .0729747     .262325
        arch  
ARCH          
                                                                              
       _cons     .0068423   .0022141     3.09   0.002     .0025028    .0111819
         D1.     .1192279   .0307725     3.87   0.000      .058915    .1795408
      lnspot  
lnsp500       
                                                                              
   D.lnsp500        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                               OPG
                                                                              
Log likelihood =  444.8259                         Prob > chi2     =    0.0001
Distribution: Gaussian                             Wald chi2(1)    =     15.01
Sample: 3 - 267, but with gaps                     Number of obs   =       243
ARCH family regression
Iteration 10:  log likelihood =  444.82587  
Iteration 9:   log likelihood =  444.82587  
Iteration 8:   log likelihood =  444.82565  
Iteration 7:   log likelihood =  444.82399  
Iteration 6:   log likelihood =  444.81741  
Iteration 5:   log likelihood =  444.78335  
(switching optimization to BFGS)
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  444.39614  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =   438.1037  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  428.64876  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  426.10203  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  423.82471  
(setting optimization to BHHH)
(note: conditioning reset at each gap)
Number of gaps in sample:  11
. arch  d.lnsp500 d.lnspot, arch(1) garch(1)
 Prob > chi2(40)           =     0.7634
 Portmanteau (Q) statistic =    33.3196
                                       
Portmanteau test for white noise
                                                                              
       _cons     .0021744   .0002231     9.75   0.000     .0017372    .0026116
         L1.     .1871468   .0852727     2.19   0.028     .0200155    .3542782
        arch  
ARCH          
                                                                              
       _cons     .0047045   .0026536     1.77   0.076    -.0004965    .0099054
         D1.     .3112424   .0834118     3.73   0.000     .1477582    .4747266
     lnindex  
lnspot        
                                                                              
    D.lnspot        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                               OPG
                                                                              
Log likelihood =  487.1791                         Prob > chi2     =    0.0002
Distribution: Gaussian                             Wald chi2(1)    =     13.92
Sample: 2 - 313                                    Number of obs   =       312
ARCH family regression
Iteration 5:   log likelihood =  487.17913  
(switching optimization to BFGS)
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  487.17911  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  487.17888  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =   487.1751  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  487.09009  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  486.45931  
(setting optimization to BHHH)
. arch d.lnspot d.lnindex,arch(1)
 Prob > chi2(40)           =     0.3405
 Portmanteau (Q) statistic =    43.0906
                                       
Portmanteau test for white noise
. wntestq se2DRAFT LIST OF MEMBERS AND OBSERVERS - Confidential 
 
(b) 
 
Output #49   
(a) 
   
(b) 
 
                                                                      
            D_lnindex                ALL    4.4902     2    0.106     
            D_lnindex           D.lnspot    4.4902     2    0.106     
                                                                      
             D_lnspot                ALL    2.9255     2    0.232     
             D_lnspot          D.lnindex    2.9255     2    0.232     
                                                                      
             Equation           Excluded     chi2     df Prob > chi2  
                                                                      
   Granger causality Wald tests
. vargranger
                                                                              
       _cons     .0010973   .0017375     0.63   0.528    -.0023081    .0045027
        L2D.     .0306905   .0572336     0.54   0.592    -.0814854    .1428664
         LD.     .0257725   .0576563     0.45   0.655    -.0872318    .1387768
     lnindex  
        L2D.     .0430055   .0339756     1.27   0.206    -.0235854    .1095963
         LD.     .0618738   .0340025     1.82   0.069    -.0047699    .1285175
      lnspot  
D_lnindex     
                                                                              
       _cons     .0037291    .002958     1.26   0.207    -.0020684    .0095266
        L2D.     .1356195   .0974372     1.39   0.164    -.0553539    .3265929
         LD.    -.1048346   .0981568    -1.07   0.286    -.2972184    .0875492
     lnindex  
        L2D.     .0136252   .0578416     0.24   0.814    -.0997422    .1269927
         LD.    -.0755287   .0578875    -1.30   0.192    -.1889861    .0379287
      lnspot  
D_lnspot      
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                
D_lnindex             5     .030656   0.0185   5.850102   0.2106
D_lnspot              5      .05219   0.0186   5.886374   0.2078
                                                                
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  2.37e-06                         SBIC            = -7.091638
FPE            =  2.53e-06                         HQIC            = -7.163988
Log likelihood =  1127.887                         AIC             = -7.212173
Sample:  4 - 313                                   No. of obs      =       310
Vector autoregression
                                                                              
       _cons     .0017287   .0002044     8.46   0.000     .0013282    .0021293
         L1.     .2978743   .1035731     2.88   0.004     .0948747    .5008738
        arch  
ARCH          
                                                                              
       _cons     .0047715   .0024418     1.95   0.051    -.0000143    .0095574
         D1.     .5237023   .0691149     7.58   0.000     .3882396    .6591651
lncommercial  
lnspot        
                                                                              
    D.lnspot        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                               OPG
                                                                              
Log likelihood =   506.791                         Prob > chi2     =    0.0000
Distribution: Gaussian                             Wald chi2(1)    =     57.42
Sample: 2 - 313                                    Number of obs   =       312
ARCH family regression
Iteration 5:   log likelihood =  506.79102  
(switching optimization to BFGS)
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  506.79099  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  506.79065  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  506.78551  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  506.69759  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  505.68489  
(setting optimization to BHHH)
. arch d.lnspot d.lncommercial,arch(1)
 Prob > chi2(40)           =     0.4628
 Portmanteau (Q) statistic =    40.1676
                                       
Portmanteau test for white noise
. wntestq se2
                                                                      
       D_lncommercial                ALL    10.813     2    0.004     
       D_lncommercial           D.lnspot    10.813     2    0.004     
                                                                      
             D_lnspot                ALL    .85219     2    0.653     
             D_lnspot     D.lncommercial    .85219     2    0.653     
                                                                      
             Equation           Excluded     chi2     df Prob > chi2  
                                                                      
   Granger causality Wald tests
. vargranger
                                                                              
       _cons     .0002048    .001915     0.11   0.915    -.0035486    .0039582
        L2D.     .0232649   .0587898     0.40   0.692    -.0919609    .1384908
         LD.     .2178197   .0618738     3.52   0.000     .0965494    .3390901
lncommercial  
        L2D.     .0605981   .0401766     1.51   0.131    -.0181467    .1393429
         LD.     .1259623   .0401583     3.14   0.002     .0472535     .204671
      lnspot  
D_lncommer~l  
                                                                              
       _cons     .0037833   .0029635     1.28   0.202    -.0020252    .0095917
        L2D.     .0803889   .0909778     0.88   0.377    -.0979243    .2587022
         LD.     .0025603   .0957503     0.03   0.979    -.1851068    .1902274
lncommercial  
        L2D.     .0007661   .0621738     0.01   0.990    -.1210922    .1226245
         LD.    -.0942447   .0621453    -1.52   0.129    -.2160473    .0275579
      lnspot  
D_lnspot      
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                
D_lncommercial        5     .033838   0.1292   46.00973   0.0000
D_lnspot              5     .052364   0.0121   3.793477   0.4347
                                                                
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  2.53e-06                         SBIC            = -7.025231
FPE            =  2.70e-06                         HQIC            = -7.097581
Log likelihood =  1117.594                         AIC             = -7.145766
Sample:  4 - 313                                   No. of obs      =       310
Vector autoregression
. var d.lnspot d.lncommercial, lags(1/2) 
 
Output #50   
(a) 28/2/1990 - 31/12/2001 
   
      
 
(b) 31/1/2002 - 31/3/2012 
   
    
 
Output #51   
     
     
 
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0011687   .0057619    -0.20   0.840    -.0125664    .0102289
         D1.     .1947901   .1333794     1.46   0.147    -.0690475    .4586277
     LnSp500  
                                                                              
    D.lnspot        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .571253415   133  .004295138           Root MSE      =  .06526
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0084
    Residual    .562169984   132  .004258864           R-squared     =  0.0159
       Model    .009083431     1  .009083431           Prob > F      =  0.1466
                                                       F(  1,   132) =    2.13
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     134
. reg d.lnspot d.LnSp500 if tin(2,144)
                                                          
Residuals       0.1789      0.9144      0.0739      0.9637
                                                          
(n = 243)          D-H     P-value        asy.     P-value
                                                          
. omninorm res
                  Prob > F =      0.1526
                 F(3, 129) =      1.79
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of D.lnspot
. estat ovtest
                                                   
               Total         5.31      4    0.2571
                                                   
            Kurtosis         1.42      1    0.2328
            Skewness         3.59      1    0.0581
  Heteroskedasticity         0.29      2    0.8630
                                                   
              Source         chi2     df      p
                                                   
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test
. estat imtest
-
.
2
-
.
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0
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LnSpot
                                                                              
       _cons     .0108423   .0081698     1.33   0.187    -.0053466    .0270313
         D1.     .6437329   .1763173     3.65   0.000     .2943484    .9931174
     LnSp500  
                                                                              
    D.lnspot        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .935127295   112  .008349351           Root MSE      =  .08673
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0992
    Residual     .83486969   111  .007521349           R-squared     =  0.1072
       Model    .100257605     1  .100257605           Prob > F      =  0.0004
                                                       F(  1,   111) =   13.33
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     113
. reg d.lnspot d.LnSp500 if tin(145,267)
                                                          
Residuals       0.0490      0.9758      0.1064      0.9482
                                                          
(n = 242)          D-H     P-value        asy.     P-value
                                                          
. omninorm res2
                  Prob > F =      0.6191
                 F(3, 108) =      0.60
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of D.lnspot
. estat ovtest
                                                   
               Total         3.74      4    0.4423
                                                   
            Kurtosis         0.05      1    0.8237
            Skewness         0.47      1    0.4915
  Heteroskedasticity         3.22      2    0.2002
                                                   
              Source         chi2     df      p
                                                   
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test
. estat imtest
-
.
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-
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0
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4.5 5 5.5 6
LnSpot
 Prob > chi2(40)           =     0.6801
 Portmanteau (Q) statistic =    35.3350
                                       
Portmanteau test for white noise
                                                          
Residuals       0.8559      0.6519      0.9615      0.6183
                                                          
(n = 297)          D-H     P-value        asy.     P-value
                                                          
. omninorm res
                                                   
               Total        24.59     19    0.1744
                                                   
            Kurtosis         4.37      1    0.0365
            Skewness         5.12      4    0.2748
  Heteroskedasticity        15.09     14    0.3717
                                                   
              Source         chi2     df      p
                                                   
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test
         Prob > chi2  =    0.3717
         chi2(14)     =     15.09
         against Ha: unrestricted heteroskedasticity
White's test for Ho: homoskedasticity
. estat imtest, white
-
.
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LnSpot
                  Prob > F =      0.4193
                 F(3, 299) =      0.94
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of D.lnspot
. ovtestDRAFT LIST OF MEMBERS AND OBSERVERS - Confidential 
 
 
Soybean oil 
Output #52   
(a) 
   
  
 
(b) 
 
 
 
(c) 
   
 
(d) 
                                                                              
       _cons     .0042566   .0003804    11.19   0.000      .003511    .0050022
         L1.     .4512822   .1003649     4.50   0.000     .2545706    .6479938
        arch  
ARCH          
                                                                              
       _cons      .007016   .0040471     1.73   0.083    -.0009162    .0149482
         D1.    -1.086871    .396006    -2.74   0.006    -1.863028   -.3107133
    lndollar  
lnprice3mo~h  
                                                                              
lnprice3mo~h        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
D.            
                               OPG
                                                                              
Log likelihood =  302.4949                         Prob > chi2     =    0.0061
Distribution: Gaussian                             Wald chi2(1)    =      7.53
Sample: 2 - 267                                    Number of obs   =       266
ARCH family regression
Iteration 8:   log likelihood =  302.49489  
Iteration 7:   log likelihood =  302.49487  
Iteration 6:   log likelihood =  302.49284  
Iteration 5:   log likelihood =  302.46755  
(switching optimization to BFGS)
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  302.44757  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  302.41708  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  302.36249  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  302.27177  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  301.57521  
(setting optimization to BHHH)
. arch d.lnprice3month d.lndollar, arch(1)
-
4
-
2
0
2
4
s
e
4.5 5 5.5 6
LnPrice3month
 Prob > chi2(40)           =     0.0696
 Portmanteau (Q) statistic =    53.9318
                                       
Portmanteau test for white noise
                                                                              
       _cons     .0043782    .000397    11.03   0.000     .0036001    .0051563
         L1.     .4344254   .1020464     4.26   0.000     .2344181    .6344327
        arch  
ARCH          
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0222375   .0127356    -1.75   0.081    -.0471988    .0027237
         D1.     2.620072   1.077346     2.43   0.015     .5085138    4.731631
     lnchina  
lnprice3mo~h  
                                                                              
lnprice3mo~h        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
D.            
                               OPG
                                                                              
Log likelihood =  300.5345                         Prob > chi2     =    0.0150
Distribution: Gaussian                             Wald chi2(1)    =      5.91
Sample: 2 - 267                                    Number of obs   =       266
ARCH family regression
Iteration 8:   log likelihood =  300.53445  
Iteration 7:   log likelihood =  300.53445  
Iteration 6:   log likelihood =  300.53328  
Iteration 5:   log likelihood =  300.51989  
(switching optimization to BFGS)
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  300.50984  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  300.49091  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  300.46113  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  300.40599  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  299.96558  
(setting optimization to BHHH)
. arch d.lnprice3month d.lnchina, arch(1)
-
4
-
2
0
2
4
s
e
4.5 5 5.5 6
LnPrice3month
 Prob > chi2(40)           =     0.8108
 Portmanteau (Q) statistic =    32.0406
                                       
Portmanteau test for white noise
                                                                              
       _cons     .0037245   .0004151     8.97   0.000     .0029108    .0045382
         L1.      .637632    .120623     5.29   0.000     .4012152    .8740488
        arch  
ARCH          
                                                                              
       _cons     .0031547   .0034391     0.92   0.359    -.0035858    .0098953
        L2D.     .0137835   .0044735     3.08   0.002     .0050155    .0225514
         LD.    -.0121224   .0037985    -3.19   0.001    -.0195673   -.0046776
 palmerindex  
lnprice3mo~h  
                                                                              
lnprice3mo~h        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
D.            
                               OPG
                                                                              
Log likelihood =  300.0642                         Prob > chi2     =    0.0000
Distribution: Gaussian                             Wald chi2(2)    =     20.64
Sample: 4 - 267                                    Number of obs   =       264
ARCH family regression
Iteration 10:  log likelihood =  300.06415  
Iteration 9:   log likelihood =  300.06413  
Iteration 8:   log likelihood =   300.0638  
Iteration 7:   log likelihood =  300.05885  
Iteration 6:   log likelihood =  299.98536  
Iteration 5:   log likelihood =  298.96294  
(switching optimization to BFGS)
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  298.56093  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  298.19989  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  297.63974  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  297.00981  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  296.11565  
(setting optimization to BHHH)
. arch d.lnprice3month dl(1/2).palmerindex, arch(1)
-
3
-
2
-
1
0
1
2
s
e
4.5 5 5.5 6
LnPrice3month
 Prob > chi2(40)           =     0.3130
 Portmanteau (Q) statistic =    43.8108
                                       
Portmanteau test for white noise
(note: time series has 4 gaps)
. wntestq se2 
 
     
 
Output #53   
     
 
 
Output #54   
   
 
                                                                              
       _cons     .0038188   .0004166     9.17   0.000     .0030023    .0046353
         L1.     .5269845   .1122066     4.70   0.000     .3070635    .7469055
        arch  
ARCH          
                                                                              
       _cons     -.024552   .0115167    -2.13   0.033    -.0471243   -.0019797
        L2D.     .0112477   .0052064     2.16   0.031     .0010434    .0214521
         LD.    -.0120399   .0045463    -2.65   0.008    -.0209505   -.0031293
 palmerindex  
         D1.     2.481874   1.031218     2.41   0.016      .460724    4.503025
     lnchina  
         D1.    -.9465937   .3810291    -2.48   0.013    -1.693397   -.1997904
    lndollar  
lnprice3mo~h  
                                                                              
lnprice3mo~h        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
D.            
                               OPG
                                                                              
Log likelihood =  305.6508                         Prob > chi2     =    0.0000
Distribution: Gaussian                             Wald chi2(4)    =     30.05
Sample: 4 - 267                                    Number of obs   =       264
ARCH family regression
Iteration 10:  log likelihood =   305.6508  
Iteration 9:   log likelihood =   305.6508  
Iteration 8:   log likelihood =  305.65065  
Iteration 7:   log likelihood =  305.64963  
Iteration 6:   log likelihood =  305.61292  
Iteration 5:   log likelihood =  305.11403  
(switching optimization to BFGS)
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  304.94717  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  304.60856  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  304.16566  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =   303.5928  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  302.88927  
(setting optimization to BHHH)
. arch d.lnprice3month d.lndollar d.lnchina dl(1/2).palmerindex,arch(1)
-
4
-
2
0
2
4
6
s
e
4.5 5 5.5 6
LnPrice3month
                                                                              
       _cons     .0026612   .0005426     4.90   0.000     .0015977    .0037246
         L1.     .2047762   .0905811     2.26   0.024     .0272405     .382312
       garch  
         L1.     .5393028   .1193705     4.52   0.000      .305341    .7732647
        arch  
ARCH          
                                                                              
       _cons     .0067463   .0041585     1.62   0.105    -.0014041    .0148968
         D1.     .0781047   .0415484     1.88   0.060    -.0033286     .159538
  lncrudeoil  
lnprice3mo~h  
                                                                              
lnprice3mo~h        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
D.            
                               OPG
                                                                              
Log likelihood =  301.5173                         Prob > chi2     =    0.0601
Distribution: Gaussian                             Wald chi2(1)    =      3.53
Sample: 2 - 267                                    Number of obs   =       266
ARCH family regression
Iteration 10:  log likelihood =  301.51729  
Iteration 9:   log likelihood =  301.51727  
Iteration 8:   log likelihood =  301.51724  
Iteration 7:   log likelihood =   301.5171  
Iteration 6:   log likelihood =  301.50549  
Iteration 5:   log likelihood =  301.45187  
(switching optimization to BFGS)
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =   301.4025  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  301.31019  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  301.05973  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  298.60018  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  283.68348  
(setting optimization to BHHH)
. arch d.lnprice3month d.lncrudeoil, arch(1) garch(1)
-
4
-
2
0
2
s
e
4.5 5 5.5 6
LnPrice3month
 Prob > chi2(40)           =     0.4129
 Portmanteau (Q) statistic =    41.3167
                                       
Portmanteau test for white noise
(note: time series has 5 gaps)
. wntestq se2
                                                                              
       _cons     .0035325     .00582     0.61   0.544    -.0078744    .0149395
        L3D.     .0979341   .0620489     1.58   0.114    -.0236794    .2195476
        L2D.    -.0318225   .0630094    -0.51   0.614    -.1553187    .0916737
         LD.      .180922   .0622539     2.91   0.004     .0589066    .3029373
  lncrudeoil  
        L3D.     .0132102   .0195439     0.68   0.499    -.0250951    .0515155
        L2D.     .0353271   .0214126     1.65   0.099    -.0066408     .077295
         LD.     .0187256   .0196175     0.95   0.340     -.019724    .0571753
       lnvol  
D_lncrudeoil  
                                                                              
       _cons      .001422   .0180885     0.08   0.937    -.0340307    .0368748
        L3D.    -.1643075   .1928469    -0.85   0.394    -.5422803    .2136654
        L2D.    -.4252666   .1958323    -2.17   0.030    -.8090908   -.0414423
         LD.     .3049517    .193484     1.58   0.115      -.07427    .6841734
  lncrudeoil  
        L3D.    -.2053712   .0607421    -3.38   0.001    -.3244236   -.0863189
        L2D.    -.3139966     .06655    -4.72   0.000    -.4444322    -.183561
         LD.    -.5532231   .0609709    -9.07   0.000    -.6727239   -.4337223
       lnvol  
D_lnvol       
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                
D_lncrudeoil          7     .094422   0.0512   13.85547   0.0313
D_lnvol               7     .293462   0.2673   93.74259   0.0000
                                                                
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  .0007265                         SBIC            = -1.249176
FPE            =  .0008102                         HQIC            = -1.364761
Log likelihood =  199.3626                         AIC             = -1.442511
Sample:  5 - 267, but with a gap                   No. of obs      =       257
Vector autoregression
. var d.lnvol d.lncrudeoil, lags(1/3)
                                                                      
         D_lncrudeoil                ALL    2.7797     3    0.427     
         D_lncrudeoil            D.lnvol    2.7797     3    0.427     
                                                                      
              D_lnvol                ALL    7.6657     3    0.053     
              D_lnvol       D.lncrudeoil    7.6657     3    0.053     
                                                                      
             Equation           Excluded     chi2     df Prob > chi2  
                                                                      
   Granger causality Wald tests
. vargrangerDRAFT LIST OF MEMBERS AND OBSERVERS - Confidential 
 
Output #55   
(a) 
     
 
 
(b) 
   
 
 
Output #56   
(a) 31/1/1990 - 31/12/2001 
    
      
                                                                              
       _cons     .0001112   .0000893     1.25   0.213    -.0000639    .0002863
         L1.     .7537579   .0810172     9.30   0.000     .5949672    .9125487
       garch  
         L1.     .2004418   .0647636     3.09   0.002     .0735075    .3273762
        arch  
ARCH          
                                                                              
       _cons     .0074541   .0026226     2.84   0.004     .0023139    .0125943
         D1.      .071249   .0340167     2.09   0.036     .0045774    .1379206
lnprice3mo~h  
lnsp500       
                                                                              
   D.lnsp500        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                               OPG
                                                                              
Log likelihood =  453.1115                         Prob > chi2     =    0.0362
Distribution: Gaussian                             Wald chi2(1)    =      4.39
Sample: 2 - 267, but with gaps                     Number of obs   =       254
ARCH family regression
Iteration 10:  log likelihood =  453.11146  
Iteration 9:   log likelihood =  453.11145  
Iteration 8:   log likelihood =  453.11134  
Iteration 7:   log likelihood =  453.10946  
Iteration 6:   log likelihood =  453.08654  
Iteration 5:   log likelihood =  452.86202  
(switching optimization to BFGS)
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  452.62465  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  451.85709  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =   448.5652  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  445.32818  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  435.21784  
(setting optimization to BHHH)
(note: conditioning reset at each gap)
Number of gaps in sample:  6
. arch  d.lnsp500 d.lnprice3month, arch(1) garch(1)
-
4
-
2
0
2
4
s
e
5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5
LnSp500
 Prob > chi2(40)           =     0.9981
 Portmanteau (Q) statistic =    18.9113
                                       
Portmanteau test for white noise
(note: time series has 6 gaps)
. wntestq se2
                                                                              
       _cons     .0033653   .0003772     8.92   0.000      .002626    .0041047
         L1.     .7244462   .1355166     5.35   0.000     .4588385    .9900538
        arch  
ARCH          
                                                                              
       _cons     .0087679    .003881     2.26   0.024     .0011613    .0163745
         D1.     .1425161   .0724144     1.97   0.049     .0005865    .2844458
     lnsp500  
lnprice3mo~h  
                                                                              
lnprice3mo~h        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
D.            
                               OPG
                                                                              
Log likelihood =  292.6283                         Prob > chi2     =    0.0491
Distribution: Gaussian                             Wald chi2(1)    =      3.87
Sample: 2 - 267, but with gaps                     Number of obs   =       254
ARCH family regression
Iteration 10:  log likelihood =  292.62832  
Iteration 9:   log likelihood =  292.62831  
Iteration 8:   log likelihood =  292.62803  
Iteration 7:   log likelihood =  292.62548  
Iteration 6:   log likelihood =   292.5422  
Iteration 5:   log likelihood =  292.07937  
(switching optimization to BFGS)
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =   291.8634  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  291.63047  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =   290.6925  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  289.13691  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  287.46966  
(setting optimization to BHHH)
(note: conditioning reset at each gap)
Number of gaps in sample:  6
. arch d.lnprice3month d.lnsp500, arch(1)
-
4
-
2
0
2
s
e
4.5 5 5.5 6
LnPrice3month
 Prob > chi2(40)           =     0.1605
 Portmanteau (Q) statistic =    48.7928
                                       
Portmanteau test for white noise
(note: time series has 6 gaps)
. wntestq se2
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0033636   .0051984    -0.65   0.519    -.0136445    .0069174
         D1.     .1862305   .1210448     1.54   0.126    -.0531589    .4256199
     lnsp500  
                                                                              
lnprice3mo~h        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
D.            
                                                                              
       Total    .488242034   136  .003590015           Root MSE      =  .05962
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0100
    Residual    .479828824   135  .003554288           R-squared     =  0.0172
       Model    .008413209     1  .008413209           Prob > F      =  0.1263
                                                       F(  1,   135) =    2.37
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     137
. reg d.lnprice3month d.lnsp500 if tin(1,144)
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         Prob > chi2  =    0.7058
         chi2(2)      =      0.70
         against Ha: unrestricted heteroskedasticity
White's test for Ho: homoskedasticity
. estat imtest,white
                  Prob > F =      0.9131
                 F(3, 132) =      0.18
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of D.lnprice3month
. estat ovtest
                                                          
Residuals       5.5116      0.0636      4.5047      0.1052
                                                          
(n = 247)          D-H     P-value        asy.     P-value
                                                          
. omninorm res 
 
 
(b) 31/1/2002 - 31/2/2012 
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       _cons     .0033653   .0003772     8.92   0.000      .002626    .0041047
         L1.     .7244462   .1355166     5.35   0.000     .4588385    .9900538
        arch  
ARCH          
                                                                              
       _cons     .0087679    .003881     2.26   0.024     .0011613    .0163745
         D1.     .1425161   .0724144     1.97   0.049     .0005865    .2844458
     lnsp500  
lnprice3mo~h  
                                                                              
lnprice3mo~h        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
D.            
                               OPG
                                                                              
Log likelihood =  292.6283                         Prob > chi2     =    0.0491
Distribution: Gaussian                             Wald chi2(1)    =      3.87
Sample: 2 - 267, but with gaps                     Number of obs   =       254
ARCH family regression
Iteration 10:  log likelihood =  292.62832  
Iteration 9:   log likelihood =  292.62831  
Iteration 8:   log likelihood =  292.62803  
Iteration 7:   log likelihood =  292.62548  
Iteration 6:   log likelihood =   292.5422  
Iteration 5:   log likelihood =  292.07937  
(switching optimization to BFGS)
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =   291.8634  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  291.63047  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =   290.6925  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  289.13691  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  287.46966  
(setting optimization to BHHH)
(note: conditioning reset at each gap)
Number of gaps in sample:  6
. arch d.lnprice3month d.lnsp500, arch(1)
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 Prob > chi2(40)           =     0.1605
 Portmanteau (Q) statistic =    48.7928
                                       
Portmanteau test for white noise
                                                          
Residuals       3.4578      0.1775      2.9826      0.2251
                                                          
(n = 300)          D-H     P-value        asy.     P-value
                                                          
. omninorm res
 Prob > chi2(40)           =     0.1970
 Portmanteau (Q) statistic =    47.3759
                                       
Portmanteau test for white noise
                  Prob > F =      0.0150
                 F(3, 299) =      3.54
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of D.lnspotprice
. estat ovtest
               Total        27.59     19    0.0917
                                                   
            Kurtosis         3.57      1    0.0589
            Skewness         4.53      4    0.3384
  Heteroskedasticity        19.48     14    0.1473
                                                   
              Source         chi2     df      p
                                                   
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test
         Prob > chi2  =    0.1473
         chi2(14)     =     19.48
         against Ha: unrestricted heteroskedasticity
White's test for Ho: homoskedasticity
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       _cons    -.0115619   .0052151    -2.22   0.029    -.0218929   -.0012308
        L2D.    -.7651314   .3963509    -1.93   0.056      -1.5503    .0200367
         LD.    -.2687389   .3999099    -0.67   0.503    -1.060957    .5234796
    lndollar  
        L2D.     .0004787   .0001613     2.97   0.004     .0001591    .0007982
         LD.     .0003926   .0001623     2.42   0.017     .0000712    .0007141
convenienc~d  
        L2D.    -26.71155   7.007961    -3.81   0.000    -40.59427   -12.82883
         LD.     25.34634   6.992639     3.62   0.000     11.49397     39.1987
      lnoecd  
                                                                              
  D.lnstocks        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .364525304   120  .003037711           Root MSE      =  .04834
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.2308
    Residual     .26636632   114  .002336547           R-squared     =  0.2693
       Model    .098158984     6  .016359831           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  6,   114) =    7.00
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     121
. reg d.lnstocks dl(1/2).lnoecd dl(1/2).convenienceyield dl(1/2).lndollar
                                                   
               Total        46.13     34    0.0801
                                                   
            Kurtosis         1.77      1    0.1833
            Skewness        12.27      6    0.0562
  Heteroskedasticity        32.09     27    0.2287
                                                   
              Source         chi2     df      p
                                                   
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test
         Prob > chi2  =    0.2287
         chi2(27)     =     32.09
         against Ha: unrestricted heteroskedasticity
White's test for Ho: homoskedasticity
. estat imtest,white
                  Prob > F =      0.0938
                 F(3, 111) =      2.19
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of D.lnstocks
. estat ovtest
                                                          
Residuals       2.2367      0.3268      1.3632      0.5058
                                                          
(n = 118)          D-H     P-value        asy.     P-value
                                                          
. omninorm res
 Prob > chi2(40)           =     0.0337
 Portmanteau (Q) statistic =    57.8422
                                       
Portmanteau test for white noise
(note: time series has 1 gap)
. wntestq res
    Exogenous:  _cons
   Endogenous:  D.lnstocks D.lnoecd
                                                                               
     4    1107.99  24.573*   4  0.000  3.8e-11* -18.3192* -18.1485* -17.8989*  
     3    1095.71  124.99    4  0.000  4.4e-11    -18.18  -18.0472   -17.853   
     2    1033.21   283.3    4  0.000  1.2e-10  -17.1969   -17.102  -16.9633   
     1    891.562  338.58    4  0.000  1.2e-09  -14.8834  -14.8265  -14.7433   
     0    722.274                      1.9e-08  -12.1054  -12.0865  -12.0587   
                                                                               
   lag      LL      LR      df    p      FPE       AIC      HQIC      SBIC     
                                                                               
   Sample:  6 - 124                             Number of obs      =       119
   Selection-order criteria
. varsoc
                                                                      
             D_lnoecd                ALL    6.1412     4    0.189     
             D_lnoecd         D.lnstocks    6.1412     4    0.189     
                                                                      
           D_lnstocks                ALL    15.913     4    0.003     
           D_lnstocks           D.lnoecd    15.913     4    0.003     
                                                                      
             Equation           Excluded     chi2     df Prob > chi2  
                                                                      
   Granger causality Wald tests
. vargranger
                                                                              
       _cons     .0000249   .0000132     1.89   0.059    -9.78e-07    .0000508
        L4D.     -.381368   .0863927    -4.41   0.000    -.5506945   -.2120414
        L3D.     1.815831   .2302274     7.89   0.000     1.364594    2.267068
        L2D.    -3.419239   .2279817   -15.00   0.000    -3.866075   -2.972403
         LD.     2.966666   .0836845    35.45   0.000     2.802647    3.130684
      lnoecd  
        L4D.     .0003198   .0001911     1.67   0.094    -.0000546    .0006943
        L3D.    -.0003606   .0001972    -1.83   0.067    -.0007471    .0000258
        L2D.     .0000873   .0001967     0.44   0.657    -.0002981    .0004727
         LD.    -.0002288   .0001969    -1.16   0.245    -.0006148    .0001571
    lnstocks  
D_lnoecd      
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0089326   .0061078    -1.46   0.144    -.0209036    .0030384
        L4D.    -13.90982   39.95672    -0.35   0.728    -92.22356    64.40392
        L3D.     -6.85452   106.4805    -0.06   0.949    -215.5524    201.8434
        L2D.     20.62377   105.4419     0.20   0.845    -186.0385     227.286
         LD.    -2.207348   38.70418    -0.06   0.955    -78.06614    73.65144
      lnoecd  
        L4D.    -.1423082   .0883669    -1.61   0.107    -.3155041    .0308878
        L3D.       .06184   .0911974     0.68   0.498    -.1169036    .2405835
        L2D.    -.1104736   .0909533    -1.21   0.225    -.2887389    .0677917
         LD.     .1463323   .0910652     1.61   0.108    -.0321521    .3248167
    lnstocks  
D_lnstocks    
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                
D_lnoecd              9     .000112   0.9981   63179.78   0.0000
D_lnstocks            9     .051615   0.1937   28.59675   0.0004
                                                                
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  2.80e-11                         SBIC            = -17.89886
FPE            =  3.80e-11                         HQIC            = -18.14854
Log likelihood =  1107.994                         AIC             = -18.31924
Sample:  6 - 124                                   No. of obs      =       119
Vector autoregression
. var d.lnstocks d.lnoecd, lags(1/4)
    Exogenous:  _cons
   Endogenous:  D.lnstocks D.lnoecd
                                                                               
     4    1107.99  24.573*   4  0.000  3.8e-11* -18.3192* -18.1485* -17.8989*  
     3    1095.71  124.99    4  0.000  4.4e-11    -18.18  -18.0472   -17.853   
     2    1033.21   283.3    4  0.000  1.2e-10  -17.1969   -17.102  -16.9633   
     1    891.562  338.58    4  0.000  1.2e-09  -14.8834  -14.8265  -14.7433   
     0    722.274                      1.9e-08  -12.1054  -12.0865  -12.0587   
                                                                               
   lag      LL      LR      df    p      FPE       AIC      HQIC      SBIC     
                                                                               
   Sample:  6 - 124                             Number of obs      =       119
   Selection-order criteria
. varsoc
                                                                      
             D_lnoecd                ALL    6.1412     4    0.189     
             D_lnoecd         D.lnstocks    6.1412     4    0.189     
                                                                      
           D_lnstocks                ALL    15.913     4    0.003     
           D_lnstocks           D.lnoecd    15.913     4    0.003     
                                                                      
             Equation           Excluded     chi2     df Prob > chi2  
                                                                      
   Granger causality Wald tests
. vargranger
                                                                              
       _cons     .0000249   .0000132     1.89   0.059    -9.78e-07    .0000508
        L4D.     -.381368   .0863927    -4.41   0.000    -.5506945   -.2120414
        L3D.     1.815831   .2302274     7.89   0.000     1.364594    2.267068
        L2D.    -3.419239   .2279817   -15.00   0.000    -3.866075   -2.972403
         LD.     2.966666   .0836845    35.45   0.000     2.802647    3.130684
      lnoecd  
        L4D.     .0003198   .0001911     1.67   0.094    -.0000546    .0006943
        L3D.    -.0003606   .0001972    -1.83   0.067    -.0007471    .0000258
        L2D.     .0000873   .0001967     0.44   0.657    -.0002981    .0004727
         LD.    -.0002288   .0001969    -1.16   0.245    -.0006148    .0001571
    lnstocks  
D_lnoecd      
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0089326   .0061078    -1.46   0.144    -.0209036    .0030384
        L4D.    -13.90982   39.95672    -0.35   0.728    -92.22356    64.40392
        L3D.     -6.85452   106.4805    -0.06   0.949    -215.5524    201.8434
        L2D.     20.62377   105.4419     0.20   0.845    -186.0385     227.286
         LD.    -2.207348   38.70418    -0.06   0.955    -78.06614    73.65144
      lnoecd  
        L4D.    -.1423082   .0883669    -1.61   0.107    -.3155041    .0308878
        L3D.       .06184   .0911974     0.68   0.498    -.1169036    .2405835
        L2D.    -.1104736   .0909533    -1.21   0.225    -.2887389    .0677917
         LD.     .1463323   .0910652     1.61   0.108    -.0321521    .3248167
    lnstocks  
D_lnstocks    
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                
D_lnoecd              9     .000112   0.9981   63179.78   0.0000
D_lnstocks            9     .051615   0.1937   28.59675   0.0004
                                                                
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  2.80e-11                         SBIC            = -17.89886
FPE            =  3.80e-11                         HQIC            = -18.14854
Log likelihood =  1107.994                         AIC             = -18.31924
Sample:  6 - 124                                   No. of obs      =       119
Vector autoregression
. var d.lnstocks d.lnoecd, lags(1/4) 
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          D_lnconv100                ALL     13.54     5    0.019     
          D_lnconv100         D.lnstocks     13.54     5    0.019     
                                                                      
           D_lnstocks                ALL    42.237     5    0.000     
           D_lnstocks        D.lnconv100    42.237     5    0.000     
                                                                      
             Equation           Excluded     chi2     df Prob > chi2  
                                                                      
   Granger causality Wald tests
. vargranger
    Exogenous:  _cons
   Endogenous:  D.lnstocks D.lnconv100
                                                                               
     5    226.367  10.546*   4  0.032  .000107* -3.46385*  -3.2541  -2.94728   
     4    221.094  9.2052    4  0.056   .00011  -3.44227  -3.27066  -3.01962   
     3    216.491   15.78    4  0.003  .000111  -3.43205  -3.29858* -3.10333   
     2    208.601   18.08    4  0.001  .000118  -3.36612  -3.27078  -3.13132   
     1    199.561  23.376    4  0.000  .000129  -3.28069  -3.22349  -3.13981*  
     0    187.873                      .000147  -3.15039  -3.13132  -3.10343   
                                                                               
   lag      LL      LR      df    p      FPE       AIC      HQIC      SBIC     
                                                                               
   Sample:  7 - 124                             Number of obs      =       118
   Selection-order criteria
. varsoc
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0177321   .0187825    -0.94   0.345    -.0545452     .019081
        L5D.    -.0150828   .0960265    -0.16   0.875    -.2032912    .1731256
        L4D.    -.2649406   .1029035    -2.57   0.010    -.4666278   -.0632535
        L3D.    -.3491295   .0983568    -3.55   0.000    -.5419053   -.1563537
        L2D.    -.1381468   .0934045    -1.48   0.139    -.3212163    .0449227
         LD.     -.238503   .0891556    -2.68   0.007    -.4132448   -.0637612
   lnconv100  
        L5D.    -.9931503   .3634421    -2.73   0.006    -1.705484   -.2808169
        L4D.     .1701778   .3720504     0.46   0.647    -.5590276    .8993833
        L3D.    -.3888243   .3773409    -1.03   0.303    -1.128399    .3507502
        L2D.      .625776   .3827124     1.64   0.102    -.1243266    1.375879
         LD.    -.7343964   .3862121    -1.90   0.057    -1.491358    .0225654
    lnstocks  
D_lnconv100   
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0088269   .0044506    -1.98   0.047    -.0175499    -.000104
        L5D.    -.0218589   .0227538    -0.96   0.337    -.0664555    .0227376
        L4D.      .024404   .0243833     1.00   0.317    -.0233864    .0721944
        L3D.     .0467034   .0233059     2.00   0.045     .0010246    .0923822
        L2D.     .1058564   .0221325     4.78   0.000     .0624775    .1492353
         LD.     .0852532   .0211257     4.04   0.000     .0438476    .1266588
   lnconv100  
        L5D.    -.1222133   .0861187    -1.42   0.156    -.2910029    .0465762
        L4D.    -.0246997   .0881585    -0.28   0.779    -.1974872    .1480877
        L3D.     .2288172   .0894121     2.56   0.010     .0535728    .4040616
        L2D.     .0876845   .0906849     0.97   0.334    -.0900546    .2654236
         LD.     .1191221   .0915141     1.30   0.193    -.0602423    .2984865
    lnstocks  
D_lnstocks    
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                
D_lnconv100          11     .200269   0.2608   41.63903   0.0000
D_lnstocks           11     .047454   0.3268   57.28993   0.0000
                                                                
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  .0000739                         SBIC            = -2.947279
FPE            =  .0001074                         HQIC            = -3.254105
Log likelihood =   226.367                         AIC             = -3.463847
Sample:  7 - 124                                   No. of obs      =       118
Vector autoregression
. var d.lnstocks d.lnconv100, lags(1/5)
                                                                      
          D_lnconv100                ALL     13.54     5    0.019     
          D_lnconv100         D.lnstocks     13.54     5    0.019     
                                                                      
           D_lnstocks                ALL    42.237     5    0.000     
           D_lnstocks        D.lnconv100    42.237     5    0.000     
                                                                      
             Equation           Excluded     chi2     df Prob > chi2  
                                                                      
   Granger causality Wald tests
. vargranger
    Exogenous:  _cons
   Endogenous:  D.lnstocks D.lnconv100
                                                                               
     5    226.367  10.546*   4  0.032  .000107* -3.46385*  -3.2541  -2.94728   
     4    221.094  9.2052    4  0.056   .00011  -3.44227  -3.27066  -3.01962   
     3    216.491   15.78    4  0.003  .000111  -3.43205  -3.29858* -3.10333   
     2    208.601   18.08    4  0.001  .000118  -3.36612  -3.27078  -3.13132   
     1    199.561  23.376    4  0.000  .000129  -3.28069  -3.22349  -3.13981*  
     0    187.873                      .000147  -3.15039  -3.13132  -3.10343   
                                                                               
   lag      LL      LR      df    p      FPE       AIC      HQIC      SBIC     
                                                                               
   Sample:  7 - 124                             Number of obs      =       118
   Selection-order criteria
. varsoc
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0177321   .0187825    -0.94   0.345    -.0545452     .019081
        L5D.    -.0150828   .0960265    -0.16   0.875    -.2032912    .1731256
        L4D.    -.2649406   .1029035    -2.57   0.010    -.4666278   -.0632535
        L3D.    -.3491295   .0983568    -3.55   0.000    -.5419053   -.1563537
        L2D.    -.1381468   .0934045    -1.48   0.139    -.3212163    .0449227
         LD.     -.238503   .0891556    -2.68   0.007    -.4132448   -.0637612
   lnconv100  
        L5D.    -.9931503   .3634421    -2.73   0.006    -1.705484   -.2808169
        L4D.     .1701778   .3720504     0.46   0.647    -.5590276    .8993833
        L3D.    -.3888243   .3773409    -1.03   0.303    -1.128399    .3507502
        L2D.      .625776   .3827124     1.64   0.102    -.1243266    1.375879
         LD.    -.7343964   .3862121    -1.90   0.057    -1.491358    .0225654
    lnstocks  
D_lnconv100   
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0088269   .0044506    -1.98   0.047    -.0175499    -.000104
        L5D.    -.0218589   .0227538    -0.96   0.337    -.0664555    .0227376
        L4D.      .024404   .0243833     1.00   0.317    -.0233864    .0721944
        L3D.     .0467034   .0233059     2.00   0.045     .0010246    .0923822
        L2D.     .1058564   .0221325     4.78   0.000     .0624775    .1492353
         LD.     .0852532   .0211257     4.04   0.000     .0438476    .1266588
   lnconv100  
        L5D.    -.1222133   .0861187    -1.42   0.156    -.2910029    .0465762
        L4D.    -.0246997   .0881585    -0.28   0.779    -.1974872    .1480877
        L3D.     .2288172   .0894121     2.56   0.010     .0535728    .4040616
        L2D.     .0876845   .0906849     0.97   0.334    -.0900546    .2654236
         LD.     .1191221   .0915141     1.30   0.193    -.0602423    .2984865
    lnstocks  
D_lnstocks    
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                
D_lnconv100          11     .200269   0.2608   41.63903   0.0000
D_lnstocks           11     .047454   0.3268   57.28993   0.0000
                                                                
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  .0000739                         SBIC            = -2.947279
FPE            =  .0001074                         HQIC            = -3.254105
Log likelihood =   226.367                         AIC             = -3.463847
Sample:  7 - 124                                   No. of obs      =       118
Vector autoregression
. var d.lnstocks d.lnconv100, lags(1/5)
                                                                      
      D_dividendyield                ALL    5.5033     3    0.138     
      D_dividendyield         D.lnstocks    5.5033     3    0.138     
                                                                      
           D_lnstocks                ALL    25.422     3    0.000     
           D_lnstocks    D.dividendyield    25.422     3    0.000     
                                                                      
             Equation           Excluded     chi2     df Prob > chi2  
                                                                      
   Granger causality Wald tests
. vargranger
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0925152   .1686846    -0.55   0.583    -.4231309    .2381006
        L3D.    -.1860217   .0952118    -1.95   0.051    -.3726335    .0005901
        L2D.    -.1699064   .0993353    -1.71   0.087    -.3646001    .0247872
         LD.    -.3870866   .0897555    -4.31   0.000     -.563004   -.2111691
dividendyi~d  
        L3D.    -3.417981    3.18248    -1.07   0.283    -9.655527    2.819564
        L2D.    -1.025197   3.254285    -0.32   0.753    -7.403479    5.353084
         LD.    -5.520695   3.255658    -1.70   0.090    -11.90167    .8602774
    lnstocks  
D_dividend~d  
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0070619   .0046133    -1.53   0.126    -.0161039      .00198
        L3D.     .0056773   .0026039     2.18   0.029     .0005737    .0107809
        L2D.     .0117103   .0027167     4.31   0.000     .0063857     .017035
         LD.     .0093046   .0024547     3.79   0.000     .0044934    .0141157
dividendyi~d  
        L3D.     .1693345   .0870372     1.95   0.052    -.0012553    .3399244
        L2D.     .0586943    .089001     0.66   0.510    -.1157445    .2331332
         LD.     .1630825   .0890386     1.83   0.067    -.0114299    .3375949
    lnstocks  
D_lnstocks    
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                
D_dividendyield       7     1.82175   0.1802   26.37582   0.0002
D_lnstocks            7     .049823   0.2306   35.96702   0.0000
                                                                
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2
Det(Sigma_ml)  =   .007304                         SBIC            =  1.314957
FPE            =  .0092259                         HQIC            =  1.121817
Log likelihood = -45.38496                         AIC             =  .9897493
Sample:  5 - 124                                   No. of obs      =       120
Vector autoregression
. var d.lnstocks d.dividendyield, lags(1/3)
                                                                      
      D_dividendyield                ALL    5.5033     3    0.138     
      D_dividendyield         D.lnstocks    5.5033     3    0.138     
                                                                      
           D_lnstocks                ALL    25.422     3    0.000     
           D_lnstocks    D.dividendyield    25.422     3    0.000     
                                                                      
             Equation           Excluded     chi2     df Prob > chi2  
                                                                      
   Granger causality Wald tests
. vargranger
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0925152   .1686846    -0.55   0.583    -.4231309    .2381006
        L3D.    -.1860217   .0952118    -1.95   0.051    -.3726335    .0005901
        L2D.    -.1699064   .0993353    -1.71   0.087    -.3646001    .0247872
         LD.    -.3870866   .0897555    -4.31   0.000     -.563004   -.2111691
dividendyi~d  
        L3D.    -3.417981    3.18248    -1.07   0.283    -9.655527    2.819564
        L2D.    -1.025197   3.254285    -0.32   0.753    -7.403479    5.353084
         LD.    -5.520695   3.255658    -1.70   0.090    -11.90167    .8602774
    lnstocks  
D_dividend~d  
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0070619   .0046133    -1.53   0.126    -.0161039      .00198
        L3D.     .0056773   .0026039     2.18   0.029     .0005737    .0107809
        L2D.     .0117103   .0027167     4.31   0.000     .0063857     .017035
         LD.     .0093046   .0024547     3.79   0.000     .0044934    .0141157
dividendyi~d  
        L3D.     .1693345   .0870372     1.95   0.052    -.0012553    .3399244
        L2D.     .0586943    .089001     0.66   0.510    -.1157445    .2331332
         LD.     .1630825   .0890386     1.83   0.067    -.0114299    .3375949
    lnstocks  
D_lnstocks    
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                
D_dividendyield       7     1.82175   0.1802   26.37582   0.0002
D_lnstocks            7     .049823   0.2306   35.96702   0.0000
                                                                
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2
Det(Sigma_ml)  =   .007304                         SBIC            =  1.314957
FPE            =  .0092259                         HQIC            =  1.121817
Log likelihood = -45.38496                         AIC             =  .9897493
Sample:  5 - 124                                   No. of obs      =       120
Vector autoregression
. var d.lnstocks d.dividendyield, lags(1/3)DRAFT LIST OF MEMBERS AND OBSERVERS - Confidential 
 
Output #62   
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0023319   .0011477    -2.03   0.042    -.0045813   -.0000826
        L4D.     .1113992   .0923517     1.21   0.228    -.0696068    .2924053
        L3D.     .0073958    .099898     0.07   0.941    -.1884007    .2031924
        L2D.    -.2185481   .0995293    -2.20   0.028    -.4136219   -.0234743
         LD.     .4009914   .0916225     4.38   0.000     .2214146    .5805681
    lndollar  
        L4D.    -.0039761   .0195441    -0.20   0.839    -.0422819    .0343297
        L3D.     -.001333   .0204842    -0.07   0.948    -.0414812    .0388152
        L2D.    -.0306887    .020339    -1.51   0.131    -.0705524     .009175
         LD.     -.019167   .0197849    -0.97   0.333    -.0579448    .0196107
    lnstocks  
D_lndollar    
                                                                              
       _cons     -.009615   .0050111    -1.92   0.055    -.0194365    .0002065
        L4D.     1.390764   .4032426     3.45   0.001     .6004228    2.181105
        L3D.    -.1311532   .4361926    -0.30   0.764     -.986075    .7237686
        L2D.    -.4073755   .4345824    -0.94   0.349    -1.259141    .4443903
         LD.    -.7225591   .4000583    -1.81   0.071    -1.506659    .0615407
    lndollar  
        L4D.    -.1909898    .085337    -2.24   0.025    -.3582474   -.0237323
        L3D.     .1348701   .0894416     1.51   0.132    -.0404322    .3101725
        L2D.     .0143291   .0888077     0.16   0.872    -.1597307    .1883889
         LD.     .2210972   .0863886     2.56   0.010     .0517788    .3904157
    lnstocks  
D_lnstocks    
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                
D_lndollar            9     .011592   0.2034   30.38714   0.0002
D_lnstocks            9     .050614   0.2247    34.4953   0.0000
                                                                
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  2.93e-07                         SBIC            = -8.643937
FPE            =  3.97e-07                         HQIC            = -8.893609
Log likelihood =  557.3263                         AIC             = -9.064308
Sample:  6 - 124                                   No. of obs      =       119
Vector autoregression
. var d.lnstocks d.lndollar, lags(1/4)
                                                                      
           D_lndollar                ALL    4.5608     4    0.335     
           D_lndollar         D.lnstocks    4.5608     4    0.335     
                                                                      
           D_lnstocks                ALL    21.305     4    0.000     
           D_lnstocks         D.lndollar    21.305     4    0.000     
                                                                      
             Equation           Excluded     chi2     df Prob > chi2  
                                                                      
   Granger causality Wald tests
. vargranger
                                                                               
     5    553.579  1.9411    4  0.747  4.2e-07  -9.00981  -8.80006  -8.49324   
     4    552.608  15.616*   4  0.004  4.0e-07* -9.06115* -8.88955  -8.63851   
     3      544.8  1.7877    4  0.775  4.2e-07  -8.99661  -8.86313  -8.66788   
     2    543.906  10.752    4  0.029  4.0e-07  -9.04925  -8.95392  -8.81445   
     1     538.53  29.142    4  0.000  4.1e-07  -9.02593  -8.96873* -8.88505*  
     0    523.959                      4.9e-07  -8.84676  -8.82769   -8.7998   
                                                                               
   lag      LL      LR      df    p      FPE       AIC      HQIC      SBIC     
                                                                               
   Sample:  7 - 124                             Number of obs      =       118
   Selection-order criteria
. varsoc 
 
Output #63   
(a)  
   
 
(b) 
 
                                                                      
              D_lnvol                ALL    16.259     3    0.001     
              D_lnvol          D.lnindex    16.259     3    0.001     
                                                                      
            D_lnindex                ALL    .43589     3    0.933     
            D_lnindex            D.lnvol    .43589     3    0.933     
                                                                      
             Equation           Excluded     chi2     df Prob > chi2  
                                                                      
   Granger causality Wald tests
. vargranger
                                                                              
       _cons     .0030159   .0104727     0.29   0.773    -.0175102     .023542
        L3D.     .0218923   .0567351     0.39   0.700    -.0893064     .133091
        L2D.    -.0574218   .0553379    -1.04   0.299     -.165882    .0510385
         LD.     .0632297   .0553935     1.14   0.254    -.0453395     .171799
       lnvol  
        L3D.    -.6408383   .1644884    -3.90   0.000    -.9632297   -.3184469
        L2D.     .2590291   .1647432     1.57   0.116    -.0638617    .5819199
         LD.    -.1814907   .1641532    -1.11   0.269     -.503225    .1402437
     lnindex  
D_lnvol       
                                                                              
       _cons     .0043558   .0036238     1.20   0.229    -.0027467    .0114584
        L3D.    -.0102594   .0196318    -0.52   0.601     -.048737    .0282183
        L2D.    -.0025157   .0191483    -0.13   0.895    -.0400458    .0350144
         LD.     .0067352   .0191676     0.35   0.725    -.0308326    .0443029
       lnvol  
        L3D.     -.088694   .0569173    -1.56   0.119    -.2002498    .0228618
        L2D.    -.1208887   .0570054    -2.12   0.034    -.2326173   -.0091601
         LD.     .1495828   .0568013     2.63   0.008     .0382544    .2609113
     lnindex  
D_lnindex     
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                
D_lnvol               7     .184901   0.0549   17.89589   0.0065
D_lnindex             7      .06398   0.0475   15.35966   0.0176
                                                                
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  .0001336                         SBIC            = -2.984211
FPE            =  .0001464                         HQIC            = -3.085967
Log likelihood =  499.6791                         AIC             = -3.153761
Sample:  5 - 312                                   No. of obs      =       308
Vector autoregression
. var d.lnindex d.lnvol, lags(1/3)
                                                                      
              D_lnvol                ALL    16.259     3    0.001     
              D_lnvol          D.lnindex    16.259     3    0.001     
                                                                      
            D_lnindex                ALL    .43589     3    0.933     
            D_lnindex            D.lnvol    .43589     3    0.933     
                                                                      
             Equation           Excluded     chi2     df Prob > chi2  
                                                                      
   Granger causality Wald tests
. vargranger
                                                                              
       _cons     .0030159   .0104727     0.29   0.773    -.0175102     .023542
        L3D.     .0218923   .0567351     0.39   0.700    -.0893064     .133091
        L2D.    -.0574218   .0553379    -1.04   0.299     -.165882    .0510385
         LD.     .0632297   .0553935     1.14   0.254    -.0453395     .171799
       lnvol  
        L3D.    -.6408383   .1644884    -3.90   0.000    -.9632297   -.3184469
        L2D.     .2590291   .1647432     1.57   0.116    -.0638617    .5819199
         LD.    -.1814907   .1641532    -1.11   0.269     -.503225    .1402437
     lnindex  
D_lnvol       
                                                                              
       _cons     .0043558   .0036238     1.20   0.229    -.0027467    .0114584
        L3D.    -.0102594   .0196318    -0.52   0.601     -.048737    .0282183
        L2D.    -.0025157   .0191483    -0.13   0.895    -.0400458    .0350144
         LD.     .0067352   .0191676     0.35   0.725    -.0308326    .0443029
       lnvol  
        L3D.     -.088694   .0569173    -1.56   0.119    -.2002498    .0228618
        L2D.    -.1208887   .0570054    -2.12   0.034    -.2326173   -.0091601
         LD.     .1495828   .0568013     2.63   0.008     .0382544    .2609113
     lnindex  
D_lnindex     
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                
D_lnvol               7     .184901   0.0549   17.89589   0.0065
D_lnindex             7      .06398   0.0475   15.35966   0.0176
                                                                
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  .0001336                         SBIC            = -2.984211
FPE            =  .0001464                         HQIC            = -3.085967
Log likelihood =  499.6791                         AIC             = -3.153761
Sample:  5 - 312                                   No. of obs      =       308
Vector autoregression
. var d.lnindex d.lnvol, lags(1/3)
                                                                      
              D_lnvol                ALL    13.672     3    0.003     
              D_lnvol     D.LnCommercial    13.672     3    0.003     
                                                                      
       D_LnCommercial                ALL    3.4145     3    0.332     
       D_LnCommercial            D.lnvol    3.4145     3    0.332     
                                                                      
             Equation           Excluded     chi2     df Prob > chi2  
                                                                      
   Granger causality Wald tests
. vargranger
                                                                              
       _cons     .0006926   .0104582     0.07   0.947    -.0198051    .0211902
        L3D.      .019339     .05717     0.34   0.735    -.0927121    .1313902
        L2D.    -.0453552   .0564636    -0.80   0.422    -.1560219    .0653115
         LD.     .0385717   .0563523     0.68   0.494    -.0718768    .1490202
       lnvol  
        L3D.    -.5446018   .2779408    -1.96   0.050    -1.089356    .0001521
        L2D.     .2970789   .2816743     1.05   0.292    -.2549925    .8491503
         LD.     .6854761   .2748706     2.49   0.013     .1467395    1.224213
LnCommercial  
D_lnvol       
                                                                              
       _cons     1.34e-06   .0021601     0.00   1.000    -.0042324    .0042351
        L3D.    -.0100222   .0118084    -0.85   0.396    -.0331663    .0131219
        L2D.     .0032118   .0116625     0.28   0.783    -.0196463      .02607
         LD.     .0180621   .0116395     1.55   0.121     -.004751    .0408751
       lnvol  
        L3D.    -.0728936   .0574085    -1.27   0.204    -.1854122    .0396251
        L2D.    -.1555313   .0581797    -2.67   0.008    -.2695614   -.0415012
         LD.     .2330083   .0567744     4.10   0.000     .1217325    .3442841
LnCommercial  
D_LnCommer~l  
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                
D_lnvol               7     .185642   0.0473   15.29671   0.0181
D_LnCommercial        7     .038344   0.0852   28.69267   0.0001
                                                                
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  .0000484                         SBIC            = -4.000301
FPE            =   .000053                         HQIC            = -4.102057
Log likelihood =   656.157                         AIC             = -4.169851
Sample:  5 - 312                                   No. of obs      =       308
Vector autoregression
. var d.LnCommercial d.lnvol, lags(1/3)
                                                                      
              D_lnvol                ALL    13.672     3    0.003     
              D_lnvol     D.LnCommercial    13.672     3    0.003     
                                                                      
       D_LnCommercial                ALL    3.4145     3    0.332     
       D_LnCommercial            D.lnvol    3.4145     3    0.332     
                                                                      
             Equation           Excluded     chi2     df Prob > chi2  
                                                                      
   Granger causality Wald tests
. vargranger
                                                                              
       _cons     .0006926   .0104582     0.07   0.947    -.0198051    .0211902
        L3D.      .019339     .05717     0.34   0.735    -.0927121    .1313902
        L2D.    -.0453552   .0564636    -0.80   0.422    -.1560219    .0653115
         LD.     .0385717   .0563523     0.68   0.494    -.0718768    .1490202
       lnvol  
        L3D.    -.5446018   .2779408    -1.96   0.050    -1.089356    .0001521
        L2D.     .2970789   .2816743     1.05   0.292    -.2549925    .8491503
         LD.     .6854761   .2748706     2.49   0.013     .1467395    1.224213
LnCommercial  
D_lnvol       
                                                                              
       _cons     1.34e-06   .0021601     0.00   1.000    -.0042324    .0042351
        L3D.    -.0100222   .0118084    -0.85   0.396    -.0331663    .0131219
        L2D.     .0032118   .0116625     0.28   0.783    -.0196463      .02607
         LD.     .0180621   .0116395     1.55   0.121     -.004751    .0408751
       lnvol  
        L3D.    -.0728936   .0574085    -1.27   0.204    -.1854122    .0396251
        L2D.    -.1555313   .0581797    -2.67   0.008    -.2695614   -.0415012
         LD.     .2330083   .0567744     4.10   0.000     .1217325    .3442841
LnCommercial  
D_LnCommer~l  
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                
D_lnvol               7     .185642   0.0473   15.29671   0.0181
D_LnCommercial        7     .038344   0.0852   28.69267   0.0001
                                                                
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  .0000484                         SBIC            = -4.000301
FPE            =   .000053                         HQIC            = -4.102057
Log likelihood =   656.157                         AIC             = -4.169851
Sample:  5 - 312                                   No. of obs      =       308
Vector autoregression
. var d.LnCommercial d.lnvol, lags(1/3)DRAFT LIST OF MEMBERS AND OBSERVERS - Confidential 
 
Output #64   
(a) 1/2/1990 - 31/12/2001 
   
     
 
(b) 1/1/2002 - 31/3/2012 
 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     .0002574   .0072319     0.04   0.972    -.0140462    .0145609
         D1.     .0154551   .1677976     0.09   0.927    -.3164194    .3473296
     lnsp500  
                                                                              
    D.lnspot        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total     .91529736   135   .00677998           Root MSE      =  .08264
                                                       Adj R-squared = -0.0074
    Residual    .915239417   134  .006830145           R-squared     =  0.0001
       Model    .000057943     1  .000057943           Prob > F      =  0.9268
                                                       F(  1,   134) =    0.01
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     136
. reg d.lnspot d.lnsp500 if tin(1,143)
-
.
2
-
.
1
0
.
1
.
2
R
e
s
i
d
u
a
l
s
6 6.5 7 7.5 8
LnSpot
                                                          
Residuals       0.8341      0.6590      0.3048      0.8586
                                                          
(n = 251)          D-H     P-value        asy.     P-value
                                                          
. omninorm res
                  Prob > F =      0.3400
                 F(3, 131) =      1.13
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of D.lnspot
. estat ovtest
         Prob > chi2  =    0.6573
         chi2(2)      =      0.84
         against Ha: unrestricted heteroskedasticity
White's test for Ho: homoskedasticity
. estat imtest,white
                                                                              
       _cons      .001204   .0080923     0.15   0.882    -.0148253    .0172333
         D1.    -.3073464   .1761205    -1.75   0.084    -.6562073    .0415145
     lnsp500  
                                                                              
    D.lnspot        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total     .90123957   116  .007769307           Root MSE      =  .08738
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0173
    Residual    .877989327   115   .00763469           R-squared     =  0.0258
       Model    .023250243     1  .023250243           Prob > F      =  0.0836
                                                       F(  1,   115) =    3.05
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     117
. reg d.lnspot d.lnsp500 if tin(144,266)
-
.
2
-
.
1
0
.
1
.
2
R
e
s
i
d
u
a
l
s
6 6.5 7 7.5 8
LnSpot
                                                          
Residuals       0.6897      0.7083      0.7078      0.7019
                                                          
(n = 251)          D-H     P-value        asy.     P-value
                                                          
. omninorm res2
                  Prob > F =      0.0077
                 F(3, 112) =      4.17
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of D.lnspot
. estat ovtest 
 
Output #65   
 
Output #66   
(a) 
 
     
                                                                      
                D_soi                ALL    .51086     2    0.775     
                D_soi           D.lnspot    .51086     2    0.775     
                                                                      
             D_lnspot                ALL    6.9092     2    0.032     
             D_lnspot              D.soi    6.9092     2    0.032     
                                                                      
             Equation           Excluded     chi2     df Prob > chi2  
                                                                      
   Granger causality Wald tests
. vargranger
                                                                              
       _cons     .1753696   .7223941     0.24   0.808    -1.240497    1.591236
        L2D.    -.3640753    .085443    -4.26   0.000    -.5315406     -.19661
         LD.    -.7373996   .0854538    -8.63   0.000     -.904886   -.5699131
         soi  
        L2D.    -.4512998    8.18196    -0.06   0.956    -16.48765    15.58505
         LD.     5.610363   8.016867     0.70   0.484    -10.10241    21.32313
      lnspot  
D_soi         
                                                                              
       _cons     .0054339   .0080898     0.67   0.502    -.0104218    .0212896
        L2D.     .0021004   .0009568     2.20   0.028     .0002251    .0039758
         LD.     .0022816    .000957     2.38   0.017      .000406    .0041572
         soi  
        L2D.    -.0138183   .0916264    -0.15   0.880    -.1934027    .1657661
         LD.     -.137119   .0897776    -1.53   0.127    -.3130798    .0388418
      lnspot  
D_lnspot      
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                
D_soi                 5     8.06989   0.3946   78.86541   0.0000
D_lnspot              5     .090371   0.0761   9.968621   0.0410
                                                                
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  .4864945                         SBIC            =  5.351571
FPE            =  .5739883                         HQIC            =  5.214355
Log likelihood = -299.7911                         AIC             =  5.120514
Sample:  4 - 124                                   No. of obs      =       121
Vector autoregression
. var d.lnspot d.soi, lags(1/2)
    Exogenous:  _cons
   Endogenous:  D.lnspot D.soi
                                                                               
     5   -285.734   4.662    4  0.324  .632022   5.21584   5.42558   5.73241   
     4   -288.065  1.8561    4  0.762  .614092   5.18755   5.35916    5.6102   
     3   -288.993  4.0885    4  0.394  .582753   5.13548   5.26895   5.46421   
     2   -291.038  21.962*   4  0.000  .563652*  5.10233*  5.19767*  5.33714*  
     1   -302.019  47.101    4  0.000    .6344   5.22066   5.27786   5.36154   
     0   -325.569                       .88362   5.55202   5.57109   5.59899   
                                                                               
   lag      LL      LR      df    p      FPE       AIC      HQIC      SBIC     
                                                                               
   Sample:  7 - 124                             Number of obs      =       118
   Selection-order criteria
. varsoc
                                                                              
       _cons     .0047352   .0071269     0.66   0.509    -.0094826     .018953
         D1.     .1519512   .0812379     1.87   0.066    -.0101141    .3140165
lncommerci~b  
                                                                              
 D.lncocoawb        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .261450085    70  .003735001           Root MSE      =  .06005
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0345
    Residual     .24883327    69  .003606279           R-squared     =  0.0483
       Model    .012616815     1  .012616815           Prob > F      =  0.0657
                                                       F(  1,    69) =    3.50
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      71
. reg d.lncocoawb d.lncommercialwb
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LnCocoaWB
                                                          
Residuals       4.5021      0.1053      2.7918      0.2476
                                                          
 (n = 71)          D-H     P-value        asy.     P-value
                                                          
. omninorm res
                  Prob > F =      0.1261
                  F(3, 66) =      1.98
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of D.lncocoawb
. estat ovtest
                                                   
               Total         3.91      4    0.4179
                                                   
            Kurtosis         1.55      1    0.2125
            Skewness         2.17      1    0.1407
  Heteroskedasticity         0.19      2    0.9104
                                                   
              Source         chi2     df      p
                                                   
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test
. estat imtest
 Prob > chi2(33)           =     0.5662
 Portmanteau (Q) statistic =    31.0156
                                       
Portmanteau test for white noise
. wntestq resDRAFT LIST OF MEMBERS AND OBSERVERS - Confidential 
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       _cons     .0036892   .0072702     0.51   0.613    -.0108144    .0181929
         D1.       .05762   .0462263     1.25   0.217     -.034599     .149839
   lnindexwb  
                                                                              
 D.lncocoawb        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .261450085    70  .003735001           Root MSE      =  .06087
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0078
    Residual    .255692544    69  .003705689           R-squared     =  0.0220
       Model    .005757541     1  .005757541           Prob > F      =  0.2168
                                                       F(  1,    69) =    1.55
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      71
. reg d.lncocoawb d.lnindexwb
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0028993   .0066279    -0.44   0.662    -.0159569    .0101583
         D1.      4.15593   2.432871     1.71   0.089    -.6370939    8.948955
      lnoecd  
                                                                              
 lnwbarabica        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
D.            
                                                                              
       Total    1.37740551   236  .005836464           Root MSE      =  .07609
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0081
    Residual    1.36051151   235  .005789411           R-squared     =  0.0123
       Model    .016894004     1  .016894004           Prob > F      =  0.0889
                                                       F(  1,   235) =    2.92
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     237
. reg d.lnwbarabica d.lnoecd
                                                          
Residuals       1.1869      0.5524      1.3659      0.5051
                                                          
(n = 234)          D-H     P-value        asy.     P-value
                                                          
. omninorm res
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               Total         6.43      4    0.1692
                                                   
            Kurtosis         1.37      1    0.2413
            Skewness         3.44      1    0.0637
  Heteroskedasticity         1.62      2    0.4450
                                                   
              Source         chi2     df      p
                                                   
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test
         Prob > chi2  =    0.4450
         chi2(2)      =      1.62
         against Ha: unrestricted heteroskedasticity
White's test for Ho: homoskedasticity
. estat imtest, white
                  Prob > F =      0.6534
                 F(3, 232) =      0.54
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of D.lnwbarabica
. estat ovtest 
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       _cons    -.0231866   .0144637    -1.60   0.110    -.0516817    .0053085
         D1.     2.543959   1.242951     2.05   0.042     .0952096    4.992709
     lnchina  
                                                                              
 lnwbarabica        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
D.            
                                                                              
       Total    1.37740551   236  .005836464           Root MSE      =  .07589
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0133
    Residual    1.35328242   235  .005758649           R-squared     =  0.0175
       Model    .024123098     1  .024123098           Prob > F      =  0.0418
                                                       F(  1,   235) =    4.19
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     237
. reg d.lnwbarabica d.lnchina
                                                          
Residuals       2.5104      0.2850      2.2636      0.3225
                                                          
(n = 234)          D-H     P-value        asy.     P-value
                                                          
. omninorm res2
                  Prob > F =      0.5613
                 F(3, 232) =      0.69
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of D.lnwbarabica
. estat ovtest
                                                   
               Total         6.14      4    0.1891
                                                   
            Kurtosis         1.39      1    0.2382
            Skewness         4.36      1    0.0367
  Heteroskedasticity         0.38      2    0.8257
                                                   
              Source         chi2     df      p
                                                   
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test
         Prob > chi2  =    0.8257
         chi2(2)      =      0.38
         against Ha: unrestricted heteroskedasticity
White's test for Ho: homoskedasticity
. estat imtest, white
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       _cons      .003908   .0047669     0.82   0.413    -.0054949    .0133109
         D1.     .3145184   .1097062     2.87   0.005     .0981199    .5309169
lnrealdollar  
                                                                              
 lnwbarabica        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
D.            
                                                                              
       Total    .859794816   191  .004501544           Root MSE      =  .06586
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0364
    Residual    .824143203   190  .004337596           R-squared     =  0.0415
       Model    .035651614     1  .035651614           Prob > F      =  0.0046
                                                       F(  1,   190) =    8.22
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     192
. reg d.lnwbarabica d.lnrealdollar
                                                          
Residuals       4.0029      0.1351      4.2122      0.1217
                                                          
(n = 192)          D-H     P-value        asy.     P-value
                                                          
. omninorm res3
                  Prob > F =      0.9637
                 F(3, 187) =      0.09
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of D.lnwbarabica
. estat ovtestDRAFT LIST OF MEMBERS AND OBSERVERS - Confidential 
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(a) 31/1/1992 - 31/1/2001 
 
   
 
                                                   
               Total         2.94      4    0.5687
                                                   
            Kurtosis         0.93      1    0.3353
            Skewness         1.32      1    0.2507
  Heteroskedasticity         0.69      2    0.7091
                                                   
              Source         chi2     df      p
                                                   
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test
         Prob > chi2  =    0.7091
         chi2(2)      =      0.69
         against Ha: unrestricted heteroskedasticity
White's test for Ho: homoskedasticity
. estat imtest,white
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       _cons    -.0012078   .0097962    -0.12   0.902    -.0206432    .0182276
         D1.    -.0402378   .2503991    -0.16   0.873    -.5370225    .4565469
     lnsp500  
                                                                              
 lnwbarabica        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
D.            
                                                                              
       Total    .919122679   101  .009100225           Root MSE      =  .09586
                                                       Adj R-squared = -0.0097
    Residual    .918885397   100  .009188854           R-squared     =  0.0003
       Model    .000237282     1  .000237282           Prob > F      =  0.8727
                                                       F(  1,   100) =    0.03
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     102
. reg d.lnwbarabica d.lnsp500 if tin(1,109)
                                                          
Residuals       0.9607      0.6186      1.0247      0.5991
                                                          
(n = 224)          D-H     P-value        asy.     P-value
                                                          
. omninorm res
                                                   
               Total         4.74      4    0.3149
                                                   
            Kurtosis         1.39      1    0.2392
            Skewness         3.33      1    0.0682
  Heteroskedasticity         0.03      2    0.9850
                                                   
              Source         chi2     df      p
                                                   
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test
         Prob > chi2  =    0.9850
         chi2(2)      =      0.03
         against Ha: unrestricted heteroskedasticity
White's test for Ho: homoskedasticity
. estat imtest, white
                  Prob > F =      0.6692
                  F(3, 97) =      0.52
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of D.lnwbarabica
. estat ovtest
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(b) 31/1/2002 - 31/3/2012  
 
   
   
 
Output #71   
(a) 
   
 
                                                                              
       _cons     .0084737   .0048723     1.74   0.084    -.0011699    .0181174
         D1.     .2549912    .102993     2.48   0.015     .0511391    .4588433
     lnsp500  
                                                                              
 lnwbarabica        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
D.            
                                                                              
       Total    .389156924   125  .003113255           Root MSE      =  .05469
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0394
    Residual    .370826047   124  .002990533           R-squared     =  0.0471
       Model    .018330877     1  .018330877           Prob > F      =  0.0146
                                                       F(  1,   124) =    6.13
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     126
. reg d.lnwbarabica d.lnsp500 if tin(109,243)
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               Total         1.85      4    0.7642
                                                   
            Kurtosis         0.00      1    0.9967
            Skewness         1.50      1    0.2208
  Heteroskedasticity         0.35      2    0.8412
                                                   
              Source         chi2     df      p
                                                   
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test
         Prob > chi2  =    0.8412
         chi2(2)      =      0.35
         against Ha: unrestricted heteroskedasticity
White's test for Ho: homoskedasticity
. estat imtest,white
                  Prob > F =      0.8002
                 F(3, 121) =      0.33
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of D.lnwbarabica
. estat ovtest
                                                          
Residuals       0.2879      0.8659      0.4333      0.8052
                                                          
(n = 224)          D-H     P-value        asy.     P-value
                                                          
. omninorm res2
                                                                              
       _cons     .0003079   .0001713     1.80   0.072    -.0000279    .0006438
         L1.     .7326351   .1131361     6.48   0.000     .5108924    .9543777
       garch  
         L1.     .1279673   .0536113     2.39   0.017     .0228912    .2330435
        arch  
ARCH          
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0003812   .0025516    -0.15   0.881    -.0053822    .0046199
         D1.     .2305037   .0895733     2.57   0.010     .0549432    .4060641
     lnindex  
lnspotprice   
                                                                              
 lnspotprice        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
D.            
                               OPG
                                                                              
Log likelihood =  527.9429                         Prob > chi2     =    0.0101
Distribution: Gaussian                             Wald chi2(1)    =      6.62
Sample: 2 - 313                                    Number of obs   =       312
ARCH family regression
Iteration 13:  log likelihood =  527.94291  
Iteration 12:  log likelihood =   527.9429  
Iteration 11:  log likelihood =  527.94274  
Iteration 10:  log likelihood =    527.935  
Iteration 9:   log likelihood =   527.9054  
Iteration 8:   log likelihood =  527.83524  
Iteration 7:   log likelihood =  527.75564  
Iteration 6:   log likelihood =  527.41263  
Iteration 5:   log likelihood =    522.188  
(switching optimization to BFGS)
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  521.59389  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  521.18405  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  520.57595  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  520.32535  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  519.59673  
(setting optimization to BHHH)
. arch d.lnspotprice d.lnindex, arch(1) garch(1)
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(b) 
   
   
                                                                              
       _cons     .0002487    .000121     2.05   0.040     .0000115    .0004859
         L1.     .7346519   .0866752     8.48   0.000     .5647717    .9045321
       garch  
         L1.     .1624529   .0611954     2.65   0.008     .0425121    .2823936
        arch  
ARCH          
                                                                              
       _cons     .0002191   .0024039     0.09   0.927    -.0044924    .0049306
         D1.     .1478921   .0446578     3.31   0.001     .0603644    .2354198
lncommercial  
lnspotprice   
                                                                              
 lnspotprice        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
D.            
                               OPG
                                                                              
Log likelihood =  528.4876                         Prob > chi2     =    0.0009
Distribution: Gaussian                             Wald chi2(1)    =     10.97
Sample: 2 - 313                                    Number of obs   =       312
ARCH family regression
Iteration 15:  log likelihood =  528.48759  
(switching optimization to BHHH)
Iteration 14:  log likelihood =  528.48758  
Iteration 13:  log likelihood =  528.48736  
Iteration 12:  log likelihood =  528.48248  
Iteration 11:  log likelihood =  528.42999  
Iteration 10:  log likelihood =  528.14374  
Iteration 9:   log likelihood =  527.02662  
Iteration 8:   log likelihood =  526.53207  
Iteration 7:   log likelihood =  524.71949  
Iteration 6:   log likelihood =  523.24567  
Iteration 5:   log likelihood =  519.93107  
(switching optimization to BFGS)
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  519.22741  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  518.58064  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  518.26525  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  517.69328  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =   516.8969  
(setting optimization to BHHH)
. arch d.lnspotprice d.lncommercial, arch(1) garch(1)
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